Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

A naturalized U.S. citizen and his noncitizen son challenged the U.S. Secretary of State and the Consul General of the U.S. Consulate in Rio de Janeiro over the reclassification of a visa petition. The father, after becoming a lawful permanent resident, filed a Form I-130 petition for his son, who was under 21 at the time. The son turned 21 during the process, and the petition was approved when a visa in the F2A category was available. After the father naturalized, the consulate reclassified the petition into the F1 category for adult children of U.S. citizens, resulting in a lengthy wait for visa availability. The plaintiffs alleged that, under the Child Status Protection Act (CSPA), the son should still be considered under 21 for visa purposes, and the reclassification was unlawful.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed the complaint, relying on the doctrine of consular nonreviewability, which generally bars judicial review of consular decisions regarding visa denials. The court did not address the merits of whether the reclassification was lawful under the CSPA.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that the doctrine of consular nonreviewability did not bar judicial review in this instance because the plaintiffs were challenging the reclassification of the visa petition, not a visa denial. The court then addressed the merits and concluded that, under the CSPA, the son’s statutory age should be calculated using the formula provided for F2A beneficiaries, which accounts for bureaucratic delays. Therefore, the son remained a “child” for visa purposes at the time of the father’s naturalization, and the reclassification to the F1 category was unlawful. The First Circuit reversed the District Court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "Teles De Menezes v. Rubio" on Justia Law

A Haitian national who was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident at age 13 faced removal proceedings after being convicted in New Hampshire for the sale of a controlled drug, which was classified as an aggravated felony under federal immigration law. During removal proceedings, he sought deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), arguing that he would likely be tortured if returned to Haiti due to risks posed by Haitian authorities, gangs, and individuals seeking revenge, especially given his severe mental illness.An Immigration Judge (IJ) sustained the removal charge and denied his application for CAT relief after conducting hearings and considering evidence. The IJ found that, although conditions in Haitian detention facilities were deplorable and extrajudicial violence was a problem, the petitioner had not shown that the Haitian government maintained these conditions with the specific intent to torture detainees. The IJ also found insufficient likelihood that the petitioner would be targeted for torture by gangs, mobs, or private individuals with government acquiescence. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision, and the petitioner timely sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.The First Circuit held that the BIA erred by failing to address the petitioner’s CAT claim regarding the risk of torture by low-level Haitian officials in detention facilities. The court vacated the BIA’s order and remanded for further consideration of this specific claim, instructing the BIA to properly distinguish between intent and purpose requirements for torture under CAT. The petition for review was otherwise denied, as the court found no error in the agency’s handling of other aspects of the CAT claim or in its evidentiary rulings. View "Fleurimond v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A Mexican citizen entered the United States without authorization in 2005. In 2018, the Department of Homeland Security began removal proceedings against him, initially serving him with a Notice to Appear (NTA) that did not specify the date and time of his hearing. He later received a subsequent notice with the specific date, time, and location of his hearing, which also warned of the consequences of failing to appear. Neither he nor his attorney appeared at the scheduled hearing, resulting in an in absentia removal order.He first moved to reopen the proceedings, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, but the Immigration Judge, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit all denied relief. While his appeal was still pending, he filed a second motion to reopen, arguing that the initial NTA was deficient and that, under recent Supreme Court precedent, he was entitled to rescission of the removal order and eligibility for cancellation of removal. He also requested that the BIA reopen his case on its own motion (sua sponte). The BIA denied all requested relief, finding that he had received proper notice under the law, was ineligible for cancellation of removal, and declining to exercise its sua sponte authority.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s decision. The court held that the petitioner was not entitled to rescission of the in absentia removal order because, although the initial NTA was deficient, he received a subsequent notice that satisfied statutory requirements. The court also held that he forfeited his argument for cancellation of removal by failing to adequately develop it. Finally, the court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction his claim regarding the BIA’s refusal to reopen the case sua sponte. The petition was denied in part and dismissed in part. View "Guzman-Torralva v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Celia Ignacia Esquivel-Bataz, a Mexican citizen, was previously convicted of making a false statement to obtain credit and deported in 2012. In April 2025, she was found by ICE agents at an illegal gambling parlor in Houston. She was indicted for illegal reentry after deportation following a felony conviction, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b). ICE lodged an immigration detainer against her, indicating that she would be taken into custody and removed to Mexico if released.A magistrate judge initially found that Esquivel-Bataz was not a flight risk and ordered her release on bond pending trial. The Government responded with an emergency motion to stay and revoke the release order, which the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted. Esquivel-Bataz then moved for pretrial release, and the district court held an evidentiary hearing. After hearing testimony, including from an ICE officer about the detainer’s effect, the district court denied her motion, finding her to be a flight risk based on her criminal history, Mexican citizenship, prior deportation, and current unlawful presence.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s order under an abuse-of-discretion standard. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying pretrial release. The Fifth Circuit clarified that the district court did not treat the immigration detainer or potential deportation as flight risk per se, but rather considered the totality of circumstances, including individualized factors required by the Bail Reform Act. The order denying pretrial release was affirmed. View "United States v. Esquivel-Bataz" on Justia Law

A citizen of Mexico, who had been a lawful permanent resident in the United States since 1982, was convicted twice for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon—first in 2011 for shooting his ex-wife and again in 2018 for assaulting a roommate with a knife. These felony convictions led the Department of Homeland Security to initiate removal proceedings against him under Section 237(a)(2)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which concerns firearm offenses. An immigration judge ordered his removal after he completed his sentences, finding him ineligible for relief due to his convictions.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the removal order in 2020. The individual’s first petition for review to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was dismissed as untimely. In 2022, he filed his first motion to reopen or reconsider with the BIA, arguing that a Supreme Court decision, Borden v. United States, changed the legal landscape regarding his removability. The BIA denied this motion, finding Borden inapplicable because his removal was based on a firearm offense, not an aggravated felony, and that the motion was untimely. In 2024, he filed a second motion to reopen, again citing Borden and seeking equitable tolling of both the time and numerical limits on motions to reopen. The BIA denied this second motion, holding that the statutory limit of one motion to reopen applied and that equitable tolling did not extend to the numerical bar.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s denial. The court held that the statutory “number bar” in the INA, which generally allows only one motion to reopen, is not subject to equitable tolling. The court dismissed the petition in part and denied it in part, concluding that the BIA did not err in refusing to reopen the removal proceedings. View "Garcia Morin v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Several individuals who had received grants of parole under programs established by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for nationals of Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela challenged the government’s decision to terminate those grants. The parole programs, created during the Biden Administration, allowed eligible individuals from these countries to enter the United States temporarily for up to two years, based on urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit. When President Trump took office in January 2025, he issued executive orders directing DHS to end categorical parole programs, including the CHNV programs. DHS subsequently published a notice terminating the programs and revoking all existing grants of parole within thirty days, rather than allowing them to expire naturally.The plaintiffs, affected by the early termination, filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The district court certified a class of affected individuals and granted a preliminary stay, preventing DHS from revoking their parole grants before the original expiration dates. The court found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claim that the categorical termination was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), in part because the agency’s rationale rested on a legal error and failed to adequately consider reliance and humanitarian interests.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s order. The First Circuit held that the relevant statute requires DHS to grant parole only on a case-by-case basis, but does not impose the same limitation on the termination of parole. The court also found that the agency’s explanation for terminating the parole programs was not so deficient as to be arbitrary and capricious under the APA. Concluding that the plaintiffs had not made a strong showing of likelihood of success on the merits, the First Circuit vacated the district court’s stay and remanded for further proceedings. View "Doe v. Noem" on Justia Law

A native of Uzbekistan and citizen of Israel entered the United States on a visitor’s visa in 2009, married a U.S. citizen, and had two children who are U.S. citizens. After his visa expired, he was placed in removal proceedings, conceded removability, and was ordered removed. He sought to adjust his status based on marriage, but after divorcing in 2017, that petition was withdrawn. He then applied for cancellation of removal on two grounds: (1) that his removal would cause exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his U.S. citizen children, and (2) that he was eligible for special cancellation under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) due to alleged battery or extreme cruelty by his ex-wife.An Immigration Judge (IJ) denied both applications, finding his testimony credible but insufficient without corroborating evidence such as medical records for his daughter, proof of child support payments, or tax returns. The IJ also found that his ex-wife’s conduct did not rise to the level of battery or extreme cruelty required by statute. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, agreeing that the evidence did not meet the statutory standards for either form of relief and that the lack of corroboration was fatal to his claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s decision. The court held that it had jurisdiction to review the application of legal standards to established facts as mixed questions of law and fact. The court concluded that the BIA correctly determined the petitioner failed to provide required corroborating evidence for hardship and that the ex-wife’s actions did not constitute battery or extreme cruelty under the statute. The petition for review was denied. View "Simantov v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Philip Myers, a native and citizen of Liberia, was adopted by a U.S. citizen and entered the United States as a child. He later sustained several criminal convictions, including for aggravated felonies. In 2021, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him. Myers claimed derivative citizenship through his adoptive mother, who had become a naturalized U.S. citizen, and also alleged that he had been abused by her. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) had previously denied his derivative citizenship application, finding insufficient evidence that he was in his adoptive mother’s legal and physical custody at the relevant time. During removal proceedings, Myers, sometimes represented by counsel and sometimes pro se, was found competent to proceed without safeguards. He applied for various forms of relief, including asylum and protection under the Convention Against Torture, but these were denied.The Immigration Judge ordered Myers removed to Liberia. Myers appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), arguing that the competency determination was flawed and that he should have been found incompetent to proceed pro se. The BIA found no clear error in the Immigration Judge’s competency finding and dismissed the appeal. Myers then moved to reopen the proceedings, citing a pending motion with USCIS regarding derivative citizenship, alleged errors in the competency determination, a new asylum claim based on his sexual orientation, and a pending T-visa application as a victim of sex trafficking. The BIA denied the motion to reopen, and Myers was removed to Liberia.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s denial of the motion to reopen for abuse of discretion and found none. The court also rejected Myers’s constitutional challenge to the statutory requirements for derivative citizenship and found no genuine issue of material fact regarding his nationality claim. The petition for review was denied. View "Myers v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Luis Alfredo Lezama-Ramirez, a noncitizen who had previously been removed from the United States, pleaded guilty to unlawfully reentering the country in violation of federal law. After his guilty plea, the Probation Office prepared a presentence report (PSR) that included a list of standard and special conditions for supervised release. At sentencing, Lezama-Ramirez’s counsel indicated there were no objections to the PSR, and the district court adopted it. The court imposed a one-year term of supervised release, referencing compliance with standard and special conditions, but did not read these conditions aloud. The written judgment later included the same conditions as those in the PSR.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana entered the judgment, and Lezama-Ramirez appealed, arguing that there were discrepancies between the oral pronouncement of supervised release conditions at sentencing and those listed in the written judgment. He specifically challenged the imposition of certain standard and special conditions that were not read aloud, as well as differences between the oral and written versions of two particular conditions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that because Lezama-Ramirez had notice of the supervised release conditions through the PSR and did not object at sentencing, there was no reversible error in imposing the conditions that were not read aloud. However, the court found that the written version of one special condition (Special Condition 2) imposed an additional reporting requirement not included in the oral pronouncement, which constituted an impermissible conflict. The Fifth Circuit vacated the imposition of Special Condition 2 and remanded for the district court to conform it to the oral pronouncement, while affirming the remainder of the judgment. View "United States v. Lezama-Ramirez" on Justia Law

The petitioner, a Black native and citizen of Guyana, entered the United States as a lawful permanent resident in infancy and lived there since. He suffered from untreated mental illness, including schizophrenia, and physical disabilities requiring a wheelchair. After a psychotic episode, he was convicted of several felonies and served sixteen years in prison. Following his release, the Department of Homeland Security charged him as removable due to his aggravated felony conviction. Fearing torture if deported to Guyana because of his mental health, physical disabilities, criminal-deportee status, and race, he sought deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture, presenting testimony and evidence of mistreatment faced by similar groups in Guyana.An Immigration Judge found the petitioner and his expert credible but denied relief, concluding that the likelihood of torture in Guyana was insufficient. The judge determined that Guyanese police do not actively seek to harm or torture mentally ill persons and that government acquiescence was not supported by the evidence. The judge also found that discrimination and poor conditions existed but did not rise to the level of torture or government acquiescence. The petitioner appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, arguing that the judge failed to consider the cumulative risk of torture based on all asserted grounds and misapplied the definition of torture. The Board affirmed, focusing only on mental illness and finding no clear error in the judge’s conclusions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed only the Board’s decision. The court held that the Board abused its discretion by ignoring relevant, unrebutted evidence regarding the petitioner’s risk of torture due to his race, physical disabilities, and criminal-deportee status. The court granted the petition for review, vacated the Board’s decision, and remanded for further proceedings, instructing the agency to consider all evidence and apply the definition of torture to each claim. View "McDougall v. Bondi" on Justia Law