Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

The petitioner, a Black native and citizen of Guyana, entered the United States as a lawful permanent resident in infancy and lived there since. He suffered from untreated mental illness, including schizophrenia, and physical disabilities requiring a wheelchair. After a psychotic episode, he was convicted of several felonies and served sixteen years in prison. Following his release, the Department of Homeland Security charged him as removable due to his aggravated felony conviction. Fearing torture if deported to Guyana because of his mental health, physical disabilities, criminal-deportee status, and race, he sought deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture, presenting testimony and evidence of mistreatment faced by similar groups in Guyana.An Immigration Judge found the petitioner and his expert credible but denied relief, concluding that the likelihood of torture in Guyana was insufficient. The judge determined that Guyanese police do not actively seek to harm or torture mentally ill persons and that government acquiescence was not supported by the evidence. The judge also found that discrimination and poor conditions existed but did not rise to the level of torture or government acquiescence. The petitioner appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, arguing that the judge failed to consider the cumulative risk of torture based on all asserted grounds and misapplied the definition of torture. The Board affirmed, focusing only on mental illness and finding no clear error in the judge’s conclusions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed only the Board’s decision. The court held that the Board abused its discretion by ignoring relevant, unrebutted evidence regarding the petitioner’s risk of torture due to his race, physical disabilities, and criminal-deportee status. The court granted the petition for review, vacated the Board’s decision, and remanded for further proceedings, instructing the agency to consider all evidence and apply the definition of torture to each claim. View "McDougall v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A Nigerian citizen, after returning to his home country from Venezuela, was recruited under false pretenses to work as a cook at a rural camp. Upon arrival, he discovered the camp was operated by a group known as the Unknown Gunmen, which the Nigerian government considers a terrorist organization. He was not allowed to leave, was forced to cook for the group’s leaders, and was eventually held without pay. After several months, he managed to escape and, fearing for his life due to repeated threats and attacks by the group, fled Nigeria. He traveled to Venezuela and then to the United States, where he sought asylum and withholding of removal, claiming a well-founded fear of persecution.An Immigration Judge found him removable for entering the United States without valid documents. The judge denied his applications for asylum and withholding of removal, concluding that by cooking for the Unknown Gunmen, he had provided “material support” to a terrorist organization, which barred him from relief. The judge also denied his claim for protection under the Convention Against Torture, finding insufficient evidence that he would likely be tortured with the acquiescence of a public official if returned to Nigeria. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the Immigration Judge’s decision, agreeing that the material-support bar applied and that there was no de minimis or duress exception.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the petitioner’s forced cooking for the group did not constitute “material support” under the relevant statute, as his actions were not sufficiently substantial to help the organization accomplish its terrorist activities. The court granted the petition for review, vacated the Board’s order of removal, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Ozurumba v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Mariano Ortiz Trejo, a native and citizen of Mexico, entered the United States without inspection in 1999, briefly returned to Mexico in 2004, and reentered the U.S. without inspection in 2005. He resides in Rhode Island with his minor son, a U.S. citizen, and the child’s mother, who is not a legal permanent resident. Ortiz Trejo works in construction and contributes to the household income. In 2015, he was served a Notice to Appear, conceded removability, and applied for cancellation of removal, arguing that his removal would cause “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to his son due to the child’s allergies and emotional health. He also sought voluntary departure as an alternative.The Immigration Judge of the Immigration Court found Ortiz Trejo credible but determined that he had not established the requisite hardship for cancellation of removal. The judge found that the child’s allergies were controllable, the likelihood of a severe reaction was low, and the child’s mother could provide for him, with continued access to medical care in Rhode Island. The judge admitted a psychological evaluation diagnosing the child with “Adjustment Disorder” but gave it limited weight. Cancellation of removal was denied, but voluntary departure was granted.Ortiz Trejo appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which affirmed the denial of cancellation and the grant of voluntary departure. The Board found that the Immigration Judge had considered all evidence, including the psychological evaluation, and concluded that the record did not establish exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. Ortiz Trejo then petitioned for review by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.The First Circuit held that the Board did not err in its decision, finding no legal error or failure to consider key evidence. The court denied the petition for review, upholding the Board’s determination that Ortiz Trejo had not met the hardship standard required for cancellation of removal. View "Ortiz Trejo v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Hundreds of thousands of Venezuelan nationals living in the United States received Temporary Protected Status (TPS), which allowed them to work and protected them from deportation due to ongoing humanitarian crises in Venezuela. In January 2025, the Secretary of Homeland Security extended TPS for Venezuelans through October 2026, consolidating two prior designations to streamline the process. Shortly after, a new Secretary, following a change in administration, attempted to vacate this extension and terminate TPS for one group of Venezuelan nationals, citing confusion and alleged improvements in Venezuela’s conditions. This abrupt reversal threatened TPS holders with imminent loss of status, employment, and the risk of deportation.The National TPS Alliance and several individual TPS holders filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, seeking to restore the extension. The district court granted preliminary relief, postponing the effective dates of the vacatur and termination notices nationwide under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), finding that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits, would suffer irreparable harm without relief, and that the balance of equities and public interest favored postponement.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order. The Ninth Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to review the preliminary relief and that neither the TPS statute nor 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) barred judicial review of the Secretary’s authority. The court concluded that the Secretary lacked statutory authority to vacate a prior extension of TPS, as the statute provides specific procedures for designation, extension, and termination, but not for vacatur. The court also found that nationwide relief was necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs. The district court’s order postponing the vacatur and termination of Venezuelan TPS was affirmed. View "National TPS Alliance v. Noem" on Justia Law

A Guatemalan national who had lived in the United States since 2000 applied for cancellation of removal, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). She testified that, before leaving Guatemala, she received frequent death threats from individuals seeking to extort her father's meat shop and experienced a separate violent incident unrelated to her family. She feared returning to Guatemala due to potential targeting by gangs, particularly as a deportee perceived to have money. In the United States, she had three U.S. citizen children, one of whom suffered from anxiety and was receiving therapy.An Immigration Judge (IJ) denied all three forms of relief. The IJ found that the petitioner was not statutorily eligible for cancellation of removal due to insufficient continuous presence in the United States and, alternatively, that she failed to show her children would suffer exceptional and extremely unusual hardship if she were removed. The IJ also determined that the threats and harm she experienced in Guatemala did not amount to persecution on account of a protected ground, but rather were motivated by general criminal activity. The IJ further found no evidence that she would be tortured with the acquiescence of the Guatemalan government, denying her CAT claim.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision on all grounds. The BIA agreed that the hardship to her children did not meet the statutory threshold, that there was no nexus between the harm feared and a protected ground for withholding of removal, and that the CAT claim was waived due to lack of meaningful challenge.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and denied the petition for review. The court held that the BIA did not err in its determinations regarding hardship, nexus to a protected ground, or waiver of the CAT claim. View "Lopez Cano v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A Cuban national fled his home country after enduring years of persecution and briefly stayed in Mexico, where he also faced threats and extortion. Upon entering the United States, he sought asylum, describing his fears of returning to both Cuba and Mexico. An Immigration Judge granted him withholding of removal to Cuba, but did not designate Mexico or any other country as an alternative for removal. Neither party appealed this decision, making it final. Despite this, federal immigration officials removed him to Mexico, where he was threatened by gang members. He returned to the United States two days later, was detained, and was ultimately granted asylum.After these events, the individual filed a lawsuit for damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, alleging that his removal to Mexico was improper and caused him harm. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, relying on 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5), (b)(9), and (g), which restrict judicial review of certain immigration actions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) did not bar the lawsuit because the plaintiff’s claims challenged the legal authority and process of his removal to Mexico, not the discretionary decision to execute a removal order. The court found that the claims were based on actions taken after the conclusion of removal proceedings and were not subject to the exclusive petition-for-review process. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the Federal Tort Claims Act suit and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "IBARRA-PEREZ V. USA" on Justia Law

A family from Mexico fled their home after a criminal cartel murdered one of their members and issued repeated threats demanding that the family abandon their land and leave the area. The threats continued even after the family relocated within Mexico, ultimately leading them to enter the United States without valid documents. The family sought asylum and withholding of removal, arguing that they were persecuted because of their membership in a particular social group—namely, their family.The Immigration Judge (IJ) found the family members credible but denied their applications, concluding that the asserted social groups were not cognizable and that, even if they were, the evidence did not show that family membership was a central reason for the persecution. The IJ found that the cartel’s primary motive was to control the land, not to target the family because of their familial ties. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed the appeal, upholding the IJ’s finding that there was no sufficient nexus between the persecution and the protected ground of family membership. The BIA stated that if a persecutor targets a family as a means to achieve an unrelated goal, family membership is only incidental or subordinate and not a central reason for the harm.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed only the BIA’s decision. The court held that the BIA applied an erroneous legal standard for determining whether family membership was “at least one central reason” for the persecution, as required by the Immigration and Nationality Act. The Tenth Circuit found that the BIA’s categorical rule improperly excluded mixed-motive claims where both protected and unprotected grounds may be central reasons for persecution. The court granted the petition for review, vacated the BIA’s order, and remanded for further proceedings under the correct legal standard. View "O.C.V. v. Bondi" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, born in Mexico in 1976 to a U.S. citizen father and a Mexican citizen mother, sought recognition of U.S. citizenship based on his father’s physical presence in the United States prior to his birth. His father, born in Texas, had lived in the U.S. for a cumulative sixteen years, including seven years after turning fourteen. The plaintiff’s parents were unmarried at his birth but married in Texas the following year. In 2012, the plaintiff applied to the United States Citizenship & Immigration Services (USCIS) for a certificate of citizenship, submitting various documents to establish his father’s physical presence in the U.S. prior to his birth.USCIS denied the application in 2015, finding insufficient proof of the father’s physical presence. The plaintiff appealed to the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO), which dismissed the appeal in 2018. He then filed a timely motion to reconsider and reopen, submitting additional evidence, but the AAO denied this motion in September 2018. Nearly five years later, in August 2023, the plaintiff filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas under 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a), seeking a declaration of citizenship.The district court dismissed the suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, reasoning that the five-year statute of limitations in § 1503(a) was jurisdictional and had expired, starting from the AAO’s dismissal of the appeal rather than the denial of the motion to reopen. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the five-year time bar in § 1503(a) is not jurisdictional but a nonjurisdictional claims-processing rule. The court further held that a timely motion to reconsider or reopen extends the time to file suit, and since the plaintiff’s motion was timely, his suit was not time-barred. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "Sarabia v. Noem" on Justia Law

The defendant, a noncitizen, was charged in Los Angeles County with carjacking, second degree robbery, and resisting an executive officer. The jury found him guilty of carjacking and found true the allegation that he personally used a deadly weapon, but acquitted him of robbery. He had previously pleaded guilty to resisting an executive officer. He was sentenced to a total of 12 years in prison. Years later, after being released from criminal custody, the defendant faced removal proceedings in immigration court based on his conviction, and he sought to vacate his conviction under Penal Code section 1473.7, arguing he had not understood the immigration consequences of going to trial or accepting a plea.The defendant filed a motion in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County to vacate his conviction, providing evidence of indigency and making a prima facie showing for relief. He requested appointment of counsel for the hearing. The trial court denied his request, relying on People v. Fryhaat, and reasoning that appointed counsel was only required if the moving party was in federal immigration custody and unable to attend the hearing. The court proceeded with an evidentiary hearing and ultimately denied the motion, finding no evidence that an immigration-neutral plea offer had been made.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the trial court’s denial of appointed counsel. The appellate court held that the right to appointed counsel in section 1473.7 proceedings attaches when an indigent defendant makes a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief and the court proceeds to an evidentiary hearing, regardless of whether the defendant is in federal immigration custody. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s order and remanded for further proceedings, including consideration of the request for appointed counsel and a new hearing on the merits of the section 1473.7 motion. View "P. v. Gutierrez" on Justia Law

A woman who entered the United States illegally as a child was later granted Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) status, which rendered her prior removal order unenforceable. She frequently visited a local Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) office to post bond for detainees and was well known to the staff. During one such visit, ICE agents detained her without a warrant or probable cause, despite being aware of her DACA status. She was held for eight days and transferred between multiple locations before being released. While detained, she sought habeas relief, but her petition was denied as moot after her release.She subsequently filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky against the ICE agents, alleging violations of her First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment rights under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics. The district court initially dismissed her claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), but the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that DACA status rendered the removal order non-executable and outside the jurisdiction-stripping provision. The Sixth Circuit also dismissed her First Amendment claim based on Supreme Court precedent. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the remaining Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims, finding they constituted new Bivens contexts and that alternative remedies existed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the plaintiff’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims arose in new Bivens contexts—specifically, immigration enforcement by ICE agents outside the home and outside the federal employment context. The court further found that alternative remedies, such as administrative complaint procedures under the Immigration and Nationality Act and habeas corpus, precluded the extension of Bivens. Thus, no implied damages remedy was available. View "Enriquez-Perdomo v. Newman" on Justia Law