Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying his motion to reconsider the denial of an administrative closure of his removal proceedings. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, arguing an intervening BIA decision -- Matter of Cruz-Valdez -- granted administrative closure authority the BIA previously found lacking and instructed the Board to apply the administrative closure standard set out in Avetisyan. The BIA agreed   The Eighth Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review. The court held that the BIA did not abuse its broad discretion to deny motions to reconsider. As in Gonzalez-Vega, the court concluded it is “clear from the record that the [BIA] had the appropriate [Avetisyan] considerations in mind and committed no clear error of judgment in weighing them.” Petitioner argued the BIA did not analyze all the Avetisyan factors. But the court wrote it does not require the Board “to recite the considerations mechanically when applying them to the facts.” The BIA announced its decision in terms sufficient to enable us to perceive that it has heard and thought and not merely reacted. Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its broad discretion in denying the motion to reconsider View "Alejandro Islas-Saldana v. Merrick B. Garland" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied in part and dismissed in part the order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upholding an immigration judge's (IJ) denial of Petitioners' request for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), holding that Petitioners were not entitled to relief.The IJ denied the requests for asylum and withholding of removal brought by Petitioners, a mother and daughter who were natives and citizens of Honduras, based on its finding Petitioners failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution "on account of" a statutorily protected ground. Petitioners sought judicial review. The First Circuit denied the petition in part and otherwise dismissed it, holding (1) substantial evidence supported the agency's findings; and (2) Petitioners' CAT claim was not administratively exhausted. View "Barnica-Lopez v. Garland" on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated the order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) rejecting Petitioner's claim for withholding of removal, holding that the BIA erred in failing properly to consider significant documentary evidence.Petitioner, a native and citizen of Honduras, applied for withholding of removal, alleging that she endured pervasive abuse at the hands of her ex-husband and that she fled Honduras to escape the abuse. An immigration judge (IJ) denied her application for withholding of removal, finding Petitioner to be not credible. The BIA dismissed Petitioner's appeal. The First Circuit vacated the BIA's decision because the agency had failed to consider the documentary evidence. On remand, the BIA again affirmed. The First Circuit vacated the BIA's order and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the BIA failed properly to consider the documentary evidence in accordance with this Court's prior remand order. View "Aguilar-Escoto v. Garland" on Justia Law

At issue is whether the Commonwealth of Virginia would recognize a divorce granted by a foreign nation to its own citizens when neither spouse was domiciled in that nation at the time of the divorce. The question arises from Petitioner’s marriage to a woman after the woman and another man — both Ghanaian citizens — divorced pursuant to Ghanaian customary law. At the time of the divorce, the woman and man were lawful permanent residents of the United States, and neither was present or domiciled in Ghana. Based on his marriage to the woman, Petitioner became a lawful permanent resident of the United States. But when Petitioner applied to become a naturalized citizen, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) determined that he and the woman were not validly married. USCIS reasoned that under controlling Virginia law, the Commonwealth would not recognize a divorce granted by a nation where neither spouse was domiciled at the time of the divorce. Petitioner sought a review of the decision in the district court, which granted summary judgment to USCIS. Petitioner then brought this appeal.   The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to grant Petitioner’s naturalization application. The court concluded as a matter of comity, Virginia would recognize this otherwise valid divorce granted by a foreign nation to its own citizens, regardless of the citizens’ domicile at the time. The court explained it rejected only USCIS’s argument that pursuant to present Virginia law, the Commonwealth would refuse to recognize a divorce granted by a foreign nation to its own citizens simply because neither was domiciled in the foreign nation at the time of the divorce. View "Michael Adjei v. Alejandro Mayorkas" on Justia Law

Hernandez, a citizen of El Salvador, came to the U.S. in 1994, without inspection. In 1999, an IJ ordered him removed in his absence. More than 10 years later, another IJ reopened his removal proceedings. In the meantime, Hernandez married. Hernandez sought cancellation of removal, which required proof that he had remained in the U.S. for the past 10 years; that he had “been a person of good moral character”; that he had not been convicted of certain crimes; and that his “removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to” his wife. 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1)(A)–(D). The IJ concluded that Hernandez lacked good moral character because of his failure to pay taxes and because, in 2007 and 2010, he pleaded guilty to DUI.Meanwhile, his wife’s petition to allow him to become a permanent resident was approved. On remand, the IJ administratively closed Hernandez’s case to allow him to apply for a waiver to receive the visa while remaining in this country. Hernandez never sought the waiver. An IJ reopened his removal proceedings and found that Hernandez’s removal would cause his wife exceptional hardship but Hernandez still lacked “good moral character,” having been arrested twice for DUI in 2016.The Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review, first holding that the question of whether the historical facts show that an immigrant lacks “good moral character” qualifies as a mixed question within its jurisdiction. The BIA properly concluded that Hernandez’s history of alcohol use and drinking-and-driving convictions showed his lack of “good moral character.” View "Hernandez v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner is a native and citizen of Cameroon. He applied for admission to the United States in 2019 and was subsequently charged with removability under 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). On November 13, 2019, he appeared and admitted that he was removable but applied for asylum or withholding of removal based on his political opinion and sought protection under the CAT. Petitioner's claim was based on the allegations that the Cameroon government was killing “English-speaking Cameroonians” such as himself.The Immigration Judge denied Petitioner's request, finding that his testimony was too vague to be credible, noting that there were likely documents that were not presented that could have corroborated his claims. In front of the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"), Petitioner claimed that the Immigrations Judge erred in its credibility assessment. The BIA denied relief.On appeal, The Fifth Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review, finding no grounds to reverse the BIA's decision. View "Mohndamenang v. Garland" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the decision of the immigration (IJ) denying all three forms of relief sought by Petitioner, holding that the agencies improperly denied relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).Petitioner, a Guatemalan citizen, fled to the United States after a police-aided assault left him hospitalized. Petitioner sought asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the CAT. The IJ found Petitioner credible but denied his requests for relief. The First Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding (1) there was no basis to reverse the IJ's denial of asylum or withholding of removal; but (2) the harm inflicted in the past on Petitioner clearly satisfied the severity element of torture for purposes of adjudicating a claim for relief under the CAT. View "Hernandez-Martinez v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought a review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing his appeal from an order of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) finding him removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). The IJ and BIA concluded that Petitioner is removable because his prior conviction for sexual abuse in the second degree under N.Y. Penal Law Section 130.60(2) 2 is both (1) “sexual abuse of a minor,” which is an “aggravated felony” under 8 U.S.C. Section 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii); and (2) “a crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment” under 8 U.S.C. Section 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).   The Second Circuit dismissed Petitioner’s petition in part and denied it in part. The court reasoned that a conviction under N.Y. Penal Law Section 130.60(2) constitutes “sexual abuse of a minor.” Further, the court wrote that “sexual abuse of a minor” is defined as an “aggravated felony” under the INA, and the court lacks jurisdiction to review a final order of removal against an alien who committed an “aggravated felony.” The court, therefore, dismissed Petitioner’s petition in part. Second, Petitioner has abandoned any arguments as to whether N.Y. Penal Law Section 130.60(2) constitutes a “crime of child abuse,” so the court declined to reach the issue and denied this aspect of the petition. View "Debique v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeal affirming the decision of the trial court denying Defendant's motion to vacate his conviction, holding that holding that the court of appeals erred in ruling that Defendant failed adequately to corroborate his claim that immigration consequences were a paramount concern and thus that Defendant could not demonstrate prejudice within the meaning of Cal. Penal Code 1473.7.In 2004, Defendant, a native of Mexico, accepted a plea bargain and served one year in jail. In 2015, Defendant was detained by federal immigration authorities after a return flight to the United States, and his permanent residence card was seized. In his his third motion to vacate his conviction, Defendant argued that he had not been aware of the immigration consequences of his plea and that, had he been aware, he would have sought a plea with lesser consequences or gone to trial. The trial court denied the motion without holding an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the totality of the circumstances, there was a reasonable probability that Defendant would have rejected the plea had he understood its immigration consequences. View "People v. Espinoza" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitioned for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) streamlined affirmance of the immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of her claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Petitioner was verbally and physically harassed and received death threats because her community in Guatemala perceived her to be a lesbian, including because she wore men’s clothing to work. Petitioner challenged the IJ’s findings that: (1) this treatment did not amount to persecution, (2) the relevant social group for asylum purposes is based on “manner of dress,” and (3) no persecution was committed by the Guatemalan government or by forces that the government was unwilling or unable to control.   The Ninth Circuit granted Petitioner’s petition for review. The panel held that (1) substantial evidence did not support the agency’s determination that the treatment Petitioner suffered did not amount to persecution, (2) the agency erred in characterizing Petitioner’s proposed social group and concluding that it was not cognizable, and (3) the agency erred by failing to consider highly probative evidence regarding the Guatemalan government’s willingness or ability to control the persecution.   The panel explained that in concluding that this treatment amounted simply to threats, the immigration judge failed to recognize that threats may be compelling evidence of past persecution, particularly when the threats are specific and menacing and accompanied by violent confrontations, near-confrontations and vandalism. Further, the panel wrote that the record suggested that the agency failed to consider all of the evidence. View "REBECA CRISTOBAL ANTONIO V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law