Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Mohsen Mahdawi, a Lawful Permanent Resident and undergraduate student at Columbia University, was arrested during his naturalization interview in Vermont. He was detained and served with a Notice to Appear, indicating that the U.S. Secretary of State had determined he was removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act. Mahdawi filed a habeas petition, claiming his arrest and detention were in retaliation for his advocacy on the war in Gaza, violating his First and Fifth Amendment rights. The district court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) preventing his removal from Vermont and later granted his release on bail, finding he was neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community.The United States District Court for the District of Vermont initially granted Mahdawi’s emergency motion for a TRO and later extended it. The court also granted his motion for release on bail pending the resolution of his habeas petition. The government sought an emergency stay of these orders, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction over Mahdawi’s habeas petition and the authority to order his release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and denied the government’s motion for a stay. The court found that the government was unlikely to succeed on its arguments that the district court lacked jurisdiction over Mahdawi’s habeas petition and the authority to order his release. The court also concluded that the government had not demonstrated irreparable injury and that the balance of equities tipped in favor of denying the stay. Consequently, the government’s motion for a stay and request for a writ of mandamus were both denied. View "Mahdawi v. Trump" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to the Department of Defense's (DoD) authority to impose time-in-service requirements for expedited naturalization of noncitizen servicemembers under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Historically, the DoD certified noncitizens' honorable service for naturalization without a time-in-service requirement. However, in 2017, the DoD issued a policy requiring a minimum of 180 days of active-duty service or one year for reservists before certifying honorable service. In 2020, a group of noncitizen servicemembers challenged this policy under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, finding the policy arbitrary and capricious, contrary to law, and that the DoD's role in certifying honorable service was purely ministerial. The court vacated the time-in-service requirement and enjoined the DoD from withholding certification based on the policy. The DoD appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. During the appeal, the DoD rescinded the challenged policy and did not introduce a replacement. The court determined that the case was moot due to the rescission of the policy and dismissed the appeal. The court also vacated the district court's judgment, finding no indication that the DoD rescinded the policy to evade review and emphasizing the need to clear the path for future litigation on the issue. View "Samma v. DOD" on Justia Law

Erika Marie Plancarte pleaded guilty to conspiracy to transport an alien into the United States. The plea agreement required the government to recommend a 90-day imprisonment sentence. At the San Ysidro Port of Entry, Plancarte illegally transported a woman and her three children into the U.S., using false documents. She was arrested after admitting to the smuggling.The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California received a presentence report (PSR) that contained ambiguities about the relationship between the woman and the children. Plancarte requested a non-custodial sentence, while the government adhered to the plea agreement, recommending 90 days of custody. The government also clarified the PSR's ambiguities and highlighted Plancarte's criminal history and recidivism, arguing that previous sentences had not deterred her behavior. Plancarte argued that the government breached the plea agreement by including additional commentary and referencing her criminal history.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the government did not implicitly breach the plea agreement. The government’s references to Plancarte’s criminal history and its clarification of the PSR were permissible and did not undermine the plea agreement. The court found that the government’s comments were made in good faith and were consistent with advocating for the agreed-upon sentence. The court also noted that the government was not required to present mitigating evidence. Consequently, the appellate waiver in the plea agreement was enforced, and the appeal was dismissed. View "USA V. PLANCARTE" on Justia Law

A Turkish graduate student, Rümeysa Öztürk, was lawfully residing in Massachusetts on a student visa when she was arrested by plainclothes officers without warning on March 25, 2025. She was transported across state lines and eventually detained in Louisiana. Her counsel, unaware of her location, filed a habeas petition in the District of Massachusetts, alleging her arrest was based on an op-ed she co-authored. The petition was transferred to the District of Vermont after it was revealed she had been in Vermont during transit.The District of Vermont set a schedule for a bail hearing and to resolve the constitutional claims in the habeas petition. The court ordered the government to transfer Öztürk from Louisiana to Vermont to aid in these proceedings. The government appealed this order, seeking an emergency stay of the transfer.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that the government failed to justify a stay. It determined that the District of Vermont was the proper venue for the habeas petition since Öztürk was in Vermont when the petition was filed. The court also found that the government was unlikely to succeed on its arguments that jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act deprived the district court of jurisdiction over Öztürk’s detention challenge. Additionally, the court held that the government did not demonstrate irreparable injury absent a stay and that the balance of equities favored Öztürk.The Second Circuit denied the government’s motion for a stay, denied the request for a writ of mandamus, and vacated the administrative stay. The court ordered the government to comply with the district court’s transfer order within one week. View "Öztürk v. Hyde" on Justia Law

Stefan Green, a South African citizen, applied for an R-1 visa to serve as a worship leader at Calvary Albuquerque, Inc., a non-profit church in New Mexico. His application was denied by a consular officer, leading Calvary to sue, alleging the denial violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). The district court dismissed the suit, citing the consular nonreviewability doctrine, which generally prevents judicial review of consular officers' visa decisions.The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico dismissed the case, ruling that RFRA did not authorize judicial review of the consular officer’s decision. The court also found that the consular officer provided a facially legitimate and bona fide reason for the visa denial, and Calvary did not plausibly allege bad faith. The district court denied Calvary’s motion for a preliminary injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Tenth Circuit held that RFRA does not expressly authorize judicial review of consular officers' visa decisions, thus upholding the consular nonreviewability doctrine. The court also concluded that even if RFRA claims could be considered under the constitutional claim exception, the consular officer provided a facially legitimate and bona fide reason for denying the visa, and Calvary did not plausibly allege bad faith. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Calvary Albuquerque v. Blinken" on Justia Law

Samir Fernandes Baptista, a lawful permanent resident, was convicted in Massachusetts of unarmed assault with intent to rob or steal. During his removal proceedings, the immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) determined that this state crime is categorically an aggravated felony attempted theft offense under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Consequently, the immigration judge ordered Baptista removed for committing an aggravated felony after admission, and the BIA upheld this order.Baptista appealed the BIA's decision, arguing that his conviction does not qualify as an attempted theft offense under the INA. He contended that under Massachusetts law, a defendant could be convicted of unarmed assault by stealing property with the victim’s fraudulently obtained consent, which would make the state offense broader than the generic federal theft offense that requires the taking to be against the victim’s will. Baptista also argued that his conviction cannot qualify as an attempt because it does not require a defendant to commit an overt act toward a taking.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the BIA's legal conclusion de novo. The court concluded that the Massachusetts unarmed assault statute requires the taking to be against the victim’s will and involves force and violence, making it a categorical match to a generic federal theft offense. Additionally, the court found that the statute requires an overt act constituting a substantial step towards the commission of the theft, thus qualifying as an attempted theft offense under the INA. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit denied Baptista’s petition for review. View "Baptista v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Adolfo Acevedo Ibarra, a Mexican citizen, entered the United States illegally and used the identity of a U.S. citizen, Raul Cabrera, to obtain various documents and benefits fraudulently. He was detained in 2014 for using a fraudulent Social Security number and later pleaded guilty to illegal entry. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him, and Ibarra admitted to the allegations and agreed he was removable. He sought cancellation of removal, arguing that his removal would cause hardship to his four U.S.-citizen children. However, the immigration judge denied his application, citing his lack of good moral character due to his fraudulent activities.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the immigration judge's decision, agreeing that Ibarra's significant negative criminal history, including fraud, outweighed any evidence of good character. Ibarra then petitioned for review, claiming that his Fifth Amendment rights were violated during the removal hearing when his attorney's attempts to assert the privilege against self-incrimination were overruled.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and found that substantial evidence supported the immigration judge's finding that Ibarra lacked good moral character. The court noted that Ibarra's fraudulent activities, even without a conviction, justified the finding under the catchall provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f). The court also rejected Ibarra's Fifth Amendment claim, stating that the privilege against self-incrimination must be asserted by the individual, not their attorney, and that Ibarra continued to testify without asserting the privilege himself.The Fourth Circuit denied Ibarra's petition for review, upholding the BIA's decision to deny cancellation of removal based on the substantial evidence of his lack of good moral character and rejecting his Fifth Amendment claims. View "Ibarra v. Bondi" on Justia Law

In 2015, two Ecuadorian citizens, Mayancela and Santander, along with Mayancela's minor children, entered the United States without admission or parole. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) charged them with removability under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). They did not contest their removability but applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). An immigration judge (IJ) in the Boston Immigration Court denied their applications, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the denials.The IJ found that while both petitioners testified credibly, they did not meet the burden of proof for their claims. The IJ concluded that Mayancela did not establish that her persecution was on account of her membership in the particular social groups "Ecuadorian women" and "Ecuadorian females," attributing the harm to her cousin's violent behavior and substance abuse. The IJ also found that Santander's asylum application was untimely and that the government had shown a fundamental change in Ecuador's conditions, rebutting any presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution. The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing that the evidence did not establish the requisite nexus for Mayancela's claims and that the government had sufficiently demonstrated changed conditions in Ecuador for Santander.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the agency failed to conduct the required mixed-motivation nexus analysis for Mayancela's asylum claim and vacated the agency's decision regarding her asylum and withholding of removal claims, remanding for further proceedings. The court affirmed the agency's decision denying Santander's asylum and withholding of removal claims, as well as the denial of CAT protection for both petitioners, finding that the record did not compel a contrary conclusion. View "Mayancela Guaman v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Petitioners, a married couple from Guatemala, have resided in Massachusetts for over twenty years and have four U.S. citizen children. In 2015, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security issued Notices to Appear, charging them with removability. They applied for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b, citing their son L.C.'s medical and educational needs. The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied their application, finding they did not meet the "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" requirement due to insufficient corroborating evidence about L.C.'s situation in Guatemala. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision and later denied their first motion to reopen based on the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.Petitioners filed a second motion to reopen, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel by their previous attorney, who failed to submit crucial evidence about L.C.'s educational needs. They provided new evidence, including country conditions in Guatemala and additional information about their children's medical and educational challenges. The BIA denied this motion, stating that Petitioners had not shown that their counsel's performance was so deficient that they suffered prejudice and that they had not established a prima facie case for cancellation of removal.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the BIA's decision. The court found that the BIA provided insufficient explanation for its ruling, making it impossible to review the legal bases for its conclusions. The court noted that the BIA did not adequately address whether the failure to submit corroborating evidence about L.C.'s educational needs constituted ineffective assistance of counsel or whether Petitioners had established a prima facie case for relief. Consequently, the court granted the petition for review, vacated the BIA's decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Chanchavac Garcia v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A couple from Guatemala, Gustavo Evelio Mendez Nolasco and Blanca America Niz Mendez, entered the United States without inspection in 1981 and 2001, respectively. They married in 2004 and have four children, three of whom are U.S. citizens and one a Legal Permanent Resident. They own a landscaping business and a home in Massachusetts. They applied for cancellation of removal, arguing that their children would face exceptional and extremely unusual hardship if they were deported to Guatemala.An Immigration Judge (IJ) denied their applications, finding that they did not demonstrate good moral character due to undisclosed criminal histories and that their children would not face the requisite level of hardship. The IJ considered factors such as the children's limited Spanish skills, the family's financial assets, and the conditions in Guatemala but concluded that the hardships were not substantially beyond what is typically expected upon removal.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing with the IJ's assessment of the hardship factors and finding no need to address the good moral character determination. The BIA highlighted the children's limited Spanish skills, the couple's assets, and the potential for their oldest child to remain in the U.S. and petition for their legal status adjustment.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and found no legal error in the agency's application of the hardship standard. The court noted that the BIA properly considered the relevant factors and evaluated them in the aggregate. The court denied the petition for review, concluding that the agency's decision was consistent with its precedent and that the couple did not meet the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard. View "Mendez Nolasco v. Bondi" on Justia Law