Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

The petitioner, Socorro Colin-Villavicencio, a native and citizen of Mexico, entered the United States lawfully in 1988. Her mother became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 1998. Colin-Villavicencio applied for adjustment of status but missed fingerprint appointments, leading to the abandonment of her application. In 2015, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings after she was convicted of multiple felonies, including child abuse and drug possession. Representing herself, she claimed derivative citizenship based on her mother’s naturalization, but an Immigration Judge (IJ) denied this claim, finding she did not become a lawful permanent resident as a minor. The IJ also denied her relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision, agreeing that Colin-Villavicencio did not establish a likelihood of torture if returned to Mexico. The BIA found that the country conditions and her brother’s attack did not sufficiently demonstrate a particularized risk of torture or police acquiescence. The BIA also upheld the IJ’s determination that her prior convictions precluded asylum and withholding of removal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court denied Colin-Villavicencio’s derivative citizenship claim, concluding she did not meet the requirements under 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a)(3) because her parents never married, and her father’s paternity was established by legitimation under Baja California law. The court also found substantial evidence supporting the BIA’s denial of CAT relief, noting she did not show a particularized risk of torture or police acquiescence. The Ninth Circuit thus denied her petition for review. View "COLIN-VILLAVICENCIO V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Franklin Manaen Ramos-Gutierrez, a native of El Salvador, entered the United States in 2013 and was served with a Notice to Appear, charging him with removability. He applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Ramos-Gutierrez claimed he was harassed and beaten by gang members in El Salvador for refusing to join them. He testified that the gang continued to inquire about him even after he moved to the United States. The Immigration Judge (IJ) found him credible but denied his applications, concluding that his claimed social groups were not legally cognizable and that he failed to demonstrate a nexus between the harm and a protected ground.The IJ determined that Ramos-Gutierrez's claimed social groups—"young person who has been beaten and threatened by gangs" and "young individual targeted for gang recruitment"—were impermissibly circular and too amorphous. The IJ also found that the gang's actions were criminal acts aimed at coercion rather than persecution based on a protected ground. The IJ denied the CAT claim, stating that Ramos-Gutierrez had not shown he would be tortured if returned to El Salvador. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing that the claimed social groups were not cognizable and that there was no nexus to a protected ground. The BIA also noted that Ramos-Gutierrez had waived any challenge to the IJ's denial of CAT protection.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and upheld the BIA's decision. The court found substantial evidence supporting the IJ's and BIA's conclusions that the claimed social groups were not legally cognizable and that there was no nexus between the harm and a protected ground. The court also agreed that the petitioner had waived his CAT claim. Consequently, the petition for review was denied. View "Ramos-Gutierrez v. Garland" on Justia Law

The case involves several companies that post immigration surety bonds challenging a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) rule. The rule, promulgated by Acting Secretary Chad Wolf in 2020, allowed DHS to refuse business from certain surety firms. The plaintiffs argued that Wolf was not duly appointed and thus lacked the authority to issue the rule. In 2021, Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas, who was duly appointed, ratified the rule.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. The court found that Wolf was not properly serving as Acting Secretary when he promulgated the rule and that Mayorkas's ratification was barred by the Federal Vacancies Reform Act (FVRA). The district court vacated the rule, agreeing with the plaintiffs that the rule was improperly promulgated.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the FVRA did not bar Mayorkas from ratifying the rule and that the ratification cured any defects in the rule’s promulgation. The court explained that the Ratification Bar in the FVRA applies only to nondelegable functions or duties, which are those required by statute or regulation to be performed by the applicable officer and only that officer. Since the promulgation of the rule was a delegable duty, the ratification by Mayorkas was valid.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and remanded the case for further proceedings. The main holding was that the ratification by a duly appointed Secretary cured any defects in the rule’s initial promulgation by an improperly appointed Acting Secretary. View "GONZALES & GONZALES BONDS & INSURANCE AGENCY, INC." on Justia Law

Petitioner Prince Belo Paye, a Krahn from Liberia, sought review of a final order of removal issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). Paye fled Liberia as a child during the civil war due to ethnic cleansing and genocide against the Krahn people. He lived in refugee camps in Sierra Leone and Guinea before entering the United States as a refugee in 2005. Paye was later convicted of firearms-related offenses in the U.S., leading to removal proceedings. He sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), arguing that his forced flight from Liberia and an assault at the Sierra Leone-Guinea border constituted past persecution.The Immigration Judge (IJ) found Paye's testimony credible but denied his claims. The IJ determined that Paye's convictions were "particularly serious crimes," making him ineligible for withholding of removal. The IJ also concluded that Paye did not demonstrate past persecution, as the assault at the border could not be attributed to the Liberian government. The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing that Paye's convictions were particularly serious crimes and that the Liberian government was not responsible for the border assault.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the agency failed to address whether Paye's forced flight from Liberia due to ethnic cleansing and genocide constituted past persecution. This omission hindered meaningful review of the agency's denial of withholding of removal. The court vacated the BIA's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the agency to consider whether Paye's escape from Liberia amounted to past persecution and to provide a clear and reasoned explanation for its determination. The court affirmed the agency's conclusion regarding the border attack, finding no error in its analysis. View "Paye v. Garland" on Justia Law

Arjun KC, a native and citizen of Nepal, sought asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) in the United States. He claimed that Maoist partisans in Nepal threatened to kill him unless he supported their party. KC argued that these threats constituted past persecution and that this past persecution should give rise to a presumption of future persecution if he were to return to Nepal.The Immigration Judge (IJ) found KC credible but concluded that he had not demonstrated past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. The IJ denied his claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. KC appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which affirmed the IJ's decision without opinion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and agreed with the IJ and BIA. The court held that death threats alone do not automatically constitute past persecution. Instead, such threats must be sufficiently imminent, concrete, or menacing to qualify as persecution. The court found that the threats against KC were not sufficiently imminent or concrete to constitute past persecution. Additionally, KC did not provide other evidence to demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution. Consequently, the court denied KC's petition for review and affirmed the BIA's decision ordering his removal. View "KC v. Garland" on Justia Law

Dolores Ortega-Cordova, a native and citizen of El Salvador, entered the United States without inspection in 2002. In 2012, he was arrested in Norfolk, Virginia, and charged with solicitation of prostitution under Virginia Code § 18.2-346(B). He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 90 days’ imprisonment, with 86 days suspended, and fined. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him. Ortega-Cordova conceded removability but applied for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1).The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied Ortega-Cordova’s application, finding him ineligible for cancellation of removal because his conviction for solicitation of prostitution was deemed a crime involving moral turpitude under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). The IJ relied on the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) long-standing position that prostitution-related offenses are morally turpitudinous. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision, noting that Ortega-Cordova failed to prove that solicitation of prostitution is no longer considered morally reprehensible by society.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and upheld the BIA’s decision. The court concluded that solicitation of prostitution under Virginia law categorically involves moral turpitude because it debases a moral norm against treating sex as a commercial transaction. The court rejected Ortega-Cordova’s arguments that societal views on prostitution are evolving and that the statute criminalizes consensual conduct between adults. The court also dismissed his procedural arguments, including the claim that the BIA abused its discretion by not referring his case to a three-member panel. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit denied Ortega-Cordova’s petition for review. View "Ortega-Cordova v. Garland" on Justia Law

Maximo Robert Vera Punin, a citizen of Ecuador, was ordered removed by immigration authorities after being convicted in state court of multiple counts involving the rape of a young child. He is currently serving a 25-year prison term and faces deportation upon completion of his sentence. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) served him with a notice to appear in September 2020, charging him with being a removable alien under various sections of the Immigration and Nationality Act. DHS submitted a Form I-213 to prove his alienage, which listed detailed personal information and his previous removal from the United States.The Immigration Judge (IJ) admitted the I-213 over Vera Punin’s objection, finding it sufficient to prove his alienage by clear and convincing evidence. The IJ sustained the charges of removability and ordered Vera Punin removed to Ecuador. Vera Punin appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), arguing that the I-213 was unreliable and should not have been admitted. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision, holding that the I-213 was inherently trustworthy and sufficient to establish his alienage.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that Vera Punin did not exhaust his argument that the agency failed to explain its reasoning, and thus lacked authority to consider this claim. The court held that the I-213 is presumptively reliable and capable of proving alienage by clear and convincing evidence, and Vera Punin did not rebut that presumption. The court also found that the presumption of reliability afforded to an I-213 does not impermissibly shift the burden of proof away from the government. Additionally, the court determined that the temporary Appellate Immigration Judge was properly appointed by the Attorney General. Consequently, the petition for review was denied in part and dismissed in part. View "Punin v. Garland" on Justia Law

Three foreign nationals, crewmembers aboard the vessel MARGUERITA, were detained in the United States after the vessel was held in port in Maine due to alleged improper disposal of bilge water and inaccurate record-keeping. The plaintiffs were ordered to remain in the U.S. as potential material witnesses. They were later allowed to leave but returned for trial and were awarded for their contributions to the conviction of the vessel's operator.The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics and the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) against various U.S. government entities and officials, alleging violations of their constitutional rights and various tort claims. The U.S. District Court for the District of Maine dismissed the Bivens claim and granted summary judgment for the defendants on the FTCA claims. The court found that the plaintiffs' detention and the revocation of their landing permits were authorized and that the plaintiffs did not show that the actions taken by the government officials were unlawful or unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the requirement for ships to maintain an Oil Record Book under 33 C.F.R. § 151.25 is valid and that the plaintiffs' detention was justified under the circumstances. The court also found that the plaintiffs failed to establish their claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, abuse of process, and intentional infliction of emotional distress under the FTCA. Additionally, the court concluded that the Bivens claim presented a new context and that special factors counseled hesitation in extending a Bivens remedy, particularly given the availability of alternative remedies and the implications for government policy and international relations. View "Hornof v. United States" on Justia Law

Ashraf Abdulkarim-Ali Alkotof, a Yemeni citizen, entered the U.S. on a B1/B2 visa in 2006 and overstayed. In 2010, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a notice to appear, alleging he was subject to removal. Alkotof admitted the allegations but sought adjustment of status based on an I-130 petition filed by his U.S. citizen spouse, Tiffany Alfano. After Alfano's petition was denied, Alkotof divorced her and married Hajer Ali Yehia, who filed another I-130 petition, which was initially approved but later revoked due to alleged marriage fraud. Alkotof appealed the revocation and also applied for a U-Visa as a crime victim.The Immigration Judge (IJ) continued Alkotof’s removal proceedings multiple times but ultimately ordered his removal in 2018, citing the lack of an approved I-130 petition and the speculative nature of his U-Visa application. Alkotof appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which dismissed his appeal and denied his motion to remand for cancellation of removal, citing insufficient evidence to rebut the marriage fraud finding.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded it lacked jurisdiction over the BIA’s denial of Alkotof’s motion to remand for cancellation of removal, as it involved discretionary judgment. The court also found that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Alkotof’s request for administrative closure or a continuance. The court noted that Alkotof was ineligible for adjustment of status due to the revoked I-130 petition and that he could continue to pursue his U-Visa application even after removal. Consequently, the court affirmed in part and dismissed in part Alkotof’s petition for review. View "Ashraf Abdulkarim-Ali Alkotof v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Petitioners, Sandra Estela Calvo-Tino and her minor daughter A.M.L.C., are natives of Guatemala. A.M.L.C. suffers from a severe genetic disorder that requires constant medical attention. In Guatemala, they faced inadequate medical care and alleged mistreatment by hospital staff, including accusations of poisoning and improper medical procedures. Fearing further mistreatment, they entered the United States in October 2016 and were subsequently charged as inadmissible aliens. They applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).The Immigration Judge denied all forms of relief, finding that Calvo-Tino had not suffered past persecution, had not established a well-founded fear of future persecution, and that her proposed social group of "parents of permanently disabled or handicapped individuals" was not cognizable. The judge also found no likelihood of torture. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) adopted and affirmed these findings, dismissing the appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the BIA's decision under the substantial evidence standard. The court upheld the BIA's findings, agreeing that the alleged mistreatment did not amount to persecution and that there was no evidence of a well-founded fear of future persecution. The court also found that the BIA did not need to address the cognizability of the proposed social group since the claim failed on other grounds. Additionally, the court concluded that the petitioners did not meet the burden of proof for CAT relief, as there was no evidence that Calvo-Tino would be tortured if returned to Guatemala.The Eighth Circuit denied the petition for review, affirming the BIA's decision. View "Calvo-Tino v. Garland" on Justia Law