Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit granted Petitioner's petition for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the denial of Petitioner's application for deferral of removal to Honduras under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), holding that the BIA erred in its review of the decision of the immigration judge (IJ).The IJ denied deferral of removal to Honduras, concluding that Petitioner was not likely to be tortured by, or with the consent or acquiescence of, the Honduran government. The BIA found no error in the IJ's determination. The First Circuit reversed, holding the the BIA erred when it (1) applied the incorrect standard of review to uphold the IJ's denial of CAT relief as to Honduras; (2) improperly failed to address Petitioner's argument that he would likely be tortured by or at the instigation of Honduran officials; and (3) failed meaningfully to address Petitioner's argument that MS-13 members may act under color of law. View "H.H. v. Garland" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review of a final removal order upheld by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), holding that the BIA did not commit legal error or abuse its discretion in failing adequately to address new evidence.Petitioner, a native and citizen of Cape Verde, sought adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. 1255(a) through his U.S.-citizen son. The immigration judge (IJ) denied Petitioner's application for adjustment of status, and the BIA affirmed. The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review, holding (1) the arguments and challenges Petitioner put forth as to the denial of his application for adjustment of status were neither constitutionally cognizable nor legally colorable; and (2) there was no basis to overturn the BIA's decision to deny the motion to remand the case. View "Moreno v. Garland" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing his appeal of an order of the immigration judge (IJ) denying Petitioner nunc pro tunc relief from removal, holding that there was no error in the agency's decision.Petitioner was charged with removability. Petitioner denied the charges, arguing that the Department of Homeland Appeals should be equitably estopped from removing him, and sought cancellation of removal, nunc pro tunc relief under former section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, and voluntary departure. The IJ determined that Petitioner was ineligible for relief from removal. The BIA dismissed the appeal. The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review, holding (1) Petitioner was not eligible for nunc pro tunc relief under former section 212(c); and (2) Defendant was not entitled to equitable estoppel. View "Reyes-Batista v. Garland" on Justia Law

The First Circuit dismissed Petitioner's petition for review of the denial by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) of his application for withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3), holding that the petition is dismissed due to Petitioner's failure to exhaust an issue upon which which his argument on appeal depended.After he was placed in removal proceedings Petitioner sought asylum and withholding of removal or, in the alternative, voluntary departure. The immigration judge (IJ) denied all claims, and the BIA affirmed without opinion. Petitioner appealed, challenging only the BIA's denial of his application for withholding of removal. The First Circuit dismissed the petition for review, holding that because Petitioner did not challenge the aspect of the IJ's ruling to the BIA that he now appealed, he could not bring that challenge to the First Circuit in the first instance because the issue was not exhausted. View "Cante-Lopez v. Garland" on Justia Law

An immigration judge (“IJ”) denied Petitioner’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under he Convention Against Torture based on his failure to adequately corroborate his claim with documentary evidence. The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed. Petitioner argued that the BIA was unduly deferential to the IJ’s determination that corroboration was required.The Second Circuit denied the petition for review. The court held that the BIA reviews de novo an IJ’s determination under 8 U.S.C. Section 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) that an applicant should provide additional evidence that corroborates otherwise credible testimony, because that is not a finding of fact. In contrast, the BIA reviews for clear error an IJ’s finding as to whether an applicant does not have and cannot reasonably obtain such corroborating evidence because that is a finding of fact. Here, the court explained that the BIA properly applied de novo review to the IJ’s request for corroborating evidence and properly reviewed for clear error the IJ’s finding that Petitioner failed to produce requested evidence that he could reasonably have obtained. View "Pinel-Gomez v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioners natives and citizens of El Salvador, petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) denial of Petitioners’ motion to reconsider the BIA’s prior order, which upheld the immigration judge’s (IJ) decision finding the Petitioners removable and denying their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT)   The Eighth Circuit denied the petition. The court explained that here, in denying Petitioners’ motion to reconsider, the BIA reaffirmed its previous finding that Petitioners have not persuasively shown any error of law or fact in our prior decision to establish that the Salvadoran government would be unable or unwilling to control the individuals they fear. In their petition for review, Petitioners do not meaningfully argue that the BIA erred in reaching this conclusion and have accordingly waived any challenge to such a finding. Thus, Petitioners cannot show that they suffered persecution and their claims for relief necessarily fail. View "Fatima Coreas-Chavez v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner petitioned for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision affirming an Immigration Judge’s denial of his application for asylum and withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Petitioner argued that the agency erred in denying his withholding of removal claim when it required that he demonstrate that his ethnicity was “at least one central reason” motivating his claimed persecution. He also challenges the BIA’s denial of his asylum claim and its finding that he waived his CAT claim.   The Second Circuit denied the petition. The court held that the withholding of removal statute is ambiguous as to the showing required to establish that a protected ground, such as ethnicity, motivated a persecutor. The court also held that the BIA’s interpretation that the “one central reason” standard applies to withholding of removal claims is reasonable and thus entitled to deference.   The court explained that substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Petitioner did not demonstrate a link between his ethnicity and future persecution. Although Petitioner’s brother, who is in the United States, declared that the family “still received threatening messages,” his mother, who continues to live in Ecuador, did not corroborate this statement. She stated that her life would be at risk not because of threats or harm from the gang, but because if Petitioner were to return, he would be unable to support her. View "Quituizaca v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Petitioner asserts that he suffered past persecution and has a well-founded fear of future persecution due to his familial association with his brother, who is a member of the Shiromani Akali Dal Party (Mann Party), and his own affiliation with that Party. The Mann Party advocates for the creation of a sovereign state for Sikh people and is opposed by the Congress Party, one of India’s major political parties.   The Ninth Circuit granted in part and denied in part Petitioner’s petition for review. The panel held that substantial evidence did not support the BIA’s determination that the harm Petitioner suffered did not rise to the level of past persecution, but substantial evidence did support the BIA’s determination that the harm did not amount to past torture and that Petitioner failed to show that he would more likely than not face a clear probability of future torture. View "SHAMSHER SINGH V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

Petitioner was removed to Mexico in 2008, partly because of a California conviction for drug possession. In 2018, a California court expunged that conviction under California’s rehabilitative statute, and Petitioner sought to reopen his immigration proceedings. An immigration judge and the BIA denied the motion to reopen, and Petitioner sought review in this court.   Denying in part and granting in part and remanding, the panel held that: (1) the vacatur of a conviction underlying a removal order does not excuse a late motion to reopen, and therefore, Petitioner’s motion to reopen was untimely; (2) the BIA acted within its discretion in concluding that Petitioner failed to act with sufficient diligence to warrant equitable tolling of the motion-to-reopen deadline; and (3) the BIA erred as a matter of law in denying sua sponte reopening.   Because a motion to reopen must generally be filed within 90 days of a final order of removal, Petitioner’s motion was approximately a decade late. The panel rejected Petitioner’s argument, observing that it was bound by Perez-Camacho v. Garland, 42 F.4th 1103 (9th Cir. 2022), in which this court recently held that the Cardoso-Tlaseca rule applies only to timely motions to reopen; it does not excuse late filing. The panel also concluded that, even if it were not bound, it would reach the same result. The panel explained that the statute and regulation governing motions to reopen contain explicit exceptions to the timeliness requirement, but there is no exception for persons removed pursuant to an unlawfully executed order, and the codified exceptions strongly suggest that Congress and the agency did not intend that exception. View "JOSE LARA-GARCIA V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied Petitioner’s application for cancellation of removal on the ground that he had not established that his United States citizen children would suffer “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” if he were removed. 8 U.S.C. Section 1229b(b)(1). The Ninth Circuit, held that: 1) 8 U.S.C. Section 1252(a)(2)(D) grants the court jurisdiction to review a question of law or a mixed question of law and fact presented in a challenge to an agency denial of cancellation of removal for failure to establish the required hardship; and 2) assuming arguendo that Petitioner’s petition presented such questions, his hardship claim failed on the merits.   Despite finding facial merit in the Fourth and Sixth Circuit decisions, the panel concluded that it need not take a definitive side in the circuit split. The panel explained that it is settled that this court can assume statutory jurisdiction arguendo when the jurisdictional issue is complex, but the claim clearly lacks merit. The panel explained that it had no qualms with that approach here. The panel concluded that the BIA’s decision that exceptional and extremely unusual hardship was not established was clearly supported by the record. The panel explained that Petitioner largely focused on financial hardship, but the BIA has concluded that economic detriment alone is insufficient to support even a finding of extreme hardship. View "ANTONIO DE LA ROSA-RODRIGUEZ V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law