Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Three nonprofit organizations brought suit challenging an executive order that denies U.S. citizenship to children born in the United States whose fathers are neither citizens nor lawful permanent residents, and whose mothers are present in the country either unlawfully or only temporarily. The organizations alleged that they have members who are expecting children affected by the order, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that the order violates the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Immigration and Nationality Act.The United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire found that the plaintiffs had standing and a cause of action for injunctive relief. The court determined that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their constitutional and statutory claims, and that the equitable factors favored granting relief. It issued a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the executive order against the plaintiffs and their members, but not against nonparties. The government appealed the scope and propriety of the injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion, with de novo review of legal issues and clear error review of factual findings. The court affirmed the district court’s determination that the plaintiffs had standing and were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims under the Citizenship Clause and 8 U.S.C. § 1401. However, the First Circuit vacated the injunction to the extent that it ran directly against the President and the agencies themselves, holding that injunctive relief should be limited to agency officials. The court affirmed the injunction as applied to the organizations’ members who are likely to be harmed, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "New Hampshire Indonesian Community Support v. Trump" on Justia Law

The case concerns challenges to Executive Order No. 14160, issued in January 2025, which seeks to deny birthright citizenship to children born in the United States after its effective date if their fathers are not U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents and their mothers are either unlawfully or temporarily present in the country. Plaintiffs include individual immigrants, nonprofit organizations, and a coalition of states and local governments. They allege that the Executive Order violates the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a), the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment, the Separation of Powers doctrine, and the Administrative Procedure Act. The plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent enforcement of the Order.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted preliminary injunctions to both sets of plaintiffs, finding they were “exceedingly likely” to succeed on their claims under the Citizenship Clause and § 1401(a). The injunctions barred federal agencies and officials from enforcing the Executive Order against the plaintiffs and, in the case brought by the states, issued a nationwide injunction to provide complete relief. The government appealed, challenging the plaintiffs’ standing, the scope of the injunctions, and the merits of the constitutional and statutory claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s findings that the plaintiffs have Article III standing and are likely to succeed on the merits. The First Circuit held that the Executive Order’s denial of birthright citizenship to children born in the United States under the specified circumstances violates both the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a), as interpreted by United States v. Wong Kim Ark and subsequent precedent. The court affirmed the preliminary injunctions in part, vacated them in part as to agency defendants, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Doe v. Trump" on Justia Law

A Haitian national entered the United States on a temporary visa in 2010 and was later charged with removability for overstaying his visa. After initially obtaining temporary protected status, which was extended for several years, his status was not renewed in 2018. He was subsequently arrested multiple times in New Hampshire between 2018 and 2020 for incidents involving domestic violence and resisting arrest, though not all arrests resulted in convictions. Following his last arrest, he was detained and removal proceedings were initiated. He sought adjustment of status through his wife, as well as cancellation of removal and other forms of relief.An Immigration Judge (IJ) found him removable and denied his applications for adjustment of status and cancellation of removal. The IJ found the testimonies of the petitioner and his wife credible but inconsistent regarding the details of the arrests, and gave more weight to police reports, which were considered closer in time to the events. The IJ denied adjustment of status as a matter of discretion, citing the negative factors reflected in the police reports, and found the petitioner ineligible for cancellation of removal due to insufficient continuous physical presence, as his notice to appear was served less than two years after his arrival.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision, holding that the police reports were reliable and their use was not fundamentally unfair, and that the IJ could consider evidence of criminal conduct not resulting in conviction. The BIA also found the notice to appear sufficient to stop the accrual of continuous presence. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the BIA erred by failing to determine whether the police reports were corroborated before giving them substantial weight in denying adjustment of status. The court vacated the BIA’s order as to adjustment of status and remanded for further proceedings, but affirmed the denial of cancellation of removal. View "Maurice v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A Nigerian citizen who became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in 2005 was placed in removal proceedings after being convicted of conspiracy to commit passport fraud. He had lived in the U.S. for many years, had a long-term partner, and was the father of four U.S. citizen children. His conviction stemmed from a scheme to obtain fraudulent U.S. passports for noncitizens, for which he was sentenced to 27 months in prison. After serving his sentence and briefly fleeing to Canada, he was returned to the U.S. and charged as inadmissible for committing a crime involving moral turpitude. In removal proceedings, he applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), claiming past persecution and fear of future harm in Nigeria due to his former union activities and threats from a militia group.An Immigration Judge (IJ) found him inadmissible, denied all forms of relief, and determined that his conviction constituted a particularly serious crime, barring asylum and withholding. The IJ also found his and his partner’s testimony not credible and denied CAT relief, concluding he had not shown a likelihood of torture with government acquiescence. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, agreeing with the IJ’s findings and further holding that the absence of an interpreter did not violate due process, that the conviction was a particularly serious crime, and that he was not eligible for a waiver of inadmissibility.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the BIA misapplied the legal standard for determining a particularly serious crime by failing to consider the elements of the underlying substantive offense in the conspiracy conviction. The court also found that the BIA did not properly analyze the CAT claim under the required legal framework and failed to consider eligibility for a waiver of inadmissibility. The court denied the due process claim but vacated the BIA’s decision and remanded for further proceedings, ordering a stay of removal pending the outcome. View "Amos v. Attorney General United States of America" on Justia Law

A Mexican citizen of Mayan descent sought relief from removal to Mexico, claiming that his indigenous heritage, visible gang-related tattoos, history of multiple deportations, mental illnesses, and substance-abuse disorder placed him at high risk of persecution and torture by Mexican police or criminal organizations. He described three attacks in Mexico: one by police, one by a vigilante group, and one by masked gang or cartel members. He also submitted expert testimony and extensive documentary evidence about widespread human rights abuses in Mexico, particularly against individuals with characteristics similar to his.After the Department of Homeland Security reinstated his prior removal order, he applied for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). An Immigration Judge (IJ) denied both forms of relief, finding him not credible based on his denial of gang membership, his demeanor, and the omission of a sensitive injury from his application. The IJ also found that his country-conditions evidence did not independently establish a likelihood of torture. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s findings and denied relief.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court denied the petition for review as to withholding of removal, holding that substantial evidence supported the agency’s adverse credibility determination, particularly regarding the implausibility of the petitioner’s denial of gang membership and his demeanor. However, the court found that the BIA failed to give reasoned consideration to substantial expert and country-conditions evidence relevant to the CAT claim. The court therefore granted the petition in part, remanding the CAT claim for further consideration in light of all relevant evidence, and denied the petition in part as to withholding of removal. View "Uc Encarnacion v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Five Indian citizens entered the United States on F-1 student visas, completed their studies, and enrolled in “optional practical training” (OPT) programs. They allege that the organizations providing their OPT programs failed to deliver any actual training or work, and ultimately ceased communication. After returning to India for brief visits, each attempted to reenter the United States. At the airports, immigration officials revoked their visas. Four were subjected to expedited removal, while the fifth was permitted to withdraw his application for entry. All five returned to India and subsequently filed suit from abroad.The plaintiffs brought their case in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, invoking the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to challenge the administrative findings that they had misused the OPT program. They claimed they never received notice of any administrative proceedings or an opportunity to respond. The district court dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, relying on 8 U.S.C. §1252(a)(2)(A)(i), which generally bars judicial review of individual determinations or claims arising from expedited removal orders under §1225(b)(1). The court found that the plaintiffs’ attempt to challenge the underlying findings, rather than the removal orders themselves, did not avoid the jurisdictional bar.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court held that §1252(a)(2)(A)(i) precludes judicial review not only of expedited removal orders but also of the underlying justifications for those orders. The court further concluded that the administrative findings regarding the OPT programs were not “final” agency actions reviewable under the APA, as they were merely steps leading to the removal orders. Thus, the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the plaintiffs’ claims. View "Dubey v. Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

The case concerns a Guatemalan petitioner, López, who sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture in the United States. After an immigration judge denied her applications, López appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), indicating her intent to file a supporting brief. On the deadline, her counsel attempted to file the brief electronically but mistakenly submitted it to the immigration court instead of the BIA. The immigration court rejected the filing weeks later, and counsel promptly refiled with the BIA and moved for acceptance of the late brief, explaining the technical error.The BIA, through an unsigned notice, denied the motion to accept the late-filed brief, stating only that the rationale was insufficient and that no further motions or reconsideration would be entertained. Subsequently, a single-member panel of the BIA dismissed López’s appeal, adopting the immigration judge’s decision and stating that the grounds for appeal were waived because they were not developed in a timely brief or statement. The BIA did not address the circumstances of the late filing or the explanation provided by López’s counsel.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the BIA’s actions. The court held that the BIA abused its discretion by failing to provide an adequate explanation for denying the motion to accept the late-filed brief, especially given the plausible and promptly explained reason for the delay. The First Circuit granted the petition for review and remanded the case to the BIA for further consideration consistent with its opinion, without addressing the merits of the underlying asylum claims. View "Lopez-Gomez v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A Guatemalan citizen and her minor son entered the United States without legal status in August 2021. In November 2022, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against her. Nearly a year later, she applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), naming her son as a derivative applicant. She claimed that, for four years prior to her departure, unidentified hooded men in her home village threatened to kidnap her children if she did not support their side in a local land conflict. She did not report these threats to authorities, and neither she nor her family suffered physical harm or kidnapping attempts.An Immigration Judge (IJ) found her asylum application untimely, rejecting her argument that ignorance of immigration law constituted an extraordinary circumstance excusing the late filing. The IJ also found that the threats did not amount to past persecution, nor did she establish a well-founded fear of future persecution, as the threats were unfulfilled and not linked to a protected ground. The IJ denied withholding of removal, citing her failure to meet the higher burden required, and denied CAT protection, finding no evidence she would likely be tortured or that the Guatemalan government would acquiesce in such harm. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, agreeing that her circumstances were not extraordinary and that the threats were insufficiently specific or severe to constitute persecution or torture.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. It held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the discretionary denial of her untimely asylum application under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D). The court further held that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s denial of withholding of removal and CAT protection, as the record did not compel a finding of past persecution, future persecution, or likely torture. The petition for review was dismissed in part and denied in part. View "Zapet-Alvarado v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A woman from Honduras entered the United States without inspection in 2005 and was served with a Notice to Appear (NTA) for removal proceedings, which included the time, date, and location of her initial hearing, as well as instructions to update her address. She failed to appear at her first scheduled hearing, which was dismissed because the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) had not filed the NTA with the immigration court. After DHS filed the NTA and moved to recalendar, subsequent hearing notices sent to her listed address were returned as undeliverable. She did not appear at the rescheduled hearing in November 2009, and the immigration judge (IJ) ordered her removal in absentia.She later filed three motions to reopen her removal proceedings, arguing each time that she had not received notice of her hearing. The first motion was denied by the IJ, who found she had constructive notice and was at fault for not updating her address; the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. Her second motion was denied by the BIA as repetitive. In her third motion, she cited new Supreme Court decisions (Pereira v. Sessions and Niz-Chavez v. Garland) and raised a new jurisdictional argument, but the BIA found the motion untimely and numerically barred, declined to exercise its sua sponte authority, and rejected her legal arguments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s denial under an abuse-of-discretion standard. The court held that even if multiple motions to reopen based on lack of notice were permitted, the petitioner’s arguments lacked merit because she received an NTA that satisfied statutory notice requirements and failed to fulfill her obligation to update her address. The court also held that the immigration court had jurisdiction and that it lacked authority to review the BIA’s discretionary decision not to reopen proceedings sua sponte. The petition for review was denied. View "Vargas-Rodriguez v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A naturalized U.S. citizen and his noncitizen son challenged the U.S. Secretary of State and the Consul General of the U.S. Consulate in Rio de Janeiro over the reclassification of a visa petition. The father, after becoming a lawful permanent resident, filed a Form I-130 petition for his son, who was under 21 at the time. The son turned 21 during the process, and the petition was approved when a visa in the F2A category was available. After the father naturalized, the consulate reclassified the petition into the F1 category for adult children of U.S. citizens, resulting in a lengthy wait for visa availability. The plaintiffs alleged that, under the Child Status Protection Act (CSPA), the son should still be considered under 21 for visa purposes, and the reclassification was unlawful.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed the complaint, relying on the doctrine of consular nonreviewability, which generally bars judicial review of consular decisions regarding visa denials. The court did not address the merits of whether the reclassification was lawful under the CSPA.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that the doctrine of consular nonreviewability did not bar judicial review in this instance because the plaintiffs were challenging the reclassification of the visa petition, not a visa denial. The court then addressed the merits and concluded that, under the CSPA, the son’s statutory age should be calculated using the formula provided for F2A beneficiaries, which accounts for bureaucratic delays. Therefore, the son remained a “child” for visa purposes at the time of the father’s naturalization, and the reclassification to the F1 category was unlawful. The First Circuit reversed the District Court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "Teles De Menezes v. Rubio" on Justia Law