Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Iris and Jose lived with their two children in Usulután, a part of El Salvador that they believed to be controlled by MS-13. They ran a small retail business. In 2016, gang members began extorting Jose, threatening to kill the family if Jose did not pay. Gang members robbed Jose and a colleague at gunpoint. Jose did not report the crimes to the police. He knew that the police conducted daily raids in his neighborhood to combat gang activity but he believed that the gangs had infiltrated the government. He feared that MS-13 would learn of his complaints and kill him. The mayor was subsequently arrested for helping gang members collect “rent.” Members of MS-13 interrogated Jose about his dealings with the police. Jose left El Salvador but the gang continued to extort and threaten Iris. Eventually, she fled to the United States.The family sought asylum and withholding of removal, submitting country-condition reports about gang activity in El Salvador that corroborated their testimony. An IJ ordered the family’s removal, finding Iris and Jose credible, but concluding that they had not established that the government was unable or unwilling to control MS-13. The BIA affirmed. The Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review. The BIA did not commit a legal error in interpreting and applying the asylum and withholding-of-removal statutes. Its opinion permits discernment of the grounds on which it relied and its findings have a fair evidentiary basis. View "Rodriguez de Palucho v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing his appeal of an immigration judge’s (IJ) denial of his application for cancellation of removal. Petitioner contended that the BIA erred in concluding that he failed to demonstrate that his stepchildren are United States citizens, and thus “qualifying relatives” for purposes of his application, and by improperly reviewing the IJ’s findings of fact de novo. He also asserted that the BIA’s interpretation of 8 U.S.C. Section 1229b(b)(1)(D) violates the Fifth Amendment as it has been construed to guarantee equal protection.   The Fifth Circuit denied the petition. The court concluded that Section1229b(b)(1)(D)’s requirement that an alien demonstrate “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to a qualifying relative, irrespective of hardship suffered by the alien, passes constitutional muster. In enacting the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard, Congress thus emphasized that an alien must provide evidence of harm to a qualifying relative substantially beyond that which ordinarily would be expected due to the alien’s deportation. The court further explained that Congress’s articulated justification provides a “reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis” for the hardship requirement, and Petitioner’s argument on this issue lacks merit. View "Agustin-Matias v. Garland" on Justia Law

Lopez, a citizen of El Salvador, entered the United States without authorization in 2001. In removal proceedings in 2009, he applied for relief under the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA). While removal proceedings continued, Lopez was charged with possession of marijuana. Following a guilty plea in 2015, DHS added a charge of removability under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), applicable to aliens who committed a controlled substance offense. That triggered a limiting provision in NACARA (Section 203(b)) that bumps the requirement of continuous presence in the United States from seven to 10 years and restarts the clock from the commission of the controlled substance offense. Lopez cited section 212(h), which gives the Attorney General discretion to grant a waiver of inadmissibility for applicants who meet the eligibility requirements, to excuse that added charge. The Board of Immigration Appeals denied Lopez relief, holding that a 212(h) waiver may not be used with an application for NACARA cancellation of removal.The Third Circuit denied a petition for review. An application for NACARA cancellation of removal is not an application for adjustment of status; the enactment of NACARA did not expand section 212(h). View "Lopez v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

Petitioner petitioned for habeas relief after being in immigration detention for over a year without a bond hearing. During her initial removal proceedings, she was subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. Section 1226(c) (“Subsection C”) due to a conviction. Thus, she was not statutorily entitled to a bond hearing. However, in Casas Castrillon v. Department of Homeland Security, the Ninth Circuit held that once a noncitizen’s immigration case reaches judicial review, the authority for holding a Subsection C detainee shifts to 8 U.S.C. Section 1226(a) (“Subsection A”), which does entitle a noncitizen to a bond hearing. Accordingly, Petitioner argued she was entitled to a bond hearing.   The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of habeas relief and held that a noncitizen of the United States—who initially was subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. Section 1226(c)—is not entitled to a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. Section 1226(a) while awaiting a decision from this court on a petition for review.   Here, the panel observed that the Supreme Court’s decision in Jennings does not directly address the question in Casas Castrillon—when, if ever, mandatory detention under Subsection C ends. However, the panel explained that Jennings’s reasoning makes clear that Subsection A and Subsection C apply to discrete categories of noncitizens, and not to different stages of a noncitizen’s legal proceedings. The district court declined to reach Petitioner’s alternative argument that she was entitled to habeas relief as a matter of due process. The panel remanded to the district court to consider this question. View "LEXIS HERNANDEZ AVILEZ V. MERRICK GARLAND, ET AL" on Justia Law

Petitioner and her minor daughter petition for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals denying their motion to reopen removal proceedings to allow them to apply for cancellation of removal. The Fifth Circuit granted the petition for review and remanded to the Board of Immigration Appeals for further proceedings.   The court explained that an abuse of discretion occurs if the BIA’s decision “is capricious, irrational, utterly without foundation in the evidence, based on legally erroneous interpretations of statutes or regulations, or based on unexplained departures from regulations or established policies. That standard is met here because the BIA’s decision to deny Petitioner’s motion to reopen was based on a legally erroneous interpretation of the statutes governing Notices to Appear and the stop-time rule. View "Parada v. Garland" on Justia Law

At Petitioner’s removal proceeding, the government introduced into the record an INTERPOL Red Notice as the only evidence that Gonzalez-Castillo had committed a serious nonpolitical crime in El Salvador.   The Ninth Circuit granted in part and dismissed in part Petitioner’s petition for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals. The panel held that: (1) substantial evidence did not support the agency’s determination that Petitioner was ineligible for withholding of removal; (2) the agency erred by failing to consider all of Petitioner’s evidence under the Convention Against Torture, and (3) Petitioner waived review of the agency’s application of the one-year bar to asylum.   The panel held that, in this case, the Red Notice did not, by itself, establish probable cause that there were serious reasons to believe that Petitioner committed a serious nonpolitical crime in El Salvador. Explaining that probable cause requires a “fair probability” that the noncitizen committed a serious nonpolitical crime, the panel concluded that the Red Notice, in this case, did not meet that standard due to errors that cast doubt on its reliability, and its failure to articulate any specific crime of which Petitioner was accused. The panel rejected the government’s argument that by presenting “some evidence” in the form of the Red Notice, even if scant, it had shifted the burden to disprove the existence of probable cause on to Petitioner. The panel held Petitioner never alerted the agency to the two possible grounds for excusing the filing deadline that he raised in his briefing to the court. View "OSCAR GONZALEZ-CASTILLO V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review of the ruling of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) vacating the immigration judge's (IJ) decision granting Petitioner's application for cancellation of removal and ordering Petitioner removed, holding that the BIA did not commit reversible legal error.Petitioner, a native and citizen of Guatemala, conceded that he was removable from the United States but sought cancellation of removal predicated on the impact his removal would have on his young children. The IJ granted the application, concluding that Petitioner established the requisite extreme hardship. The BIA reversed, holding that the IJ incorrectly concluded that the hardships presented were sufficient to satisfy the applicable standard. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Petitioner failed to show that the BIA misconstrued or overlooked relevant evidence and that there was no evidence that the BIA applied an improper standard. View "Domingo-Mendez v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner initially sought asylum claiming that he was persecuted in India on account of being a Sikh who supports the creation of Khalistan and the Akali Dal (Mann) Party. An immigration judge denied Petitioner’s claims after concluding that Petitioner’s testimony was not credible because of inconsistencies and a lack of detail. The IJ also highlighted a State Department report showing that the situation for Sikhs had greatly normalized and the IJ found further that Petitioner had failed to even establish his identity.   The Ninth Circuit granted Petitioner’s petition. The panel held that the BIA erred in holding that earlier adverse credibility finding barred Petitioner’s motion to reopen, and in concluding that Petitioner failed to show that the conditions for Sikhs in India had changed qualitatively since his last hearing.   The panel explained that although the BIA may rely on a previous adverse credibility determination to deny a motion to reopen if that earlier finding still factually undermines the petitioner’s new argument, here, Petitioner’s motion included newly submitted evidence based on information independent of the prior adverse credibility finding.   The panel concluded that the BIA erred in rejecting Petitioner’s new evidence for two other reasons. First, the panel held that the record did not support the BIA’s determination that Petitioner was not similarly situated to the people harmed in 2017 political violence. Second, the panel held that Petitioner provided sufficient evidence demonstrating that the conditions for Sikhs in India had changed in the two decades since his asylum hearing. View "RUPINDER SINGH V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

In 2008, DHS removed Casas, a Mexican citizen, from the United States pursuant to a valid removal order. Four years later, DHS learned she had returned and sought to reinstate the removal order, using Form I-871. The form has a large section providing notice to the noncitizen of DHS’s intent to reinstate a removal order, a section for the noncitizen to acknowledge receipt of the notice, and a final section for DHS’s ultimate decision. According to the dates on the Form I-871 Casas received, DHS made its decision to reinstate Casas’s removal order first, and gave Casas notice later—an inversion of the procedure ordinarily requiring notice to a noncitizen before a final decision is rendered, The large notice section is dated a day after the decision to reinstate but the middle section shows that Casas acknowledged receipt of the notice six months after that decision. For seven years, Casas remained on supervision in the United States. In 2020, when Casas appeared for a routine check-in, DHS detained her. Casas requested a reasonable-fear interview, during which she discussed a purported kidnapping and possible “reprisal[s].” Casas’s mother and sister still live in Mexico.The asylum officer determined that Casas had not shown a reasonable fear of persecution or torture. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. Casas cannot show that she suffered any prejudice as a result of DHS’s procedural errors. The IJ’s reasonable-fear finding is supported by substantial evidence. View "Casas v. Garland" on Justia Law

The BIA concluded that Petitioner R.M was inadmissible and ineligible for adjustment of status based on his § 13-3415 conviction. Petitioner H.C, who was a lawful permanent resident, was found removable based on his Section 13-3408 conviction. For both petitioners, the agency applied the modified categorical approach to determine that their Arizona convictions were convictions for controlled substances under federal law. However, because Arizona’s list of prohibited drugs is overbroad with respect to federal law, the panel previously certified three questions to the Supreme Court of Arizona: 1) Is A.R.S. Section 13-3415 divisible as to drug type?; 2) Is A.R.S. Section 13-3408 divisible as to drug type?; and 3) Put another way, is jury unanimity required as to which drug or drugs was involved in an offense under either Section 13-3415 or Section 13-3408?   The Supreme Court of Arizona ruled that it had improvidently accepted the first two questions because divisibility pertains solely to federal law, and no Arizona court had addressed the issue. On the third question, the Supreme Court of Arizona concluded that jury unanimity as to the identity of the drug involved was required for a conviction under Section 13-3408.   Based on the Supreme Court of Arizona’s holding that jury unanimity as to the identity of a specific drug is required for a conviction for drug possession under Section 13-3408, the panel held that Section 13-3408 is divisible as to drug type. Accordingly, the panel concluded that the agency did not err in by applying the modified categorical approach to examine H.C record of conviction. View "JORGE ROMERO-MILLAN V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law