Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

An immigration judge (“IJ”) denied Petitioner’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under he Convention Against Torture based on his failure to adequately corroborate his claim with documentary evidence. The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed. Petitioner argued that the BIA was unduly deferential to the IJ’s determination that corroboration was required.The Second Circuit denied the petition for review. The court held that the BIA reviews de novo an IJ’s determination under 8 U.S.C. Section 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) that an applicant should provide additional evidence that corroborates otherwise credible testimony, because that is not a finding of fact. In contrast, the BIA reviews for clear error an IJ’s finding as to whether an applicant does not have and cannot reasonably obtain such corroborating evidence because that is a finding of fact. Here, the court explained that the BIA properly applied de novo review to the IJ’s request for corroborating evidence and properly reviewed for clear error the IJ’s finding that Petitioner failed to produce requested evidence that he could reasonably have obtained. View "Pinel-Gomez v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioners natives and citizens of El Salvador, petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) denial of Petitioners’ motion to reconsider the BIA’s prior order, which upheld the immigration judge’s (IJ) decision finding the Petitioners removable and denying their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT)   The Eighth Circuit denied the petition. The court explained that here, in denying Petitioners’ motion to reconsider, the BIA reaffirmed its previous finding that Petitioners have not persuasively shown any error of law or fact in our prior decision to establish that the Salvadoran government would be unable or unwilling to control the individuals they fear. In their petition for review, Petitioners do not meaningfully argue that the BIA erred in reaching this conclusion and have accordingly waived any challenge to such a finding. Thus, Petitioners cannot show that they suffered persecution and their claims for relief necessarily fail. View "Fatima Coreas-Chavez v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner petitioned for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision affirming an Immigration Judge’s denial of his application for asylum and withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Petitioner argued that the agency erred in denying his withholding of removal claim when it required that he demonstrate that his ethnicity was “at least one central reason” motivating his claimed persecution. He also challenges the BIA’s denial of his asylum claim and its finding that he waived his CAT claim.   The Second Circuit denied the petition. The court held that the withholding of removal statute is ambiguous as to the showing required to establish that a protected ground, such as ethnicity, motivated a persecutor. The court also held that the BIA’s interpretation that the “one central reason” standard applies to withholding of removal claims is reasonable and thus entitled to deference.   The court explained that substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Petitioner did not demonstrate a link between his ethnicity and future persecution. Although Petitioner’s brother, who is in the United States, declared that the family “still received threatening messages,” his mother, who continues to live in Ecuador, did not corroborate this statement. She stated that her life would be at risk not because of threats or harm from the gang, but because if Petitioner were to return, he would be unable to support her. View "Quituizaca v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Petitioner asserts that he suffered past persecution and has a well-founded fear of future persecution due to his familial association with his brother, who is a member of the Shiromani Akali Dal Party (Mann Party), and his own affiliation with that Party. The Mann Party advocates for the creation of a sovereign state for Sikh people and is opposed by the Congress Party, one of India’s major political parties.   The Ninth Circuit granted in part and denied in part Petitioner’s petition for review. The panel held that substantial evidence did not support the BIA’s determination that the harm Petitioner suffered did not rise to the level of past persecution, but substantial evidence did support the BIA’s determination that the harm did not amount to past torture and that Petitioner failed to show that he would more likely than not face a clear probability of future torture. View "SHAMSHER SINGH V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

Petitioner was removed to Mexico in 2008, partly because of a California conviction for drug possession. In 2018, a California court expunged that conviction under California’s rehabilitative statute, and Petitioner sought to reopen his immigration proceedings. An immigration judge and the BIA denied the motion to reopen, and Petitioner sought review in this court.   Denying in part and granting in part and remanding, the panel held that: (1) the vacatur of a conviction underlying a removal order does not excuse a late motion to reopen, and therefore, Petitioner’s motion to reopen was untimely; (2) the BIA acted within its discretion in concluding that Petitioner failed to act with sufficient diligence to warrant equitable tolling of the motion-to-reopen deadline; and (3) the BIA erred as a matter of law in denying sua sponte reopening.   Because a motion to reopen must generally be filed within 90 days of a final order of removal, Petitioner’s motion was approximately a decade late. The panel rejected Petitioner’s argument, observing that it was bound by Perez-Camacho v. Garland, 42 F.4th 1103 (9th Cir. 2022), in which this court recently held that the Cardoso-Tlaseca rule applies only to timely motions to reopen; it does not excuse late filing. The panel also concluded that, even if it were not bound, it would reach the same result. The panel explained that the statute and regulation governing motions to reopen contain explicit exceptions to the timeliness requirement, but there is no exception for persons removed pursuant to an unlawfully executed order, and the codified exceptions strongly suggest that Congress and the agency did not intend that exception. View "JOSE LARA-GARCIA V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied Petitioner’s application for cancellation of removal on the ground that he had not established that his United States citizen children would suffer “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” if he were removed. 8 U.S.C. Section 1229b(b)(1). The Ninth Circuit, held that: 1) 8 U.S.C. Section 1252(a)(2)(D) grants the court jurisdiction to review a question of law or a mixed question of law and fact presented in a challenge to an agency denial of cancellation of removal for failure to establish the required hardship; and 2) assuming arguendo that Petitioner’s petition presented such questions, his hardship claim failed on the merits.   Despite finding facial merit in the Fourth and Sixth Circuit decisions, the panel concluded that it need not take a definitive side in the circuit split. The panel explained that it is settled that this court can assume statutory jurisdiction arguendo when the jurisdictional issue is complex, but the claim clearly lacks merit. The panel explained that it had no qualms with that approach here. The panel concluded that the BIA’s decision that exceptional and extremely unusual hardship was not established was clearly supported by the record. The panel explained that Petitioner largely focused on financial hardship, but the BIA has concluded that economic detriment alone is insufficient to support even a finding of extreme hardship. View "ANTONIO DE LA ROSA-RODRIGUEZ V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

After the U.S. Consulate in El Salvador denied the immigrant visa application of Plaintiff, he and his U.S.-citizen spouse (collectively "Plaintiffs") sought judicial review of the government’s visa decision. Relying on the doctrine of consular nonreviewability, the district court granted summary judgment to the government.   Vacating the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the government, and remanding, the panel held that (1) where the adjudication of a non-citizen’s visa application implicates the constitutional rights of a citizen, due process requires that the government provide the citizen with timely and adequate notice of a decision that will deprive the citizen of that interest; and (2) because the government failed to provide timely notice in this case, the government was not entitled to summary judgment based on the doctrine of consular nonreviewability. The panel explained that, as set forth in Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972), and Kerry v. Din, 576 U.S. 86 (2015), the doctrine of consular nonreviewability admits an exception in certain circumstances where the denial of a visa affects the fundamental rights of a U.S. citizen. View "SANDRA MUNOZ, ET AL V. DOS, ET AL" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought asylum and related relief on the ground that he was persecuted in China for his Christian faith. In a statement in support of his application, Petitioner wrote that he was arrested at a church gathering and detained, and during that detention, the police beat him, questioned him about church activities, and forced him to sign a document stating that he would not participate in the church. Before an immigration judge, Petitioner later testified that he was detained for one week, during which he was interrogated twice. Petitioner also testified in response to questions regarding his injuries and failure to get medical care, and the IJ asked him to clarify other apparent discrepancies between his application and testimony. 
 The Ninth Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review the BIA’s decision upholding the denial of his application for asylum and related relief on credibility grounds, the panel concluded that the agency’s adverse credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence. The panel concluded that, in light of Petitioner’s apparent demeanor, it was reasonable for the BIA to conclude that his omission of the first interrogation from his application, together with his questionable explanation for that omission, undermined his credibility. The panel explained that the omission was not enough to undermine his credibility, but Petitioner’s shifting explanation could be reasonably viewed as internally inconsistent, and therefore, implausible. The panel also gave credit to the IJ’s finding that Petitioner exhibited a suspect demeanor during this exchange, explaining that such findings merit special deference. View "MINGNAN DONG V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

Plaintiff a citizen of Guatemala, petitions for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision dismissing his appeal of an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) order denying his application for relief under the Convention Against Torture. The Ninth Circuit concluded: (1) the record, in this case, compels the conclusion that two of Petitioner’s attackers were police officers during a July 2011 incident; (2) Petitioner showed acquiescence on the part of the Guatemalan government with respect to that incident because government officials— namely, the two police officers—directly participated in the incident; and (3) the record indicates that the IJ and BIA’s conclusion that Petitioner is not likely to be subjected to torture with government acquiescence if returned to Guatemala disregards several important circumstances pertinent to evaluating the likelihood of future torture. View "RISVIN DE LEON LOPEZ V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

Petitioner entered the United States without inspection and was immediately detained by Officers from the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). Two days later, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. Section 1225, DHS issued an expedited removal order against him. Petitioner asserted a fear of persecution, an asylum officer conducted a credible fear interview and concluded that Petitioner had not shown a reasonable fear of future persecution on account of a protected ground.   The Ninth Circuit dismissed Petitioner’s s petition for review from a decision of an immigration judge affirming an asylum officer’s negative credible fear determination in expedited removal proceedings. The court held that because Congress has clearly and unambiguously precluded the court from asserting jurisdiction over the merits of individual expedited removal orders, even with regard to constitutional challenges to such orders, and because that prohibition on jurisdiction raises no constitutional difficulty, the court lacked jurisdiction over Petitioner’s petition for review. View "HEVER MENDOZA LINARES V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law