Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Kevin Hsieh, a native and citizen of India, was convicted of inducing a minor to engage in illegal sexual activity under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). Following his conviction, an immigration judge (IJ) ordered his removal from the United States, citing his conviction as an aggravated felony of sexual abuse of a minor and a crime of child abuse under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Hsieh appealed the removal order, arguing that the statute of conviction is broader than the generic offenses of sexual abuse of a minor and child abuse.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Hsieh's appeal, agreeing with the IJ's determination that Hsieh's conviction under § 2422(b) categorically matched both the aggravated felony of sexual abuse of a minor and the crime of child abuse as defined in the INA. Hsieh then filed a petition for review with the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.The Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that a conviction under § 2422(b) does indeed categorically constitute a match for both the aggravated felony of sexual abuse of a minor and the crime of child abuse under the INA. The court noted that § 2422(b) targets conduct directed toward minors, involves a mental element focused on sexual gratification, and includes both physical and nonphysical misuse or maltreatment of minors. The court also determined that the statute's mens rea requirement and the harm caused by the offense align with the definitions of sexual abuse of a minor and child abuse.Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit denied Hsieh's petition for review, upholding the BIA's decision that Hsieh's conviction warranted his removal from the United States. View "Hsieh v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Rodrigo Linares-Rivas, a native and citizen of Mexico, entered the United States in 1996. In 2016, he was placed in removal proceedings while in state custody for driving without a license with prior convictions. Linares-Rivas conceded removability and applied for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1), claiming his removal would cause exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his two U.S. citizen sons. His initial counsel submitted untimely evidence, which the immigration judge considered. At a hearing in April 2018, Linares-Rivas appeared with new counsel who requested a continuance to file additional evidence, blaming previous counsel for missed deadlines. The immigration judge denied the continuance but admitted the previously submitted evidence.The immigration judge denied Linares-Rivas’s application for cancellation of removal, citing negative factors such as his two DWI convictions, frequent driving without a license, and lack of evidence of tax payments. Linares-Rivas appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), raising issues including ineffective assistance of counsel and the denied continuance. The BIA remanded the case to the immigration judge to provide a complete decision. In September 2019, the immigration judge again denied the application, finding Linares-Rivas statutorily ineligible and denying relief as a matter of discretion. The BIA affirmed the decision in March 2024.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court dismissed the petition in part for lack of jurisdiction to review the agency’s discretionary denial of cancellation of removal. The court also denied the petition in part regarding the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, as it was not initially raised before the BIA. The court concluded that Linares-Rivas’s arguments did not raise a colorable legal question about the agency’s discretionary denial. View "Linares-Rivas v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Lalakshi Kale and Gurusaday Dey, both Indian nationals, have resided in the United States since 2009 and sought to obtain legal permanent residence based on Kale's employment. They applied for adjustment of status with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) in 2022. Their applications were initially accepted because their priority dates were current. However, due to higher-than-expected demand, the final action date retrogressed, causing their applications to be held in abeyance under USCIS's adjudication hold policy until visa numbers become available.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which precludes judicial review of discretionary decisions by the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security. The district court also noted an alternative basis for dismissal under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) pursuant to 5 U.S.C § 701(a)(2).The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Fourth Circuit held that USCIS's adjudication hold policy is a discretionary action under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a), which grants the Attorney General the discretion to adjust the status of an alien and to prescribe regulations for such adjustments. The court found that this discretionary authority includes the implementation of the adjudication hold policy, thus falling under the jurisdiction-stripping provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). Consequently, the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review the challenge to USCIS's policy and affirmed the dismissal of the case. View "Kale v. Alfonso-Royals" on Justia Law

Dharwinder Singh, a citizen of India, petitioned for review of an order by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) that affirmed an Immigration Judge's (IJ) denial of his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Singh claimed he faced persecution in India due to his political opinion and provided testimony about attacks he suffered in 2013. However, his statements during a border interview in the United States contradicted his hearing testimony, leading to an adverse credibility determination by the IJ.The IJ found Singh not credible because his hearing testimony about being attacked in August and November 2013 conflicted with his statement to a border patrol agent that he left India in April 2013. Singh explained that he lied during the border interview on the advice of his smuggler. The IJ did not find this explanation convincing and determined that Singh's willingness to lie undermined his credibility. The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing that the REAL ID Act's totality-of-the-circumstances standard applied, rather than the Ramsameachire factors previously used to evaluate the reliability of border interviews.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and upheld the BIA's decision. The court agreed that the REAL ID Act displaced the Ramsameachire factors and established a presumption that border interviews are proper to consider in adverse credibility determinations. The court found that the IJ and BIA properly assessed the reliability of Singh's border interview under the totality of the circumstances and that substantial evidence supported the adverse credibility determination. Consequently, the court denied Singh's petition for review. View "Singh v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Ryan Castaneira, a U.S. citizen, filed a Form I-130 petition to obtain permanent residency for his spouse, a Mexican national. USCIS issued a Notice of Intent to Deny the petition due to Castaneira's prior convictions in Georgia for crimes that appeared to qualify as "specified offenses against a minor" under the Adam Walsh Act. Castaneira argued that his convictions involved an undercover officer, not a minor, and thus should not be considered offenses against a minor. He also challenged the agency's use of the "beyond any reasonable doubt" standard to prove he posed no risk to his spouse.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed Castaneira's claims. The court held that his prior convictions fell within the statutory definition of "specified offense against a minor" and that the Adam Walsh Act's grant of "sole and unreviewable discretion" to USCIS precluded judicial review of the evidentiary standard applied by the agency. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review the standard of proof used by USCIS in making the no-risk determination.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the District Court's ruling in part, agreeing that Castaneira's prior convictions were covered by the Adam Walsh Act. However, the appellate court vacated the District Court's jurisdictional ruling regarding the evidentiary standard. The court held that while USCIS's ultimate no-risk determinations are unreviewable, challenges to the agency's departure from its own binding precedent, such as the standard of proof, are reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act. The case was remanded for further proceedings to determine whether USCIS violated its own precedent by applying the "beyond any reasonable doubt" standard. View "Castaneira v. Noem" on Justia Law

Judith Jeltsje Pietersen, a Dutch citizen, and her fiancé, Daniel Gerhard Brown, an American citizen, sought to obtain a visa for Pietersen to enter the United States so they could marry. Pietersen had previously traveled to the U.S. under the Visa Waiver Program but was denied entry in February 2020 by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) for alleged unlawful employment. Pietersen and Brown applied for a K-1 visa, but consular officers denied the applications, citing willful misrepresentation of a material fact under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i).The appellants filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against the U.S. Department of State, challenging the visa denials and the guidance in the State Department's Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM). They argued that the consular officers failed to properly review Pietersen’s applications and that the "reason to believe" standard used to determine inadmissibility was contrary to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The District Court dismissed the complaint, holding that the consular nonreviewability doctrine barred the claims and that the claims were otherwise meritless.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and remanded the case. The court held that the consular nonreviewability doctrine did not bar the appellants' Administrative Procedure Act (APA) claim for prospective relief. The court expressed doubts about the viability of the State Department's "reason to believe" standard and vacated the District Court’s alternative holding based on 8 U.S.C. § 1201(g). The case was remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the INA authorizes the challenged FAM guidance. View "Pietersen v. United States Department of State" on Justia Law

The Texas Attorney General alleged that Annunciation House, a nonprofit organization in El Paso, was unlawfully harboring illegal aliens. The Attorney General sought to examine the organization's records and initiate quo warranto proceedings, which could lead to the revocation of its charter. Annunciation House, which provides shelter to immigrants and refugees, was served with a records request by state officials, who demanded immediate compliance. Annunciation House sought legal relief, arguing that the request violated its constitutional rights.The 205th Judicial District Court in El Paso County granted a temporary restraining order and later a temporary injunction against the Attorney General's records request. The court also denied the Attorney General's motion for leave to file a quo warranto action, ruling that the statutes authorizing the records request were unconstitutional and that the allegations of harboring illegal aliens did not constitute a valid basis for quo warranto. The court further held that the statutes were preempted by federal law and violated the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case on direct appeal. The court held that the trial court erred in its constitutional rulings and that the Attorney General has the constitutional authority to file a quo warranto action. The court emphasized that it was too early to express a view on the merits of the underlying issues and that the usual litigation process should unfold. The court also held that the statutes authorizing the records request were not facially unconstitutional and that the trial court's injunction against the Attorney General's records request was improper. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "PAXTON v. ANNUNCIATION HOUSE, INC." on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to a Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS) rule that authorized state licenses for two residential facilities where the federal government detained mothers and children after their illegal entry into the United States. The plaintiffs, including detained mothers and Grassroots Leadership, Inc., sought to prohibit the detention of children at these facilities, arguing that the rule was invalid under state law. However, by the time the case reached the court of appeals, all the mothers and children had been released from the facilities.The trial court denied the pleas to the jurisdiction filed by the department and the facility operators, eventually ruling in favor of the plaintiffs by declaring the rule invalid and enjoining the department from granting licenses under it. The Third Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing and that their claims were moot since they were no longer detained. However, the court of appeals proceeded to address the merits of the case by invoking the "public-interest exception" to mootness and held the rule invalid under the Administrative Procedure Act.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that Texas courts are not constitutionally authorized to adjudicate moot cases, even if they raise questions of considerable public importance. The court emphasized that mootness is a constitutional limitation on judicial power, and there is no "public-interest exception" to mootness in Texas. Consequently, the court reversed the court of appeals' judgment regarding its jurisdiction, vacated the judgment on the merits, and dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES v. GRASSROOTS LEADERSHIP, INC" on Justia Law

Arsen Sarkisov, an alien unlawfully present in the United States, was issued a final deportation order by an immigration judge. Over six years later, Sarkisov moved to reopen his case, but the immigration judge denied the motion. Sarkisov then appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which also rejected his claim. In 2023, Sarkisov appealed the Board’s decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and requested a stay of the deportation order during the appeal. The United States did not oppose the stay request, and the case was paused for almost a year while Sarkisov attempted to negotiate with the government. When negotiations failed, the litigation resumed, and Sarkisov's motion for a stay was considered.The immigration judge initially denied Sarkisov's motion to reopen his case, and the Board of Immigration Appeals upheld this decision. Sarkisov then appealed to the Sixth Circuit, seeking a stay of removal during the appeal process. The United States did not oppose the stay request, but the case was paused for nearly a year due to ongoing negotiations, which ultimately failed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed Sarkisov's motion for a stay of removal. The court applied the traditional test for a stay, as outlined in Nken v. Holder, which requires the applicant to show a likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm without a stay. Sarkisov failed to address the merits of his appeal or provide reasons for irreparable harm, leading the court to deny his motion. The court emphasized that the burden of removal alone does not constitute irreparable injury and that the public interest favors prompt execution of removal orders. Consequently, the motion for a stay of removal was denied. View "Sarkisov v. Bondi" on Justia Law

The petitioner, Nakia Courtney Hamilton, a Jamaican citizen, was ordered removed from the United States in 2017 following a conviction for aggravated battery with a deadly weapon. Hamilton, who was admitted to the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident in 2009, has filed three motions to reopen his removal proceedings. His most recent motion sought to apply for a waiver of the immigration consequences of his conviction under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h).The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied Hamilton’s third motion to reopen, finding it untimely and procedurally barred. Hamilton argued that the procedural limitations should be equitably tolled based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Niz-Chavez v. Garland, which held that a notice to appear must be a single document containing all required information to trigger the stop-time rule for cancellation of removal. The BIA concluded that Niz-Chavez did not affect Hamilton’s eligibility for a § 1182(h) waiver and thus did not justify reopening the proceedings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and upheld the BIA’s decision. The court found that the stop-time rule in § 1182(h) is triggered by the initiation of removal proceedings, not by the issuance of a compliant notice to appear as required by § 1229(a). The court determined that Hamilton’s removal proceedings were validly initiated when the Department of Homeland Security filed the notice to appear with the immigration court, regardless of whether it included the date and time of the hearing. Consequently, the court held that Hamilton was not eligible for a § 1182(h) waiver and that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to reopen. The petition for review was denied. View "Hamilton v. Attorney General" on Justia Law