Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Shlomo Bador, an Israeli citizen, received conditional permanent resident status in the U.S. based on his marriage to a U.S. citizen. Two years later, he and his wife filed a joint petition to remove the conditions on his status. However, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) suspected the marriage was fraudulent. After interviewing Bador’s wife, she withdrew her support for the petition, leading to the automatic termination of Bador’s conditional status. Consequently, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) sought to remove Bador, and he conceded his removability.An Immigration Judge (IJ) reviewed the case, where Bador requested a good-faith waiver, claiming his marriage was genuine but had ended in divorce. During the hearing, Bador admitted the marriage was fraudulent, having paid his wife and a broker to secure his status. The IJ denied the good-faith waiver and ruled Bador ineligible for a fraud waiver under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H), which applies to aliens charged with being inadmissible at the time of admission due to fraud. The IJ found that Bador’s removal was based on the termination of his conditional status, not the fraud itself.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the IJ’s decision, agreeing that Bador could not use the fraud waiver to excuse his failure to file a joint petition. The BIA dismissed his appeal, leading Bador to petition the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for review.The Second Circuit denied Bador’s petition, holding that he was ineligible for the fraud waiver. The court concluded that Bador’s removal was due to the termination of his conditional status for failing to file a joint petition, not because of his fraudulent marriage. Therefore, the fraud waiver under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H) did not apply. View "Bador v. Garland" on Justia Law

Hugo Abraham Aguilar, a native and citizen of Honduras, entered the United States without inspection in 2001 and has three U.S. citizen children. In January 2014, he was arrested in New Jersey for allegedly sexually assaulting his stepdaughter and remained in pretrial detention for 1,332 days due to his inability to afford bail. In May 2017, Aguilar pled guilty to a reduced charge of third-degree endangering the welfare of a child and was sentenced to 1,332 days in prison, with credit for time served. Shortly after his sentencing, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him.The Immigration Judge (IJ) found Aguilar statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal, citing his inability to demonstrate "good moral character" due to his confinement for more than 180 days as a result of his conviction. The IJ also denied his request for a continuance to challenge his conviction in state court. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Aguilar's appeal, agreeing with the IJ's findings and concluding that the IJ acted within his discretion in denying the continuance.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that pre-conviction detention credited toward a defendant's sentence is considered confinement "as a result of conviction" under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Consequently, Aguilar's 1,332 days of pre-conviction detention, credited as time served, precluded him from establishing the required good moral character for cancellation of removal. The court also denied as moot Aguilar's challenge to the BIA's decision dismissing his appeal from the IJ's denial of a continuance, as his state post-conviction relief efforts had concluded unsuccessfully. The Third Circuit denied Aguilar's petition for review. View "Aguilar v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

The case involves Raymond Sefakor Yao Azumah, a Ghanaian national who was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 2010. After a trip to Ghana in 2014, Azumah was deemed inadmissible due to an intervening embezzlement conviction. Despite this, the government paroled Azumah into the country and initiated removal proceedings against him. These proceedings were later dismissed, and Azumah applied for citizenship. However, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services denied his application, arguing that Azumah was statutorily ineligible because he was not “lawfully admitted for permanent residence” upon his return to the United States in 2014. The district court affirmed this denial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit disagreed with the lower court's decision. The court noted that Azumah was indeed “lawfully admitted for permanent residence” at all relevant times, including 2010, 2014, and when he sought citizenship, because he had the status of a legal permanent resident of the United States. The court did not interpret the agency regulation to impose upon Azumah the additional burden of showing that he was “lawfully admitted” rather than paroled when he returned to the United States in 2014. Therefore, the court vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Azumah v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services" on Justia Law

Three Chinese individuals invested in a project to improve Philadelphia’s transit infrastructure as part of an effort to obtain EB-5 visas, which are visas for foreign investors who create jobs in the United States. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) approved their visa applications. However, due to the oversubscription of the EB-5 visa program, the investors were waiting in line for visas to become available. In 2022, Congress changed the eligibility requirements for EB-5 visas, creating a new category of “reserved” EB-5 visas for foreigners who invest in “infrastructure projects”. The investors believed that they should be eligible for the new “reserved” visas based on their past investments in infrastructure. They sued the Department of Homeland Security and USCIS, arguing that previous investments in already-approved infrastructure-focused projects should be eligible for reserved EB-5 visas. The district court dismissed the complaint, ruling that the government had taken no final agency action that may be challenged at this time.The case was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The court agreed with the lower court that the arguments made by the appellants were premature. The court found that the statements made by USCIS in a Q&A and a policy manual merely clarified the existing process for seeking an immigration benefit and did not constitute final agency action. The court also noted that the appellants were not precluded from applying for reserved EB-5 visas. Therefore, the court affirmed the decision of the district court, dismissing the appellants' claims for lack of finality under the Administrative Procedure Act. View "Delaware Valley Regional Center, LLC v. Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

The case involves a family from El Salvador seeking asylum in the United States. The family consists of Jose Maria Rivera, a pastor, his wife Morena, their two children, and Morena's son Reyes. Rivera and his church were known for evangelizing to gang members, which led to threats and violence from the gangs. The situation escalated when a gang member, Ronal Granadeno, decided to join Rivera's church, leading to an attack on Rivera, Granadeno, and Morena. Granadeno was killed, and Rivera was threatened with death. The family fled to the United States, and Rivera applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) on behalf of himself and his family.The Immigration Judge (IJ) found Rivera and Reyes credible but concluded that Rivera had failed to demonstrate that the persecution was "on account of" his religion or any other protected ground. The IJ reasoned that the gang was angry that Rivera had interfered with the gang's ranks by convincing Granadeno to leave the gang, and that Rivera's religion was therefore only "incidental" to his persecution. The IJ denied the family's claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed the family's appeal, agreeing with the IJ's findings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit partially granted the family's petition for review. The court found that the BIA and IJ had erred in their analysis of whether Rivera's religion was a central reason for his persecution. The court noted that the BIA and IJ had failed to consider evidence that Rivera's religion may have been an additional central reason for his persecution. The court vacated the BIA's decision on the issue of nexus and remanded the case for further proceedings. However, the court denied the petition for review as to Reyes's separate asylum claim, finding that the record did not compel the conclusion that his membership in the family was one central reason that he was threatened. View "Rivera v. Garland" on Justia Law

The case involves an American citizen and her noncitizen husband who sued two U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) officials, alleging that USCIS unreasonably delayed adjudicating a waiver application the husband submitted two years prior. The plaintiffs argued that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Mandamus Act granted subject-matter jurisdiction over their claims. The district court dismissed their claims, concluding that language in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) that denies courts jurisdiction over suits based on agency “decisions or actions” also bars suits over agency inaction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, but for different reasons. The appellate court found that the district court erred in interpreting the INA's jurisdictional bar to include agency inaction. However, the court concluded that no statute or regulation requires USCIS to adjudicate the husband’s waiver application, and therefore, the district court lacked jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims. The court noted that while the delay in adjudication was stressful for the plaintiffs, their complaint should be addressed to the political branches, as the court lacked jurisdiction to order the relief sought. View "Lovo v. Miller" on Justia Law

The case involves Mike Govender Hatchet, a Sierra Leone citizen who sought to adjust his immigration status to that of a lawful permanent resident in the United States. Hatchet applied for discretionary relief multiple times, but the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied each application, citing facts that rendered Hatchet ineligible for discretionary relief. Hatchet challenged the agency's actions in federal district court, arguing that the agency relied on facts clearly at odds with the record.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. The district court dismissed Hatchet's case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, agreeing with the defendants' argument that the Supreme Court's recent decision in Patel demonstrated that Hatchet's claims were not subject to judicial review due to a jurisdiction-stripping statute.The case was then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The appellate court affirmed the district court's dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to review the factual findings of USCIS, and because Hatchet's arguments were entirely fact-bound, the court agreed that the district court properly dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court's decision was based on the Supreme Court's recent decision in Patel, which held that federal courts are without jurisdiction to review both discretionary and non-discretionary judgments related to the granting of relief, including factual findings. View "Hatchet v. Andrade" on Justia Law

Miguel Angel Garcia Carrera, a nonpermanent resident and citizen of Mexico, sought to cancel his removal from the United States. Garcia Carrera argued that his removal would cause exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his U.S. citizen daughter. The Department of Homeland Security had placed him in removal proceedings after he entered the U.S. without inspection. Garcia Carrera had been in the U.S. since 2005, with a brief return to Mexico in 2005. His removal proceedings began in 2012 following an arrest for driving while intoxicated.The Immigration Judge (IJ) initially denied Garcia Carrera's application for cancellation of removal, concluding that he had not demonstrated the requisite hardship to his daughter. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed this decision, agreeing that Garcia Carrera failed to establish the necessary hardship as his daughter, who would remain in the U.S. with her mother, had no serious physical or mental disabilities. Garcia Carrera, proceeding without counsel, appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.The Second Circuit, following the Supreme Court's decision in Wilkinson v. Garland, confirmed that it had jurisdiction to review Garcia Carrera's claim. The court considered both the IJ's and the BIA's decisions and found no error in the agency's conclusion that Garcia Carrera failed to demonstrate the requisite hardship. The court noted that the IJ correctly stated the applicable legal standards and addressed the hardships that Garcia Carrera claimed his daughter would suffer. The court also found no indication that the IJ failed to consider other relevant evidence. Therefore, the court denied Garcia Carrera's petition for review. View "Garcia Carrera v. Garland" on Justia Law

The case involves Sergio Manrique Gutierrez, a lawful permanent resident of the United States, who was convicted of carjacking under California law. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld an Immigration Judge's (IJ) decision that Gutierrez was removable for having been convicted of an aggravated felony crime of violence and for having been convicted of two crimes of moral turpitude.The BIA held that Gutierrez's conviction for carjacking under California law is a categorical crime of violence. The BIA did not address the second ground for removal, concluding that Gutierrez waived his challenge to the moral turpitude removal charge. Gutierrez separately petitioned for review of the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen his appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that California carjacking under Cal. Penal Code § 215(a) is not a categorical crime of violence. The court also concluded that the BIA erroneously determined that Gutierrez waived his challenge to the moral turpitude removal charge. The court remanded the case to the BIA to decide, in the first instance, whether Gutierrez is removable for having been convicted of two crimes of moral turpitude. The court dismissed Gutierrez’s petition for review of the IJ’s sua sponte reopening of his case to consider a change in the law. The court denied Gutierrez’s petition as to his remaining claims concerning the IJ’s adverse credibility finding, the discretionary denial of his application for waiver of admissibility, the denial of protection under the Convention Against Torture, and the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen his case to consider new evidence that he was incompetent and to consider his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. View "GUTIERREZ v. GARLAND" on Justia Law

The case involves a family from Guatemala who entered the United States without valid entry documents and were served with Notices to Appear, charging them with removability under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The father, Roni Cruz Galicia, filed an application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, with his wife and child as derivative beneficiaries. Cruz claimed that they were members of a particular social group ("PSG") defined as "climate refugees," having fled Guatemala due to severe environmental conditions and the government's inadequate response.The Immigration Judge (IJ) found Cruz's testimony credible but rejected his asylum claim. The IJ determined that Cruz did not experience sufficient harm in Guatemala to constitute past persecution, the asserted PSG of "climate refugees" was not legally cognizable, and Cruz's fear of poor conditions in his home country did not constitute a well-founded fear of future persecution. Cruz appealed the IJ's asylum ruling to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which summarily affirmed the IJ's decision.In the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, Cruz argued that his asserted PSG of "climate refugees" was legally cognizable and that he had experienced past persecution and had a well-founded fear of future persecution due to his membership in the PSG. The court found no error in the determination that Cruz failed to show that his asserted PSG is legally cognizable. The court also rejected Cruz's argument that the BIA erred by affirming the denial of his asylum claim summarily and without a written opinion. The court denied the petition. View "Cruz Galicia v. Garland" on Justia Law