Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

In 1996, Melvin Osorio-Morales’s family member, Jeremias, was dating Argueta, who was also dating a member of the Hernandez family. The men had a shootout; Jeremias was killed. In retaliation, the Osorio family killed Robert Hernandez. The Hernandez family set fire to the Osorio home, burning a grandmother alive. Two uncles escaped with significant burns. Apparently, a criminal case was brought after the fire, but the accused Hernandez family members were subsequently released, setting off a bloody feud. Melvin was born a year later. Melvin never had a violent interaction with the Hernandez family, but had to “watch [his] back” and carry weapons for protection. Melvin testified that one cousin was left paralyzed, three uncles were killed, two cousins committed suicide out of fear of what the Hernandez family would do to them, and another cousin was stabbed to death.Melvin entered the U.S. in 2014. The BIA affirmed the denial of his claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. The Seventh Circuit denied relief. Findings that the Honduran government is not “unable or unwilling” to control the threat from the Hernandez family were supported by substantial evidence. A government’s decision not to prosecute, without more information, does not show an “unwillingness or inability to protect.” View "Osorio-Morales v. Garland" on Justia Law

Madrid-Mancia, who entered the United States from Honduras without being admitted or paroled, was immediately detained and served a putative Notice to Appear (NTA) charging her as removable, 8 U.S.C. 1229(a)(1)(A)–(D). The putative NTA directed Madrid-Mancia that she was “required to provide the DHS, in writing, with [her] full mailing address and telephone number,” and “notify the Immigration Court immediately” of any changes. It warned that “a removal order may be made by the immigration judge in [her] absence” if she failed to appear when summoned. The document stated that a removal hearing would take place on “a date to be set at a time to be set.” The Department of Justice sent Madrid-Mancia a second document (a “Notice of Hearing”) years later providing the missing information. She had moved and claims she never received the notice. When Madrid-Mancia did not appear as directed, she was ordered removed in absentia.The Third Circuit ordered that the removal order be rescinded. Congress only allows a supplemental notice “in the case of any change or postponement in the time and place of [an alien’s removal] proceedings,” 8 U.S.C. 1229(a)(2)(A). Here, no change or postponement occurred; DHS never issued a new Notice to Appear. View "Madrid-Mancia v. Attorney General of the United States" on Justia Law

Pakistani nationals and brothers petitioned for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals decision upholding orders denying them adjustment of status and directing their removal from the United States. Petitioners argued that the agency erred in finding them ineligible for adjustment of status based on their earlier filing of frivolous, i.e., deliberately and materially false, asylum applications because those applications were untimely and, thus, their concededly false statements could not have been material to a matter properly before the agency for decision. Petitioners further faulted the agency for alternatively denying them adjustment of status as a matter of discretion.   The Second Circuit denied Petitioners’ petition for their review. However, the court explained that a question arises as to how Petitioners removal will affect their future ability to apply for reentry to the United States. A permanent and unwaivable bar on reentry applies to any alien who filed a frivolous claim for asylum after receiving notice of that consequence. Otherwise, the alien may be subject to lesser, waivable bars on reentry. Because this court cannot determine on the present record whether Petitioners received the notice required to trigger a permanent, unwaivable bar. The court granted review as to that single question and remanded for the limited purpose of allowing the agency to make an express finding as to notice and, based on that finding, to specify the scope of the reentry bar that will attend Petitioners’ removal. View "Ud Din v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner pleaded guilty to 13 drug-related charges, including possession of cocaine for sale under California Health and Safety Code Section 11351. In removal proceedings, the agency found Petitioner removable for having committed a drug-trafficking aggravated felony and for having committed a controlled-substance offense. Applying the presumption established in Matter of Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 270 (A.G. 2002)—that drug-trafficking offenses are, particularly serious crimes—the agency concluded that Petitioner’s Section 11351 conviction was a particularly serious crime that barred withholding. The agency also denied CAT relief.   The Ninth Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review. The panel explained that in Matter of Y-L-, the Attorney General instructed that aggravated felonies involving illicit drug trafficking are presumptively, particularly serious crimes and that this presumption may be overcome only in the most extenuating circumstances that are both extraordinary and compelling. The panel noted that the BIA’s particularly-serious-crime analysis here was cursory but concluded that the BIA applied Matter of Y-L- ’s presumption and that the BIA’s decision was supported by adequate reasoning. Observing that neither the IJ nor the BIA recited the Matter of Y-L- criteria, the panel explained that they are not required to do so.   The panel further concluded that, even if it had found that the BIA erred by considering facts not expressly incorporated into Matter of Y-L-’s minimum standard, it would still deny Petitioner’s petition because it was a legal certainty that Petitioner could not satisfy Matter of Y-L-’s minimum criteria. Thus, the panel concluded that this was one of those narrow circumstances where remand was unwarranted. View "KWANG PARK V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

Petitioner and her children, natives and citizens of Honduras, petitioned the Eighth Circuit for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) order affirming an immigration judge’s (IJ) decision ordering them removed and denying their claims for relief. In her petition for review, Petitioner claimed that the BIA erred (1) by finding that her due process rights were not violated when the IJ continued her case instead of terminating it and (2) by denying her application for asylum and statutory withholding of removal.   The Eighth Circuit denied their petition. The court explained that while Petitioner contends that by continuing the proceedings, the IJ “was engineering a preferred outcome,” the record demonstrates that the IJ “had not researched the issue before” and simply wanted “to give [DHS] a chance to address the issue.” Second, the court agreed with the BIA that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that she was prejudiced. By continuing the removal proceedings, the IJ provided Petitioner with exactly what she was promised: presence in the United States until November 10, 2018.   Further, the court concluded that substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that the gangsters’ threats did not rise to the level of past persecution. Here, the threats were telephonic, sporadic, and over a period of four years. Given that the record does not indicate that the gangsters ever acted, or attempted to act, upon these threats during this long period, the threats lack immediacy and appear exaggerated. View "Rosaura Brizuela v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

The H-1B visa program allows foreign nationals to work in the United States in specialized positions for sponsoring employers. By regulation, any such employer must file amended paperwork with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services whenever it makes a “material change” in the terms of covered employment. In Simeio Solutions, LLC, 26 I & N Dec. 542 (AAO 2015), USCIS interpreted that phrase to include a change in the place of employment. And in an ensuing guidance document, USCIS memorialized this interpretation and exercised discretion to limit its retroactive enforcement. ITServe Alliance, Inc., a trade association representing employers, seeks a declaratory judgment that Simeio and the guidance document are unlawful. ITServe contends that Simeio was a procedurally defective rulemaking and that USCIS lacks statutory authority to require the amended filings.   The DC Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and held that ITServe has Article III standing to raise these arguments, but the court rejected them on the merits. The court explained that because USCIS may consider LCA-related issues in exercising its own authority to approve, disapprove, or revoke H-1B petitions, it may require new or amended petitions corresponding to changes in the place of employment that necessitate the filing of new LCAs. View "ITServe Alliance, Inc. v. DHS" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitioned for review of the denial of his application to adjust his immigration status to lawful permanent resident while in removal proceedings. During two prior arrests for driving under the influence of alcohol, Petitioner falsely presented himself as a U.S. citizen. Based on these incidents, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) found that Petitioner was barred from adjusting status under 8 U.S.C. Section 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I), which renders inadmissible “any alien who falsely represents, or has falsely represented, himself or herself to be a citizen of the United States for any purpose or benefit under . . . Federal or State law.”   The Ninth Circuit granted Petitioner’s petition for review. The panel concluded that Petitioner’s misrepresentations about his citizenship to police officers for the purpose of avoiding removal proceedings did not render him inadmissible. The panel explained that the key question was what it means for a purpose or benefit to be “under” federal or state law. The BIA concluded that this means that a false claim must be made to achieve a purpose or obtain a benefit that is “governed by” federal or state law. The panel concluded that the BIA’s interpretation was untenable, agreeing with the Third Circuit that its construction was unmoored from the purposes and concerns of the statute. The panel concluded that Petitioner’s misrepresentations about his citizenship to police officers did not trigger Section 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I). View "EFRAIN RAMIREZ MUNOZ V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

In 2019, Appellant filed a Form I-140 petition for a work visa under 8 USC Sec. 1153(b)(2) and Form I-485 applications for himself and his spouse to adjust their immigration statuses. Appellant's I-140 petition asserted that he satisfied the requirements to obtain a national-interest waiver under Sec. 1153(b)(2)(B)(i). USCIS declined to grant Appellant's request and denied his request for reconsideration.Appellant sued the US government, challenging the denials of his I-140 petition, his motion for reopening or reconsideration, and his I-485 applications. The Government moved to dismiss Appellant's complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), arguing that the jurisdictional bar in 8 USC § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) applies to national-interest waiver denials. The district court dismissed Appellant's case, citing a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, Appellant claimed the district court erred in concluding that Sec. 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) bars jurisdiction over the denial of an I140 petition. Joining the Ninth, Eleventh, Third and D.C. Circuits, the court affirmed, finding Sec. 1153(b)(2)(B)(i) “expressly and specifically vest discretion in the Attorney General” to deny national-interest waivers. Thus, the jurisdiction bar in Sec. 1252(a)(2)(B) applies. View "Flores v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought review of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) order denying his motion to reconsider the dismissal of his requests for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). In its order denying reconsideration, the Board affirmed the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) finding that Petitioner, a Salvadoran national whose entire family had fled to the United States, had not established a nexus between his family membership and the threat of persecution as required for his asylum and withholding of removal claims. The Board also affirmed the IJ’s finding that Petitioner had not shown acquiescence by public officials as required for his CAT claim.   The Fourth Circuit granted in part and denied in part the petition for review, vacated in part the Board’s order denying reconsideration, and remanded for further proceedings. The court explained that the Board abused its discretion by applying an incorrect legal standard in its nexus analysis for the Petitioner’s asylum and withholding of removal claims. The court also held with regard to these two claims that the Board abused its discretion by arbitrarily disregarding Petitioner’s testimony about the threat of future persecution. However, the court rejected Petitioner’s argument that the Board abused its discretion with regard to his CAT claim. The Board provided specific reasons for finding the Petitioner’s testimony insufficient to meet his burden of proof and appropriately evaluated the evidence under the futility exception. View "Marvin A.G. v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

In 2021, the Secretary of Homeland Security promulgated Guidelines for the Enforcement of Civil Immigration Law that prioritize the arrest and removal from the U.S. of noncitizens who are suspected terrorists or dangerous criminals or who have unlawfully entered the country only recently. Texas and Louisiana claimed that the Guidelines contravened federal statutes that require the arrest of certain noncitizens upon their release from prison (8 U.S.C. 1226(c)) or entry of a final order of removal (1231(a)(2)). The district court found that the states had standing, citing costs they would incur, then found the Guidelines unlawful. The Fifth Circuit declined to stay the judgment.The Supreme Court reversed. Texas and Louisiana lack Article III standing to challenge the Guidelines. To establish standing, a plaintiff must show an injury in fact caused by the defendant and redressable by a court order. The alleged injury must “be legally and judicially cognizable.” There is no precedent, history, or tradition of federal courts entertaining lawsuits of this kind; a plaintiff lacks standing to bring such a suit “when he himself is neither prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution.” Such lawsuits implicate the Executive’s Article II authority to decide how to prioritize and how aggressively to pursue legal actions against defendants who violate the law, which extends to the immigration context. The Court stated that the standing calculus might change if the Executive Branch wholly abandoned its statutory responsibilities to make arrests or bring prosecutions and that policies governing the continued detention of noncitizens who have been arrested arguably might raise different standing questions. View "United States v. Texas" on Justia Law