Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Victor Meza-Carmona, born in Mexico to a U.S. citizen mother, Victoria, claimed U.S. citizenship based on his mother's status. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (1952), Victoria could transmit citizenship to him only if she had been physically present in the U.S. for a continuous period of one year before his birth. Victoria was born in Los Angeles and baptized in El Paso, Texas, but later moved to Mexico. The case hinges on whether Victoria met the continuous physical presence requirement.The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against Meza-Carmona in 2012. An immigration judge ordered his removal, and the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed his appeal. Meza-Carmona then petitioned for review. The Ninth Circuit transferred the case to the District of Arizona to resolve factual disputes about his citizenship claim. The district court found that Meza-Carmona failed to prove his mother's continuous physical presence in the U.S. for one year before his birth.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court's findings. The court held that 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) requires a person claiming citizenship to show that their mother stayed in the U.S. for one year without leaving. The Ninth Circuit found that the district court did not clearly err in determining that Meza-Carmona failed to establish his mother's continuous presence. The evidence allowed for either inference—that Victoria stayed continuously in the U.S. or that she did not. Given the record, the district court's conclusion was not clear error. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit denied Meza-Carmona's petition for review. View "MEZA-CARMONA V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Collins Enyong Aben, a native and citizen of Cameroon, entered the United States without valid entry documents and was placed in removal proceedings. He sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), claiming persecution due to his political opinion and membership in several particular social groups. Aben testified that he was targeted by the Cameroonian military for treating separatist fighters as a nurse, leading to multiple arrests, beatings, and death threats.The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied all relief, citing the Third-Country Transit Bar and doubting Aben's credibility due to inconsistencies in his testimony. The IJ also found that Aben failed to establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution, and that his harm was not politically motivated but due to his occupation as a nurse. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Aben's appeal, assuming his credibility but agreeing with the IJ that he did not establish past persecution or a nexus to a protected ground. The BIA also found that Aben failed to corroborate his claims and that changed country conditions in Cameroon undermined his fear of future persecution.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the BIA's decision. The court found that the BIA failed to address key evidence, including credible death threats and the imputation of a political opinion to Aben. The court held that the BIA's determinations regarding past persecution, nexus, and corroboration were not supported by substantial evidence. The court vacated the BIA's decision on Aben's asylum and withholding of removal claims and remanded for further proceedings. However, the court denied the petition for review regarding Aben's CAT claim, finding that he had forfeited any challenge to the BIA's determination on that issue. View "Aben v. Garland" on Justia Law

Edson Pires Rosa, a citizen of Cape Verde, entered the U.S. on a visitor visa in 2015, which expired later that year. His mother, a lawful permanent resident, filed a petition for him, which was approved, but his subsequent application for adjustment of status was denied. In 2019, Rosa was accused of participating in a sexual assault, leading to a police report and a pending criminal charge. Despite his denial of the allegations, he was placed in removal proceedings for overstaying his visa. Rosa applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and voluntary departure.The Immigration Judge (IJ) initially denied Rosa's asylum and withholding of removal applications but granted voluntary departure. Rosa appealed the denial of asylum and withholding of removal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which remanded the case to consider his adjustment of status application after his mother became a U.S. citizen. On remand, a new IJ denied his adjustment of status and voluntary departure requests, citing the pending criminal charge as a significant negative factor. Rosa appealed to the BIA, which upheld the IJ's decision, finding no error in the reliance on the police report and pending charge.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the BIA erred in deeming Rosa's challenge to the voluntary departure denial as waived and vacated the BIA's decision on both adjustment of status and voluntary departure. The court remanded the case to the BIA to reconsider these issues, particularly whether the police report and pending charge alone could justify the denial of discretionary relief without corroborating evidence, as required by precedent. View "Rosa v. Garland" on Justia Law

The petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in 1990. In 1999, she was convicted of possession for sale of methamphetamine in California. In 2015, upon returning from a trip to Mexico, she was detained and later charged with inadmissibility due to her drug conviction. She sought cancellation of removal and later moved to terminate the removal proceedings.The Immigration Judge (IJ) sustained the charges of removability and denied her relief, ordering her removal to Mexico. The petitioner appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), requesting remand to the IJ to pursue derivative U visa status based on her husband's pending U visa application. She also moved for administrative closure of her removal proceedings. The BIA dismissed her appeal and denied both motions, finding it speculative whether she would receive U visa relief and noting the need for an inadmissibility waiver due to her conviction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of the petitioner’s motions for remand and administrative closure due to the criminal jurisdiction bar under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C). The court found that the petitioner’s motions merged with her final order of removal and that judicial review does not extend to factual challenges to the final removal order. The court also noted that the decision did not disturb the result in Alvarez-Santos v. INS, which requires an agency determination of removability based on a covered conviction for the criminal alien bar to apply. The petition for review was dismissed. View "CORIA V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Fredly Charles, a native and citizen of Haiti, was admitted to the United States in 2007 and became a lawful permanent resident on a conditional basis in 2009. He lost this status in 2012, and in 2019, the Department of Homeland Security charged him with removability. Charles conceded removability but applied for cancellation of removal, adjustment of status, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, arguing that his removal would cause exceptional hardship to his U.S. citizen children and parents. An Immigration Judge denied his applications in 2019, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed his appeal in 2020.Charles submitted three motions to reopen his immigration proceedings. The first two motions, filed in 2020, were denied by the BIA, which found that he had not demonstrated the required exceptional hardship or materially changed conditions in Haiti. His third motion, filed in 2022, cited the birth of his daughter with serious medical conditions as new evidence. The BIA denied this motion as untimely and numerically barred, stating that Charles had not provided sufficient evidence to warrant reopening his case sua sponte.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the BIA's denial of Charles' third motion to reopen. The court noted that it has jurisdiction to review refusals to reopen sua sponte only if the BIA commits legal error. The court found no indication that the BIA ignored relevant evidence about Charles' daughter's medical condition and concluded that the BIA did not arbitrarily depart from its prior practices. Consequently, the court dismissed Charles' challenge to the BIA's denial of his motion to reopen. View "Charles v. Garland" on Justia Law

David Bernardo-De La Cruz, a Mexican national, has lived in the U.S. without legal authorization for nineteen years. He was pulled over for speeding in 2014, which led to his immigration status being questioned. He conceded removability but applied for cancellation of removal, citing his long-term residence, good moral character, and the potential hardship his removal would cause his U.S. citizen daughters. The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied his application, finding that his removal would not cause an "exceptionally high level of hardship" for his daughters. However, the IJ granted him voluntary departure. Bernardo-De La Cruz appealed the denial of cancellation of removal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision. Temporary Appellate Immigration Judge (TAIJ) Gabriel Gonzalez upheld the IJ's findings, including the determination that Bernardo-De La Cruz's daughters would remain in the U.S. after his removal. The TAIJ acknowledged evidence suggesting that one daughter required special educational services but did not find it sufficient to warrant a different outcome. Bernardo-De La Cruz then petitioned for review, arguing that the agency exceeded its authority in promulgating 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(i), the appointment of the TAIJ was unconstitutional, and the IJ and BIA failed to adequately consider the evidence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(i), which limits voluntary departure for noncitizens contesting a removal order, was within the agency's statutory authority. The court also found that TAIJ Gonzalez was lawfully appointed by the Acting Attorney General, not the EOIR Director, thus complying with the Appointments Clause. Finally, the court determined that the IJ and BIA had adequately considered the evidence regarding the hardship to Bernardo-De La Cruz's daughters. The petition for review was denied. View "Bernardo-De La Cruz v. Garland" on Justia Law

Claude Stephen Bent, a lawful permanent resident from Jamaica, pleaded no contest to two felony charges in California in 2006. The judge did not inform him of the immigration consequences of his plea. After serving his sentence, Bent was detained by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2016 and charged with removability based on his felony conviction. Bent applied for asylum and other relief, but an immigration judge (IJ) denied his application and ordered his removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision. Bent appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which remanded the case to the BIA. The BIA again dismissed his appeal, and Bent petitioned for review.Bent moved to vacate his 2006 conviction in California state court, which was granted in 2022 on the grounds that his plea was involuntary and violated his Fifth Amendment rights. Bent then moved to reopen his removal proceedings before the BIA, arguing that his vacated conviction invalidated the basis for his removal. The BIA denied the motion, stating it was untimely and not subject to equitable tolling, and mischaracterized the California statute as allowing vacatur solely to mitigate immigration consequences.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the BIA erred in its interpretation of California Penal Code § 1473.7(a)(1) and the state court's order, which vacated Bent's conviction due to a constitutional defect, not to alleviate immigration consequences. The Ninth Circuit also held that the BIA misapplied equitable tolling precedent by not properly assessing whether Bent diligently pursued his rights. The court granted Bent's petition for review in part and remanded the case to the BIA to adjudicate his motion to reopen under the correct legal standards. View "BENT V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Tahawwur Hussain Rana, a Pakistani national, was tried in a U.S. district court for his involvement in supporting a terrorist organization responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attacks. He was convicted of providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization and conspiring to support a foiled plot in Denmark but was acquitted of conspiring to support the Mumbai attacks. After serving seven years in prison and being granted compassionate release, India requested his extradition to face charges related to the Mumbai attacks.The magistrate judge certified Rana as extraditable, rejecting his arguments that the U.S.-India extradition treaty's Non Bis in Idem (double jeopardy) provision protected him from extradition and that India failed to provide sufficient evidence of probable cause. Rana then filed a habeas corpus petition in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, which upheld the magistrate judge's decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's denial of Rana's habeas corpus petition. The court held that the term "offense" in the extradition treaty refers to a charged crime defined by its elements, not the underlying acts. Therefore, the Non Bis in Idem exception did not apply because the Indian charges contained distinct elements from the crimes for which Rana was acquitted in the U.S. The court also found that India provided sufficient competent evidence to support the magistrate judge's finding of probable cause that Rana committed the charged crimes. View "RANA V. JENKINS" on Justia Law

A Mexican citizen, Alfredo Viveros-Chavez, was found in the United States without lawful immigration status after previously being removed. He was charged with violating 8 U.S.C. § 1326, which prohibits noncitizens from reentering the U.S. without authorization. Viveros-Chavez moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that § 1326 violates the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee due to its discriminatory intent and disproportionate impact on Mexican and Latino individuals. The district court denied the motion, finding insufficient evidence of racial animus behind the statute’s enactment.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois applied the discriminatory-intent framework from Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., rather than rational basis review. The court acknowledged that the predecessor to § 1326, the Undesirable Aliens Act of 1929, was motivated by racial animus but found little evidence that such animus influenced the enactment of § 1326 in 1952. The court also found the statistical evidence presented by Viveros-Chavez unpersuasive, noting the lack of evidence that the government disproportionately targeted Mexican and Latino individuals for illegal reentry prosecutions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo and its factual findings for clear error. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s ruling, concluding that § 1326 does not violate the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee. The court found no clear error in the district court’s determination that the 1952 Congress was not motivated by racial animus when enacting § 1326. The court also noted that the statistical evidence provided by Viveros-Chavez was insufficient to demonstrate a disparate impact on Mexican and Latino individuals. View "USA v. Viveros-Chavez" on Justia Law

A land dispute in Ecuador between Jose Vicente Penafiel-Peralta and his sister Sandra led to Penafiel-Peralta, his wife Monica Lourdes Castro-Pineda, and their minor son G.E.P.C. being forced from their home. After being threatened by Sandra and a former military member, Borroso, who claimed ownership of the land, the family fled to the United States. Penafiel-Peralta applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), with Castro-Pineda and G.E.P.C. listed as derivatives on the asylum application.An Immigration Judge (IJ) denied all applications, finding that the threats did not amount to persecution, there was no nexus between the threats and a protected ground, and there was insufficient evidence that the Ecuadorian government was unable or unwilling to protect them. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing that the threats were due to a personal land dispute and not because of any protected ground, and that the family did not report the threats to the police, undermining their claim of government inaction.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the BIA and IJ correctly applied the mixed-motive analysis and found substantial evidence supporting the conclusion that the threats were due to a personal land dispute rather than family membership. The court also noted that the record did not compel a conclusion that family membership was a central reason for the persecution. Consequently, the court denied the petition for review, affirming the denial of asylum and withholding of removal. View "Penafiel-Peralta v. Garland" on Justia Law