Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

The Fifth Circuit granted Petitioner’s petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissal of Petitioner’s appeal from the immigration judge’s (IJ) denial of his application for relief from removal. Because the IJ’s adverse credibility determination was not supported by evidence in the record, the court determined that the BIA erred in affirming it and remanded the case to the BIA. Petitioner filed a timely application for attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA).   The Fifth Circuit found that Petitioner is entitled to attorneys’ fees under the EAJA and awarded $56,169.79. The court found that the government’s position was not substantially justified at each stage of this litigation. Accordingly, Petitioner is entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs under the EAJA. The court found that the EAJA statutory rate, adjusted for regional cost of living increases, adequately compensates counsel for the work performed. Petitioner also sought fees for work performed by a paralegal. The court wrote that a review of district court cases analyzing the prevailing rate for paralegals in Louisiana under the EAJA reveals a range of $75/hr to $100/hr. In light of the paralegal’s experience,the court found that a rate of $100/hr appears appropriate. View "Nkenglefac v. Garland" on Justia Law

Defendant entered the United Stated without authorization in 2004. He was then convicted of malicious wounding in Virginia and was deported back to El Salvador. Defendant later re-entered the United States before being convicted of another crime in 2020. He was indicted for illegal entry. moved to dismiss that indictment, arguing that the five year statute of limitations on his prosecution had run and that his crime of malicious wounding was not a deportable offense. The district court rejected Defendant's claims.On appeal, Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Defendant's collateral attack of his removal order, finding that Defendant entered the United States without authorization, committed a deportable offense, re-entered again illegally, and then committed another crime. The court explained that Defendant's "case falls right at the heart of what Congress sought to criminalize and the executive branch seeks to stop with the illegal reentry statute of 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1326." View "US v. Omar Alas" on Justia Law

Petitioner petitioned for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) order upholding the immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). He also challenged the BIA’s determinations that defects in the Notice to Appear (“NTA”) did not require termination of his proceedings and that the BIA lacked authority to administratively close his case.   The Ninth Circuit dismissed the defective NTA claim for lack of jurisdiction and denied the petition as to the CAT claim. The panel granted the petition and remanded as to the administrative closure issue, given the government’s recommendation that the panel does so based on an intervening decision by the Attorney General. The panel granted the petition and remanded as to the asylum and withholding of removal claims because the BIA applied the wrong standard in reviewing the IJ’s determination that the evidence failed to establish the requisite nexus between a protected ground and past or future harm. The panel concluded that substantial evidence supported the agency’s determination that Petitioner failed to establish the requisite government involvement or government acquiescence to any torture View "JOSUE UMANA-ESCOBAR V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

Appellant is a dual citizen of the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia who entered the United States on a visa to receive graduate medical education. He sought to adjust his immigration status to that of a legal permanent resident under Section 1255 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the “INA”). The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) determined that he was ineligible for adjustment of status and denied his applications. Appellant and his wife challenged that decision by filing suit under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). The district court dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i).   The DC Circuit affirmed and held that the district court correctly dismissed Appellants’ case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Based on the plain meaning of Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), and the reasoning of Patel v. Garland, 142 S. Ct. 1614, USCIS’s decision to deny Appellants’ application for adjustment of status is unreviewable by a federal district court. The court explained that to avoid the dismissal of their case, Appellants sought to confine Patel’s holding to petitions for review of removal orders. Although Patel addressed a judgment made in a removal proceeding before an immigration judge and reserved ruling on whether Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) bars review of analogous judgments by USCIS that are challenged under the APA in a federal court. The court saw no basis for the distinction that Appellants attempt to draw. Section 1252(a)(2)(B) specifically provides that the relevant jurisdiction-stripping language applies “regardless of whether the judgment, decision, or action is made in removal proceedings.” View "Adil Abuzeid v. Alejandro Mayorkas" on Justia Law

Petitioner entered the United States without inspection. In 1993, he was served an OSC, the charging document that initiated immigration proceedings prior to the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”). Petitioner’s OSC did not list the time and place of his proceedings. Petitioner sought suspension of deportation, a form of relief available prior to IIRIRA. IIRIRA provided that continuous physical presence is deemed to end when the applicant is served with a notice to appear (“NTA”). Under IIRIRA’s transitional rules, which apply to individuals like Petitioner, whose proceedings were pending when IIRIRA was enacted, this stop-time rule applies retroactively to proceedings initiated by an OSC.   Accordingly, Petitioner’s continuous physical presence was deemed to end when he was served his OSC—only four years after his arrival, and thus short of the required seven years. Petitioner contended that the Supreme Court’s decision in Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), instructs that his OSC was statutorily defective and that the stop-time rule was therefore inapplicable.   The Ninth Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review of the BIA’s decision, the panel held that: 1) an OSC that fails to disclose the time and place of an immigrant’s deportation proceedings is sufficient to trigger the stop-time rule in a transitional rules case; 2) Petitioner’s OSC triggered the stop-time rule, making him ineligible for suspension of deportation; and 3) substantial evidence supported the denial of withholding of removal and protection under the CAT. View "WINSTON GUTIERREZ-ALM V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the denial of his application for cancellation of removal. In his petition, Petitioner argued that the IJ erred as a matter of law in denying his application for cancellation of removal based on the IJ’s conclusion that the harm Petitioner’s children will suffer upon his removal is not “exceptional and extremely unusual.”   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that Petitioner’s argument is actually an “argument . . . that the [IJ] erred in failing to afford what he believes is sufficient weight to Petitioner’s step-son’s emotional hardship in rendering the hardship determination.” The court explained that a petitioner’s argument “that the [Board] applied the incorrect legal standard by failing to adequately consider certain factors” is actually a challenge to the Board’s discretionary determination that the court lacks jurisdiction to review. View "Artemio Garcia-Pascual v. Merrick B. Garland" on Justia Law

In a case in which federal civil immigration detainees— who are held in the Northeast ICE Processing Center (“NWIPC”), a private detention center in Tacoma, Washington, operated by GEO Group—challenge GEO’s practice of paying them less than the State’s minimum wage to work at the detention center, the Ninth Circuit certified the following questions to the Washington Supreme Court:1) In the circumstances of this case, are the detained workers at NWIPC employees within the meaning of Washington’s Minimum Wage Act (“MWA”)? 2) If the answer to the first question is yes, does the MWA apply to work performed in comparable circumstances by civil detainees confined in a private detention facility operating under a contract with the State? 3) If the answer to the first question is yes and the answer to the second question is no, and assuming that the damage award to the detained workers is sustained, is that damage award an adequate legal remedy that would foreclose equitable relief to the State in the form of an unjust enrichment award? View "UGOCHUKWU NWAUZOR, ET AL V. THE GEO GROUP, INC." on Justia Law

Petitioner is a native citizen of Mexico who received lawful permanent resident status in the United States in 2003. In 2014, Petitioner was convicted by way of a guilty plea of an Aggravated Robbery in Texas. Petitioner was then deemed removable by an Immigration Judge ("IJ"). The Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") affirmed, finding that Petitioner had been convicted of an "aggravated felony."The Fifth Circuit affirmed. Under 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), an “alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable.” Section 1101(a)(43) of title 8 provides a list of offenses that qualify as aggravated felonies, which includes felony theft crimes, felony crimes of violence and attempts to commit these offenses. Petitioner argued that “since the Texas definition of a robbery encompasses an attempt to commit theft, it cannot categorically be defined as a theft offense, as an actual taking or exercise of control over the property of another is not needed for purposes of a conviction.However, the court held that, for Petitioner's purposes, it didn't matter if he was convicted of attempted theft or aggravated theft. The court explained that Petitioner is ineligible for asylum because his conviction qualifies as a non-political felony crime of violence as defined in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 16(a). View "Rodriguez Gonzalez v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of Mexico, entered the United States without authorization in 2000. In 2017, Petitioner accidentally hit a pedestrian with her car and then fled the scene. She entered a guilty plea to Texas Transportation Code Sec. 550.021 and was sentenced to five years’ deferred adjudication.While on deferred adjudication, the Department of Homeland Security arrested Petitioner and charged her with being present without admission or parole under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. In 2020, Petitioner filed an application for cancellation of removal with the immigration court; she also requested voluntary departure. The Immigration Judge denied her application, finding her 2017 conviction was for a crime of moral turpitude, rendering her ineligible for cancellation. The Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") affirmed and denied Petitioner's motion to reconsider.In reviewing Petitioner's claim, the BIA applied outdated precedent. Under controlling precedent, outlined in Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500 (2016), the proper focus is on the minimum conduct prohibited by the statute, not on the Petitioner's particular actions. Here, The minimum conduct that can trigger liability is the failure to remain at the scene of the accident and provide one’s name and other information. However, this question was not addressed by the BIA. Thus, the court vacated the BIA's order and remanded to determine whether the failure to share information under Sec. 550.021(a)(4) is a CIMT. View "Zamaro-Silvero v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Department of Homeland Security charged him with removability under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). Petitioner admitted the factual allegations and conceded the charge of removability. Petitioner applied for cancellation of removal, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. The immigration judge (“IJ”) denied his application for all claims. Petitioner appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). The BIA dismissed the appeal. Petitioner petitioned for review in the Fifth Circuit, and he only preserved his cancellation of removal claim.   The Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal and held that it lacked jurisdiction to review either decision. The court explained that Section 1252(d)(1)’s exhaustion requirement applies to claims alleging defects in the BIA proceedings that the BIA “never had a chance to consider” because they arise “only as a consequence of the Board’s error.” Moreover, “when a petitioner seeks to raise a claim not presented to the BIA and the claim is one that the BIA has adequate mechanisms to address and remedy, the petitioner must raise the issue in a motion to reopen prior to resorting to review by the courts.” Here, Petitioner failed to meet these requirements. He never presented his ultra vires claim to the BIA, even though he could have raised it in his motion to reconsider. Moreover, Petitioner seeks the exact relief the BIA could’ve awarded him on reconsideration—namely, a new decision by a board member serving an unexpired term. View "Ayala Chapa v. Garland" on Justia Law