Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Haiti, experienced targeted violence while in Haiti. He fled to the United States, where he was detained and transferred to a detention center in Texas. He sought asylum, withholding of removal, and for protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The Immigration Judge denied relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed and dismissed Petitioner's appeal.Petitioner then sought relief in the Fifth Circuit but failed to address the denial of his CAT claim and withholding of removal claim. Thus, the court only considered the BIA's finding that Petitioner failed to show that the Haitian government was unable or unwilling to protect him.The Fifth Circuit denied Petitioner's petition, citing the efforts of the Haitian government following the attacks against Petitioner. Based on the government's response, Petitioner could not show that the Haitian government was unable or unwilling to protect him. View "Bertrand v. Garland" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a class action filed under the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 by individuals who were incarcerated in private immigration detention facilities owned and operated by a for-profit corporation, CoreCivic, Inc. These individuals were detained solely due to their immigration status alleged that the overseers of their private detention facilities forced them to perform labor against their will and without compensation. The inquiry on appeal concerns only whether the district court properly certified three classes of detainees.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order certifying three classes in an action. The court held that the district court properly exercised its discretion in certifying a California Labor Law Class, a California Forced Labor Class, and a National Forced Labor Class. The court held that, as to the California Forced Labor Class, Plaintiffs submitted sufficient proof of a class-wide policy of forced labor to establish commonality. Plaintiff established predominance because the claims of the class members all depended on common questions of law and fact. The court agreed with the district court that narrowing the California Forced Labor Class based on the California TVPA’s statute of limitations was not required at the class certification stage.   The court held that, as to the National Forced Labor Class, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Plaintiffs presented significant proof of a class-wide policy of forced labor. As to the California Labor Law Class, the court held that Plaintiffs established that damages were capable of measurement on a class-wide basis. View "SYLVESTER OWINO V. CORECIVIC, INC." on Justia Law

A certificate of appealability to the Fifth Circuit was granted on two issues: 1.) Was Defendant’s sentence enhanced under the unconstitutional residual clause found in 18 U.S.C. Section 16(b)? and 2.) Is Defendant entitled to collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255? The Fifth Circuit held that Defendant’s Section 2255 motion is not barred by AEDPA’s res judicata provision and the motion was properly authorized under Section  2255(h)(2). The court reasoned that the court denied Defendant’s request for authorization to file his motion. That means he never actually filed the underlying motion. And it also means that AEDPA’s absolute bar on previously presented claims is inapplicable. Further, the court held that Section  2255(h)(2) requires the court to conclude that Defendant’s underlying claim relies on “[1] a new rule of constitutional law, [2] made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that [3] was previously unavailable.” Turning to the merits question, the court held that Defendant’s Section 2255 motion is timely. The court next found that Defendant procedurally defaulted his void-for-vagueness claim. And he cannot excuse that default because he cannot show either (A) cause and prejudice or (B) actual innocence. Thus, the court found no reversible error in the district court's judgment because Defendant failed to preserve his void-for-vagueness claim. And there’s no persuasive reason to excuse that default. View "USA v. Vargas-Soto" on Justia Law

An asylum Petitioner argued that the Board of Immigration Appeals erred in denying her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Her application was based on membership in a particular social group and CAT. She defined the particular social group as “Salvadoran women in a domestic relationships who are unable to leave.” She stated that her ex-partner was physically, emotionally, and sexually abusive. The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied her application finding that she did not establish the requisite nexus between her harm and her particular social group and the BIA denied her motion to extend the briefing deadline.   The Fifth Circuit denied her petition. The court explained that under 8 U.S.C. Section 1101(a)(42)(A) an applicant seeking asylum must demonstrate that she “is unable or unwilling to avail . . . herself of the protection of [her] country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”  Further, an applicant seeking asylum or withholding of removal based on membership in a particular social group must make three showings. The court explained that while the IJ intimated that Petitioner’s proffered social groups were cognizable. The court has disagreed, holding that circularly defined social groups are not cognizable. Thus, because the IJ is bound to follow the law of this circuit on remand, he would be forced to conclude that Petitioner’s social groups were not cognizable, thus ending the analysis. View "Lopez-Perez v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner was ordered removed to China after he was convicted of aiding and abetting marriage fraud in order to evade immigration laws and procure his admission to the United States, see 8 U.S.C. Sections 1227(a)(1)(G)(ii), 1325(c), and an immigration judge (IJ) denied his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).   The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) concluded Petitioner’s motion was untimely and numerically barred, and he was not excused from these bars because he failed to show a material change in country conditions. The BIA also concluded Petitioner failed to show prima facie eligibility for relief. Finally, it declined to exercise its discretion to grant reopening sua sponte.   The Eighth Circuit denied the petition and vacated Petitioner’s stay of removal. The court concluded that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner’s motion to reopen based on his failure to demonstrate prima facie eligibility for relief. Although Petitioner argued he was not attempting to reassert or relitigate his prior claim, he specifically included the alleged 2005 detention in both his new application and personal statement, and he continued to assert entitlement to relief based on underground Christian churches. The IJ therefore rationally concluded Petitioner’s new claim lacked factual independence. Further, Petitioner proffered no evidence—new or otherwise—to corroborate the alleged 2005 detention, interrogation, and beating. View "Caimin Li v. Merrick B. Garland" on Justia Law

Nunez, a 52-year-old citizen of the Dominican Republic has been a lawful permanent resident of the U.S. since 2010. In 2019, he pled guilty to endangering the welfare of a child in the third degree. Charged with removability under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), as having been convicted of "a crime of child abuse," Nunez moved to terminate removal, arguing that the state offense did not constitute a crime of child abuse. The IJ held that a violation of N.J. Stat. 2C:24-4(a)(1) is categorically a crime of child abuse because, under New Jersey state law, a conviction requires proof that the “defendant knowingly engaged in sexual conduct with the victim, which would impair or debauch the morals of a child.” Nunez then sought cancellation of removal, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(a), testifying that his conduct was “sending a video” while “drunk” and that it occurred in October 2018.The IJ concluded that Nunez’s testimony contradicted his prior admissions and that Nunez’s conviction was for a continuing offense that began on January 1, 2013; the “stop-time rule” was triggered on that date, before he accrued seven years of continuous residence. The BIA affirmed. The Third Circuit denied a petition for review. There was substantial evidence that Nunez committed the crime within seven years of being admitted to the U.S. View "DeJesus Nunez v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

Petitioner applied for asylum and withholding of removal based on claims he was targeted by gangs for his religious activities. An immigration judge (IJ) disbelieved Petitioner’s story and denied his application. After the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed his appeal and denied reconsideration, Petitioner filed two petitions seeking review.   The Fifth Circuit denied Petitioner’s application. The court first held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider this argument because Petitioner has not exhausted it. The court reasoned that Petitioner did not raise the argument initially before the BIA, despite the fact that he was in possession of the pertinent documents.   Next, in regard to Petitioner’s argument that the IJ’s bias denied him due process, the court held that the record does not show “obvious bias” and Petitioner failed to point to record evidence showing the IJ’s “hostility due to extrajudicial sources” or “a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” The court reasoned that IJ occasionally questioned Petitioner about his religious activities, but only because those activities were the basis for his claims.   Finally, Petitioner argued that the BIA erred in affirming the IJ’s adverse credibility determination. The court held that the evidence does not compel the conclusion that the IJ’s negative credibility determinations were wrong. The court reasoned that IJ may assess credibility based on inconsistencies between an applicant’s testimony and prior statements. Here, the IJ cited “specific inconsistencies” and “identified crucial omissions in statements” by Petitioner and his sister and in the letters he provided. View "Cardona-Franco v. Garland" on Justia Law

Argueta-Orellana, a citizen of El Salvador, entered the U.S. illegally and was charged with unlawful presence. Assisted by counsel, he sought asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. An IJ ordered him removed. Still represented by counsel, Argueta-Orellana appealed. The Board of Immigration Appeal’s standard Notice of Appeal asks whether the appellant intends to file an optional written brief or statement, advising: WARNING: If you mark “Yes” . . . , you will be expected to file a written brief or statement after you receive a briefing schedule from the Board. The Board may summarily dismiss your appeal if you do not file a brief or statement within the time set in the briefing schedule. Argueta-Orellana’s counsel marked “Yes.” The Board issued a briefing schedule that repeated the warning. The Board later sent Argueta-Orellana a signed copy of the judge’s decision, along with a reminder of the briefing schedule containing the identical caution. Argueta-Orellana filed nothing.Exercising its discretion, the Board dismissed his appeal. The Third Circuit denied a petition for review. The Board’s decision was neither arbitrary nor irrational and a court cannot consider new arguments raised for the first time on appeal. View "Argueta-Orellana v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

8 U.S.C. Section 1226(a) permits the Attorney General to detain aliens pending their removal hearings. Under those procedures, an alien is given notice and three opportunities to seek release by showing they are neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community.   A district court determined that a class of aliens had a likelihood of establishing that those procedures violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. That court then issued a preliminary injunction ordering, on a class-wide basis, that to continue detaining an alien under Section 1226(a), the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that an alien is either a flight risk or a danger to the community. The district court also required immigration judges to consider an alien’s ability to pay any bond imposed and consider alternatives to detention.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s preliminary injunction order and held that under Section 1252(f)(1), the district court lacked jurisdiction to issue class-wide injunctive relief that enjoined or restrained the process used to conduct Section 1226(a) bond hearings. Further, the detention procedures adopted for Section 1226(a) bond hearings provide sufficient process to satisfy constitutional requirements. The court concluded for that reason-the aliens are unable to establish a likelihood of success on their due process claims. Nor have they shown that they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in their favor or that an injunction is in the public interest. View "Marvin Miranda v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner petitioned for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) upholding the decision of the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying her application for cancellation of removal and ordering her removed to Mexico.     The Ninth Circuit denied in part and dismissed in part Petitioner’s petition and held that Petitioner’s conviction for corporal injury upon a child, in violation of California Penal Code Section 273d(a), is a crime of violence aggravated felony that made her ineligible for cancellation of removal. The court reasoned that The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) defines “aggravated felony” to include a “crime of violence for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year.” 8 U.S.C. Section 1101(a)(43)(F). Thus, because Petitioner’s conviction records confirmed a jail term of 365 days, the court explained that whether Petitioner was convicted of an aggravated felony turned solely on whether a violation of Section 273d(a) constitutes a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. Section 16.   The court explained that the relevant language of Section 273d(a) imposes criminal punishment on any “person who willfully inflicts upon a child any cruel or inhuman corporal punishment or an injury resulting in a traumatic condition.” The BIA noted that this phrasing is very similar to California Penal Code Section 273.5(a), which punishes any “person who willfully inflicts corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition upon” specified persons. The court rejected the remaining challenges to Petitioner’s removal order View "AURORA OLEA-SEREFINA V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law