Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

An employee of a multinational information technology company alleged that his employer engaged in fraudulent practices by obtaining less expensive L-1 and B-1 visas for foreign workers who, according to him, should have been sponsored under the more costly H-1B visa program. He claimed this allowed the company to avoid paying higher application fees and payroll taxes owed to the U.S. government. The employee also asserted that after he reported these alleged practices internally, the company retaliated against him by imposing unrealistic performance goals, removing him from a key client account, and ultimately terminating his employment.After the employee filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA) in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, the government declined to intervene. The district court dismissed the employee’s first amended complaint, holding that he failed to state a claim for a reverse false claim under the FCA because the company was not obligated to pay higher payroll taxes or application fees for visas it never sought. The court also dismissed the retaliation claim, finding that the employee’s reports concerned only potential statutory and regulatory violations, not FCA-protected activity.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the reverse false claim, concluding that the employer had no established obligation under the FCA to pay higher payroll taxes or H-1B visa fees for visas it did not apply for. However, the appellate court reversed the dismissal of the retaliation claim, holding that the employee sufficiently alleged he engaged in protected activity under the FCA and that the employer retaliated against him for this conduct. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the retaliation claim. View "United States v. Tata Consultancy Services, LTD" on Justia Law

David Fiddler, a Jamaican national who entered the United States as a child, was convicted in Illinois of first-degree murder and attempted first-degree murder, resulting in a lengthy prison sentence. He suffers from severe schizophrenia, which has led to repeated hospitalizations. After the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him in 2021, Fiddler sought deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), arguing that, if returned to Jamaica, he would likely become homeless, lack access to mental health care, and face violence from police or private individuals, with the acquiescence of authorities, due to his mental illness.An Immigration Judge (IJ) initially denied Fiddler’s CAT claim, finding insufficient evidence that he would face a substantial risk of torture. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) remanded for further analysis, but the IJ again denied relief, concluding that while Fiddler was likely to become homeless and vulnerable, the evidence did not show a substantial risk of torture or that Jamaican officials would act with the specific intent required under the CAT. The BIA affirmed, holding that Fiddler had not demonstrated that harm he feared would be inflicted with the specific intent to torture, nor that Jamaican officials would acquiesce in torture by private actors. After a further remand and another BIA affirmation (with one dissent), Fiddler petitioned for review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and denied the petition. The court held that Fiddler failed to establish it was more likely than not he would be tortured with the specific intent required by the CAT, either by government officials or with their acquiescence. The court found the BIA’s analysis consistent with CAT standards and concluded that the evidence did not compel a contrary result. View "Fiddler v Bondi" on Justia Law

Two noncitizens, one from Egypt and one from Guatemala, each entered the United States in the 1990s and were granted asylum after claiming persecution in their home countries. Both later committed criminal offenses—one was convicted of stalking and child endangerment, the other of multiple driving while intoxicated offenses. As a result, the Department of Homeland Security initiated proceedings to terminate their asylum status, arguing that their convictions constituted “particularly serious crimes.” Immigration Judges in both cases terminated their asylum status and ordered their removal, but the petitioners sought to adjust their status to lawful permanent resident under 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b).In the first case, the Immigration Judge initially granted the adjustment application, reasoning that the statute did not explicitly require current asylum status. The Department of Homeland Security appealed, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) reversed, relying on its decision in Matter of T-C-A-, which held that only those with current asylum status are eligible for adjustment. In the second case, the Immigration Judge denied the adjustment application on the same grounds, and the BIA affirmed. Both petitioners then sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the statutory language and the relevant context, including neighboring provisions and legislative history. The court held that 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b) requires a noncitizen to have current asylum status to be eligible for adjustment to lawful permanent resident status. The court concluded that a past grant of asylum is insufficient if that status has since been terminated. Accordingly, the court denied both petitions for review. View "Wassily v. Bondi" on Justia Law

The defendant, a Mexican citizen, was first brought to the United States as a child. He was discovered by federal officials in Texas in 2015 and deported later that year. In 2020, he was again found in the United States and arrested on outstanding warrants. He was convicted in state court for drug-related offenses and sentenced to five years in prison. While serving this sentence, he was screened by immigration authorities and subsequently indicted for illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). In 2024, he pleaded guilty to the federal charge without a plea agreement. The district court sentenced him to 24 months in prison and one year of supervised release, adopting special conditions recommended in the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR), including requirements to report to immigration authorities and seek work authorization.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas confirmed at sentencing that the defendant and his counsel had reviewed the PSR, which contained the special conditions. The court orally adopted the PSR and its appendix, imposed the recommended conditions, and provided the defendant an opportunity to object. The defendant’s counsel objected only to the relationship between the federal and state offenses, not to the special conditions. The written judgment included all the conditions from the PSR. The defendant appealed, arguing that the written judgment conflicted with the oral pronouncement regarding the special conditions of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case for plain error, as the defendant had notice and an opportunity to object at sentencing but did not do so. The court held that the district court satisfied the oral-pronouncement requirement by adopting the PSR and providing notice and opportunity to object. Therefore, there was no conflict between the written judgment and the oral pronouncement, and the judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "USA v. Quezada-Atayde" on Justia Law

A married couple, both citizens of Mexico, have lived in the United States for over twenty years without legal status. They have two U.S.-born children, one of whom, I.L., has a learning disability, ADHD, and requires ongoing medical and educational support. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against the couple, who conceded inadmissibility but sought cancellation of removal, arguing that deportation would cause their son an “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” due to his special needs and the alleged lack of adequate services in Mexico.An immigration judge found both parents credible and agreed they met the first three statutory requirements for cancellation of removal, but concluded they did not satisfy the hardship requirement. The judge acknowledged the difficulties I.L. would face but determined these did not rise to the high threshold set by the statute. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the judge’s decisions in separate, but materially identical, rulings, agreeing that the hardship standard was not met.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the Board’s application of the hardship standard under the substantial-evidence standard, as clarified by recent Supreme Court precedent. The court held that the Board’s determination was supported by substantial evidence, given the record showed that some medical and educational services were available in Mexico and that the Board applied the correct legal standard. The court denied the petitions for review, holding that the Board’s application of the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) is reviewable for substantial evidence, and that the Board’s decisions in these cases met that standard. View "Lopez-Martinez v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Two students challenged the University of California’s policy that prohibits the employment of undocumented students who lack federal work authorization. The University’s longstanding practice allowed employment of undocumented students with Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) status, as they have federal work authorization, but excluded those without such authorization. After the federal government stopped accepting new DACA applications, the number of undocumented students without work authorization increased. The University considered changing its policy but ultimately decided against it, citing significant risks of federal enforcement under the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) and related regulations, and dissolved a working group tasked with exploring alternatives.The students filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, arguing that the University’s policy was an abuse of discretion and violated the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) by discriminating based on immigration status. The court initially denied the petition, but the California Supreme Court granted review and transferred the case back, instructing the appellate court to reconsider. The University argued that its policy was based on risk assessment rather than a definitive interpretation of IRCA, and that even if the policy was discriminatory, the risk of federal enforcement justified its continuation.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, held that the University’s policy facially discriminates based on immigration status and that, under state law, such discrimination is only permissible if required by federal law, which the University did not establish. The court concluded that the University abused its discretion by relying solely on litigation risk as a justification for its policy. The court issued a writ of mandate directing the University to reconsider its policy using proper legal criteria. View "Munoz v. The Regents of the University of Cal." on Justia Law

A woman from El Salvador entered the United States without valid documents in 2014 after fleeing an abusive relationship with a gang member who had threatened her and her family. She experienced repeated physical assaults and threats, including an incident where her hand was cut with a knife. After reporting the abuse to local police, who dismissed her concerns, she relocated within El Salvador but continued to receive threats from the gang. Fearing for her life, she fled to the United States, where she sought asylum, claiming past persecution and a well-founded fear of future persecution based on her membership in a particular social group.An Immigration Judge denied her application for asylum, finding that her proposed social groups were not legally cognizable because they were defined by the harm suffered and lacked particularity and social distinction. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed this decision, also concluding that her social groups were impermissibly circular and that she had not demonstrated a well-founded fear of future persecution. The BIA later denied her motion to reconsider, rejecting her argument that precedent supported recognition of her social group.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s denial of the motion to reconsider. The Fourth Circuit held that the BIA committed legal error by rejecting the petitioner’s proposed social group without conducting a substantive, fact-based analysis as required by law. The court vacated the BIA’s ruling on the social group issue and remanded for further proceedings, instructing the BIA to perform a proper analysis based on the facts and evidence of the case. The court also vacated the BIA’s analysis of future persecution, directing that it be reconsidered if the social group is found cognizable on remand. View "Guardado v. Bondi" on Justia Law

P.A.-V., a Mexican citizen, first entered the U.S. in 1995 but was removed in 1998 and 1999. He re-entered in 1999 and remained until 2020 when he was arrested for DUI, leading to the reinstatement of his removal order by the Department of Homeland Security. He applied for protection under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and the Convention Against Torture (CAT), fearing violence in Mexico due to cartel activity linked to his parents' land. An immigration judge denied his application, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the decision.The immigration judge found P.A.-V.'s testimony credible but concluded that he had not shown past persecution or a reasonable fear of future persecution or torture. The judge noted that the violence experienced by his family was not directly linked to him and was consistent with general violence in the region. The judge also determined that P.A.-V. could safely relocate within Mexico. The BIA affirmed the judge's decision on the same grounds.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case, applying a highly deferential standard of review. The court found that substantial evidence supported the immigration judge's and BIA's conclusions. The court held that P.A.-V. failed to establish past persecution or a reasonable fear of future persecution, as the evidence did not show a direct link between the violence and a threat to him. The court also agreed that P.A.-V. could reasonably relocate within Mexico. Additionally, the court found that P.A.-V. did not meet the higher burden required for CAT relief, as there was no evidence that the Mexican government would consent or acquiesce to any harm he might face. Consequently, the petition for review was denied. View "P. A.-V. v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of the Dominican Republic and a lawful permanent resident of the United States, was ordered removed after being convicted of sexual abuse in the second degree under New York Penal Law (NYPL) § 130.60(2). This conviction was deemed an "aggravated felony" under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(A) and 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) because it constituted "sexual abuse of a minor." Approximately a year later, the petitioner moved to reopen his removal proceedings, but the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied the motion as untimely and concluded that he did not warrant equitable tolling.An Immigration Judge (IJ) initially determined that the petitioner’s conviction was an aggravated felony, rendering him removable and ineligible for asylum and cancellation of removal. The IJ also found the conviction to be a "particularly serious crime," barring withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision and denied the petitioner’s motion to remand for consideration of new evidence regarding his mental health and diabetes diagnosis.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court dismissed the petition challenging the removal order, citing its recent decision in Debique v. Garland, which held that a conviction under NYPL § 130.60(2) is categorically an aggravated felony. The court rejected the petitioner’s arguments that Debique was not binding and that the Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo undermined its precedential force. The court also denied the petition challenging the BIA’s denial of the motion to reopen, finding that the BIA had a reasonable basis for concluding that the petitioner failed to show due diligence for the entire period between the expiration of the 90-day deadline and the filing of the motion. View "Garcia Pinach v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Jonathan Alexander Colorado Navarro, a former MS-13 gang member, came to the United States after killing three people in El Salvador. He initially omitted this information in his asylum applications, only fully confessing during his testimony before an Immigration Judge (IJ). Despite these omissions and other lies, the IJ found him credible and concluded that he qualified for protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), based on the likelihood of being tortured in El Salvador.The Department of Homeland Security issued Colorado a Notice to Appear, charging him with being in the country illegally. At his initial immigration court hearing, he admitted his illegal status and sought asylum and CAT protection. Colorado went through three asylum applications, each progressively revealing more information about his past crimes. The IJ granted him deferral of removal under CAT, finding his testimony credible and determining that he was likely to be tortured if returned to El Salvador.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) reviewed the IJ's decision and reversed it, finding clear error in the IJ's credibility determination and the likelihood of torture analysis. The BIA noted inconsistencies and omissions in Colorado's applications and testimony, undermining his credibility. The BIA also found that the evidence did not support the IJ's conclusion that Colorado was likely to be tortured, either by Salvadoran officials or gangs, if returned.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the BIA's decision. The court found that substantial evidence supported the BIA's conclusions. The court agreed that Colorado's omissions and inconsistent explanations undermined his credibility and that the evidence did not establish a sufficient likelihood of torture. The court also noted that Colorado's claim that the BIA should have remanded the case for further testimony was unreviewable because it was not raised before the BIA. Consequently, the court denied Colorado's petition for review. View "Colorado Navarro v. Bondi" on Justia Law