Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

The United States’ war in Afghanistan required regional allies willing to aid the effort. One such ally was Petitioner, a Pakistani businessman who sold supplies to coalition forces. This invoked the wrath of the Pakistani Taliban, which demanded exorbitant payments from Petitioner under threat of death. Petitioner repeatedly refused, and the Taliban attempted to carry out its threat, promising to hunt him until it succeeded. After losing his business, home, and nearly his life, Petitioner fled to the United States seeking asylum. The Immigration Judge and Board of Immigration Appeals both recognized that Petitioner suffered past persecution, entitling him to a presumption that the Taliban would continue to target him if he returned to Pakistan. But they agreed with the government that because Petitioner lived in Islamabad (the capital of Pakistan) for a few weeks without the Taliban finding him, he could live in a new area of the country without fear of reprisal.   The Fourth Circuit granted Petitioner’s petition for review, reversed the Board’s denial of Petitioner’s preserved claims, and remanded with instructions that the agency grant relief. The court explained that Petitioner’s brief sojourn to Islamabad—where he never left the house— doesn’t rebut the presumption that a notorious terrorist organization continues to imperil his life. The court granted relief since the record would compel any reasonable adjudicator to conclude Petitioner faces a well-founded threat of future persecution. View "Shaker Ullah v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner is a native of China admitted to the United States on a student visa in 2009. Petitioner sought review of a Board of Immigration Appeals order denying his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. If removed to China, Petitioner fears, he will be persecuted and tortured by Chinese authorities, who in 2008 allegedly imprisoned and violently beat him because of his Christian beliefs and practices.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the Board’s decision and remanded for further explanation. In denying relief on Petitioner’s withholding claim, both the IJ and the BIA relied at least in part on Petitioner’s failure to provide affidavits from his minister or fellow church members from China, attesting to his “activities as a Christian” and his arrest during home church services. But Petitioner repeatedly explained during his hearing why such evidence was not available: his minister and co-religionists feared reprisal from Chinese authorities if they came forward on his behalf. And neither the IJ nor the BIA made any finding as to the sufficiency of that explanation or the reasonable availability of the affidavits hypothesized by the IJ, or even noted Petitioner’s explanation in their opinions. The court left it to the agency on remand to evaluate Petitioner’s explanation and determine whether evidence from his co-religionists in China was “reasonably obtainable.” View "Zuowei Chen v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner is a rancher from Mexico who fears returning. He gives several reasons why. Twice, his uncles were kidnapped and held for ransom. The second time, the kidnapping was reported to the police. And though the police said they would “try to help,” they were ultimately unable to “do anything.” On another occasion, someone took pictures of Petitioner’s family home and then demanded money and threatened to kidnap a family member. And once, when he was driving from his family’s ranch to his home, two vans began chasing him. Shortly after Petitioner entered the United States, the Attorney General began removal proceedings against him. Petitioner conceded removability and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied his applications.  The BIA explained that it agreed with the IJ’s social-group-recognizability and nexus rulings, as well as the IJ’s determination regarding CAT relief.   The Eighth Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition. The court explained that here, the record does not support Petitioner’s contention that the Mexican government has turned a blind eye to criminal-gang-inflicted torture. When one of Petitioner’s uncles was kidnapped, the police offered to help. The fact that they were unable to “do anything” does not evidence acquiescence. And when Petitioner sought help from the police after the car chase, they provided it. Petitioner counters that country conditions reports show that criminal organizations have infiltrated the Mexican police and government. Yet he does not explain how this “general infiltration” makes the Mexican government “likely to acquiesce in his torture.” View "Efren Uriostegui-Teran v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Peru, appeals the Board of Immigration Appeals’ determination that she is ineligible for relief under 8 U.S.C. Section 1229b(b)(2), a provision whose language was originally adopted as part of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 and that outlines the conditions under which certain “battered spouses or children” qualify for discretionary cancellation of removal. As relevant here, it requires a petitioning alien to show that she “has been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty” by her spouse or parent. Petitioner contends that the Immigration Judge and the BIA made two errors in refusing her cancellation request. First, she maintains that, as a matter of law, they misinterpreted the statutory term “extreme cruelty” to require proof of physical—as distinguished from mental or emotional—abuse. And second, she asserts that having misread the law, the IJ and the BIA wrongly concluded that she doesn’t qualify for discretionary relief.   The Eleventh Circuit granted her petition for review and remanded it to the BIA for further consideration. The court explained that it agreed with Petitioner—and held— that the BIA misinterpreted 8 U.S.C. Section 1229b(b)(2). The term “extreme cruelty” does not require a petitioning alien to prove that she suffered physical abuse in order to qualify for discretionary cancellation of removal; proof of mental or emotional abuse is sufficient to satisfy the “extreme cruelty” prong of Section 1229b(b)(2)’s five-prong standard. View "Esmelda Ruiz v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for rehearing en banc after a request for a vote on whether to rehear the matter en banc, and the matter failed to receive a majority of the votes of the nonrecused active judges in favor of en banc consideration in a case in which the panel held that: (1) subject only to a very limited form of habeas corpus review that is inapplicable in this case, Section 242 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), “clearly and unambiguously” precludes judicial review of expedited removal orders, even with regard to constitutional challenges to such orders; and (2) as applied in this case—which involved an arriving alien with no previous ties to the United States—that denial of all judicial review was constitutional. View "HEVER MENDOZA LINARES V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

In 1996, Melvin Osorio-Morales’s family member, Jeremias, was dating Argueta, who was also dating a member of the Hernandez family. The men had a shootout; Jeremias was killed. In retaliation, the Osorio family killed Robert Hernandez. The Hernandez family set fire to the Osorio home, burning a grandmother alive. Two uncles escaped with significant burns. Apparently, a criminal case was brought after the fire, but the accused Hernandez family members were subsequently released, setting off a bloody feud. Melvin was born a year later. Melvin never had a violent interaction with the Hernandez family, but had to “watch [his] back” and carry weapons for protection. Melvin testified that one cousin was left paralyzed, three uncles were killed, two cousins committed suicide out of fear of what the Hernandez family would do to them, and another cousin was stabbed to death.Melvin entered the U.S. in 2014. The BIA affirmed the denial of his claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. The Seventh Circuit denied relief. Findings that the Honduran government is not “unable or unwilling” to control the threat from the Hernandez family were supported by substantial evidence. A government’s decision not to prosecute, without more information, does not show an “unwillingness or inability to protect.” View "Osorio-Morales v. Garland" on Justia Law

Madrid-Mancia, who entered the United States from Honduras without being admitted or paroled, was immediately detained and served a putative Notice to Appear (NTA) charging her as removable, 8 U.S.C. 1229(a)(1)(A)–(D). The putative NTA directed Madrid-Mancia that she was “required to provide the DHS, in writing, with [her] full mailing address and telephone number,” and “notify the Immigration Court immediately” of any changes. It warned that “a removal order may be made by the immigration judge in [her] absence” if she failed to appear when summoned. The document stated that a removal hearing would take place on “a date to be set at a time to be set.” The Department of Justice sent Madrid-Mancia a second document (a “Notice of Hearing”) years later providing the missing information. She had moved and claims she never received the notice. When Madrid-Mancia did not appear as directed, she was ordered removed in absentia.The Third Circuit ordered that the removal order be rescinded. Congress only allows a supplemental notice “in the case of any change or postponement in the time and place of [an alien’s removal] proceedings,” 8 U.S.C. 1229(a)(2)(A). Here, no change or postponement occurred; DHS never issued a new Notice to Appear. View "Madrid-Mancia v. Attorney General of the United States" on Justia Law

Pakistani nationals and brothers petitioned for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals decision upholding orders denying them adjustment of status and directing their removal from the United States. Petitioners argued that the agency erred in finding them ineligible for adjustment of status based on their earlier filing of frivolous, i.e., deliberately and materially false, asylum applications because those applications were untimely and, thus, their concededly false statements could not have been material to a matter properly before the agency for decision. Petitioners further faulted the agency for alternatively denying them adjustment of status as a matter of discretion.   The Second Circuit denied Petitioners’ petition for their review. However, the court explained that a question arises as to how Petitioners removal will affect their future ability to apply for reentry to the United States. A permanent and unwaivable bar on reentry applies to any alien who filed a frivolous claim for asylum after receiving notice of that consequence. Otherwise, the alien may be subject to lesser, waivable bars on reentry. Because this court cannot determine on the present record whether Petitioners received the notice required to trigger a permanent, unwaivable bar. The court granted review as to that single question and remanded for the limited purpose of allowing the agency to make an express finding as to notice and, based on that finding, to specify the scope of the reentry bar that will attend Petitioners’ removal. View "Ud Din v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner pleaded guilty to 13 drug-related charges, including possession of cocaine for sale under California Health and Safety Code Section 11351. In removal proceedings, the agency found Petitioner removable for having committed a drug-trafficking aggravated felony and for having committed a controlled-substance offense. Applying the presumption established in Matter of Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 270 (A.G. 2002)—that drug-trafficking offenses are, particularly serious crimes—the agency concluded that Petitioner’s Section 11351 conviction was a particularly serious crime that barred withholding. The agency also denied CAT relief.   The Ninth Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review. The panel explained that in Matter of Y-L-, the Attorney General instructed that aggravated felonies involving illicit drug trafficking are presumptively, particularly serious crimes and that this presumption may be overcome only in the most extenuating circumstances that are both extraordinary and compelling. The panel noted that the BIA’s particularly-serious-crime analysis here was cursory but concluded that the BIA applied Matter of Y-L- ’s presumption and that the BIA’s decision was supported by adequate reasoning. Observing that neither the IJ nor the BIA recited the Matter of Y-L- criteria, the panel explained that they are not required to do so.   The panel further concluded that, even if it had found that the BIA erred by considering facts not expressly incorporated into Matter of Y-L-’s minimum standard, it would still deny Petitioner’s petition because it was a legal certainty that Petitioner could not satisfy Matter of Y-L-’s minimum criteria. Thus, the panel concluded that this was one of those narrow circumstances where remand was unwarranted. View "KWANG PARK V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

Petitioner and her children, natives and citizens of Honduras, petitioned the Eighth Circuit for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) order affirming an immigration judge’s (IJ) decision ordering them removed and denying their claims for relief. In her petition for review, Petitioner claimed that the BIA erred (1) by finding that her due process rights were not violated when the IJ continued her case instead of terminating it and (2) by denying her application for asylum and statutory withholding of removal.   The Eighth Circuit denied their petition. The court explained that while Petitioner contends that by continuing the proceedings, the IJ “was engineering a preferred outcome,” the record demonstrates that the IJ “had not researched the issue before” and simply wanted “to give [DHS] a chance to address the issue.” Second, the court agreed with the BIA that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that she was prejudiced. By continuing the removal proceedings, the IJ provided Petitioner with exactly what she was promised: presence in the United States until November 10, 2018.   Further, the court concluded that substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that the gangsters’ threats did not rise to the level of past persecution. Here, the threats were telephonic, sporadic, and over a period of four years. Given that the record does not indicate that the gangsters ever acted, or attempted to act, upon these threats during this long period, the threats lack immediacy and appear exaggerated. View "Rosaura Brizuela v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law