Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner petitioned for a review of the denial of his claim to protection under the Convention Against Torture. The immigration judge found that Petitioner, a bisexual man and former gang member, had not shown the requisite likelihood that he would be tortured if returned to his home country of Jamaica. Petitioner now challenged that finding on appeal, arguing that it does not properly account for his aggregate risk of torture as required by the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Rodriguez-Arias v. Whitaker, 915 F.3d 968 (4th Cir. 2019).   The Fourth Circuit disagreed and denied the petition. The court explained that it is abundantly clear that both the IJ and the BIA applied the aggregation rule of Rodriguez-Arias, considering not only the individual risk of torture from each actor identified by Petitioner but also the cumulative probability of torture. The IJ recognized from the start, in laying out the applicable law, that “the risks of torture from all sources must be aggregated when determining whether an individual is more likely than not to be tortured in a particular country.”   Further, the court reasoned that Petitioner identified no record evidence suggesting that he would be singled out for torture as, say, a “bisexual former gang member” and thus subjected to a risk of torture greater than the “sum of its parts” – greater, that is, than the risk captured by aggregating the likelihood of torture based on sexual orientation with the risk of torture based on former gang membership. View "O' Neil Kerr v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

A federal jury convicted Petitioners of visa fraud, and the government charged them with removability based on that conviction. Petitioners contend that the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) erred in holding that the visa fraud waiver could not overcome the grounds for their removal. Petitioners also raised a due process claim and issues the BIA did not address.   The Fifth Circuit dismissed the petition for review in part for lack of jurisdiction and denied it in part. The court held that Section 1227(a)(1)(H) does not function to waive a charge under Section 1227(a)(3)(B)(iii). The BIA’s treatment of Petitioners, in this case, is dissimilar and far from arbitrary—the government charged them with removability for fraud convictions under a provision intended to make aliens removable for committing specifically that crime. The government simply applied the law as Congress wrote it. Further, the court wrote that the IJ and the BIA found no need to consider Petitioners’ other arguments. Petitioners submitted significant evidence to the agency and were afforded multiple oral hearings to present their case, where the IJ reviewed their evidence. Petitioners were also afforded the opportunity to argue their theory of the law. Thus, Petitioners have not shown a violation of their due process rights. View "Reese v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the denial of his application for cancellation of removal by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). After an immigration judge (“IJ”) initially granted cancellation, the BIA reversed, determining that Petitioner was statutorily eligible for cancellation but did not merit a favorable exercise of the agency’s discretion in light of his criminal history— namely, his two convictions for domestic violence. Petitioner objected to the BIA’s characterization of his criminal history, arguing that it impermissibly engaged in factfinding and reevaluated the IJ’s factual findings.   The Second Circuit dismissed the petition, holding that it lacks jurisdiction to review the discretionary decision. The court explained that the BIA did not second-guess the IJ’s factual findings or find facts of its own—it conducted a de novo reweighing of the equities based on the facts found by the IJ. The BIA thus properly exercised its discretion to deny cancellation of removal. View "Hernandez v. Garland" on Justia Law

Appellants are both citizens of Venezuela. They were both admitted to the United States as nonimmigrant visitors and remained in the United States beyond the expiration of their authorization to remain. Appellants filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. Section 2241 following their criminal convictions. The district courts granted both Petitions. However, Appellants challenged the denial of attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”).   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that since “a habeas corpus proceeding is neither a wholly criminal nor a wholly civil action, but rather a hybrid action that is unique, a category unto itself,” it is not purely a civil action, and the EAJA does not authorize attorney’s fees for successful 28 U.S.C. Section 2241 motions. Accordingly, the court wrote that it does not need to reach the issue of whether the Government was substantially justified in its actions. View "Castro Balza v. Garland" on Justia Law

Appellants are both citizens of Venezuela. They were both admitted to the United States as nonimmigrant visitors and remained in the United States beyond the expiration of their authorization to remain. Appellants filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. Section 2241 following their criminal convictions. The district courts granted both Petitions. However, Appellants challenged the denial of attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”).   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that since “a habeas corpus proceeding is neither a wholly criminal nor a wholly civil action, but rather a hybrid action that is unique, a category unto itself,” it is not purely a civil action, and the EAJA does not authorize attorney’s fees for successful 28 U.S.C. Section 2241 motions. Accordingly, the court wrote that it does not need to reach the issue of whether the Government was substantially justified in its actions. View "Gomez Barco v. Witte" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are six citizens of El Salvador and Honduras who entered the United States illegally over twenty years ago, and all have final orders of deportation and removal. After receiving those orders, all Plaintiffs successfully achieved temporary protected status (“TPS”) and traveled out of the United States with an advance parole document. Plaintiffs sued, alleging that USCIS’s failure to accept jurisdiction and adjudicate the claims violated the Administrative Procedure Act. Defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), alleging that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction. The district court granted the motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. Citing Duarte v. Mayorkas, 27 F.4th 1044 (5th Cir. 2022), the court explained that Duarte dealt with TPS beneficiaries with final removal or deportation orders who traveled abroad, returned, and challenged USCIS’s administrative closure of their status-adjustment applications for want of jurisdiction. The court explained that Plaintiffs provided no relevant reasons for how their case functionally differs from Duarte's. Instead, they openly asked the court to revisit and re-analyze Duarte. Thus, the court reasoned that even if it disagreed with Duarte’s interpretation of the law, the court still would have to follow it. View "Hernandez v. Jaddou" on Justia Law

The First Circuit dismissed in part and denied in part Petitioner's petition for judicial review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the decision of the immigration judge (IJ) ordering Petitioner's removal, holding that the Court lacked jurisdiction in part and that Petitioner was not entitled to relief on his remaining allegations of error.Petitioner, a Jordanian national, was granted status as a conditional permanent resident of the United States due to his marriage to a citizen, but an IJ later ordered his removal due to his inability to prove that he entered the marriage in good faith. The BIA affirmed. Thereafter, Petitioner filed a petition for judicial review. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) this Court lacked jurisdiction to review the agency's factual findings; and (2) Petitioner's remaining challenges to the BIA's decisions were unavailing. View "Alzaben v. Garland" on Justia Law

Doyduk came to the U.S. from Turkey on a visa that expired in 2010. Still in the country a year later, he participated in a night of heavy drinking with his then-girlfriend Filipova (also in the country without authorization). Filipova was stabbed in the stomach, suffering a serious injury. Doyduk’s boss, Coskun, called 911. Doyduk was charged with aggravated assault, possessing an instrument of crime, possessing a prohibited offensive weapon, simple assault, and recklessly endangering another person. All the charges were withdrawn after Filipova and Coskun refused to testify. The charging documents were discarded under a Pennsylvania law that requires expungement after 18 months pass without action.In 2011 removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(C)(i) for having overstayed his visa, Doyduk sought an adjustment of status based on his marriage to a U.S. citizen. At a 2017 hearing, the officer who arrested Doyduk testified about the stabbing. The IJ also considered the Philadelphia police report and heard testimony from Doyduk, his citizen-wife, and others attesting to Doyduk’s character. The IJ denied relief, finding that the evidence strongly suggested that Doyduk committed the crime. The BIA affirmed. The Third Circuit denied a petition for review. The Immigration and Nationality Act allows IJs to consider facts underlying expunged charges. View "Doyduk v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff entered the United States in 1981 and became a lawful permanent resident in 1990. He has been married to his U.S. citizen wife, with whom he has two U.S. citizen children, since 1993. After being convicted of possession of a controlled substance for sale under California law, he was ordered removed in absentia and deported in 1999. He re-entered the United States without authorization shortly thereafter. In 2008, during a school festival, Plaintiff tackled an active shooter, knocked his gun away and helped restrain the shooter till law enforcement arrived. In 2010, the Department of Homeland Security apprehended Plaintiff and reinstated his 1996 removal order. To avoid removal, Plaintiff applied for a U-visa and a waiver of inadmissibility. USCIS denied Plaintiff’s request for a waiver of inadmissibility as a matter of discretion and subsequently denied his U-visa application on account of his inadmissibility.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The panel held that Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) precludes judicial review of USCIS’s denial of a waiver of inadmissibility under Section 1182(d)(3)(A)(ii) because the latter statute commits the decision to the agency’s sole discretion. The panel rejected Plaintiff’s contention that the district court had jurisdiction to hear his claim. The panel concluded that by all accounts, Plaintiff demonstrated remarkable courage by intervening to stop an active shooter,  and his efforts to care for his wife were equally worthy of praise. But however compelling his objections to USCIS’s denial of a waiver of inadmissibility may be, judicial review of that decision was barred by 8 U.S.C. Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). View "JAIRO VEGA V. UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP SERV, ET AL" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Ukraine, sought review of a December 12, 2019 decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the denial of his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Based on ostensible inconsistencies in  Petitioner’s testimony and a purported failure to submit corroborating evidence, an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) entered an adverse credibility finding.   The Second Circuit granted the petition for review, vacated the BIA’s decision, and remanded the case. The court explained that based on ostensible inconsistencies in Petitioner’s testimony and a purported failure to submit corroborating evidence, the IJ entered an adverse credibility finding. However, the court d that the adverse credibility finding is not supported by substantial evidence and that the IJ unjustifiably refused to allow Petitioner to present readily available witness testimony, thereby depriving him of a full and fair hearing.   The court reasoned that the IJ identified discrepancies between Petitioner’s testimony as to whether his prior employment included driving responsibilities and whether his most recent period of employment began in October 2013 or March 2014. These findings were not adopted by the BIA. Though labeled a “material inconsistency” by the IJ, nowhere in his decision did he explain how these issues relate to Petitioner’s asylum claim, nor is the connection self-evident. The court explained that it has doubts whether, absent the errors identified above, the IJ would have reached the same conclusion based on these remaining issues. View "Malets v. Garland" on Justia Law