Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit denied Petitioners' petition for review of their asylum and withholding of removal claims and concluded that Petitioners waived any argument regarding relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), holding that substantial evidence supported the immigration judge's (IJ) factual determinations and that the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) committed no errors of law.In their application for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief, Petitioners argued that they experiences in El Salvador established persecution and that they belonged to two separate particular social groups that were threatened by gang members. The IJ denied relief, concluding that Petitioners failed to establish persecution and did not meet their burden as to the two separate particular social groups they claimed. The BIA affirmed. The First Circuit denied review, holding that the BIA and IJ did not err when they concluded that Petitioners did not meet their burden with respect to persecution on account of a protected group and withholding of removal. View "Sanchez v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for rehearing en banc after a request for a vote on whether to rehear the matter en banc, and the matter failed to receive a majority of the votes of the nonrecused active judges in favor of en banc consideration, in a case in which the panel held that: (1) where the adjudication of a non-citizen’s visa application implicates a citizen’s constitutional rights, due process requires that the government provide timely and adequate notice to the citizen of a decision that will deprive the citizen of that interest; and (2) because the government failed to provide timely notice here, it was not entitled to summary judgment based on the doctrine of consular nonreviewability. View "SANDRA MUNOZ, ET AL V. DOS, ET AL" on Justia Law

An Immigration Judge (IJ) denied Petitioner asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, and Petitioner petitioned for review.
The Fourth Circuit granted in part, denied in part, and remanded. The BIA properly held that Petitioner was not eligible for CAT protection, and so the court denied the petition for review as to the CAT claim. But the BIA erred in not recognizing the nexus that Petitioner established between the persecution she suffered and her religion. As a result of that error, the BIA erred in determining that Petitioner was not a refugee eligible for asylum. The court explained that when Petitioner left the country 12 days after her initial police report, Petitioner had not been harmed, and she did not offer any evidence that the police colluded with MS-13 or otherwise acquiesced in the gang’s activity. With no such evidence, a reasonable adjudicator could find that there was no government acquiescence in her persecution. View "Odalis Chicas-Machado v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of Sudan and citizen of South Sudan, petitions this Court for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) order affirming the immigration judge’s (IJ) decision ordering Petitioner removed and reversing the IJ’s decision granting Petitioner deferral of removal to South Sudan. Petitioner argued that the BIA erred by (1) limiting its review on remand to address only whether he had been convicted of a theft offense, (2) determining that the Nebraska shoplifting statute constitutes an aggravated felony as a theft offense, and (3) reversing the IJ’s grant of deferral of removal to South Sudan.   The Eighth Circuit granted the petition for review, vacated the BIA’s order, and remanded the matter to the BIA for further proceedings. The court explained that for Nebraska’s shoplifting statute to be a categorical match to the generic definition of theft, it must criminalize only those who act with the specific intent to “deprive the owner of the right and benefits of ownership.” The court wrote that contrary to the BIA’s order, that appropriation “necessarily deprives the owner of the rights and benefits of ownership” does not mean that the offender acted with the specific intent for that deprivation to occur. Accordingly, the BIA erred in finding that Petitioner was removable for having committed a theft offense—and, thus, an aggravated felony—based upon his Nebraska shoplifting convictions. View "Ruachkuoth Thok v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review from two orders of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and denying his request to reopen and reconsider the denial of his applications.   The Eighth Circuit denied the petitions. The court explained that although Petitioner argued the BIA erred in affirming the IJ’s denial of his asylum application, Petitioner failed to challenge before the BIA the IJ’s alternative, holding that Petitioner was not entitled to asylum because his application was untimely, and the BIA deemed that this argument was waived. Further, the court wrote that Petitioner similarly failed to offer any argument regarding the timeliness of his asylum application before this Court. And, in any event, the court wrote that it will not disturb the BIA’s conclusion that this issue has been waived and is dispositive of the asylum application. View "Alexander Arroyo-Sosa v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner and her minor son were ordered removed in absentia. The immigration judge denied their motion to reopen the removal proceedings, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed their appeal. The BIA concluded that Petitioner had “not rebutted the slight presumption of delivery and receipt of the hearing notice at the address she provided.” Petitioner petitioned for review.   The Fourth Circuit granted the petition and vacated the dismissal by the BIA. The court explained that the statutory scheme contemplates a notice to appear that fully complies with the requirements of Section 1229(a)(1). The Supreme Court has emphasized that this notice must be a “single statutorily compliant document.” That is because the original notice to appear, by itself and regardless of any future need for a change in hearing, is a critical document, “the basis for commencing a grave legal proceeding” with profound implications for people like Petitioner and her son. If the government holds the original removal hearing as envisioned by the satisfactory notice to appear, there is no need for further notices. Of course, “if logistics require a change,” the government has statutory flexibility to send a change of hearing notice. But that flexibility does not excuse the government from its obligations to provide a valid notice to appear in the first instance. That did not happen here. Nor did Petitioner receive proper notice under Section 1229(a)(2). The court concluded that because she did not receive the “written notice required under paragraph (1) or (2) of section 1229(a),” Petitioner is entitled to the reopening of her proceedings and the rescission of her removal order. View "Azucena Lazo-Gavidia v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner petitioned for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision (1) affirming an Immigration Judge’s denial of his application for cancellation of removal and (2) denying his motion to remand. The BIA rejected Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, declined to remand for consideration of additional hardship relating to his cancellation application, and declined to remand to await adjudication of his U visa application. Petitioner argued that the BIA (1) applied an incorrect standard when reviewing his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, (2) overlooked and mischaracterized his new hardship evidence, and (3) failed to follow precedent when denying his request for remand.   The Second Circuit granted Petitioner’s petition for review, vacated the BIA’s decision, and remanded for further proceedings. The court explained that it does not matter whether Petitioner initially requested a continuance from the IJ or whether his motion to remand was filed while proceedings before the IJ were ongoing. Petitioner only became aware of prior counsel’s alleged misconduct the premise for his U visa application—after the IJ had issued its decision and Petitioner sought advice from other counsel. Thereafter, he appears to have diligently pursued his U visa application and presented proof of his submitted U visa application to the BIA while his appeal was still pending. The BIA has advanced no reason why Sanchez Sosa should not apply under these circumstances. Therefore, the court concluded that the BIA should have applied the Sanchez Sosa factors in considering Petitioner’s motion to remand as it pertains to his U visa or explained its reasoning for not doing so. View "Paucar v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of El Salvador, has twice traveled unlawfully into the United States — first in 2012, and again in 2016. In both instances, Petitioner fled threats to his life, and attacks were carried out against him by the 18th Street Gang and the Salvadoran police. After seeking protection from removal before an immigration judge (the “IJ”) in 2016, Petitioner was afforded relief — in the form of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (the “CAT”) — by three separate IJ rulings. On each occasion, the Board of Immigration Appeals (the “BIA”) reversed the IJ rulings. Petitioner, for his part, was removed to El Salvador in May 2022 and has awaited further developments in these proceedings from his home country. In this appeal, Petitioner challenged and sought reversal of three rulings made by the BIA.   The Fourth Circuit granted Petitioner’s petition for review and reverse the BIA rulings in part, affirm them in part, and vacate them in part. The court otherwise remanded to the BIA for such further proceedings. The court explained that the BIA declined to “interact seriously” with the record before it in reviewing Petitioner’s claim for CAT protection, and its failure in that regard requires a remand. Petitioner’s evidence, to be certain, is strongly supportive of his CAT claim — he has, after all, already been subjected to “cruel and inhuman treatment” after being initially removed to El Salvador. But the court declined to resolve whether Petitioner is entitled to CAT protection. Instead, the court vacated the BIA’s 2021 Reversal Order with respect to its CAT ruling and remanded for the BIA to fully and properly assess Petitioner’s CAT claim in the first instance. View "Christian Santos Garcia v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner is a native of El Salvador. He first entered the United States around 2003 and was ordered removed in 2007. He then returned three more times—in 2010, 2018, and 2019. This appeal concerns his 2019 visit. In September 2019, the federal government reinstated Petitioner’s 2007 removal order. Petitioner sought withholding of removal and CAT relief. An immigration judge denied his application and, on April 27, 2022, the BIA dismissed his appeal. Petitioner petitioned for review on May 26, 2022.   The Fifth Circuit dismissed Petitioner’s petition for lack of jurisdiction. The court explained that Congress has limited the court’s jurisdiction to final orders “concluding that the alien is deportable or ordering deportation.  And it imposed another condition: the petition must be filed within 30 days of that order. The BIA’s denial of Petitioner’s application for withholding of removal and CAT relief is not a final order of removal. And his petition is untimely because it was filed over 30 days after his reinstatement order became final. View "Argueta-Hernandez v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The immigration judge (“IJ”) denied his application, explaining that while he had left El Salvador because of a genuine fear of gangs, neither he nor his family had had any encounters with gang members. Because the basis for his fear was simply a “generalized” fear of criminal gang members and violence in El Salvador, the IJ found that he was ineligible for relief.On appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), Petitioner argued that he had proceeded pro se before the IJ and that the IJ had failed to develop the record, as required by Quintero v. Garland, 998 F.3d 612, 622 (4th Cir. 2021). The BIA concluded, however, that the IJ had fulfilled the requirements of Quintero and affirmed.The Fourth Circuit affirmed, finding that the BIA's conclusions were not legally erroneous or lacked evidentiary support. View "Jose Trejo Tepas v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law