Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around a father, Rene S., who appealed against the jurisdictional and dispositional orders which removed his daughter, F.V., from his custody. F.V. had traveled to the United States from Honduras with her father when she was nine years old, but when they were unable to cross the border together, she entered the United States alone. She was placed with her maternal uncle in California by immigration authorities, who obtained her mother's consent for the placement. The juvenile court sustained allegations that F.V.'s uncle sexually abused her. The court asserted jurisdiction based on the parents allowing F.V. to enter the U.S. unaccompanied with no plan in place for her care.At the disposition stage, the juvenile court indicated it was inclined to return F.V. to her mother in Honduras. However, the court declined to place F.V. with her father, finding his housing situation was unstable and F.V. did not want to relocate to Texas, where her father now lived. As a result, F.V. remained in foster care.The California Court of Appeal reversed the lower court's orders, holding that there was insufficient evidence of future risk to F.V. to support jurisdiction. The court noted that at the time of the jurisdiction hearing, F.V. was no longer in her uncle's custody, and there was no indication that her mother and father would allow her uncle access to her. Given that the father was now in the U.S. and able to care for her, and the mother wanted her back in Honduras, the court found it unlikely that the circumstances leading to F.V.'s entry into the U.S. alone would recur. View "In re F.V." on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Sandeep and Sarvani Thigulla, were lawful nonimmigrant workers seeking to become lawful permanent residents (LPRs) in the United States and had applied for approval of their Form I-485 applications with the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). When the Department of State decreased the number of applications it would adjudicate, the Thigullas sought a temporary restraining order against the Director of USCIS, compelling the prompt adjudication of their applications under the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court denied this order, and the Thigullas appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit dismissed the case due to a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court found that the decision to delay adjudicating the Thigullas' applications falls under the Attorney General’s discretionary authority as stated in 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) and that this authority is protected from judicial review by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). The court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments that this interpretation went against congressional intent, citing clear textual evidence in the statute. The court concluded that it lacked the jurisdiction to review the decision to delay adjudication of the applications, even under the Administrative Procedure Act. Consequently, the court dismissed the case and remanded it to the district court for proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Thigulla v. Jaddou" on Justia Law

Fody Daniel Membreno-Rodriguez, a native and citizen of Honduras, sought review of the denial of his motion to reopen his removal proceedings by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). Initially, Membreno-Rodriguez was deemed inadmissible to the United States due to lack of a valid entry document but was granted parole. He applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), all of which were denied. After marrying a U.S. citizen, Membreno-Rodriguez moved to reopen his immigration proceedings to pursue adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident. However, the BIA denied the motion on grounds of his inadmissibility under § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I).The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied the petition for review. The court concluded that substantial evidence supported the BIA's decision that Membreno-Rodriguez was ineligible for adjustment of status under § 1255(a) since he had conceded his inadmissibility under § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). The court also noted that his parole status had no effect on his status as an applicant for admission into the United States. Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Membreno-Rodriguez's motion to reopen for failing to demonstrate his prima facie eligibility for adjustment of status. View "Membreno-Rodriguez v. Garland" on Justia Law

A former restaurant owner from Mexico, Alma Reyes Galeana, and her three daughters sought asylum and withholding of removal in the United States after fleeing violent threats from gangs in Mexico. Reyes Galeana claimed that, as a Mexican business owner, she was a member of a "particular social group" that deserved protection from deportation under federal law. However, both the Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals rejected this argument, asserting that "Mexican business owners" do not constitute a specific social group.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the Board's decision and agreed with the lower courts' rulings. The court ruled that Reyes Galeana's proposed social group of "Mexican business owners" failed on grounds of particularity and social distinction. The court held that this group was neither specifically defined nor perceived as socially distinct in Mexican society. Furthermore, the court maintained that being a target for extortion, a common threat faced by business owners, does not establish membership in a particular social group. The court also found that Reyes Galeana failed to provide evidence that Mexican society perceives business owners as a distinct class of persons subject to persecution.Consequently, the court denied her petition for review, affirming the Board's decision that Reyes Galeana does not qualify for asylum or withholding of removal as a member of a particular social group. View "Galeana v. Garland" on Justia Law

The case involves Wendy Miguel-Peña and her minor daughter, natives and citizens of El Salvador, who entered the United States without authorization. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings, and an immigration judge found them removable and ineligible for asylum or protection under the Convention Against Torture. They appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which also dismissed their appeal.Miguel-Peña and her daughter then sought review of the Board's order, alleging error in denying their motion to terminate removal proceedings and denial of Miguel-Peña’s asylum claim based on a lack of connection between alleged persecution and a protected ground, and a finding that “women business owners in El Salvador” is not an immutable particular social group. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit denied the petition, finding that the petitioners failed to exhaust their claim-processing arguments under the law, and that the Board of Immigration Appeals did not err in its analysis of the asylum claim.Specifically, the court found substantial evidence supporting the Board's findings that the alleged persecution was not based on an anti-gang political opinion or membership in a particular social group. The court also agreed with the Board's conclusion that the proposed social group of "women business owners in El Salvador" was not immutable, and therefore, not a cognizable social group under asylum law. View "Miguel-Pena v. Garland" on Justia Law

Hector Herrera-Elias, a Honduran citizen, entered the United States unlawfully and was charged with removability. In response, he petitioned for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture, claiming he feared persecution and torture in Honduras due to his involvement with the MS-13 gang and his sexual orientation. An Immigration Judge (IJ) found him ineligible for asylum due to an untimely application, and deemed him barred from asylum and withholding of removal due to his having committed a serious nonpolitical crime (transporting firearms and drugs for criminal organizations in Honduras). The IJ also found that Herrera-Elias failed to prove that he would likely face torture if returned to Honduras.Upon appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the IJ's decision, concluding that Herrera-Elias knowingly participated in serious criminal activity and that no duress exception applied to the serious nonpolitical crime bar. One panel member dissented, arguing that Herrera-Elias's age and limited involvement in gang operations should not constitute a serious nonpolitical crime.On further appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the BIA's judgment. The court found substantial evidence supporting the IJ’s and BIA’s findings regarding Herrera-Elias's involvement in serious nonpolitical crime. Additionally, the court rejected Herrera-Elias's attempt to introduce a duress exception to the serious nonpolitical crime bar, noting that the elements of this bar and the persecutor bar (where the duress exception has been debated) are different, and that Herrera-Elias did not explain how duress is relevant to this specific bar. View "Hererra-Elias v. Garland" on Justia Law

In this case, the petitioner, Miguel Angel Uribe Andrade, sought a review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) decision dismissing an appeal of the Immigration Judge (IJ) order denying him asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Uribe proposed the social group, “Mexicans with mental health disorders characterized by psychotic features who exhibit erratic behavior,” as the basis for his asylum and withholding claims.However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied Uribe’s petition, ruling that the BIA did not commit legal error in finding that Uribe’s proposed social group lacked particularity. The court stated that the term "erratic behavior" was not defined in the record and was not used by Uribe’s treatment providers in describing his conditions or symptoms. Therefore, the BIA could conclude that "erratic behavior" did not provide a clear indication of who might be in the proposed group.The court also found that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s denial of CAT protection. Uribe had not shown that it was more likely than not that he would be institutionalized in Mexico and tortured. Even if Uribe were committed to a mental health institution, the poor conditions in Mexico’s mental health facilities were not created with the intent to inflict suffering. Furthermore, Uribe’s claim that he would be tortured due to his former gang membership and tattoos was also speculative. View "URIBE ANDRADE V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Sara Esteban-Garcia, a native and citizen of Guatemala and an indigenous woman of Mam descent, petitioned for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) which affirmed an immigration judge's order denying her application for asylum and claim for withholding of removal under sections 208 and 241(b)(3)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Esteban-Garcia had fled Guatemala after a man she had been romantically involved with, along with his friends, demanded she become a prostitute or sell drugs to earn money for them. The immigration judge and the BIA found that Esteban-Garcia had failed to establish a nexus between the harm she experienced and a statutorily protected ground. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the record did not compel a contrary conclusion. It noted that the petitioner consistently stated the reason why her alleged persecutors wanted her to become a prostitute and drug seller was so that they could benefit financially, which is not a protected ground. Therefore, the court denied the petition for review. View "Esteban-Garcia v. Garland" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit was asked to review a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) concerning F.J.A.P., a petitioner from El Salvador. F.J.A.P. had previously been removed from the U.S. but returned due to threats from the MS-13 gang. After his return to the U.S., his original removal order was reinstated. F.J.A.P. then applied for withholding-only relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), which an immigration judge granted. However, the BIA reversed this decision. F.J.A.P. petitioned the Seventh Circuit for review.The court first addressed whether it had jurisdiction to review F.J.A.P.'s claim. The court concluded that a reinstated order of removal was not final for purposes of judicial review under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 until the agency had completed withholding proceedings. Therefore, F.J.A.P.'s petition was timely because it was filed within 30 days of the completion of his CAT proceedings.On the merits of the case, the court found that the BIA had not applied the correct standard of review to the immigration judge's decision. The BIA was required to review the immigration judge's factual findings for clear error, not de novo. However, the BIA had failed to address the immigration judge's key factual findings, had given more weight to certain facts in the record than others, and had not explained how the immigration judge's alleged errors displayed a lack of logic, plausibility, or support in the record. As a result, the court granted F.J.A.P.'s petition and remanded the case to the BIA for reconsideration of the immigration judge's decision under the correct standard of review. View "F. J. A. P. v. Garland" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed a petition by Israel Amador-Morales, a Mexican citizen, challenging the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) to deny his motion to reopen his case. Morales had entered the United States without inspection in 2003, was voluntarily departed in 2012, and then re-entered without inspection in 2013. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) sought his removal and issued a Notice to Appear alleging his removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Morales admitted the allegations and conceded removability in 2016. However, in 2019, he withdrew his admission and concession, and moved to terminate the proceedings. The Immigration Judge denied the motion, ordered his removal, and the BIA dismissed his appeal and denied the motion to reopen.Morales argued that the BIA should have granted his motion to reopen, erred in ruling his objection to the Notice to Appear as untimely, and misconstrued his motion as asking it to compel DHS to exercise prosecutorial discretion. The court, however, found that Morales's objections to the Notice to Appear were untimely as they occurred after the closing of pleadings. The court also determined that the BIA's decision that it lacked the authority to compel the DHS to exercise prosecutorial discretion did not constitute an abuse of discretion.The court denied the petition for review, upholding the BIA's decision to deny the motion to reopen and maintaining Morales's removal order. View "Amador-Morales v. Garland" on Justia Law