Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

The named plaintiffs, aliens who were detained under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(6) after reentering the United States illegally, filed a putative class action, alleging that aliens detained under section 1231(a)(6) are entitled to bond hearings after six months’ detention. The district court certified a class of similarly situated plaintiffs and enjoined the government from detaining the class members under section 1231(a)(6) for more than 180 days without providing each a bond hearing. The Ninth Circuit affirmed.The Supreme Court reversed. INA section 1252(f )(1) deprived the district courts of jurisdiction to entertain aliens’ requests for class-wide injunctive relief. Section 1252(f )(1) generally strips lower courts of jurisdiction or authority to “enjoin or restrain the operation of ” certain INA provisions. Section 1252(f )(1)’s one exception allows lower courts to “enjoin or restrain the operation of ” the relevant statutory provisions “with respect to the application of such provisions to an individual alien against whom proceedings under such part have been initiated.” Here, both district courts entered injunctions that “enjoin or restrain the operation” of section 1231(a)(6) because they require officials to take actions that (in the government’s view) are not required by 1231(a)(6) and to refrain from actions that are allowed; the injunctions do not fall within the exception for individualized relief. Section 1252(f )(1) refers to “an individual,” not “individuals.” View "Garland v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

Arteaga-Martinez, a citizen of Mexico, was removed and reentered the U.S. His earlier removal order was reinstated and he was detained under 8 U.S.C. 1231(a). Arteaga-Martinez applied for withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture. An asylum officer determined he had established a reasonable fear of persecution or torture if returned to Mexico. DHS referred him for withholding-only proceedings before an immigration judge. After being detained for four months, Arteaga-Martinez filed a habeas corpus petition, challenging his continued detention without a bond hearing. The government conceded that Arteaga-Martinez would be entitled to a bond hearing after six months of detention based on circuit precedent. The district court ordered a bond hearing. The Third Circuit affirmed. At the bond hearing, the Immigration Judge authorized his release pending resolution of his application for withholding of removal.The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Section 1231(a)(6) does not require the government to provide noncitizens, detained for six months, with bond hearings in which the government bears the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that a noncitizen poses a flight risk or a danger to the community. Section 1231(a)(6) “does not permit indefinite detention” but “limits an alien’s post-removal-period detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from the United States”; it allows the government to provide bond hearings but does not require them. The Court remanded for consideration of Arteaga-Martinez’s alternative theory. View "Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez" on Justia Law

Defendant was sentenced to 36 months in prison to be followed by five years of supervised release after pleading guilty to illegal reentry. As a special condition of release, the district court required that Defendant be turned over to immigration authorities upon his release and that he be deported to Mexico. If immigration authorities were unwilling to take Defendant, the court required he self-deport.Defendant challenged the special condition of release requiring he self-deport. The government conceded that the district court committed plain error. The Fifth Circuit remanded for entry of a new written judgment without the special condition requiring Defendant to depart the United States. View "USA v. Badillo" on Justia Law

Petitioner was found removable on the ground that his Oregon first-degree burglary conviction was a burglary aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. Section 1101(a)(43)(G). Petitioner argued that the Oregon statute is not a categorical match with generic burglary because it is indivisible and overbroad.   Denying in part and granting in part Petitioner’s petition for review of a decision of the BIA, the court held that: (1) first-degree burglary of a dwelling under Oregon Revised Statutes section 164.225 is an aggravated felony; and (2) the BIA misapplied a presumption in determining that Petitioner’s conviction was a particularly serious crime barring withholding of removal. Applying the categorical approach, the court first addressed United States v. Cisneros, 826 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2016), and expressly recognized that Cisneros had been overruled.   As to withholding of removal, the BIA applied a “presumption” that Petitioner’s conviction was a particularly serious crime barring that relief, and required him to “rebut” this presumption. The court explained that for offenses that are not defined by statute as “per se” particularly serious crimes, the BIA has established a multi-factor test to determine on a case-by-case basis whether a crime is particularly serious and that this court has rejected the view that there is any subset of such cases that is exempt from this multi-factor analysis based solely on the elements of the offense. Because the BIA committed an error of law in failing to apply the correct legal standards, the court remanded to the BIA to consider Petitioner’s application for withholding of removal under the correct standards. View "DIEGO MENDOZA-GARCIA V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted in Texas state court of the felony offense of injury to a child, in violation of Texas Penal Code Section 22.04(a)(3). The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) served Petitioner with a Notice to Appear (NTA), charging him with removability under 8 U.S.C. Section 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), as an alien who, at any time after admission, was convicted of a crime of child abuse. After a hearing, the IJ denied Petitioner’s request for cancellation of removal, ordered him removed, and denied his request for voluntary departure. The BIA dismissed Petitioner’s appeal, denied his requests for cancellation of removal or voluntary departure, and ordered his removal. Petitioner then submitted a petition for review to the Fifth Circuit.   The Fifth Circuit denied in part Petitioner’s petition. Petitioner’s motion to terminate “squarely presented” the issue of the statute’s divisibility. Thus, the court held that the BIA did not err in rejecting Petitioner’s claim that the IJ impermissibly ruled on the divisibility issue. Further, based on Section 22.04(a)’s text, relevant state court cases, Texas’ pattern jury instructions, and the record of prior conviction itself, the court held that Section 22.04(a) is divisible as to victim class. Because the statute is divisible, the court applied the modified categorical approach to see which offense, under Section 22.04(a), is the crime of conviction. In so doing, the court looked to Petitioner’s indictment and the judicial confession entered on his guilty plea. Reviewing those documents, it is apparent that Petitioner was charged with, and pleaded guilty to, causing bodily injury to a child. View "Monsonyem v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of conspiracy to commit bank and wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1349. He was sentenced to one year and one day of imprisonment and ordered to pay $229,717.30 in restitution.   The government served Petitioner with a notice to appear, charging him with removability pursuant to 8 U.S.C. Section 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony. Specifically, the government invoked Section 1101(a)(43)(M) & (U), alleging that Petitioner was convicted of “an offense that involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000,” and “an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offense described in section 101(a)(43)(M) of the Act.” Petitioner applied for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).   Petitioner appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). The BIA found no error in the IJ’s decision and dismissed the appeal. The Fifth Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition in part and dismissed in part.   The court explained Pursuant to Section 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), “[a]ny alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable.” Section 1101(a)(43)(M) defines an “aggravated felony” as “an offense that—(i) involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000,” and § 1101(a)(43)(U) extends the definition of “aggravated felony” to “an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offense described in this paragraph.” Here, Petitioner’s order of restitution for $229,717.30—which reflects the amount owed within the judgment for his fraud conspiracy conviction— provides clear and convincing evidence of the losses to his victims. View "Osei Fosu v. Garland" on Justia Law

After being stopped for driving without a license, removal proceedings were initiated against Petitioner. In response, Petitioner applied for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. Section 1229b which the Immigration Judge denied. Petitioner appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), which “affirm[ed] the Immigration Judge’s decision on the ground that the respondent ha[d] not established that his removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his qualifying relatives.”   Petitioner appealed on two separate but interrelated grounds: 1) that the BIA committed legal error in applying the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard and 2) that the BIA failed to render a reasoned decision. The Eleventh Circuit dismissed Petitioner’s petition seeking cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. Section 1229b. The court held there was no legal or constitutional error in the decision of the BIA.   The court explained that because it cannot disturb factual findings, it is left to see if Petitioner identified any legal error with respect to the application of the law to those facts established in the BIA’s decision. The court found that Petitioner has not identified one. Turning to the second argument after reviewing the BIA’s opinion and Petitioner’s argument, the court did not see a legal argument for which it would have jurisdiction to review. As long as the BIA cites and proceeds to apply the proper legal standard, as it did in this case, the court cannot make legal error out of an inherently subjective determination of whether an applicant’s relatives will experience exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. View "Esteban Flores-Alonso v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of forgery under Section 472 for possession of a counterfeit government seal. The Board of Immigration Appeals concluded that this conviction was a crime involving moral turpitude that made him ineligible for cancellation of removal. Petitioner argued that intent to defraud is not a required element under Section 472, and therefore, his forgery conviction was not a categorical crime involving moral turpitude.   The Ninth Circuit denied in part and dismissed in part Petitioner’s petition for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals, the court held that a forgery under California Penal Code Section 472 is a crime involving moral turpitude.   The court considered the elements of Section 472 and concluded that California law does not support Petitioner’s reading of the statute. The court explained that it is reasonable to read the statutory text as requiring that all the prohibited acts be done “with the intent to defraud another,” and that no California court has held that Section 472 has separate clauses or that the intent-to-defraud element is limited to specific clauses or actions. The court also explained that California caselaw establishes that forgery requires intent to defraud and that California’s pattern jury instructions confirm that conclusion.   Finally, Petitioner contended that his argument to the BIA that his conviction did not render him inadmissible was sufficient to alert the BIA to the relevance of the petty offense exception. The court concluded that the record belied that assertion, noting that the BIA did not read Petitioner’s brief as raising that assertion. View "PEDRO VASQUEZ-BORJAS V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Haiti, experienced targeted violence while in Haiti. He fled to the United States, where he was detained and transferred to a detention center in Texas. He sought asylum, withholding of removal, and for protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The Immigration Judge denied relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed and dismissed Petitioner's appeal.Petitioner then sought relief in the Fifth Circuit but failed to address the denial of his CAT claim and withholding of removal claim. Thus, the court only considered the BIA's finding that Petitioner failed to show that the Haitian government was unable or unwilling to protect him.The Fifth Circuit denied Petitioner's petition, citing the efforts of the Haitian government following the attacks against Petitioner. Based on the government's response, Petitioner could not show that the Haitian government was unable or unwilling to protect him. View "Bertrand v. Garland" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a class action filed under the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 by individuals who were incarcerated in private immigration detention facilities owned and operated by a for-profit corporation, CoreCivic, Inc. These individuals were detained solely due to their immigration status alleged that the overseers of their private detention facilities forced them to perform labor against their will and without compensation. The inquiry on appeal concerns only whether the district court properly certified three classes of detainees.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order certifying three classes in an action. The court held that the district court properly exercised its discretion in certifying a California Labor Law Class, a California Forced Labor Class, and a National Forced Labor Class. The court held that, as to the California Forced Labor Class, Plaintiffs submitted sufficient proof of a class-wide policy of forced labor to establish commonality. Plaintiff established predominance because the claims of the class members all depended on common questions of law and fact. The court agreed with the district court that narrowing the California Forced Labor Class based on the California TVPA’s statute of limitations was not required at the class certification stage.   The court held that, as to the National Forced Labor Class, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Plaintiffs presented significant proof of a class-wide policy of forced labor. As to the California Labor Law Class, the court held that Plaintiffs established that damages were capable of measurement on a class-wide basis. View "SYLVESTER OWINO V. CORECIVIC, INC." on Justia Law