Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Immigration Law
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Petitioner a citizen of Guatemala who suffers from dwarfism and who advocated in Guatemala for increased legal protections for dwarfs, petitions our court to review the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision denying him asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture (CAT) relief.   The Ninth Circuit granted in part and denied in part Petitioner’s petition for review of the BIA’s decision upholding an immigration judge’s denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT and remanded. The panel concluded that it is evident from the record that the BIA failed to conduct a cumulative-effect review. The panel explained that the IJ analyzed each category of past harm in isolation and found that none individually rose to the level of persecution. In addition, the BIA failed to acknowledge Petitioner’s request for cumulative-effect review, and the BIA’s analysis did not demonstrate that it took a cumulative look at the various instances of harm Petitioner asserted. Instead, the BIA followed in the IJ’s footsteps, ticking off each of Petitioner’s categories of harm on an individual basis and finding that each amounted only to discrimination. The panel remanded for the agency to apply the correct legal framework to Petitioner’s asylum claim.   The panel held that the BIA also erred by applying asylum’s heightened “at least one central reason” nexus requirement to Petitioner’s withholding of removal claim, rather than the correct “a reason” standard. Finally, the panel concluded that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s conclusion that the Guatemalan government would not acquiesce in any torture Petitioner might suffer View "NERY SALGUERO SOSA V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

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Petitioner is an illegal alien who was ordered removed in absentia. A decade and a half later, she moved to reopen her immigration proceedings on the ground that she never received notice of the time or location of her hearing. The immigration judge denied her motion. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Petitioner complained that the United States informed her of her duty to provide address information where her notice to appear could be sent, but only in English, not Spanish.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed holding that the record indicates that she was warned in Spanish as well as English of the consequences of her failure to appear. And in any event, there is no legal authority to support her assertion that the United States is required to provide notice in any language other than English. View "Platero-Rosales v. Garland" on Justia Law

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Petitioner, a 31-year-old man, alleged to be a native and citizen of Honduras present in the United States without being lawfully admitted. Petitioner petitioned for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upholding the decision of an immigration judge (IJ) that found Petitioner removable and denied his application for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it is well established that “traditional rules of evidence do not apply in immigration proceedings, except to the extent that due process is implicated. To satisfy due process in a removal proceeding, “evidence must be probative and its admission must be fundamentally fair.” Here, the evidence submitted by DHS meets this standard. While some of the evidence includes undeniable inconsistencies, it is all probative of Petitioner’s alienage. And there is no indication that its admission was fundamentally unfair. View "Eduardo Escobar v. Merrick B. Garland" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff, a native of El Salvador, was detained by immigration authorities. An immigration judge (IJ) denied bond, and an IJ later denied him relief under the Convention Against Torture and ordered his removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed his appeal, and this court denied his petition for review. In April 2021, Plaintiff moved the BIA to reopen, and the BIA denied a stay of removal. In May 2021, Plaintiff filed a habeas petition with the district court, which denied his motion to enjoin his removal until his motion to reopen and habeas petition were decided. On June 14, 2021, the district court denied Plaintiff subsequently-filed motion for a TRO, and the government voluntarily agreed to stay removal up to and including August 13, 2021.   The Ninth Circuit filed: 1) an order amending the opinion filed August 13, 2021; and 2) an amended opinion affirming the district court’s denial of Plaintiff’s request for a temporary restraining order (TRO) to prevent the government from removing him. The panel concluded that the district court correctly determined that jurisdiction was barred by 8 U.S.C. Section 1252(g), which provides that “no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien.” The panel rejected Plaintiff’s claim that the Constitution’s Suspension Clause preserves judicial review here. View "WILLIAN RAUDA V. DAVID JENNINGS, ET AL" on Justia Law

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Petitioner was convicted under section 273a(a) of the California Penal Code for willfully permitting a child under his care or custody to be “placed in a situation where his or her person or health is endangered” “under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death.” The IJ and BIA concluded that this conviction rendered Petitioner removable.   The Ninth Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review. Looking at the federal generic crimes encompassed by the phrase “child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment,” a plurality of the en banc court concluded that the normal tools of statutory construction do not lead to an unambiguous interpretation. The dictionaries also did not limit the definition of “child neglect” to conduct committed by a parent or legal guardian. The plurality further explained that the surrounding provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and definitions in other federal statutes, are likewise inconclusive. Thus, the plurality concluded that the phrase is ambiguous, agreeing with this court’s sister circuits that have considered the issue. Finally, the en banc court concluded that section 273a(a), is a categorical match to Section 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).   The en banc court thus agreed with the BIA’s reasoning and conclusion that all violations of section 273a(a) are encompassed by the BIA’s definition of a crime of “child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment” in Section 1227(a)(2)(E)(i). View "RAFAEL DIAZ-RODRIGUEZ V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

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Petitioner a native and citizen of Bangladesh, seeks a review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) final order affirming the immigration judge’s denial of his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”). In the removal proceedings, the immigration judge made an adverse credibility determination against Petitioner based on (1) inconsistencies and omissions between his hearing testimony and the documentary evidence in the record and (2) his demeanor at the hearing. The BIA affirmed the immigration judge’s adverse credibility determination, finding that it was not clearly erroneous and adopting much of the immigration judge’s reasoning.   On appeal, Petitioner argued that the BIA’s affirmance of the adverse credibility determination was an error. He contends that the findings in support of that determination are not supported by substantial evidence in the record and that the immigration judge failed to cite examples in her analysis of his demeanor.   The Eleventh Circuit denied the petition for review, concluding that substantial evidence supports the adverse credibility determination against Petitioner. The court reasoned that the immigration judge and the BIA offered “specific, cogent reasons,” supported by substantial evidence in the record, for determining that Petitioner’s testimony was not credible, and this record does not compel the court to reverse that adverse credibility determination. View "Mehedi Hasan-Nayem v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

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In 2004, Enriquez-Perdomo a nine-year-old Honduran national, was ordered removed. INS signed a warrant of removal/deportation but never removed her. The 2012 Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), program applied to persons who immigrated to the U.S. when they were under the age of 16 and were under age 31 in 2012 and meet other specific requirements. In 2013, USCIS approved Enriquez-Perdomo for DACA. She renewed her DACA status through January 2019. In 2017, Enriquez-Perdomo went to an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) office to post bond for ICE detainees. Enriquez-Perdomo alleges that ICE officers (Defendants) confirmed that she had received DACA, but nevertheless arrested her without a warrant, motivated by her ethnicity and by her assistance of detainees. She claims that Defendants transported her between facilities and deprived her of sleep and food during her eight days in custody. Enriquez-Perdomo sued Defendants in their individual capacities, seeking money damages under “Bivens.”The district court dismissed her claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. 1252(g). The Sixth Circuit vacated in part. Notwithstanding her removal order, Enriquez-Perdomo was eligible for DACA relief and was granted affirmative relief from removal. Although the government could terminate that relief, it did not. Enriquez-Perdomo’s arrest and detention were unauthorized so 1252(g) does not preclude her claims; her removal order was not executable. There is no Bivens remedy for First Amendment retaliation claims; the court remanded Fourth Amendment and Fifth Amendment claims. View "Enriquez-Perdomo v. Newman" on Justia Law

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In each of these consolidated petitions for review, an alien’s initial counsel withdrew, and the alien represented himself at the merits hearing on his requests for relief from removal. After denying those requests and ordering the aliens removed, the Immigration Judge informed each alien that he had a right to administratively appeal the removal order to the Board of Immigration Appeals and that the right could be waived. Each alien waived that right, preferring to be deported rather than remain in custody. Days afterward, each alien filed a pro se notice of appeal. Later, in briefs filed by pro bono counsel, each alien disputed a removal. The BIA dismissed each administrative appeal, finding that the waiver of an administrative appeal was valid. Each alien then filed an unsuccessful motion for reconsideration with the BIA.The Third Circuit denied petitions for review. The administrative record does not compel the conclusion that the waivers were invalid, and the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the alien’s motion to reconsider. Each IJ explained the right to appeal and the meaning of the waiver; the waivers were not involuntary. View "Alexander-Mendoza v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

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Petitioner sought review of an opinion by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which upheld a decision by the immigration judge (IJ) denying his motion to reopen his prior removal proceedings. Petitioner argued that the IJ had jurisdiction over his motion because an alien may collaterally challenge a removal order when it results in a gross miscarriage of justice. The Ninth Circuit filed: 1) an order amending the opinion filed July 18, 2022; and 2) an amended opinion denying Petitioner’s petition.   The court held that: 1) 8 U.S.C. Section 1231(a)(5), which generally bars reopening reinstated orders of removal, is not subject to an exception for removal orders that result in a gross miscarriage of justice; and 2) the agency lacks authority to reopen such reinstated removal orders sua sponte. The panel concluded that this argument was not cognizable in the context of this current appeal, explaining that an alien may raise such a collateral attack, but only in a petition for review of a reinstatement proceeding or order. The panel further explained that, although the then-applicable regulation gave the agency the authority to reopen cases sua sponte, that regulation did not expressly provide that such authority overrode Section 1231(a)(5). Nor could it, the panel observed, given that a regulation does not trump an otherwise applicable statute unless the regulation’s enabling statute so provides. View "RICARDO BRAVO-BRAVO V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

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Petitioner, a lawful permanent resident, was ordered removed based on a 1997 conviction. He then filed a motion to reopen, which was denied. In 2018, he filed a second motion to reopen, claiming that he was no longer removable as charged because a state court, in 2018, had modified his conviction due to a “constitutional defect” in his criminal proceeding. Petitioner argued that his removal order was invalid, and therefore, the BIA should reopen proceedings, set aside his removal order, and terminate proceedings. The BIA denied the motion as both number-barred   The Ninth Circuit filed: 1) an order amending the opinion filed August 1, 2022, and 2) an amended opinion denying in part and dismissing in part Petitioner’s petition for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals. In the amended opinion, the panel concluded that the BIA did not err in denying Petitioner’s motion to reopen, which challenged his removal order on the ground that his underlying conviction was allegedly invalid.   The panel concluded that none of the circumstances in which an alien may challenge a removal order based on the claim that a conviction underlying a removal order is invalid were applicable here. First, the BIA’s authority to consider such a challenge when the alien brings a motion to reopen that is not time- or number-barred was not implicated here. Next, Petitioner could not raise arguments that are available for an alien challenging a reinstatement proceeding or reinstatement order. View "LUIS PEREZ-CAMACHO V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law