Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

At Petitioner’s removal proceeding, the government introduced into the record an INTERPOL Red Notice as the only evidence that Gonzalez-Castillo had committed a serious nonpolitical crime in El Salvador.   The Ninth Circuit granted in part and dismissed in part Petitioner’s petition for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals. The panel held that: (1) substantial evidence did not support the agency’s determination that Petitioner was ineligible for withholding of removal; (2) the agency erred by failing to consider all of Petitioner’s evidence under the Convention Against Torture, and (3) Petitioner waived review of the agency’s application of the one-year bar to asylum.   The panel held that, in this case, the Red Notice did not, by itself, establish probable cause that there were serious reasons to believe that Petitioner committed a serious nonpolitical crime in El Salvador. Explaining that probable cause requires a “fair probability” that the noncitizen committed a serious nonpolitical crime, the panel concluded that the Red Notice, in this case, did not meet that standard due to errors that cast doubt on its reliability, and its failure to articulate any specific crime of which Petitioner was accused. The panel rejected the government’s argument that by presenting “some evidence” in the form of the Red Notice, even if scant, it had shifted the burden to disprove the existence of probable cause on to Petitioner. The panel held Petitioner never alerted the agency to the two possible grounds for excusing the filing deadline that he raised in his briefing to the court. View "OSCAR GONZALEZ-CASTILLO V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review of the ruling of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) vacating the immigration judge's (IJ) decision granting Petitioner's application for cancellation of removal and ordering Petitioner removed, holding that the BIA did not commit reversible legal error.Petitioner, a native and citizen of Guatemala, conceded that he was removable from the United States but sought cancellation of removal predicated on the impact his removal would have on his young children. The IJ granted the application, concluding that Petitioner established the requisite extreme hardship. The BIA reversed, holding that the IJ incorrectly concluded that the hardships presented were sufficient to satisfy the applicable standard. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Petitioner failed to show that the BIA misconstrued or overlooked relevant evidence and that there was no evidence that the BIA applied an improper standard. View "Domingo-Mendez v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner initially sought asylum claiming that he was persecuted in India on account of being a Sikh who supports the creation of Khalistan and the Akali Dal (Mann) Party. An immigration judge denied Petitioner’s claims after concluding that Petitioner’s testimony was not credible because of inconsistencies and a lack of detail. The IJ also highlighted a State Department report showing that the situation for Sikhs had greatly normalized and the IJ found further that Petitioner had failed to even establish his identity.   The Ninth Circuit granted Petitioner’s petition. The panel held that the BIA erred in holding that earlier adverse credibility finding barred Petitioner’s motion to reopen, and in concluding that Petitioner failed to show that the conditions for Sikhs in India had changed qualitatively since his last hearing.   The panel explained that although the BIA may rely on a previous adverse credibility determination to deny a motion to reopen if that earlier finding still factually undermines the petitioner’s new argument, here, Petitioner’s motion included newly submitted evidence based on information independent of the prior adverse credibility finding.   The panel concluded that the BIA erred in rejecting Petitioner’s new evidence for two other reasons. First, the panel held that the record did not support the BIA’s determination that Petitioner was not similarly situated to the people harmed in 2017 political violence. Second, the panel held that Petitioner provided sufficient evidence demonstrating that the conditions for Sikhs in India had changed in the two decades since his asylum hearing. View "RUPINDER SINGH V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

In 2008, DHS removed Casas, a Mexican citizen, from the United States pursuant to a valid removal order. Four years later, DHS learned she had returned and sought to reinstate the removal order, using Form I-871. The form has a large section providing notice to the noncitizen of DHS’s intent to reinstate a removal order, a section for the noncitizen to acknowledge receipt of the notice, and a final section for DHS’s ultimate decision. According to the dates on the Form I-871 Casas received, DHS made its decision to reinstate Casas’s removal order first, and gave Casas notice later—an inversion of the procedure ordinarily requiring notice to a noncitizen before a final decision is rendered, The large notice section is dated a day after the decision to reinstate but the middle section shows that Casas acknowledged receipt of the notice six months after that decision. For seven years, Casas remained on supervision in the United States. In 2020, when Casas appeared for a routine check-in, DHS detained her. Casas requested a reasonable-fear interview, during which she discussed a purported kidnapping and possible “reprisal[s].” Casas’s mother and sister still live in Mexico.The asylum officer determined that Casas had not shown a reasonable fear of persecution or torture. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. Casas cannot show that she suffered any prejudice as a result of DHS’s procedural errors. The IJ’s reasonable-fear finding is supported by substantial evidence. View "Casas v. Garland" on Justia Law

The BIA concluded that Petitioner R.M was inadmissible and ineligible for adjustment of status based on his § 13-3415 conviction. Petitioner H.C, who was a lawful permanent resident, was found removable based on his Section 13-3408 conviction. For both petitioners, the agency applied the modified categorical approach to determine that their Arizona convictions were convictions for controlled substances under federal law. However, because Arizona’s list of prohibited drugs is overbroad with respect to federal law, the panel previously certified three questions to the Supreme Court of Arizona: 1) Is A.R.S. Section 13-3415 divisible as to drug type?; 2) Is A.R.S. Section 13-3408 divisible as to drug type?; and 3) Put another way, is jury unanimity required as to which drug or drugs was involved in an offense under either Section 13-3415 or Section 13-3408?   The Supreme Court of Arizona ruled that it had improvidently accepted the first two questions because divisibility pertains solely to federal law, and no Arizona court had addressed the issue. On the third question, the Supreme Court of Arizona concluded that jury unanimity as to the identity of the drug involved was required for a conviction under Section 13-3408.   Based on the Supreme Court of Arizona’s holding that jury unanimity as to the identity of a specific drug is required for a conviction for drug possession under Section 13-3408, the panel held that Section 13-3408 is divisible as to drug type. Accordingly, the panel concluded that the agency did not err in by applying the modified categorical approach to examine H.C record of conviction. View "JORGE ROMERO-MILLAN V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated the judgment the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the denial of Appellant's request for withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3) and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), 8 C.F.R. 1208. 16(c)-1208.18 and the denial of her motion to remand, holding that the BIA abused its discretion in denying Appellant's motion to remand.Appellant, a citizen and native of El Salvador, pursued withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3) and protection under the CAT. An immigration judge (IJ) denied Appellant's claims on the basis that she was not credible. On appeal, Appellant sought to, among other things, remand her case for consideration of new evidence that she claimed had not been previously available. The BIA upheld the IJ's adverse credibility finding and affirmed the denial of relief. The First Circuit vacated the BIA's decision and remanded the case, holding that the BIA abused its discretion in determining that the new evidence was not likely to change the result in this case. View "Rivera-Medrano v. Garland" on Justia Law

Manuel sued for wrongful termination after he was injured during the course of his employment with BrightView. The parties dispute whether Manuel’s employment was terminated in retaliation for his job injury or whether he failed to return to work due to federal immigration authorities questioning his eligibility to work in the United States. After Manuel objected to BrightView’s written discovery requests concerning his immigration status, BrightView obtained an order compelling Manuel to provide further responses to its discovery requests.The court of appeal vacated and directed the trial court to deny BrightView’s discovery motion. BrightView did not meet its burden, under Senate Bill No. 1818 (2002, codified, in part at Labor Code section 1171.5), to show that inquiry into his immigration status was necessary to comply with federal immigration law. Senate Bill 1818 declared that “[a]ll protections, rights, and remedies available under state law, except any reinstatement remedy prohibited by federal law, are available to all individuals regardless of immigration status who have applied for employment, or who are or who have been employed, in this state." A former employee’s status as an unauthorized worker is not a complete defense to a claim of wrongful termination. BrightView may not propound discovery inquiring into Manuel’s immigration status absent any showing of clear and convincing evidence that Manuel is seeking remedies for wrongful termination in violation of federal immigration law. View "Manuel v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County" on Justia Law

Segid, a citizen of Eritrea, had children there. In 2004, Segid married a U.S. citizen in Eritrea. In 2006, Segid fled Eritrea for Egypt and obtained an immigrant visa without legal counsel. The application asked him to list “ALL Children.” He marked “N/A.” He moved to the U.S. and became a lawful permanent resident. He has three children from his marriage. In 2015, Segid applied for naturalization, listed all six children, and indicated that he had never given false, fraudulent, or misleading information to a government official. At his naturalization interview, the officer confronted him about the discrepancy. Segid responded that he did not list the older children because they were not part of his visa petition, he did not believe he was named on their birth certificates, and he worried for their safety.USCIS denied Segid’s naturalization application, finding that Segid had not established that he was a person of good moral character. Segid sought review under 8 U.S.C. 1421(c). The court found that Segid had admitted that he intentionally omitted the children from his visa application, which was a material misrepresentation to procure an immigration benefit. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. Although Segid argued the merits of his eligibility for naturalization before the district court, his primary argument on appeal was that he has stated a claim for relief under section 1421(c) because he met the statute's administrative requirements but a 1421(c) claim focuses on whether the individual should have been granted naturalization. Segid’s brief was silent on this question; he waived the argument. View "Segid v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services" on Justia Law

Defendant a Mexican citizen who migrated to the United States illegally as a minor in 2006, was deported in 2011 following a four-minute removal hearing. During that hearing, the immigration judge neglected to advise Defendant about his eligibility for voluntary departure or inform him of his right to appeal. Then, in his written summary order, the immigration judge indicated that Defendant had waived his right to appeal. Upon discovering him in the country once again in 2018, the Government opted to arrest and charge him with illegal reentry. Defendant moved to dismiss his indictment, arguing that the 2011 deportation order underlying his Section 1326 charge was invalid.   The district court agreed, finding that the immigration judge’s failure to advise Defendant regarding his eligibility for voluntary departure rendered his 2011 removal fundamentally unfair. Defendant nevertheless maintains that the district court’s decision must be affirmed on an alternative basis: that the immigration judge’s denial of his right to appeal also prejudiced him. The Fourth Circuit agreed and affirmed the dismissal of Defendant’s indictment.   The court concluded that Defendant would have been granted voluntary departure on remand. The court rejected the Government’s contentions that Defendant would not have been eligible for voluntary departure. Further, the Government has waived any other arguments against that eligibility by failing to raise them before the court. Ultimately the court agreed with Defendant that, but for the denial of his appeal rights, he would not have been deported. Accordingly, the court concluded that his 2011 removal hearing was fundamentally unfair. View "US v. Bonifacio Sanchez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court remanded this immigration case to the Boards of Immigration Appeals (BIA) after it affirmed an immigration judge's (IJ) decision to deny Petitioner's applications for relief from removal based on two marijuana offenses found by the IJ and the BIA to be "particularly serious" pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii) and 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii), holding that remand was required.The IJ found Petitioner removable based on two Massachusetts state court convictions involving marijuana. The BIA upheld the IJ's determination that Petitioner was ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal for having been convicted of a particularly serious crime. The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's petition for review, holding that there was not a sufficient rational explanation to explain the BIA's conclusion that Petitioner's minor marijuana offenses were particularly serious crimes and that remand was required. View "Dor v. Garland" on Justia Law