Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court of the State of Washington held that detained workers at a privately owned and operated immigration detention center are considered "employees" under Washington's Minimum Wage Act (MWA), and are thus entitled to receive the state's minimum wage for their work. The court rejected arguments from the detention center operator, The GEO Group, that the detained workers should be exempt from the MWA because they resided and slept at their place of employment. The court also disagreed with GEO's claim that the MWA's government-institutions exemption applied to the detainees because the facility was operated under contract with the federal government. The court found the government-institutions exemption only applies to detainees in public, government-run institutions, and not in privately owned and operated facilities. Finally, the court ruled that a damages award to one party (a class of detainees) does not prevent another party (the State of Washington) from seeking equitable relief in the form of an unjust enrichment award. The case stemmed from lawsuits brought by the State and a class of detainees alleging that GEO's practice of paying detainees less than Washington's minimum wage violated the MWA. After a lower court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, GEO appealed, leading to the certification of questions to the Washington Supreme Court. View "Nwauzor v. The GEO Grp., Inc." on Justia Law

This case concerns Ana Sanchez Sebastian-Sebastian, a native and citizen of Guatemala, who appealed the denial of her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found that the BIA did not fully consider whether Sebastian-Sebastian was persecuted due to her membership in certain social groups, including "Guatemalan Chuj Women in domestic relationships who are unable to leave" and "Guatemalan Chuj Women who are viewed as property by virtue of their positions within a domestic relationship." The court noted that the BIA ended its analysis prematurely, failing to consider the possibility that Sebastian-Sebastian's persecutors may have had mixed motives for their persecution. The BIA also failed to consider whether her husband's motives were intertwined with her particular social groups. As a result, the court granted Sebastian-Sebastian's petition for review in part, vacated the BIA's denial of her application for asylum and withholding of removal, and remanded the case to the BIA for reconsideration. However, the court denied Sebastian-Sebastian's petition for review regarding her CAT claim and dismissed her due process claim, finding that her right to due process was not violated. View "Sebastian-Sebastian v. Garland" on Justia Law

In the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the defendant, William Klensch, appealed his sentence after pleading guilty to one count of transportation of an illegal alien. Klensch argued that he was entitled to a minor-role reduction in his sentencing, contending that he had no knowledge of the full smuggling operation and was paid only a small sum for his part. The district court denied this reduction because Klensch was the one physically transporting the individuals. However, the appellate court ruled that the district court did not apply the correct legal standard in denying a minor-role reduction, as the court did not conduct a proper comparative analysis of Klensch’s conduct. The court noted that the district court's explanation did not indicate it considered the factors required for a minor-role reduction. As such, the appellate court vacated Klensch’s sentence and remanded for resentencing in regard to the minor-role reduction.Additionally, Klensch argued that the district court erred by imposing a dangerous-weapons enhancement because he did not possess the stun gun in his car in connection with his illegal smuggling activity. The appellate court rejected this argument, as Klensch acknowledged having the stun gun within his reach while transporting the two men. The court ruled that even if the district court applied an incorrect standard of proof by not requiring the Government to prove a nexus to the stun gun, this error was harmless. As such, the district court's imposition of the dangerous-weapons enhancement was affirmed. View "USA V. KLENSCH" on Justia Law

Kibambe Mwendapeke, a permanent resident of the United States and a citizen of the Congo, was convicted of complicity to robbery in the first degree under Kentucky law. Later, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against Mwendapeke based on his conviction. He appealed, arguing that his conviction should not categorize him as an "aggravated felon," which would render him removable. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled that Mwendapeke's conviction is indeed a categorical match for an "aggravated felony."The court applied the categorical approach to determine whether Mwendapeke's crime was a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a), a requirement for classification as an "aggravated felony." The court found that Kentucky’s first-degree robbery statute, under which Mwendapeke was convicted, meets the level of force and has the required mens rea, or state of mind, for a "crime of violence" under § 16(a). The court also concluded that Kentucky’s complicity statute is not overbroad with respect to generic aiding-and-abetting liability. Therefore, the court ruled that Mwendapeke's conviction constituted an aggravated felony, making him removable. The court denied his petition for review. View "Mwendapeke v. Merrick B. Garland" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) and the Immigration Judge (IJ) to deny asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention against Torture (CAT) to the petitioner, Baljinder Singh Bhagtana. Bhagtana, an Indian national, claimed political persecution by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) due to his support for the Shiromani Akali Dal Amritsar or “Mann” Party and his Sikh religious affiliation. He claimed that he suffered three attacks by BJP members in Kapurthala, Punjab, which resulted in serious injuries and forced him to relocate within India on two occasions.Both the BIA and the IJ determined that Bhagtana could avoid future persecution by relocating within India, as he had done previously without incident. Bhagtana argued that he was safe in these new locations because he was "living in hiding," but this argument was rejected, as activities such as driving a taxicab and attending Mann party meetings contradicted his claim of being in hiding.The Court of Appeals agreed with the lower courts, noting that Bhagtana lived in two different cities in India without harm despite continuing his political activities. Furthermore, the U.S. Department of State’s 2016 Country Report on Human Rights Practices in India did not suggest that members of the Mann Party or Sikhs advocating for a sovereign Sikh state were victims of persecution. The Court of Appeals held that the record did not compel a conclusion contrary to the BIA and IJ's findings that Bhagtana could safely and reasonably relocate within India to avoid persecution. The Court of Appeals therefore denied Bhagtana's petition for review and affirmed the decisions of the BIA and the IJ. View "Singh Bhagtana v. Garland" on Justia Law

A group of individuals from India, who have been lawfully working in the United States for years and waiting in line for more than a decade for their immigrant visas, sued the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and U.S. Department of State. They sought to compel the USCIS to act on their applications for adjustment of status to become lawful permanent residents. However, the USCIS had not processed their applications because the State Department revised its forecast and concluded that it had hit the visa cap for the year. The plaintiffs argued that the USCIS and the State Department were improperly interpreting the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) by requiring an immigrant visa to be available at the time of adjudication rather than at the time of filing the application.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district courts' denials of injunctive relief. The court concluded that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claims. The court found that the government's interpretation of the INA, requiring an immigrant visa to be available before the government can adjudicate an application for adjustment of status, was consistent with the INA and reasonably filled in a procedural detail left open by Congress. The court also noted that the regulation was not in conflict with the statutory text and was left in the government's discretion by Congress. The court further opined that the plaintiffs' proposed rule could result in inefficiency and further delay. View "JIGAR BABARIA, ET AL V. ANTONY BLINKEN, ET AL" on Justia Law

Petitioner is a native and citizen of Mexico. He was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 2002. But in 2019, a jury convicted him of possessing methamphetamine, a controlled substance, with intent to deliver, in violation of Idaho Code section 37-2732(a)(1)(A). The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings in 2021, charging that Petitioner is removable (1) under 8 U.S.C. Section 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), for having been convicted of an aggravated felony related to illicit trafficking in a controlled substance, and (2) under 8 U.S.C. Section 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), for having been convicted of violating a state law relating to a controlled substance. Petitioner filed a motion to terminate proceedings, asserting that his conviction is neither for an aggravated felony nor for a crime related to a controlled substance. The immigration judge disagreed and ordered Petitioner’s removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissed Petitioner’s appeal. Petitioner sought review of the final order of removal.   The Ninth Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition. Applying the modified categorical approach, the panel concluded that Petitioner’s conviction record clearly documents that his conviction involved methamphetamine, a controlled substance under federal and Idaho law. The panel next concluded that the required mental state under federal and Idaho law—knowledge—is the same in all relevant respects: the defendant either must know what the substance is (even if the defendant does not know that it is controlled) or must know that the substance is illegal (even if the defendant does not know what the substance is). View "TELLEZ-RAMIREZ V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Zheng and Wu owned and operated the Tokyo Dragon restaurant, where they employed noncitizens who were working in the U.S. illegally. In 2017, Homeland Security received a tip from a nurse who suspected that they were human trafficking. Agents executed a warrant at Tokyo Dragon and discovered that the business had not filed any government paperwork with respect to the noncitizens’ employment. Four Hispanic men lived in the basement of Zheng and Wu’s home. The owners transported the men to and from work every day and to the grocery store weekly, paying them in cash. Other employees were paid by check. A Mexican citizen testified he began working as a Tokyo Dragon cook in 2015, generally working six or seven days a week for 11-12 hours per day; he did not interact with customers. Zheng instructed the noncitizens that they “should not go outside” the house and should not make noise, to avoid being deported.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions of Zheng and Wu on four counts of harboring illegal noncitizens for commercial gain, 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii). The court rejected arguments that the district court erred in instructing the jury on the meaning of “harboring” by not including a requirement that the defendants acted intentionally and knowingly in shielding the illegal noncitizens from law enforcement and invaded the province of the jury by giving examples of “harboring.” View "United States v. Zheng" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the immigration judge's (IJ) denial of Petitioner's applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), holding that Petitioner was not entitled to relief.Petitioner, who was from Nepal, sought relief based on claims that she experienced past persecution and had a well-founded fear of future persecution at the hands of Maoist insurgents on account of political opinion and membership in a particular social group, in particular, her nuclear family. The IJ granted Petitioner's application for voluntary departure but denied her claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT. The BIA affirmed. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the lower agencies did not err in concluding that Petitioner failed to establish that the Nepali government was unwilling or unable to protect her. View "Singh v. Garland" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is a foreign worker hired by defendant Alco Harvesting LLC to work at farms owned by defendant and appellant Betteravia Farms. He later brought employment claims against appellants. Alco moved to compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement presented to and signed by Plaintiff at his orientation. The trial court found the agreement void and denied the motion. It considered arbitration a “material term and condition” of Plaintiff’s employment and as such, a job requirement that Alco should have disclosed during the H-2A certification process.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that Alco’s arbitration agreement required Plaintiff to forfeit his right to a jury trial in “any claim, dispute and/or controversy that [any] Employee may have against the Company . . . arising from, relating to or having any relationship or connection whatsoever with [or to the] Employee’s . . . employment by, or other association with the Company . . . .” The arbitration agreement also prohibited him from participating in any class action claims against Alco. Thus, the court considered the relinquishing of these rights as “material terms and conditions” of his employment. View "State of Cal. v. Alco Harvest" on Justia Law