Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review of an immigration judge's (IJ) denial of his application for withholding of removal, holding that the Petitioner's arguments were unavailing.Petitioner, a native and citizen of El Salvador, was subject to removal. Petitioner expressed fear of persecution or torture with the asylum officer. The asylum officer rejected Petitioner's reasonable fear claim, concluding that there was insufficient evidence to find that Petitioner had been attacked because of a protected ground. The IJ upheld the asylum officer's decision. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the IJ did not err by dismissing Petitioner's gang-related claim. View "Reyes-Ramos v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Petitioner asserts that he suffered past persecution and has a well-founded fear of future persecution due to his familial association with his brother, who is a member of the Shiromani Akali Dal Party (Mann Party), and his own affiliation with that Party. The Mann Party advocates for the creation of a sovereign state for Sikh people and is opposed by the Congress Party. The immigration judge (IJ) and the BIA concluded that Petitioner did not qualify for asylum or withholding of removal because the injuries and threats that Petitioner had suffered at the hands of Congress Party members were not sufficiently serious.   The Ninth Circuit filed an order (1) amending the opinion filed on September 14, 2022; (2) denying the Respondent’s petition for panel rehearing; and (3) indicating that no further petitions for rehearing or for rehearing en banc would be entertained. In the amended opinion, the panel granted in part and denied in part Petitioner’s petition for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals, and remanded, holding that substantial evidence did not support the BIA’s determination that the harm Petitioner suffered did not rise to the level of past persecution, but substantial evidence did support the BIA’s determination that the harm did not amount to past torture and that Petitioner failed to show that he would more likely than not face a clear probability of future torture. View "SHAMSHER SINGH V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

Defendant, an Iraqi citizen, was convicted of attempting to procure naturalization unlawfully and of presenting a naturalization application with false statements. Both convictions were predicated on Defendant’s answers to two questions on his naturalization application, in which he asserted that he had never given false information to a U.S. Government official and that he had never lied to such an official to gain an immigration benefit.   On appeal, Defendant argued that the Government presented insufficient evidence to establish that any false statements he made during the asylum process were material to his subsequent naturalization application and that his motion for judgment of acquittal on both counts should have been granted.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction for attempting to procure naturalization unlawfully and presenting a naturalization application with false statements. The panel concluded that ample evidence supports the Government’s reliance on the “investigation-based theory” of materiality. The panel concluded that a rational jury could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a reasonable immigration judge apprised of the facts about Defendant’s presence in Germany would have found Defendant not to be credible, and would have denied asylum, on the ground that the claimed persecution in 2008 was fabricated and that Defendant thus had not established that he had suffered past persecution. Further, the panel concluded that the Government presented sufficient evidence to permit a rational jury to conclude on this basis that Defendant would have been ineligible for asylum and that his false statements on his later naturalization application were, therefore material to the naturalization decision under an “investigation-based theory.” View "USA V. SEVAN AMINTOBIA" on Justia Law

Porosh, a citizen of Bangladesh, claims he joined a political party, Jamaat in 2012, at age 15, and that an opposing party, Awami, called and threatened to kill Porosh; attacked Porosh and broke his hand; and held him against his will for two days. Porosh did not report the first two incidents to the police because he believes Awami controls the government. After he escaped, Porosh tried to report these three incidents. The police allegedly threatened to kill him if he filed a report. Porosh moved to another city but he claims Awami was still looking for him. In 2015, Porosh moved to Malaysia. In 2020, Awami contacted his father, threatening that if they found Porosh, they would kill him. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, Malaysia announced that everyone with a temporary work permit would be returned to their home country. Porosh went to the United States with what he believed to be a valid work permit. When he presented the permit in Chicago, officers identified it as fake.After an interview, officers determined Porosh had a “credible fear of persecution” based on “political opinion” but an IJ rendered an adverse credibility determination and denied Porosh asylum. The BIA dismissed Porosh’s appeal. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. While some of the IJ’s conclusions lack evidentiary support, on the whole, the decision is supported by findings that have a credible basis in the record. View "Porosh v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, seeks a review of the denial of his petition for cancellation of removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals determined that Petitioner was ineligible for cancellation of removal because he was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude: identity theft under Virginia law, which explicitly includes “intent to defraud” as an element. Va. Code Ann. Section 18.2-186.3(A)(2). On appeal, Petitioner contends the statute could be—and in his case, was—applied to crimes that don’t involve moral turpitude.   The Fourth Circuit denied the petition for review. The court concluded that subsection (A)(2) of the Virginia identity-theft statute qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude under 8 U.S.C. Section 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), and that the Board didn’t abuse its discretion in deciding Petitioner’s case in a single-member opinion. The court explained that it found no abuse of discretion in the Board’s decision to assign this case to a single-member panel. The issue was not “complex, novel, or unusual”: It was squarely resolved by the Board’s precedent for crimes with “intent to defraud” as an element. The Board considered (and was unpersuaded) by the argument that Petitioner’s offense was “more akin to deception than fraud,” and the court agreed with its conclusion. Nor is there evidence that the relatively narrow issue of whether subsection (A)(2) of the Virginia statute involved moral turpitude is a “recurring” question before the Board. View "Jose Salazar v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner and her daughter were removed in absentia by the Immigration Judge ("IJ"). Petitioner sought relief, citing non-receipt of the hearing notice. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the IJ's decision.The Ninth Circuit reversed the Board of Immigration Appeals' decision to remove Petitioner and her daughter in absentia, finding that the IJ should have determined the credibility of Petitioner's claims of non-receipt of her hearing notice in light of all the circumstantial and corroborating evidence in the record. Under 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii), an in absentia order may be rescinded upon a motion to reopen if the alien demonstrates non-receipt of the notice statutorily required for removal hearings. The Ninth Circuit found that there was circumstantial evidence supporting Petitioner's claim that she did not receive the hearing notice. View "IDANIA PEREZ-PORTILLO, ET AL V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

Petitioner a citizen of El Salvador, petitions the court for review of the denial of his application for withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and reversal of withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Petitioner has serious cognitive impairments, and while living in El Salvador he was recruited by gang members who attacked and threatened him when he refused to join.   The Eighth Circuit denied in part and granted in part. The court explained that it would have had jurisdiction to review Petitioner’s argument that the IJ applied an incorrect legal standard for determining the nexus between past persecution and any protected characteristics. But Petitioner waived this argument by raising it for the first time in his petition for review, not on appeal to the BIA.   However, the court held that the BIA did not provide sufficient justification for reversal, failing to identify reasons grounded in the record that are sufficient to satisfy a reasonable mind that the IJ clearly erred in its factual findings. The government urges affirmance, pointing to the thoroughness of the BIA’s decision and its extensive citations to the administrative record. But these features of the BIA’s decision do not establish that substantial evidence in the record supports the BIA’s decision here. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review with respect to Petitioner’s application for withholding under the CAT. View "Gustavo Alvarez-Gomez v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied a petition for review sought by Petitioners, four individuals who left El Salvador for fear of harm at the hands of a gang, holding that the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) was supported by substantial evidence in the record.After Petitioners were charged as removable they conceded removability but cross-applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the United Nations Convention Against Torture. An immigration judge (IJ) rejected Petitioners' claims for relief, concluding that Petitioners failed to show that their claimed persecution bore a nexus to a protected ground. The BIA affirmed. The First Circuit denied Petitioners' petition for review, holding that the agency's determination that family membership was not a central reason for Petitioners' persecution was supported by substantial evidence in the record. View "Jimenez-Portillo v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner is a native and citizen of Jamaica who was admitted to the United States in 2002 and who became a lawful permanent resident in 2003. In February 2012, he pleaded guilty to and was convicted of the Georgia crime of family violence battery, for which he was sentenced to 12 months confinement that he was permitted to serve on probation.In March 2015, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against Petitioner on the theory that his Georgia family violence battery conviction was an “aggravated felony” under the INA, making him removable. Petitioner challenged this classification and claimed he was entitled to relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).First, the 11th Circuit held that Petitioner's conviction in Georgia was an "aggravated felony," finding that his probationary sentence still qualified as "incarceration." Second, pertaining to his request for CAT relief, the court held Petitioner failed to show the likelihood of government involvement or acquiescence in any torture by the Jamaican government. View "Karastan L. Edwards v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement contracts with CoreCivic to incarcerate detained immigrants in 24 facilities across 11 states. Plaintiffs, detained solely due to their immigration status and neither charged with, nor convicted of, any crime, alleged that the overseers of their private detention facilities forced them to perform labor against their will and without adequate compensation in violation of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, the California Trafficking Victims Protection Act (“California TVPA”), various provisions of the California Labor Code, and other state laws.   The Ninth Circuit filed (1) an order denying a petition for panel rehearing and, on behalf of the court, a petition for rehearing en banc; and (2) an opinion (a) amending and superceding the panel’s original opinion and (b) affirming the district court’s order certifying three classes. The panel held that the district court properly exercised its discretion in certifying a California Labor Law Class, a California Forced Labor Class, and a National Forced Labor Class. The panel held that, as to the California Forced Labor Class, Plaintiffs submitted sufficient proof of a classwide policy of forced labor to establish commonality. The panel agreed with the district court that narrowing the California Forced Labor Class based on the California TVPA’s statute of limitations was not required at the class certification stage. Further, the panel held that, as to the National Forced Labor Class, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Plaintiffs presented significant proof of a classwide policy of forced labor and that common questions predominated over individual ones. View "SYLVESTER OWINO, ET AL V. CORECIVIC, INC." on Justia Law