Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner is a 32-year-old native and citizen of Jamaica who entered the United States in 2006 and overstayed his visitor visa. On December 20, 2017, Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") officers arrested Petitioner pursuant to a warrant issued by the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"). In removal proceedings before the IJ, Petitioner argued that the immigration court lacked jurisdiction over his removal proceedings and the officers violated agency regulations and his fundamental rights during his arrest and interrogation.   The Second Circuit denied the petition. The court agreed that the agency had jurisdiction and that termination of the removal proceeding was not warranted. The court explained under Rajah termination may be warranted for pre-hearing regulatory violations in cases involving "prejudice that may have affected the outcome of the proceeding, conscience-shocking conduct, or a deprivation of fundamental rights." As Petitioner has failed to show that he satisfies any of the three requirements for termination, he is not entitled to termination of his removal proceedings, with or without prejudice to renewal. Accordingly, the court found that the immigration court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motions to terminate. View "Medley v. Garland" on Justia Law

In 2019, the Department of Homeland Security charged Petitioner with removability for two counts of being an aggravated felon and for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude within five years of being admitted to the United States. Petitioner conceded her removability, making her inadmissible to the United States and subject to deportation. Seeking relief from removal, Petitioner applied for a waiver of inadmissibility. To qualify for the waiver, Petitioner needed to demonstrate statutory eligibility and that the equities warranted a favorable exercise of discretion. The Immigration Judge denied Petitioner’s application. Petitioner petitioned for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ denial of her waiver of inadmissibility.   The Eighth Circuit denied in part and dismissed in part. The court explained that although the BIA did not include hardship to Petitioner’s relatives when it listed Petitioner’s positive equities, it still considered hardship in its decision. The BIA recognized that Petitioner’s removal would “likely result in a considerable level of hardship to herself, her spouse, and her children.” Accordingly, the court denied Petitioner’s petition on this ground. Further, Petitioner challenged the BIA’s weighing of equities, specifically how it weighed her crimes. The court wrote that this is not a reviewable question of law. It is a challenge to “the discretionary conclusion of not meriting a favorable exercise of discretion,” which the court does not have jurisdiction to review. View "Aisha King v. Merrick B. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of Mexico, petitioned for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals. The Board concluded that Petitioner’s prior conviction in Kansas for possession of methamphetamine made him removable from the United States.   The Eighth Circuit concluded that Petitioner is removable and therefore denied the petition for review. Petitioner contends that the approved instruction allows a prosecutor to charge a defendant with possession of multiple drugs in the alternative. But the instruction calls for insertion of a “controlled substance” in the singular, and recommends that “an alternative charge instruction not be given” because “the defendant cannot be convicted of multiplicitous crimes.”   Petitioner further asserted that drug type must be a “means” of committing the offense because Section 21-5706(c)(1) imposes the same punishment for possession of each substance. But while different punishments would conclusively establish that drug type is an element, equivalent punishments do not show that drug type is a means. The legislature may simply have concluded that each separate drug possession offense deserves the same punishment, regardless of whether the offender possessed cocaine, heroin, or methamphetamine. Accordingly, the court held that the Board correctly concluded Petitioner was removable for committing a controlled substance offense. View "Humberto Barbosa v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

In 2005, Petitioner, a native and citizen of Brazil, was ordered removed in absentia. In 2018, he moved to reopen and rescind the removal order, and an immigration judge (IJ) denied his request. He appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), and the BIA dismissed his appeal. He petitioned for a review of that dismissal. He contends that the BIA and the IJ lacked jurisdiction over his removal proceedings because the record does not show that his notice to appear (NTA) was ever filed with the immigration court, as required by 8 C.F.R. Section 1003.14(a).   The Fifth Circuit denied the petition. The court reasoned that it has previously explained that Section 1003.14 “is not jurisdictional” but is “a claim-processing rule.” Thus, Petitioner’s jurisdictional challenge fails. Further, Petitioner argued that the BIA erred by relying on a reconstructed record that did not contain his NTA. The court explained that it discerned nothing in the record to suggest that Petitioner’s Form I-213 “is incorrect or was obtained by coercion or duress,” the BIA could thus properly rely on it as “inherently trustworthy and admissible as evidence” that Petitioner received notice of his removal hearing. Though Petitioner presented his own sworn declarations challenging his understanding of the translator’s statements, documents he may have signed, and his need to attend a removal hearing, he failed to present such compelling evidence that no reasonable factfinder could conclude against it. The BIA thus did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Petitioner’s appeal from the denial of his motion to reopen. View "Alexandre-Matias v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner came to the United States from El Salvador as a teenager. While in high school, he inappropriately touched his younger female relative and was later charged under Texas Penal Code Section 22.04(a) with injuring a child by omission. That conviction spawned immigration proceedings in which he was found removable by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). Petitioner sought review of that decision. An Immigration Judge (IJ) held a hearing and found that Petitioner was subject to removal. Petitioner then applied for asylum, withholding of removal, protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), and cancellation of removal. Petitioner then appealed to the BIA and argued that (1) Texas Penal Code Section 22.04(a) is indivisible, and even if divisible, it is overbroad and does not fit the generic federal definition of child abuse; (2) his conviction does not qualify as a CIMT; and (3) the IJ erred in denying his applications for asylum and relief under the CAT.   The Fifth Circuit denied the petition. The court held that Petitioner’s argument that the statute is indivisible is now foreclosed by Monsonyem. Petitioner was convicted under the portion of Section 22.04(a) relating to child abuse, and the BIA properly concluded he was removable based on that conviction. Further, the court held that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that Texas “would apply its statute to conduct that falls outside the generic definition of child abuse.” None of Petitioner’s proffered cases demonstrates that Texas would apply Section 22.04(a) to crimes that do not align with the BIA’s definition of child abuse. View "Ponce v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a lawful permanent resident, was convicted of attempting to elude police in violation of RCW Section 46.61.024 in 2016 and 2018. An Immigration Judge and the BIA concluded that RCW Section 46.61.024 is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude and found Petitioner removable for having been convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct. The BIA relied on Matter of RuizLopez, 25 I. & N. Dec. 551 (BIA 2011).    The Ninth Circuit granted Petitioner’s petition for review. The panel concluded that the BIA failed to address substantive changes the Washington Legislature made to the statute and subsequent Washington case law interpreting the revised statute and remanded. Applying the categorical approach, the panel identified the elements of statute of conviction. As relevant here, the version of the statute at issue in Matter of Ruiz-Lopez required driving with “wanton or willful disregard for the lives or property of others.” However, in 2003, the Washington Legislature altered that element: the current version requires proof that the vehicle was driven “in a reckless manner.” The panel explained that although the term “reckless manner” is not defined by statute, the Washington Supreme Court has held that operating a motor vehicle in a “reckless manner” means operating it in “a rash or heedless manner, indifferent to the consequences.” The panel explained that, in some circumstances, “reckless” may be the equivalent of “willful or wanton,” but under current Washington law, “reckless manner” is not the equivalent of “recklessness,” and “reckless manner” is the required mens rea in Petitioner’s statute of conviction. View "ZHOVTONIZHKO V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, was ordered by an immigration judge (IJ) to be removed from the United States after the IJ ruled that Petitioner’s application for relief from removal was untimely. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) agreed with the IJ and dismissed Petitioner’s appeal. Petitioner timely petitioned for review, arguing that the rejection of his relief application violated his due process rights.   The Ninth Circuit granted the petition. The panel held that the IJ’s rejection of the opportunity to file a relief application on December 18 deprived Petitioner of a full and fair opportunity to be heard. The panel concluded that Petitioner’s immigration proceedings were fundamentally unfair because (1) the purported deadline to submit a relief application was ambiguous; (2) Petitioner’s counsel offered to submit the application on the day of the apparent deadline while the IJ was still on the bench, making any delay in the proceeding practically nonexistent; and (3) the IJ’s denial of a continuance so that Petitioner’s recently-retained counsel could submit the application was an abuse of discretion. The panel concluded that the IJ’s rejection of Petitioner’s application clearly affected the outcome of the proceedings and thus caused him prejudice because the merits of his application were never considered by the agency at all. View "ARIZMENDI-MEDINA V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Petitioner was born in 1967 in Western Samoa to a Western Samoan father and an American Samoan mother. His mother is now a non-citizen national, but she only became eligible under the 1986 amendments and did not attain her status until after Petitioner was born. Petitioner sought a declaration that his mother’s status qualifies him to be a non-citizen national. The district court held that Petitioner’s mother’s status as a national commenced only on the date it was conferred and was not retroactive to her date of birth. The court, therefore, found Petitioner did not qualify to be a non-citizen national.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of the Government’s motion to dismiss. The panel explained that Congress has extended citizenship to individuals born in every United States territory except American Samoa, meaning that those with ties to American Samoa are the only group eligible for noncitizen national status. The status of an American Samoan is a hybrid. The panel concluded that the text of the 1986 amendments makes clear that Congress intended for the addition to apply retroactively and to bestow the same status on those born before, on, or after the date of enactment: “national, but not citizen, of the United States at birth.” The panel concluded that Petitioner’s mother’s non-citizen national status extends back to her birth and, as a result, that Petitioner qualifies for non-citizen national status too. View "ILAI KOONWAIYOU V. ANTONY BLINKEN, ET AL" on Justia Law

Petitioner testified that she was afraid to return to Guatemala because a woman had attempted to rob her after she withdrew money from a bank. The woman told Petitioner that she targeted her because Petitioner had family in the United States and a lot of money. The woman also threatened that Petitioner’s son would “pay for it” due to Petitioner’s refusal to give her the money. Petitioner and her son asserted that she had suffered past persecution and had a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of her political opinion of refusing to submit to violence by criminal groups or gangs and their claimed membership in three particular social groups: “Guatemalan families that lack an immediate family male protector,” “Guatemalan women,” and “immediate family members of Petitioner.”   The Ninth Circuit denied Petitioner and her son’s petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ dismissal of their appeal of an immigration judge’s denial of asylum and related relief. The panel held that Petitioner failed to show that the agency erred in concluding that her proposed social group comprised of “Guatemalan families that lack an immediate family male protector” was not cognizable. The panel also concluded that substantial evidence supported the agency’s determination that Petitioner had not expressed a political opinion. The panel explained that Petitioner’s refusal to give money to the threatening robber was not evidence of a “conscious and deliberate” decision that would naturally result in attributing a political position to her and that she instead simply reacted to being robbed. View "DORIS RODRIGUEZ-ZUNIGA, ET AL V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Mexican citizen, petitioned for habeas relief after being held in immigration detention for over a year without a bond hearing. A district court judge granted Petitioner’s petition for relief and ordered the Government to provide her with a bond hearing on statutory grounds, relying on Casas-Castrillon v. Department of Homeland Security, 535 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2008). The Government appealed on the ground that Casas-Castrillon is no longer good law.   The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of habeas relief and remand for consideration of Petitioner’s remaining constitutional argument. The court explained that t Jennings’s reasoning is “clearly irreconcilable” with Casas-Castrillon’s detention-shifting framework and held that Jennings abrogated this portion of Casas-Castrillon. Next, the panel explained that Subsection A provides the Government with authority to detain noncitizens “pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States” and that Jennings provides that Subsection C authorizes detention during the same period as Subsection A, but does not define that period. The panel looked to Prieto-Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2008), and held that detention authority under Subsection A continues through judicial review. The panel held that the authority under Subsection C likewise continues through judicial review. Finally, the district court declined to reach Petitioner’s alternative argument that she was entitled to habeas relief as a matter of due process. The panel remanded to the district court to consider this question in the first instance. View "LEXIS HERNANDEZ AVILEZ V. MERRICK GARLAND, ET AL" on Justia Law