Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner moved for the BIA to reopen his cancellation of removal proceedings so he could present new evidence of alleged “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to his United States citizen children. The BIA denied his motion, finding he failed to demonstrate prima facie eligibility for relief as to the good moral character and hardship requirements.   The Eighth Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review. The court explained that the material question on the issue of hardship in a motion to reopen is whether the new evidence, if proven, would show an “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to Petitioner’s United States citizen children. Further, the court explained that a petitioner must demonstrate prima facie eligibility for relief as to all required elements to have their file reopened. Here, the court found no abuse of the BIA’s substantial discretion in the alternative ruling that Petitioner failed to rebut the Castillo-Perez presumption. The final DUI occurred approximately one month after an initial and informal exercise of discretion in Petitioner’s favor: the administrative closure his file in 2016. To overcome this presumption, a petitioner must show “substantial relevant and credible contrary evidence” to demonstrate “that the multiple convictions were an aberration.” Driving under the influence one month after the suspension of his initial removal proceedings does not suggest the unusual showing described in Castillo-Perez. View "Jose Llanas-Trejo v. Merrick B. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner and her minor daughter, natives and citizens of Guatemala, petition for review of the final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissing their appeal from the immigration judge’s order denying Petitioner’s application for asylum and withholding of removal. Petitioners filed their petition for review with this Court one day after the deadline set by 8 U.S.C. Section 1252(b)(1). They contend that the Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26(c) extends the filing period by three additional days because the Board served the order by mail.   The Fourth Circuit dismissed the petition concluding that Rule 26(c) does not apply to petitions for review governed by Section 1252(b)(1). The court explained that because Section 1252(b)(1) calculates the time to file a petition for review from “the date of the final order of removal,” and not from service of that order, Rule 26(c) does not apply. View "Ana Santos-De Jimenez v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Zaragoza, a citizen of Mexico and a lawful U.S. permanent resident, pleaded guilty to the Indiana offense of criminal neglect of a dependent after locking her six-year-old son in a closet for six hours. She was sentenced to one year in jail, suspended to time served plus 30 days. After completing her sentence, she traveled abroad. When she returned, DHS found Zaragoza inadmissible based on the neglect conviction, which the agency classified as a “crime involving moral turpitude,” 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). An immigration judge entered a removal order. In the meantime, Zaragoza petitioned the state court to modify her sentence, to bring herself within the “petty offense” exception to inadmissibility, which is available to first-time offenders sentenced to six months or less. The state court reduced her sentence to 179 days.The BIA rejected Zaragoza’s arguments, finding that the Indiana offense was categorically a crime involving moral turpitude and that the sentence modification order was not effective to establish Zaragoza’s eligibility for the petty-offense exception. The Board relied on a 2019 Attorney General decision declaring that state-court sentence modification orders are effective for immigration purposes only if based on a legal defect in the underlying criminal proceeding (Thomas). The Seventh Circuit remanded. Applying Thomas in Zaragoza’s case is an impermissibly retroactive application of a new rule. View "Zaragoza v. Garland" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) that denied Petitioner's motion to reopen and terminate his removal proceedings but granted the petition and vacated the BIA's ruling as to Petitioner's motion to reopen and rescind an in absentia removal order against him, holding that Petitioner received the requisite notice.In his motion to reopen to terminate his removal proceedings Petitioner argued that the immigration court lacked jurisdiction over his removal proceedings and in his motion in the alternative to reopen and rescind his removal order in absentia he argued that he did not receive proper notice in accordance with 8 U.S.C. 1229(a). The First Circuit rejected Petitioner's first argument but agreed with his second, holding that the BIA did not permissibly construe the term "notice" in concluding that Petitioner received the requisite notice to be ordered removed in absentia for failing to appear at his removal proceedings. View "Laparra-Deleon v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Special Immigrant Juveniles (“SIJ”) program provides certain immigrant juveniles a pathway to lawful permanent residence status. Under 8 U.S.C. Section 1232(d)(2), applications for SIJ status “shall be adjudicated” not later than 180 days after they are filed. Plaintiffs—three SIJ petitioners representing a certified class of some current and future SIJ petitioners from Washington State—filed suit in the district court against USCIS and other federal government defendants (the “Government”). The district court held that USCIS’s delays were unlawful, and the Government did not challenge that holding on appeal. At issue on appeal was only whether the district court erred, after granting summary judgment to Plaintiffs, by issuing a permanent injunction and in crafting its terms and scope.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s issuance of a permanent injunction, vacated a provision of the injunction that permits SIJ petitioners (but not USCIS) to “toll” the deadline for adjudicating SIJ petitions, and remanded. The panel explained that there is an inconsistency between the reach of the jurisdictional bar as it appears in the provision that enacted it, as opposed to how it appears as codified in the United States Code.   The panel concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in entering the permanent injunction. The panel rejected the Government’s claims that the district court failed to consider the operational hardship on the Government in balancing hardships, and that the district court relied upon stale evidence to determine that Plaintiffs were likely to suffer irreparable harm. View "LEOBARDO MORENO GALVEZ, ET AL V. UR JADDOU, ET AL" on Justia Law

The First Circuit granted in part Petitioner's petition for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the denial of Petitioner's application for withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and for protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), holding that the BIA erred in rejecting Petitioner's social group claim.An immigration judge denied Petitioner's application for withholding of removal and ordered him removed. The BIA dismissed Petitioner's appeal, finding that Petitioner had not established eligibility for withholding of removal. The First Circuit granted in part Petitioner's petition for review and vacated in part the decision of the BIA, holding (1) the BIA's decision rejecting Petitioner's social group claim was in error, and remand was required for the BIA to consider whether Petitioner's proposed social group satisfied the requirements for constituting a particular social group under the INA to which Petitioner belonged; and (2) Petitioner was not entitled to relief on his remaining claims of error. View "Chavez v. Garland" on Justia Law

The First Circuit granted Petitioner's petition for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the denial of Petitioner's application for deferral of removal to Honduras under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), holding that the BIA erred in its review of the decision of the immigration judge (IJ).The IJ denied deferral of removal to Honduras, concluding that Petitioner was not likely to be tortured by, or with the consent or acquiescence of, the Honduran government. The BIA found no error in the IJ's determination. The First Circuit reversed, holding the the BIA erred when it (1) applied the incorrect standard of review to uphold the IJ's denial of CAT relief as to Honduras; (2) improperly failed to address Petitioner's argument that he would likely be tortured by or at the instigation of Honduran officials; and (3) failed meaningfully to address Petitioner's argument that MS-13 members may act under color of law. View "H.H. v. Garland" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review of a final removal order upheld by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), holding that the BIA did not commit legal error or abuse its discretion in failing adequately to address new evidence.Petitioner, a native and citizen of Cape Verde, sought adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. 1255(a) through his U.S.-citizen son. The immigration judge (IJ) denied Petitioner's application for adjustment of status, and the BIA affirmed. The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review, holding (1) the arguments and challenges Petitioner put forth as to the denial of his application for adjustment of status were neither constitutionally cognizable nor legally colorable; and (2) there was no basis to overturn the BIA's decision to deny the motion to remand the case. View "Moreno v. Garland" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing his appeal of an order of the immigration judge (IJ) denying Petitioner nunc pro tunc relief from removal, holding that there was no error in the agency's decision.Petitioner was charged with removability. Petitioner denied the charges, arguing that the Department of Homeland Appeals should be equitably estopped from removing him, and sought cancellation of removal, nunc pro tunc relief under former section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, and voluntary departure. The IJ determined that Petitioner was ineligible for relief from removal. The BIA dismissed the appeal. The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review, holding (1) Petitioner was not eligible for nunc pro tunc relief under former section 212(c); and (2) Defendant was not entitled to equitable estoppel. View "Reyes-Batista v. Garland" on Justia Law

The First Circuit dismissed Petitioner's petition for review of the denial by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) of his application for withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3), holding that the petition is dismissed due to Petitioner's failure to exhaust an issue upon which which his argument on appeal depended.After he was placed in removal proceedings Petitioner sought asylum and withholding of removal or, in the alternative, voluntary departure. The immigration judge (IJ) denied all claims, and the BIA affirmed without opinion. Petitioner appealed, challenging only the BIA's denial of his application for withholding of removal. The First Circuit dismissed the petition for review, holding that because Petitioner did not challenge the aspect of the IJ's ruling to the BIA that he now appealed, he could not bring that challenge to the First Circuit in the first instance because the issue was not exhausted. View "Cante-Lopez v. Garland" on Justia Law