Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Uulu lived with his wife and children in Kyrgyzstan. He joined an opposition party. In 2013, Uulu attended a peaceful protest, during which police fired tear gas at the crowd and attacked protesters. They took Uulu to a police station where they hit him with a filled bottle and placed cellophane over his head, causing him to lose consciousness. Uulu testified that he was detained for several hours with a chemical in the room, making him dizzy. The next morning he was returned to the station. When he returned home, unknown men beat him until he was unconscious. He woke up in the hospital.Two months later, he entered the United States on a tourist visa. Uulu says that the Kyrgyz government subsequently convicted him of “organizing mass riots” and sentenced him in absentia. An asylum officer classified him as removable (8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(B)). In 2018, an immigration court held a hearing at which Uulu testified and presented corroborating documents. The judge ordered Uulu’s voluntary removal, finding that Uulu made shifting statements about key events in his asylum application, interview, and hearing testimony, including about whether police harmed him, how long he was detained, and the attack. Uulu’s corroborating statements were from interested parties who were not available for cross-examination. The BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. Acknowledging concerns about the review of his corroborating evidence, the court found Uulu’s account included too many inconsistencies to upset the conclusion that he was not credible. View "Uulu v. Garland" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence of twenty-seven months’ imprisonment followed by three years’ supervised release for attempted reentry following removal. Defendant had been deported from the United States six times, most recently about a month before his arrest. The same district court judge who sentenced Defendant in this case had presided over his prior sentencing hearing for illegal reentry. On appeal, Defendant raised two challenges to the court’s sentence.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s sentence. The panel held that so long as Defendant is apprised of the consequences of entering into a Type B plea agreement and accedes to them voluntarily, he has no right to withdraw from the agreement on the ground that the court does not accept the sentencing recommendation or request. Accordingly, the district court’s use of the word “reject” in the context of a Type B plea agreement can have no legal effect. The panel wrote that the record establishes that Defendant was aware of the consequences of entering into a Type B plea agreement, and concluded that the district court therefore did not abuse its discretion under the circumstances.   Defendant argued that the district court committed procedural error when it used Defendant’s alleged promise at his prior sentencing hearing not to return to the United States as a sentencing factor. Reviewing for plain error, the panel held that the district court’s factual finding that Defendant had assured the court at the prior sentencing hearing that he would not return to the United States is supported by the record. View "USA V. URBANO TORRES-GILES" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitioned for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal. He argues that the BIA erred in finding that his prior menacing conviction under Oregon Revised Statute Section 163.190 constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude (“CIMT”), rendering him ineligible for cancellation of removal.   The Ninth Circuit granted the petition. The panel held that a conviction under Oregon Revised Statute Section 163.190 does not constitute a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT). The panel explained that in the BIA’s precedential decision in Matter of J-G-P-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 642 (BIA 2019), which held that Section 163.190 categorically qualifies as a CIMT, the BIA erred in its analysis of this court’s prior caselaw. The panel remanded for further consideration of Petitioner’s application for cancellation of removal. View "JOSE FLORES-VASQUEZ V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from his conviction after a conditional plea of guilty to a single count of unlawful reentry by a previously removed alien. Defendant contended that his indictment should have been dismissed on the ground that the 2000 removal order underlying his prior removals was invalid due to an error by the immigration judge (“IJ”), at his removal hearing, as to whether he was eligible for voluntary departure.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel held that, in the respects relevant here, Palomar-Santiago abrogated that caselaw as well. Even assuming arguendo that the IJ’s incorrect statement about Defendant’s eligibility for voluntary departure violated due process and rendered his removal proceedings “fundamentally unfair,” that would not automatically or “effectively” satisfy the requirement in 8 U.S.C. Section 1326(d)(1) that the alien exhausted available administrative remedies, or the requirement in 8 U.S.C. Section 1326(d)(2) that the deportation proceedings improperly deprived the alien of an opportunity for judicial review. The panel therefore concluded that Defendant remains subject to Section 1326(d)’s general rule that he may not challenge the validity of his predicate removal order. View "USA V. PRAXEDIS PORTILLO-GONZALEZ" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the terms of his supervised release arguing that there is an impermissible conflict between the district court’s oral pronouncement and written judgment. In the presentence report, the probation officer recommended various mandatory and standard conditions of supervision. The probation officer also recommended a special condition, as Defendant was a legal alien permanent resident, but his arrest would have rendered him subject to deportation proceedings. The district court imposed a guidelines sentence of imprisonment for 95 months with three years of supervised release. The court orally adopted the special conditions recommended in the presentence report and orally informed Defendant that he must be legally authorized to reenter the country, as is reflected in the written judgment. Defendant appealed, arguing that the work-authorization condition in the written judgment conflicts with the oral pronouncement of his sentence and that the written judgment should be amended to conform to the oral pronouncement.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that there is no conflict between the district court’s oral pronouncement of Defendant’s sentence and its written judgment. The work-authorization condition does not broaden the restrictions in Defendant’s supervised release already in place under the oral pronouncement. The court wrote that the purported “conflict” is then best described as an ambiguity— one that can be resolved by looking to entire record to determine the sentencing court’s intent in imposing the condition. The court explained that the record makes sufficient reference to Defendant’s immigration history to discern the district court’s efforts to ensure that Defendant complied with the relevant immigration laws. View "USA v. Pelayo-Zamarripa" on Justia Law

Al-Hasani was born in Syria in 1966. He worked there as a human rights lawyer. In 2003, Al-Hasani married Khalili, who lived in Morocco. After their son was born, the Syrian government imposed a travel ban on Al-Hasani, preventing him from seeing his family. In 2005, Al-Hasani married fellow Syrian, Jouni. He did not divorce Khalili; Syrian law did not require it. Jouni gave birth to Al-Hasani’s son. In 2009, Al-Hasani was arrested for crimes including “weakening the State’s ‘prestige.’” In 2011, Al-Hasani was released but Wikileaks reported that Al-Hasani had provided human rights information to the U.S. Al-Hasani fled Syria that day, but Jouni stayed in Damascus. Al-Hasani was paroled into the United States in 2011. In 2012, he was granted permanent resident status. Al-Hasani described legal barriers to divorce in Syria and the associated stigma. He eventually divorced Khalili in New Jersey. Al-Hasani contends he never lived in a marital relationship with both women at the same time. Al-Hasani applied for naturalization, describing the circumstances of his two marriages.USCIS denied his application because polygamy is a statutory bar to a finding of "good moral character” required for naturalization, 8 U.S.C. 1427(a). The Third Circuit upheld summary judgment for the government. An individual seeking to naturalize as a U.S. citizen has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence"that he meets all of the requirements. The polygamy bar is not ambiguous as applied to Al-Hasani. View "Al-Hasani v. Secretary United States Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

The BIA denied Petitioner’s request for cancellation of removal based on the failure to show “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to his United States-citizen children. The BIA granted voluntary departure to Mexico. Petitioner then discovered evidence of substandard attorney performance by his attorney before the IJ and filed a timely motion to reopen, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner also submitted evidence obtained between the final order and the motion to reopen, asserting that two of his children suffered from emotional- and mental-health issues that could not be adequately addressed in Mexico. The BIA denied the motion to reopen, holding that even if counsel had been unprepared before the IJ, different counsel represented Petitioner in the initial appeal to the BIA.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court found no abuse of discretion. The court explained that here, considering all of the evidence presented, the BIA rationally determined that the addition of the later-submitted evidence of emotional- and mental health issues failed to establish exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. The evidence demonstrated neither that the health issues were severe nor that treatment would be unavailable in Mexico. The BIA also rationally determined there had been no showing of prejudice associated with the claim of attorney ineffectiveness. Further, on appeal, Petitioner failed to articulate how the initial counsel’s failures affected the outcome. View "Ignacio Trejo-Gamez v. Merrick B. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. An immigration judge found Petitioner not credible and denied her application. Petitioner appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which affirmed the IJ’s credibility decision. In addition to challenging the adverse credibility finding, Petitioner claimed for the first time that the border interview record was improperly admitted into evidence at the IJ hearing. The BIA rejected that argument as waived and also rejected it on the merits. Petitioner petitioned the Second Circuit for review.   The Second Circuit granted in part, denied in part, and vacated the BIA’s decision. The court explained that the immigration judge failed to consider various factors that may have affected the reliability of the border interview record. Petitioner claimed that she was frightened during the interview because a border patrol officer hit her and yelled at her upon her arrival to the United States. Petitioner may also have been reluctant to reveal information about persecution because authorities in her home country were allegedly unwilling to help her due to her indigenous status. Moreover, the questions asked during Petitioner’s border interview generally were not designed to elicit the details of an asylum claim. The court explained that in Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, it cautioned immigration judges to consider these factors and others before relying on a border interview to find an asylum applicant not credible. Consistent with Ramsameachire and subsequent precedent, the court wrote that immigration judges are required to take such precautions. View "Pomavilla-Zaruma v. Garland" on Justia Law

Defendant, a lawful permanent resident of the United States, was charged with importation of a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. Section 952(a). Her lawyer told her that if she pleaded guilty, it was “very likely” that she would be deported. She nonetheless entered the plea. Defendant then learned that her offense did not just possibly make her deportable, it automatically did so. She then moved to withdraw her plea, alleging that if she had known the full scope of the immigration consequences of her plea, she would not have entered it. The district court denied Defendant’s motion and sentenced her. Defendant appealed. At issue is whether a lawyer’s warning of “very likely” deportation satisfies the right to effective assistance of counsel.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that when defense counsel tells an alien client that a conviction will have serious immigration consequences, including “very likely” deportation, that defendant has received sufficient advice to make an informed plea decision, as required by the Sixth Amendment. The court explained that there is some ambiguity about what specific words Defendant’s lawyer used when explaining to her the immigration consequences of the plea. But the district court’s factual finding—which is reviewed only for clear error—suggests the following bottom line: Defendant’s lawyer put her on notice of the risk of serious immigration consequences, including deportation. Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion to withdraw her plea. View "USA v. Armendariz" on Justia Law

Petitioner is a Sudanese national born in 1991 in modern-day South Sudan. He entered the United States as a refugee in 2003. In 2012, following juvenile felony and misdemeanor convictions, the Department of Homeland Security commenced removal proceedings when Petitioner was convicted of attempted murder and unlawful firearm possession and sentenced to 264 months imprisonment. Petitioner conceded removability and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) found Petitioner ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal because the latest conviction was an aggravated felony and a particularly serious crime. Petitioner appealed the denial of CAT relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissed the appeal.   The Eighth Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review. The court explained that Petitioner presented no specific evidence that the government attacks “political opponents” because they were child soldiers in a civil war that ended before South Sudan’s independence. Next, the court wrote that it agrees with the BIA that Petitioner has not shown in his “hypothetical chain of events” that “it was more likely than not that each link in the chain would occur.” Moreover, the court found that even if Petitioner were incarcerated, he presented no evidence showing that conditions inside the prison would amount to torture. View "Mongong Deng v. Merrick B. Garland" on Justia Law