Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a native of Côte d’Ivoire and citizen of Burkina Faso was admitted to the United States in 2016 with an F-1 student visa. Petitioner soon withdrew from the university, terminating his student visa. He sought asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief based on his fears of harm from his political opinions and affiliation with the Congress for Democracy and Progress. Three years later, he updated his affidavit with two additional bases for fear of future persecution: his Christian faith and Fulani ethnicity. Petitioner petitioned for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture protections. Petitioner argued that the BIA abused its discretion by finding no clear error in the IJ’s adverse credibility determination.   The Eighth Circuit denied the petition. The court held that because the IJ identified specific, cogent reasons to disbelieve Petitioner’s testimony, sufficient evidence supports the IJ’s adverse credibility determination. The BIA did not err in affirming the IJ’s denial of asylum or withholding of removal. Petitioner argued that the IJ’s adverse credibility determination for his asylum and withholding-of-removal applications should not foreclose his application for CAT protections. Because Petitioner did not raise these arguments before the BIA, they are unexhausted, and the Eighth Circuit lacks jurisdiction to consider them. View "Wendkouni Zongo v. Merrick B. Garland" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioner's claim that he had a reasonable fear of persecution if repatriated to his native Ghana on account of his membership in a particular social group, holding that the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) and immigration judge (IJ) correctly rejected Petitioner's claim.Petitioner conceded his removability but cross-applied for withholding of removal and protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture, testifying that, if returned to Ghana, he would be tortured and killed because his family never surrendered formal title to land taken from them by a local chieftain. The IJ ordered Petitioner removed to Ghana, and the BIA dismissed Petitioner's appeal. The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for judicial review, holding that the IJ and BIA did not err in finding that the interpersonal conflict between Petitioner's family and the chieftain was unconnected to a statutorily-protected ground for relief. View "Odei v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitioned for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing his appeal from the denial of his application for cancellation of removal. He challenged the BIA decision on grounds that: (1) it was ultra vires because the order was signed by a temporary BIA member whose term had expired; (2) the BIA erred in finding that Petitioner lacked good moral character; and (3) the BIA erred in affirming the denial of voluntary departure.   The Fifth Circuit dismissed his petition in part and denied it in part. Petitioner contended that the two temporary BIA members who ruled in his case acted ultra vires because their terms had “terminated by automatic operation of law” on October 31, 2020, nearly six months before they ruled in his case. His argument hinges on whether the Attorney General properly delegated his renewal authority to the Director through regulation. But his argument collapses against the BIA members’ reappointment paperwork because that documentation substantiates the Government’s assertion that the temporary BIA members were reappointed by the Attorney General, not the Director.   Petitioner also contended that the BIA improperly relied on a 2019 decision by the then-Acting Attorney General (AAG) because it was issued without legal authority due to alleged defects in the AAG’s appointment. The court did not consider merits because Petitioner failed to brief the issue adequately. View "Medina Carreon v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner is a 32-year-old native and citizen of Jamaica who entered the United States in 2006 and overstayed his visitor visa. On December 20, 2017, Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") officers arrested Petitioner pursuant to a warrant issued by the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"). In removal proceedings before the IJ, Petitioner argued that the immigration court lacked jurisdiction over his removal proceedings and the officers violated agency regulations and his fundamental rights during his arrest and interrogation.   The Second Circuit denied the petition. The court agreed that the agency had jurisdiction and that termination of the removal proceeding was not warranted. The court explained under Rajah termination may be warranted for pre-hearing regulatory violations in cases involving "prejudice that may have affected the outcome of the proceeding, conscience-shocking conduct, or a deprivation of fundamental rights." As Petitioner has failed to show that he satisfies any of the three requirements for termination, he is not entitled to termination of his removal proceedings, with or without prejudice to renewal. Accordingly, the court found that the immigration court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motions to terminate. View "Medley v. Garland" on Justia Law

In 2019, the Department of Homeland Security charged Petitioner with removability for two counts of being an aggravated felon and for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude within five years of being admitted to the United States. Petitioner conceded her removability, making her inadmissible to the United States and subject to deportation. Seeking relief from removal, Petitioner applied for a waiver of inadmissibility. To qualify for the waiver, Petitioner needed to demonstrate statutory eligibility and that the equities warranted a favorable exercise of discretion. The Immigration Judge denied Petitioner’s application. Petitioner petitioned for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ denial of her waiver of inadmissibility.   The Eighth Circuit denied in part and dismissed in part. The court explained that although the BIA did not include hardship to Petitioner’s relatives when it listed Petitioner’s positive equities, it still considered hardship in its decision. The BIA recognized that Petitioner’s removal would “likely result in a considerable level of hardship to herself, her spouse, and her children.” Accordingly, the court denied Petitioner’s petition on this ground. Further, Petitioner challenged the BIA’s weighing of equities, specifically how it weighed her crimes. The court wrote that this is not a reviewable question of law. It is a challenge to “the discretionary conclusion of not meriting a favorable exercise of discretion,” which the court does not have jurisdiction to review. View "Aisha King v. Merrick B. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of Mexico, petitioned for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals. The Board concluded that Petitioner’s prior conviction in Kansas for possession of methamphetamine made him removable from the United States.   The Eighth Circuit concluded that Petitioner is removable and therefore denied the petition for review. Petitioner contends that the approved instruction allows a prosecutor to charge a defendant with possession of multiple drugs in the alternative. But the instruction calls for insertion of a “controlled substance” in the singular, and recommends that “an alternative charge instruction not be given” because “the defendant cannot be convicted of multiplicitous crimes.”   Petitioner further asserted that drug type must be a “means” of committing the offense because Section 21-5706(c)(1) imposes the same punishment for possession of each substance. But while different punishments would conclusively establish that drug type is an element, equivalent punishments do not show that drug type is a means. The legislature may simply have concluded that each separate drug possession offense deserves the same punishment, regardless of whether the offender possessed cocaine, heroin, or methamphetamine. Accordingly, the court held that the Board correctly concluded Petitioner was removable for committing a controlled substance offense. View "Humberto Barbosa v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

In 2005, Petitioner, a native and citizen of Brazil, was ordered removed in absentia. In 2018, he moved to reopen and rescind the removal order, and an immigration judge (IJ) denied his request. He appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), and the BIA dismissed his appeal. He petitioned for a review of that dismissal. He contends that the BIA and the IJ lacked jurisdiction over his removal proceedings because the record does not show that his notice to appear (NTA) was ever filed with the immigration court, as required by 8 C.F.R. Section 1003.14(a).   The Fifth Circuit denied the petition. The court reasoned that it has previously explained that Section 1003.14 “is not jurisdictional” but is “a claim-processing rule.” Thus, Petitioner’s jurisdictional challenge fails. Further, Petitioner argued that the BIA erred by relying on a reconstructed record that did not contain his NTA. The court explained that it discerned nothing in the record to suggest that Petitioner’s Form I-213 “is incorrect or was obtained by coercion or duress,” the BIA could thus properly rely on it as “inherently trustworthy and admissible as evidence” that Petitioner received notice of his removal hearing. Though Petitioner presented his own sworn declarations challenging his understanding of the translator’s statements, documents he may have signed, and his need to attend a removal hearing, he failed to present such compelling evidence that no reasonable factfinder could conclude against it. The BIA thus did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Petitioner’s appeal from the denial of his motion to reopen. View "Alexandre-Matias v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner came to the United States from El Salvador as a teenager. While in high school, he inappropriately touched his younger female relative and was later charged under Texas Penal Code Section 22.04(a) with injuring a child by omission. That conviction spawned immigration proceedings in which he was found removable by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). Petitioner sought review of that decision. An Immigration Judge (IJ) held a hearing and found that Petitioner was subject to removal. Petitioner then applied for asylum, withholding of removal, protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), and cancellation of removal. Petitioner then appealed to the BIA and argued that (1) Texas Penal Code Section 22.04(a) is indivisible, and even if divisible, it is overbroad and does not fit the generic federal definition of child abuse; (2) his conviction does not qualify as a CIMT; and (3) the IJ erred in denying his applications for asylum and relief under the CAT.   The Fifth Circuit denied the petition. The court held that Petitioner’s argument that the statute is indivisible is now foreclosed by Monsonyem. Petitioner was convicted under the portion of Section 22.04(a) relating to child abuse, and the BIA properly concluded he was removable based on that conviction. Further, the court held that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that Texas “would apply its statute to conduct that falls outside the generic definition of child abuse.” None of Petitioner’s proffered cases demonstrates that Texas would apply Section 22.04(a) to crimes that do not align with the BIA’s definition of child abuse. View "Ponce v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a lawful permanent resident, was convicted of attempting to elude police in violation of RCW Section 46.61.024 in 2016 and 2018. An Immigration Judge and the BIA concluded that RCW Section 46.61.024 is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude and found Petitioner removable for having been convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct. The BIA relied on Matter of RuizLopez, 25 I. & N. Dec. 551 (BIA 2011).    The Ninth Circuit granted Petitioner’s petition for review. The panel concluded that the BIA failed to address substantive changes the Washington Legislature made to the statute and subsequent Washington case law interpreting the revised statute and remanded. Applying the categorical approach, the panel identified the elements of statute of conviction. As relevant here, the version of the statute at issue in Matter of Ruiz-Lopez required driving with “wanton or willful disregard for the lives or property of others.” However, in 2003, the Washington Legislature altered that element: the current version requires proof that the vehicle was driven “in a reckless manner.” The panel explained that although the term “reckless manner” is not defined by statute, the Washington Supreme Court has held that operating a motor vehicle in a “reckless manner” means operating it in “a rash or heedless manner, indifferent to the consequences.” The panel explained that, in some circumstances, “reckless” may be the equivalent of “willful or wanton,” but under current Washington law, “reckless manner” is not the equivalent of “recklessness,” and “reckless manner” is the required mens rea in Petitioner’s statute of conviction. View "ZHOVTONIZHKO V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, was ordered by an immigration judge (IJ) to be removed from the United States after the IJ ruled that Petitioner’s application for relief from removal was untimely. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) agreed with the IJ and dismissed Petitioner’s appeal. Petitioner timely petitioned for review, arguing that the rejection of his relief application violated his due process rights.   The Ninth Circuit granted the petition. The panel held that the IJ’s rejection of the opportunity to file a relief application on December 18 deprived Petitioner of a full and fair opportunity to be heard. The panel concluded that Petitioner’s immigration proceedings were fundamentally unfair because (1) the purported deadline to submit a relief application was ambiguous; (2) Petitioner’s counsel offered to submit the application on the day of the apparent deadline while the IJ was still on the bench, making any delay in the proceeding practically nonexistent; and (3) the IJ’s denial of a continuance so that Petitioner’s recently-retained counsel could submit the application was an abuse of discretion. The panel concluded that the IJ’s rejection of Petitioner’s application clearly affected the outcome of the proceedings and thus caused him prejudice because the merits of his application were never considered by the agency at all. View "ARIZMENDI-MEDINA V. GARLAND" on Justia Law