Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Elizur International Inc. (“Elizur”) filed a Form I-140 Immigration Petition for Alien Worker on behalf of its employee, seeking to permanently employ their employee in the United States as a multinational executive or manager under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) denied Elizur’s petition. Rather than file an administrative appeal, Elizur and the employee sued in federal court and lost.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the agency did not commit a clear error in judgment. The record contains ample support for the agency’s conclusion that Elizur failed to provide the necessary level of detail as to the employee's duties to permit the agency to conclude that the employee functioned in a managerial or executive capacity while employed at Triple-R. Further, the generic and vague statements, many of which the agency cited in its decision, fall well short of what’s required to demonstrate that the employee primarily performed managerial or executive functions. View "Chuncheng Ren v. USCIS" on Justia Law

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) deported Petitioner, a permanent resident of the United States, since he was six years old, because the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA or the Board) deemed his altercation with the police an aggravated felony. Because of that designation, Petitioner was not allowed back into the United States. In 2018, the Supreme Court ruled that the type of offense Petitioner committed no longer qualified as an aggravated felony. Learning of that decision in 2019, Petitioner moved the BIA to reconsider its original removal order and to equitably toll the usual thirty-day deadline for filing such motions in view of the legal change. The BIA declined. It did not dispute that Petitioner is entitled to be readmitted into the country, but it rejected Petitioner’s request to toll the limitations period, believing him insufficiently diligent in discovering his rights.   The Fourth Circuit held that it has jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court vacated the Board’s diligence determination, remanding to the BIA to consider the second prong of the equitable-tolling inquiry—whether the change in the law constituted an extraordinary circumstance—as well as the merits of Petitioner’s claim. The court explained that because the BIA determined Petitioner was not diligent, it did not consider whether Johnson and Dimaya presented an extraordinary circumstance that would warrant equitable tolling. View "Damien Williams v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

After conceding that he was removable from the United States for entering the country without being admitted or paroled, Petitioner applied for asylum on the ground that gangs in his native Honduras had persecuted him in the past and that he feared persecution from them should he return there. An immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals determined, as relevant, that any harm Petitioner had suffered bore no connection to his political opinions and denied his application. Petitioner for review of the agency's decision and his motion to reconsider that decision.   The Eighth Circuit denied Petitioner’s petitions. The court explained that the record here does not contain much evidence, if any, that Petitioner’s refusal to assist the gang, even one as powerful and politically influential as MS-13, was meant to reflect a political opinion or that the gang thought his refusal was due to a political opinion. Further, the court wrote that Petitioner’s contention that the IJ and BIA failed to examine the record adequately in reaching their conclusions is untenable. The IJ recounted the gang's interactions with Petitioner and concluded that he never expressed any political opinion or anti-corruption sentiment or that the gang imputed those things to him—conclusions that find ample support in the record. View "Hugo Aguilar Montecinos v. Merrick B. Garland" on Justia Law

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) deported Petitioner Petitioner, a permanent resident of the United States since he was six years old, because the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA or the Board) deemed his altercation with the police an aggravated felony. Because of that designation, Petitioner was not allowed back into the United States, not even to visit. He would spend the next eleven years in Jamaica, working mostly for room and board, his U.S.-citizen mother, siblings, girlfriend, and children affording only a handful of trips to see him. In 2018, the Supreme Court ruled that the type of offense Petitioner committed no longer qualified as an aggravated felony. Learning of that decision in 2019, Petitioner moved the BIA to reconsider its original removal order and to equitably toll the usual thirty-day deadline for filing such motions in view of the legal change. The BIA declined. It did not dispute that Petitioner is entitled to be readmitted into the country, but it rejected Petitioner’s request to toll the limitations period, believing him insufficiently diligent in discovering his rights.   The Fourth Circuit held that it has  have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision and that it must review it de novo. And the Court vacated the Board’s diligence determination, remanding to the BIA to consider the second prong of the equitable-tolling inquiry—whether the change in the law constituted an extraordinary circumstance—as well as the merits of Petitioner’s claim. View "Damien Williams v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying his motion to reconsider the denial of an administrative closure of his removal proceedings. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, arguing an intervening BIA decision -- Matter of Cruz-Valdez -- granted administrative closure authority the BIA previously found lacking and instructed the Board to apply the administrative closure standard set out in Avetisyan. The BIA agreed   The Eighth Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review. The court held that the BIA did not abuse its broad discretion to deny motions to reconsider. As in Gonzalez-Vega, the court concluded it is “clear from the record that the [BIA] had the appropriate [Avetisyan] considerations in mind and committed no clear error of judgment in weighing them.” Petitioner argued the BIA did not analyze all the Avetisyan factors. But the court wrote it does not require the Board “to recite the considerations mechanically when applying them to the facts.” The BIA announced its decision in terms sufficient to enable us to perceive that it has heard and thought and not merely reacted. Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its broad discretion in denying the motion to reconsider View "Alejandro Islas-Saldana v. Merrick B. Garland" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied in part and dismissed in part the order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upholding an immigration judge's (IJ) denial of Petitioners' request for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), holding that Petitioners were not entitled to relief.The IJ denied the requests for asylum and withholding of removal brought by Petitioners, a mother and daughter who were natives and citizens of Honduras, based on its finding Petitioners failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution "on account of" a statutorily protected ground. Petitioners sought judicial review. The First Circuit denied the petition in part and otherwise dismissed it, holding (1) substantial evidence supported the agency's findings; and (2) Petitioners' CAT claim was not administratively exhausted. View "Barnica-Lopez v. Garland" on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated the order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) rejecting Petitioner's claim for withholding of removal, holding that the BIA erred in failing properly to consider significant documentary evidence.Petitioner, a native and citizen of Honduras, applied for withholding of removal, alleging that she endured pervasive abuse at the hands of her ex-husband and that she fled Honduras to escape the abuse. An immigration judge (IJ) denied her application for withholding of removal, finding Petitioner to be not credible. The BIA dismissed Petitioner's appeal. The First Circuit vacated the BIA's decision because the agency had failed to consider the documentary evidence. On remand, the BIA again affirmed. The First Circuit vacated the BIA's order and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the BIA failed properly to consider the documentary evidence in accordance with this Court's prior remand order. View "Aguilar-Escoto v. Garland" on Justia Law

At issue is whether the Commonwealth of Virginia would recognize a divorce granted by a foreign nation to its own citizens when neither spouse was domiciled in that nation at the time of the divorce. The question arises from Petitioner’s marriage to a woman after the woman and another man — both Ghanaian citizens — divorced pursuant to Ghanaian customary law. At the time of the divorce, the woman and man were lawful permanent residents of the United States, and neither was present or domiciled in Ghana. Based on his marriage to the woman, Petitioner became a lawful permanent resident of the United States. But when Petitioner applied to become a naturalized citizen, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) determined that he and the woman were not validly married. USCIS reasoned that under controlling Virginia law, the Commonwealth would not recognize a divorce granted by a nation where neither spouse was domiciled at the time of the divorce. Petitioner sought a review of the decision in the district court, which granted summary judgment to USCIS. Petitioner then brought this appeal.   The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to grant Petitioner’s naturalization application. The court concluded as a matter of comity, Virginia would recognize this otherwise valid divorce granted by a foreign nation to its own citizens, regardless of the citizens’ domicile at the time. The court explained it rejected only USCIS’s argument that pursuant to present Virginia law, the Commonwealth would refuse to recognize a divorce granted by a foreign nation to its own citizens simply because neither was domiciled in the foreign nation at the time of the divorce. View "Michael Adjei v. Alejandro Mayorkas" on Justia Law

Hernandez, a citizen of El Salvador, came to the U.S. in 1994, without inspection. In 1999, an IJ ordered him removed in his absence. More than 10 years later, another IJ reopened his removal proceedings. In the meantime, Hernandez married. Hernandez sought cancellation of removal, which required proof that he had remained in the U.S. for the past 10 years; that he had “been a person of good moral character”; that he had not been convicted of certain crimes; and that his “removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to” his wife. 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1)(A)–(D). The IJ concluded that Hernandez lacked good moral character because of his failure to pay taxes and because, in 2007 and 2010, he pleaded guilty to DUI.Meanwhile, his wife’s petition to allow him to become a permanent resident was approved. On remand, the IJ administratively closed Hernandez’s case to allow him to apply for a waiver to receive the visa while remaining in this country. Hernandez never sought the waiver. An IJ reopened his removal proceedings and found that Hernandez’s removal would cause his wife exceptional hardship but Hernandez still lacked “good moral character,” having been arrested twice for DUI in 2016.The Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review, first holding that the question of whether the historical facts show that an immigrant lacks “good moral character” qualifies as a mixed question within its jurisdiction. The BIA properly concluded that Hernandez’s history of alcohol use and drinking-and-driving convictions showed his lack of “good moral character.” View "Hernandez v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner is a native and citizen of Cameroon. He applied for admission to the United States in 2019 and was subsequently charged with removability under 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). On November 13, 2019, he appeared and admitted that he was removable but applied for asylum or withholding of removal based on his political opinion and sought protection under the CAT. Petitioner's claim was based on the allegations that the Cameroon government was killing “English-speaking Cameroonians” such as himself.The Immigration Judge denied Petitioner's request, finding that his testimony was too vague to be credible, noting that there were likely documents that were not presented that could have corroborated his claims. In front of the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"), Petitioner claimed that the Immigrations Judge erred in its credibility assessment. The BIA denied relief.On appeal, The Fifth Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review, finding no grounds to reverse the BIA's decision. View "Mohndamenang v. Garland" on Justia Law