Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Ecuador, entered the United States without inspection on or about July 17, 1999. He was 25 years old. Soon after his entry, he was apprehended with others who had entered the country near Brownsville, Texas. On July 23, 1999, he was given a Notice to Appear (“NTA”), charging him as subject to removal because he was present in the United States without having been admitted or paroled. The NTA did not provide a hearing date or time. Petitioner’s then-current address was correctly listed on the NTA as the address of the processing center in Los Fresnos, Texas, where he was then detained. Petitioner challenged the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen removal proceedings and rescind his in-absentia removal order.   The Fifth Circuit denied his petition. The court held: (1) Rodriguez does not apply here; (2) Spagnol Bastos, Gudiel, and Platero-Rosales govern this case; (3) the applicable rule from those cases is that an alien who fails to provide a viable mailing address/to correct an erroneous address forfeits his right to notice under Section 1229a(b)(5)(B); and (4) Petitioner forfeited his right to notice by failing to correct the erroneous address listed in his “Notification Requirement for Change of Address” and Form I-830. View "Nivelo Cardenas v. Garland" on Justia Law

Arias and her sister, Maria, sold tortillas in El Salvador. Months after their business opened, a note was slipped under their door, demanding they pay $50 per week and enclose a piece of intimate clothing. The note threatened death if the police were contacted. Arias recognized the handwriting as belonging to a former classmate who she knew was a member of the Mara 18 gang. A friend of Arias told Arias that Mara 18 had killed her son because she had filed a police complaint in response to a similar demand. Unable to afford payments and afraid of the gang, the sisters closed the business. Arias illegally entered the U.S. in 2014. Maria remained in El Salvador, in a different home. Maria does not leave the home. Arias’s son only leaves home to attend school; he is driven to and from school to avoid gangs.An IJ denied Arias’s applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. The BIA affirmed, finding that the gang targeted Arias to raise money for its criminal ventures, not for membership in an identified social group; she did not show she would be individually targeted for harm. Arias had not shown a nexus between her fear of future harm and a protected ground. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review, finding the denials supported by substantial evidence. Arias failed to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution. View "Arias v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of Honduras, sought a review of an order from the Board of Immigration Appeals denying his application for cancellation of removal. The Fourth Circuit dismissed the petition for review. The court held that it lacks jurisdiction because Petitioner did not timely file his petition within 30 days of the Board’s final order of removal. The court explained that the availability of voluntary departure may have remained “up in the air,” but voluntary departure does not affect Petitioner’s removability – “it affects only the manner of his exit.” Further, the court wrote that its decision in Li to dismiss without prejudice a petition that was timely filed, however, has no bearing on the court's authority to act on a petition that was not. View "Williams Rodriguez Salgado v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Cambodia, was admitted to the United States as a refugee in 1983. In 1999, he pleaded guilty to receiving stolen property in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Section 3925(a) in Pennsylvania state court and was sentenced to 3 to 24 months imprisonment. Based on that conviction, Petitioner was charged as removable for having been convicted of an aggravated felony as defined in 8 U.S.C. Section 1101(a)(43)(G). Petitioner filed a motion to terminate his removal proceedings. Petitioner argued that his conviction did not categorically qualify as an aggravated felony. An IJ denied the motion, holding that Section 3925(a) “on its face” requires proof of “a defendant’s knowledge or belief, and that belief is not objective” and that the statute thus satisfied the generic mens rea requirement. Petitioner sought relief from an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming a decision by an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) finding that he is removable.   The Fifth Circuit denied the petition. The court found that Petitioner’s conviction under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Section 3925(a) constitutes receipt of stolen property and thus is an aggravated felony for purposes of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). The court explained that the Third Circuit has held that Pennsylvania’s receipt of stolen property offense does not have an objective element and is “purely subjective.” The Third Circuit has considered variations on Petitioner’s argument and has rejected them. The court, therefore, concluded that 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Section 3925(a) is a categorical theft offense and thus qualifies as an “aggravated felony.” View "Khan v. Garland" on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming Petitioner's order of removal and denying his application for adjustment of status, holding that a conviction under Mass. Gen. Laws (MGL) ch. 269, 11C is not categorically a firearm offense, as defined by 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(c).Petitioner, a citizen of El Salvador, pleaded guilty in Massachusetts state court to defacing or receiving a firearm with a defaced serial number in violation of MGL ch. 269, 11C. The Department of Homeland Security later initiated removal proceedings against Petitioner charging him with removal based solely on his Massachusetts state court conviction. Petitioner moved to terminate the proceedings on the grounds that his Massachusetts conviction did not qualify as a removable firearm offense. The immigration judge sustained the removability charge and denied Petitioner's ensuing application to adjust his status. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The First Circuit vacated the BIA's opinion and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that MGL ch. 269, 11C was facially overbroad when compared to its federal counterpart. View "Portillo v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for panel rehearing and denied on behalf of the court a petition for rehearing en banc in a case in which the panel held that federal courts lack jurisdiction to review the discretionary determination that a particular noncitizen in immigration detention poses a danger to the community, and so is not entitled to release on bond. Judge Berzon, joined by Chief Judge Murguia and Judges Wardlaw, W. Fletcher, Paez, Christen, Hurwitz, Koh, Sung, Mendoza, and Desai, disagreed with the Court’s refusal to reconsider the panel opinion en banc. View "JAVIER MARTINEZ V. LOWELL CLARK, ET AL" on Justia Law

In 2021, Respondent-Appellant left Brazil with her daughter, Y.F.G., and eventually entered the United States. The child’s father, Petitioner-Appellee, shared custody of Y.F.G., and he petitioned for the child’s return to Brazil under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction and the International Child Abduction Remedies Act.Following a bench trial at which both parents testified, the district court ordered that Y.F.G. be returned to Brazil. The district court expressly found Father not to be credible, but because the district court concluded that Mother did not provide independent corroboration to support her own testimony, the district court found she had not established by clear and convincing evidence a “grave risk” of harm to Y.F.G. in Brazil.The Eleventh Circuit reversed. The court explained that when a factfinder does not believe an interested witness’s testimony, it may—but is not required to—consider that witness’s discredited testimony as corroborating substantive evidence that the opposite of the testimony is true. And when a single witness provides the only evidence on some point, that testimony, without corroboration, can still meet the standard of clear and convincing evidence if the factfinder concludes that it is credible. The district court failed to take these principles into account, requiring reversal. View "Wellekson Goncalves Silva v. Andriene Ferreira dos Santos" on Justia Law

Petitioner petitioned for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) order upholding the immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). He also challenged the BIA’s determination that defects in the Notice to Appear (“NTA”) did not require termination of his proceedings and that the BIA lacked authority to administratively close his case.   The Ninth Circuit filed: 1) an order withdrawing the opinion filed March 17, 2023, and reported at 62 F.4th 1223 (9th Cir. 2023), replacing that opinion with a concurrently filed amended opinion and, with these amendments, denying the government’s motion to amend; and 2) an amended opinion denying in part and granting in part Petitioner’s petition for review. In the amended opinion, the panel: (1) denied the petition as to Petitioner’s unexhausted argument that the omission of required time and place information in his NTA amounted to a claim-processing error; (2) remanded Petitioner’s administrative closure claim for further consideration in light of intervening precedent; and (3) remanded Petitioner’s asylum and withholding claims because the BIA erroneously reviewed the immigration judge’s nexus determination for clear error, rather than de novo. The panel concluded that substantial evidence supported the agency’s determination that Petitioner failed to establish the requisite government involvement or government acquiescence to any torture. View "JOSUE UMANA-ESCOBAR V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

Defendant, a citizen of Mexico, was indicted for illegally reentering the United States following prior removal, in violation of 8 U.S.C. Section 1326. He successfully moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that Section 1326 violates the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment and is, therefore, facially invalid.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting Defendant’s motion to dismiss. The court wrote that Defendant did not carry his burden of proving that Section 1326 was enacted with the intent to be discriminatory towards Mexicans and other Central and South Americans. The court held that the district court erred factually and legally in holding otherwise. Further, the court reasoned that Defendant’s equal protection challenge fails even under the usual test for assessing such claims set forth in Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), the panel declined to address whether immigration laws should be evaluated through a more deferential framework. As drafted, Section 1326 is facially neutral as to race. The panel, therefore, turned to the question of whether Defendant carried his burden of showing that racial discrimination was a motivating factor in enacting Section 1326. The panel disagreed with Defendant’s argument that a Senate Report, the basis for the 1952 legislation, is replete with racism. The panel held that the district court clearly erred when it relied on Congress’s decision to override President Truman’s veto of the INA as evidence that Section 1326 was enacted in part by discriminatory animus. View "USA V. GUSTAVO CARRILLO-LOPEZ" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for attempted illegal reentry after deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. Section 1326. He contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss his information for violations of the Speedy Trial Act.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the district court did not clearly err in excluding periods of delay resulting from ends-of-justice continuances granted due to events caused by the global COVID-19 pandemic. The panel concluded that the district court complied with the applicable statutory requirements. First, the district court’s finding that the ends of justice were best served by granting continuances during the period from August 14, 2020, until December 1, 2020, was timely because the district court put this finding on the record during the July 12, 2021, hearing on Defendant’s motion to dismiss under 18 U.S.C. Section 3162(a)(2). The continuances were also specifically limited in time to successive 30-day periods. Next, the district court made the requisite findings under Section 3161(h)(7)(A). The panel rejected Defendant’s argument that the district court erred by not dismissing his information on the ground that 8 U.S.C. Section 1326 violates the Equal Protection Clause. View "USA V. ARMANDO OROZCO-BARRON" on Justia Law