Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner is a native of El Salvador. He first entered the United States around 2003 and was ordered removed in 2007. He then returned three more times—in 2010, 2018, and 2019. This appeal concerns his 2019 visit. In September 2019, the federal government reinstated Petitioner’s 2007 removal order. Petitioner sought withholding of removal and CAT relief. An immigration judge denied his application and, on April 27, 2022, the BIA dismissed his appeal. Petitioner petitioned for review on May 26, 2022.   The Fifth Circuit dismissed Petitioner’s petition for lack of jurisdiction. The court explained that Congress has limited the court’s jurisdiction to final orders “concluding that the alien is deportable or ordering deportation.  And it imposed another condition: the petition must be filed within 30 days of that order. The BIA’s denial of Petitioner’s application for withholding of removal and CAT relief is not a final order of removal. And his petition is untimely because it was filed over 30 days after his reinstatement order became final. View "Argueta-Hernandez v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The immigration judge (“IJ”) denied his application, explaining that while he had left El Salvador because of a genuine fear of gangs, neither he nor his family had had any encounters with gang members. Because the basis for his fear was simply a “generalized” fear of criminal gang members and violence in El Salvador, the IJ found that he was ineligible for relief.On appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), Petitioner argued that he had proceeded pro se before the IJ and that the IJ had failed to develop the record, as required by Quintero v. Garland, 998 F.3d 612, 622 (4th Cir. 2021). The BIA concluded, however, that the IJ had fulfilled the requirements of Quintero and affirmed.The Fourth Circuit affirmed, finding that the BIA's conclusions were not legally erroneous or lacked evidentiary support. View "Jose Trejo Tepas v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

The United States’ war in Afghanistan required regional allies willing to aid the effort. One such ally was Petitioner, a Pakistani businessman who sold supplies to coalition forces. This invoked the wrath of the Pakistani Taliban, which demanded exorbitant payments from Petitioner under threat of death. Petitioner repeatedly refused, and the Taliban attempted to carry out its threat, promising to hunt him until it succeeded. After losing his business, home, and nearly his life, Petitioner fled to the United States seeking asylum. The Immigration Judge and Board of Immigration Appeals both recognized that Petitioner suffered past persecution, entitling him to a presumption that the Taliban would continue to target him if he returned to Pakistan. But they agreed with the government that because Petitioner lived in Islamabad (the capital of Pakistan) for a few weeks without the Taliban finding him, he could live in a new area of the country without fear of reprisal.   The Fourth Circuit granted Petitioner’s petition for review, reversed the Board’s denial of Petitioner’s preserved claims, and remanded with instructions that the agency grant relief. The court explained that Petitioner’s brief sojourn to Islamabad—where he never left the house— doesn’t rebut the presumption that a notorious terrorist organization continues to imperil his life. The court granted relief since the record would compel any reasonable adjudicator to conclude Petitioner faces a well-founded threat of future persecution. View "Shaker Ullah v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner is a native of China admitted to the United States on a student visa in 2009. Petitioner sought review of a Board of Immigration Appeals order denying his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. If removed to China, Petitioner fears, he will be persecuted and tortured by Chinese authorities, who in 2008 allegedly imprisoned and violently beat him because of his Christian beliefs and practices.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the Board’s decision and remanded for further explanation. In denying relief on Petitioner’s withholding claim, both the IJ and the BIA relied at least in part on Petitioner’s failure to provide affidavits from his minister or fellow church members from China, attesting to his “activities as a Christian” and his arrest during home church services. But Petitioner repeatedly explained during his hearing why such evidence was not available: his minister and co-religionists feared reprisal from Chinese authorities if they came forward on his behalf. And neither the IJ nor the BIA made any finding as to the sufficiency of that explanation or the reasonable availability of the affidavits hypothesized by the IJ, or even noted Petitioner’s explanation in their opinions. The court left it to the agency on remand to evaluate Petitioner’s explanation and determine whether evidence from his co-religionists in China was “reasonably obtainable.” View "Zuowei Chen v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner is a rancher from Mexico who fears returning. He gives several reasons why. Twice, his uncles were kidnapped and held for ransom. The second time, the kidnapping was reported to the police. And though the police said they would “try to help,” they were ultimately unable to “do anything.” On another occasion, someone took pictures of Petitioner’s family home and then demanded money and threatened to kidnap a family member. And once, when he was driving from his family’s ranch to his home, two vans began chasing him. Shortly after Petitioner entered the United States, the Attorney General began removal proceedings against him. Petitioner conceded removability and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied his applications.  The BIA explained that it agreed with the IJ’s social-group-recognizability and nexus rulings, as well as the IJ’s determination regarding CAT relief.   The Eighth Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition. The court explained that here, the record does not support Petitioner’s contention that the Mexican government has turned a blind eye to criminal-gang-inflicted torture. When one of Petitioner’s uncles was kidnapped, the police offered to help. The fact that they were unable to “do anything” does not evidence acquiescence. And when Petitioner sought help from the police after the car chase, they provided it. Petitioner counters that country conditions reports show that criminal organizations have infiltrated the Mexican police and government. Yet he does not explain how this “general infiltration” makes the Mexican government “likely to acquiesce in his torture.” View "Efren Uriostegui-Teran v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Peru, appeals the Board of Immigration Appeals’ determination that she is ineligible for relief under 8 U.S.C. Section 1229b(b)(2), a provision whose language was originally adopted as part of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 and that outlines the conditions under which certain “battered spouses or children” qualify for discretionary cancellation of removal. As relevant here, it requires a petitioning alien to show that she “has been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty” by her spouse or parent. Petitioner contends that the Immigration Judge and the BIA made two errors in refusing her cancellation request. First, she maintains that, as a matter of law, they misinterpreted the statutory term “extreme cruelty” to require proof of physical—as distinguished from mental or emotional—abuse. And second, she asserts that having misread the law, the IJ and the BIA wrongly concluded that she doesn’t qualify for discretionary relief.   The Eleventh Circuit granted her petition for review and remanded it to the BIA for further consideration. The court explained that it agreed with Petitioner—and held— that the BIA misinterpreted 8 U.S.C. Section 1229b(b)(2). The term “extreme cruelty” does not require a petitioning alien to prove that she suffered physical abuse in order to qualify for discretionary cancellation of removal; proof of mental or emotional abuse is sufficient to satisfy the “extreme cruelty” prong of Section 1229b(b)(2)’s five-prong standard. View "Esmelda Ruiz v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for rehearing en banc after a request for a vote on whether to rehear the matter en banc, and the matter failed to receive a majority of the votes of the nonrecused active judges in favor of en banc consideration in a case in which the panel held that: (1) subject only to a very limited form of habeas corpus review that is inapplicable in this case, Section 242 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), “clearly and unambiguously” precludes judicial review of expedited removal orders, even with regard to constitutional challenges to such orders; and (2) as applied in this case—which involved an arriving alien with no previous ties to the United States—that denial of all judicial review was constitutional. View "HEVER MENDOZA LINARES V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

In 1996, Melvin Osorio-Morales’s family member, Jeremias, was dating Argueta, who was also dating a member of the Hernandez family. The men had a shootout; Jeremias was killed. In retaliation, the Osorio family killed Robert Hernandez. The Hernandez family set fire to the Osorio home, burning a grandmother alive. Two uncles escaped with significant burns. Apparently, a criminal case was brought after the fire, but the accused Hernandez family members were subsequently released, setting off a bloody feud. Melvin was born a year later. Melvin never had a violent interaction with the Hernandez family, but had to “watch [his] back” and carry weapons for protection. Melvin testified that one cousin was left paralyzed, three uncles were killed, two cousins committed suicide out of fear of what the Hernandez family would do to them, and another cousin was stabbed to death.Melvin entered the U.S. in 2014. The BIA affirmed the denial of his claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. The Seventh Circuit denied relief. Findings that the Honduran government is not “unable or unwilling” to control the threat from the Hernandez family were supported by substantial evidence. A government’s decision not to prosecute, without more information, does not show an “unwillingness or inability to protect.” View "Osorio-Morales v. Garland" on Justia Law

Madrid-Mancia, who entered the United States from Honduras without being admitted or paroled, was immediately detained and served a putative Notice to Appear (NTA) charging her as removable, 8 U.S.C. 1229(a)(1)(A)–(D). The putative NTA directed Madrid-Mancia that she was “required to provide the DHS, in writing, with [her] full mailing address and telephone number,” and “notify the Immigration Court immediately” of any changes. It warned that “a removal order may be made by the immigration judge in [her] absence” if she failed to appear when summoned. The document stated that a removal hearing would take place on “a date to be set at a time to be set.” The Department of Justice sent Madrid-Mancia a second document (a “Notice of Hearing”) years later providing the missing information. She had moved and claims she never received the notice. When Madrid-Mancia did not appear as directed, she was ordered removed in absentia.The Third Circuit ordered that the removal order be rescinded. Congress only allows a supplemental notice “in the case of any change or postponement in the time and place of [an alien’s removal] proceedings,” 8 U.S.C. 1229(a)(2)(A). Here, no change or postponement occurred; DHS never issued a new Notice to Appear. View "Madrid-Mancia v. Attorney General of the United States" on Justia Law

Pakistani nationals and brothers petitioned for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals decision upholding orders denying them adjustment of status and directing their removal from the United States. Petitioners argued that the agency erred in finding them ineligible for adjustment of status based on their earlier filing of frivolous, i.e., deliberately and materially false, asylum applications because those applications were untimely and, thus, their concededly false statements could not have been material to a matter properly before the agency for decision. Petitioners further faulted the agency for alternatively denying them adjustment of status as a matter of discretion.   The Second Circuit denied Petitioners’ petition for their review. However, the court explained that a question arises as to how Petitioners removal will affect their future ability to apply for reentry to the United States. A permanent and unwaivable bar on reentry applies to any alien who filed a frivolous claim for asylum after receiving notice of that consequence. Otherwise, the alien may be subject to lesser, waivable bars on reentry. Because this court cannot determine on the present record whether Petitioners received the notice required to trigger a permanent, unwaivable bar. The court granted review as to that single question and remanded for the limited purpose of allowing the agency to make an express finding as to notice and, based on that finding, to specify the scope of the reentry bar that will attend Petitioners’ removal. View "Ud Din v. Garland" on Justia Law