Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Immigration Law
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After the U.S. Consulate in El Salvador denied the immigrant visa application of Plaintiff, he and his U.S.-citizen spouse (collectively "Plaintiffs") sought judicial review of the government’s visa decision. Relying on the doctrine of consular nonreviewability, the district court granted summary judgment to the government.   Vacating the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the government, and remanding, the panel held that (1) where the adjudication of a non-citizen’s visa application implicates the constitutional rights of a citizen, due process requires that the government provide the citizen with timely and adequate notice of a decision that will deprive the citizen of that interest; and (2) because the government failed to provide timely notice in this case, the government was not entitled to summary judgment based on the doctrine of consular nonreviewability. The panel explained that, as set forth in Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972), and Kerry v. Din, 576 U.S. 86 (2015), the doctrine of consular nonreviewability admits an exception in certain circumstances where the denial of a visa affects the fundamental rights of a U.S. citizen. View "SANDRA MUNOZ, ET AL V. DOS, ET AL" on Justia Law

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Petitioner sought asylum and related relief on the ground that he was persecuted in China for his Christian faith. In a statement in support of his application, Petitioner wrote that he was arrested at a church gathering and detained, and during that detention, the police beat him, questioned him about church activities, and forced him to sign a document stating that he would not participate in the church. Before an immigration judge, Petitioner later testified that he was detained for one week, during which he was interrogated twice. Petitioner also testified in response to questions regarding his injuries and failure to get medical care, and the IJ asked him to clarify other apparent discrepancies between his application and testimony. 
 The Ninth Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review the BIA’s decision upholding the denial of his application for asylum and related relief on credibility grounds, the panel concluded that the agency’s adverse credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence. The panel concluded that, in light of Petitioner’s apparent demeanor, it was reasonable for the BIA to conclude that his omission of the first interrogation from his application, together with his questionable explanation for that omission, undermined his credibility. The panel explained that the omission was not enough to undermine his credibility, but Petitioner’s shifting explanation could be reasonably viewed as internally inconsistent, and therefore, implausible. The panel also gave credit to the IJ’s finding that Petitioner exhibited a suspect demeanor during this exchange, explaining that such findings merit special deference. View "MINGNAN DONG V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff a citizen of Guatemala, petitions for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision dismissing his appeal of an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) order denying his application for relief under the Convention Against Torture. The Ninth Circuit concluded: (1) the record, in this case, compels the conclusion that two of Petitioner’s attackers were police officers during a July 2011 incident; (2) Petitioner showed acquiescence on the part of the Guatemalan government with respect to that incident because government officials— namely, the two police officers—directly participated in the incident; and (3) the record indicates that the IJ and BIA’s conclusion that Petitioner is not likely to be subjected to torture with government acquiescence if returned to Guatemala disregards several important circumstances pertinent to evaluating the likelihood of future torture. View "RISVIN DE LEON LOPEZ V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

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Petitioner entered the United States without inspection and was immediately detained by Officers from the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). Two days later, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. Section 1225, DHS issued an expedited removal order against him. Petitioner asserted a fear of persecution, an asylum officer conducted a credible fear interview and concluded that Petitioner had not shown a reasonable fear of future persecution on account of a protected ground.   The Ninth Circuit dismissed Petitioner’s s petition for review from a decision of an immigration judge affirming an asylum officer’s negative credible fear determination in expedited removal proceedings. The court held that because Congress has clearly and unambiguously precluded the court from asserting jurisdiction over the merits of individual expedited removal orders, even with regard to constitutional challenges to such orders, and because that prohibition on jurisdiction raises no constitutional difficulty, the court lacked jurisdiction over Petitioner’s petition for review. View "HEVER MENDOZA LINARES V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

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Petitioner entered the United States without authorization, and after being convicted in California state court of assault with a deadly weapon, he was removed to Mexico. He later reentered the United States and was again removed. After Petitioner entered the United States for the third time, he was yet again placed in removal proceedings, and he applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). An immigration judge denied relief on all claims.   The Ninth Circuit denied the petition for review. The court concluded that the agency did not commit legal error in determining that Petitioner’s state-court conviction was for a particularly serious crime, making him ineligible for asylum or withholding of removal. And substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that he is not entitled to CAT relief. The panel wrote that the record did not support Petitioner’s arguments that the Board relied on factual inaccuracies in finding that he could obtain medication in Mexico, that he is unlikely to be institutionalized in Mexico, and that healthcare workers and the police would not intentionally subject him to torture. The panel also did not agree with Petitioner that the agency failed to consider evidence that Mexican healthcare workers and police specifically target mentally ill individuals for torture. View "GIOVANNY HERNANDEZ V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

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Petitioner sought asylum and withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) after conceding removability from the United States during removal proceedings before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”). The IJ denied both forms of relief, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed and entered a final order of removal. In so holding the BIA found that Petitioner failed to show the necessary nexus between her asserted protected ground and the persecution she suffered.The Fourth Circuit affirmed. One necessary element for an applicant seeking asylum or withholding of removal is that an applicant’s claimed persecution occurred, or will occur, on account of a statutorily protected ground that applies to her. If an applicant fails to satisfy the nexus requirement, she cannot obtain asylum or withholding of removal. The Fourth Circuit held that Petitioner failed to establish the requisite nexus based on the facts presented. View "Maira Madrid-Montoya v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

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EGF and GVG (Petitioners), each a native and citizen of El Salvador, petition for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals. That decision, in turn, affirmed an Immigration Judge’s order denying asylum to EGF and GVG, and denying withholding of their removal. GVG is EGF’s daughter and is a rider on her application.   The Fifth Circuit denied the petition for review. The court explained that the record does not compel any contrary finding. Instead, there is substantial evidence that EGF was the target of an extortion scheme, that she was safe so long as she paid, and that the extortionists targeted her because she owned a profitable business. Nor does the record compel a finding that EGF has a well-founded fear of future persecution. EGF has failed to establish that she is eligible for asylum, she has “also fail[ed] to establish eligibility for withholding of removal.” View "Guevara-Fabian v. Garland" on Justia Law

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In 1999, Javier Zapata-Chacon, then a conditional permanent resident, admitted his removability based on a Colorado conviction for possession of marihuana. An Immigration Judge (“IJ”) ordered Zapata-Chacon removed and a final administrative order issued and was executed that same year. Since his removal, Zapata-Chacon illegally reentered the United States on three occasions. In 2020, Zapata-Chacon moved for reconsideration of the 1999 removal order, arguing his possession of marihuana conviction was not a categorical match to a federal “controlled substance offense” because Colorado’s definition of marihuana used broader language than the federal definition. An IJ denied the motion. The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) adopted and affirmed the IJ’s denial, and Zapata-Chacon appealed. With the petition pending before the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals court, the Government, through a letter pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(j), contended for the first time that the IJ and the BIA lacked authority to reopen or review Zapata-Chacon’s proceeding based on him having illegally reentered the United States. The Tenth Circuit concluded 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) clearly stripped the BIA of authority to review a prior order of removal or to grant any relief provided by the Immigration and Nationality Chapter of Title 8 once a removed alien illegally reentered the United States. Accordingly, Zapata-Chacon’s petition for review was denied. View "Zapata-Chacon v. Garland" on Justia Law

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Petitioner a native of El Salvador, filed this petition for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying her petition for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the U.N. Convention Against Torture (CAT). She contends chiefly that the BIA and immigration judge (IJ) erred in rejecting her claim of persecution on account of “membership in a particular social group”—a precondition for her asylum claim under 8 U.S.C. Section 1158(b).   The Fourth Circuit denied in part and dismissed in part. The court explained that it is unable to reverse the Board’s order on the basis of its treatment of Petitioner’s proposed social groups. Because her asylum claim does not prevail, her claim for withholding of removal does not either. The agency adjudicators correctly applied law and fact in denying Petitioner’s application, and the record before us does not compel a contrary conclusion. Further, because the Board rightly stated that Petitioner had not meaningfully presented her CAT claim, the court has no jurisdiction to evaluate arguments raised for the first time on review. View "Maria Morales v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

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Appellant is a self-described “watchdog association” that brings actions for injunctive relief against immigration consultants under section 22446.5, which provides a right of action against an immigration consultant to anyone who suffers damages by reason of the immigration consultant’s fraud, misrepresentation, or failure to provide services.In October 2017, Appellant brought over 90 actions against immigration consultants, two of whom had bonds issued by Appellee insurance company. After Appellant prevailed at trial against the consultants, it filed suit against Appellee to recover its attorney fees and costs against the Immigration Consultant Act bond. The trial court granted summary judgment in the insurance company's favor.On appeal, the Second Appellate District affirmed, explaining a surety issuing a statutory bond is liable only to the extent indicated in the code section under which the surety executes the bond and under the plain language of the relevant bond statutes, a non-aggrieved person who suffers no damages is not entitled to recovery from an Immigration Consultant Act bond. View "Immigrant Rights Defense etc. v. Hudson Insurance Co." on Justia Law