Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

A private company operating a federal immigration detention facility in Washington State challenged the enforcement of several provisions of a state law that imposed health, safety, and inspection requirements on private detention centers. The law required the state Department of Health to adopt rules ensuring sanitary and safe conditions, authorized unannounced inspections, provided for civil penalties for violations, and created a private right of action for detainees. The company argued that these provisions violated the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity and were preempted by federal law, claiming they improperly targeted federal contractors and conflicted with federal standards.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington granted a preliminary injunction, finding that the challenged sections of the law violated intergovernmental immunity by discriminating against the federal government and its contractor. The court compared the requirements imposed on the federal facility to those imposed on state prisons and concluded that the law treated the federal contractor less favorably. The state appealed, and while the appeal was pending, the Washington legislature amended the law, but the changes did not materially alter the issues on appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s preliminary injunction and remanded for further proceedings. The Ninth Circuit held that the appropriate comparison for determining discrimination under intergovernmental immunity is between the federal immigration facility and other civil detention facilities in the state, not state prisons. The court directed the district court to make this comparison in the first instance. The Ninth Circuit also held that the challenged provisions were not preempted by federal law and that the district court erred in enjoining the private right of action, as the state officials named as defendants had no enforcement authority under that provision. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "THE GEO GROUP, INC. V. INSLEE" on Justia Law

In August 2022, law enforcement officers in Sterling, Virginia, stopped a Ford Explorer as part of an operation to execute an arrest warrant for a suspected armed robber. Herbert Murillo-Lopez was driving the vehicle. During the stop, officers recovered a firearm from a satchel worn by Murillo-Lopez. He admitted to being an undocumented non-citizen. Subsequent investigation confirmed he was born in El Salvador, had no lawful status in the United States, and had no record of legal entry.A grand jury indicted Murillo-Lopez for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A), which prohibits possession of a firearm by an undocumented non-citizen. He moved to suppress the evidence from the stop, arguing the stop and search were unconstitutional, but the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denied the motion. Shortly before trial, he moved to dismiss the indictment on Second Amendment grounds, but the district court found the motion untimely and unpersuasive. After a jury found him guilty, the district court denied his motion for judgment of acquittal and sentenced him to eight months in prison and three years of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Murillo-Lopez knew he was unlawfully present in the United States. The court also found the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion that Murillo-Lopez might be the subject of the arrest warrant, and that the search of his satchel was consensual. Finally, the court rejected his Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(5)(A), holding that existing circuit precedent remains valid after recent Supreme Court decisions. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Murillo-Lopez" on Justia Law

A lawful permanent resident of the United States, originally from Mexico, was convicted for purchasing firearms in the United States and reselling them in Mexico without a license, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A). As a result of these unlicensed sales, he was sentenced to 78 months in prison. Following his conviction, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings, alleging that his conviction constituted an “aggravated felony” under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), specifically as “illicit trafficking in firearms.”An immigration judge determined that the conviction qualified as an aggravated felony and ordered his removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed this decision, agreeing that the conviction under § 922(a)(1)(A) matched the generic definition of “illicit trafficking in firearms” as used in the INA. The petitioner then sought review of the BIA’s order, arguing that the statute of conviction criminalized a broader range of conduct than the generic aggravated felony and thus was not a categorical match.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo, focusing on whether a conviction under § 922(a)(1)(A) categorically constitutes “illicit trafficking in firearms.” The court held that the plain meaning of “illicit trafficking in firearms” is “unlawful trading or dealing in firearms,” and that the statute of conviction fits within this definition. The court rejected the petitioner’s arguments regarding overbreadth and found no ambiguity in the statutory language. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit denied the petition for review, holding that a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A) qualifies as an aggravated felony for “illicit trafficking in firearms” under the INA. View "Alvarez Ronquillo v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A Mexican national who entered the United States without authorization in 2000 was detained by the Department of Homeland Security in 2023 and charged as removable. Between 2019 and 2021, he was arrested and convicted of multiple offenses, including several DUIs in different states. He conceded removability and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), and later, cancellation of removal. At his hearing, the Immigration Judge (IJ) declined to hear live testimony from his wife and psychologist, relying instead on their written reports and other documentary evidence. The IJ denied all forms of relief, finding, among other things, that his DUI convictions precluded a finding of good moral character and that he failed to show his removal would cause his wife exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed his appeal. The BIA found that he had waived his challenges to the denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection by failing to raise them in his notice of appeal or briefing, rendering those claims unexhausted. The BIA also agreed with the IJ that his multiple DUI convictions established a lack of good moral character, making him ineligible for cancellation of removal. The BIA rejected his due process claim, concluding he had received a full and fair hearing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed both the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the unexhausted claims for asylum, withholding, and CAT protection. Regarding cancellation of removal, the court found that substantial evidence supported the finding that the petitioner lacked good moral character and that he failed to show prejudice from the exclusion of live witness testimony. The court dismissed the petition in part and denied it in part. View "Sanchez v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

A woman and her son fled Honduras in 2016, fearing violence from the former leader of their land cooperative, who had been ousted after allegations of embezzlement and violence against dissenters. The woman had publicly opposed this leader and received threats from his associates, including intimidation outside her home. After arriving in the United States, she learned that other cooperative leaders had been murdered, which she attributed to the same individual. Although her immediate family remained in Honduras without incident, she believed her public opposition made her a unique target if she returned.The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against her and her son. She conceded removability but applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, citing threats and violence linked to the former cooperative leader. An immigration judge found her testimony credible but denied all relief, concluding she had not suffered past persecution and did not have a well-founded fear of future persecution. The judge found that Honduran authorities were able and willing to protect her and that she could reasonably relocate within Honduras. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the denial, relying on the findings regarding government protection and internal relocation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case, applying a deferential substantial evidence standard to the agency’s factual findings. The court held that substantial evidence supported the agency’s conclusions that Honduran authorities were both willing and able to protect the petitioner and that she could reasonably relocate within Honduras. Because either ground was sufficient to deny relief, the court denied the petition for review. View "Martinez-Martinez v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A mother and her three children, all citizens of El Salvador, entered the United States without admission or parole in 2015. The Department of Homeland Security charged them as removable. The mother conceded removability but sought asylum and statutory withholding of removal, claiming persecution based on her membership in two particular social groups: her immediate family and single Salvadoran women. She described two incidents in El Salvador: threats made to her son by a classmate allegedly joining a gang, and an incident where armed gang members forced entry into her home to hide from police, which she believed was due to her status as a single woman.An Immigration Judge denied her applications, finding that the threats to her son did not amount to persecution and that the home invasion, even if it constituted persecution, was not shown to be on account of a protected ground. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, agreeing that the threats lacked specificity and immediacy and that the home invasion was motivated by the gang members’ need to hide rather than her membership in a particular social group. The BIA also found that the proposed group of single Salvadoran females was not a cognizable social group under asylum law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court determined that it had jurisdiction to consider the petition, following recent Supreme Court guidance that the 30-day filing deadline for petitions for review is not jurisdictional. On the merits, the Fourth Circuit held that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s findings: the incidents described did not establish persecution on account of a protected ground, and the record did not compel a contrary conclusion. The court denied the petition for review, holding that the petitioner was not eligible for asylum or withholding of removal. View "Rivas De Nolasco v. Bondi" on Justia Law

The petitioner, who entered the United States without authorization in 2006, lived with his wife and three children, all of whom are U.S. citizens. He was the primary financial provider for the family, earning significantly more than his wife and providing health insurance for the household. The family faced removal proceedings after the petitioner was arrested for driving on a suspended license and leaving the scene of an accident. The petitioner argued that his removal would cause his children exceptional and extremely unusual hardship, citing their emotional distress and the family’s financial dependence on him.An immigration judge found that the petitioner met all statutory requirements for cancellation of removal except for the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard. The judge determined that, while the family would experience financial and emotional difficulties, these did not rise above what is typically expected in removal cases. The petitioner appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which affirmed the immigration judge’s decision, assuming for the sake of argument that all three children were qualifying relatives.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case, holding that it had jurisdiction to consider legal questions related to the application of the hardship standard. The court applied a deferential standard of review, as suggested by recent Supreme Court precedent, and concluded that the immigration judge’s findings were supported by substantial evidence and were not clearly erroneous. The court held that the petitioner had not demonstrated that his removal would result in hardship substantially beyond what is ordinarily expected in such cases. Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit denied the petition for review. View "Santos Mendoza v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A Guatemalan citizen who had been present in the United States since 2007 conceded removability for entering the country without admission or parole. He applied for cancellation of removal, which requires, among other things, at least ten years of continuous physical presence and a qualifying U.S. citizen relative who would suffer “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” if he were removed. The Immigration Judge found that he met the good moral character and criminal history requirements but concluded he had not established the necessary continuous presence or that his U.S. citizen son was a qualifying relative, partly due to lack of documentation. The judge also found that, even if the son qualified, the hardship did not exceed what is ordinarily expected from a parent’s removal.The petitioner appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which affirmed the Immigration Judge’s findings regarding the qualifying relative and hardship, dismissing the appeal. After the Immigration Judge’s decision but before the BIA’s decision, the petitioner’s U.S. citizen daughter was born. Following the BIA’s dismissal, he moved to reopen his case, arguing that his daughter’s birth was new evidence supporting his eligibility for relief. The BIA denied the motion, reasoning that the daughter’s birth was not “new” evidence because it occurred while the appeal was pending, and also found insufficient evidence of hardship. A motion for reconsideration was also denied, with the BIA reiterating its interpretation of “former hearing” and again finding no exceptional hardship.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed only the denial of the motion for reconsideration. The court held that “new” evidence for a motion to reopen is evidence unavailable at the last hearing before the Immigration Judge, not before the BIA. However, because the BIA considered the new evidence and found it insufficient, the court found the BIA’s error harmless and denied the petition for review. View "Suchite-Salguero v. Attorney General United States of America" on Justia Law

A Venezuelan citizen entered the United States in 2019 on a B-2 visitor visa and applied for asylum before his visa expired. He remained in the country after his visa lapsed, leading to removal proceedings. The petitioner claimed he feared persecution in Venezuela due to his political activities as an opponent of the ruling party, his membership in the Primero Justicia Party, and his activism against the Maduro regime. He recounted being shot by a paramilitary group known as the “colectivos” in 2015, receiving threats, and participating in numerous protests. He also described incidents involving tear gas at demonstrations and threats relayed through neighbors, but acknowledged periods of living unharmed in Venezuela and traveling freely between Venezuela and the United States.An Immigration Judge found the petitioner’s testimony credible but denied relief, concluding that the harms he experienced, individually and collectively, did not rise to the level of persecution required for asylum. The judge also found no well-founded fear of future persecution, noting the petitioner’s ability to travel and live in Venezuela without incident for extended periods. The judge further determined that the petitioner did not meet the higher standard for withholding of removal and failed to show a likelihood of torture necessary for protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the Immigration Judge’s decision, agreeing that the petitioner had not suffered past persecution or established a well-founded fear of future persecution, and that he did not face a particularized risk of torture. The petitioner then sought review from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.The Fifth Circuit denied the petition for review, holding that substantial evidence supported the agency’s findings. The court concluded that the petitioner did not demonstrate past persecution, a well-founded fear of future persecution, or eligibility for withholding of removal or CAT protection. View "Rubio v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A woman from El Salvador, after her husband fled to the United States due to gang threats, was subjected to repeated extortion and threats of violence, including sexual extortion, by gang members who targeted her because she was a woman living alone with her children. Despite seeking help from local police, she was told to comply with the gang or flee. After enduring escalating threats and payments, she eventually fled to the United States with her children.Upon arrival, she retained an attorney to represent her in her asylum proceedings. She informed her attorney of both the financial and sexual extortion she faced, but he failed to include the sexual extortion in her application and proposed a legal theory for asylum based on a particular social group (PSG) that was foreclosed by existing precedent. The immigration judge, sitting in the Immigration Court, found the proposed PSG not cognizable and denied her claim, concluding the gang’s motivation was financial rather than based on group membership. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, adopting the immigration judge’s reasoning and denying her appeal.Represented by new counsel, she moved to reopen her case before the Board of Immigration Appeals, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) and proposing alternative, plausible PSGs. The Board denied the motion, finding no IAC and concluding her harm was not due to a protected characteristic. She then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for review.The Fourth Circuit held that noncitizens who retain counsel in removal proceedings have a Fifth Amendment right to a fundamentally fair hearing, which can be violated by ineffective assistance of counsel. The court found her original attorney’s performance objectively unreasonable and prejudicial, as alternative PSGs could have led to a different outcome. The court granted the petition for review, reversed the Board’s denial of her motion to reopen, vacated the denial of her asylum and withholding claims, and remanded for a new hearing. View "Guandique-De Romero v. Bondi" on Justia Law