Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Tantchev, a citizen of Bulgaria, entered the U.S. in 1999, with a business visa. He received lawful permanent resident status in 2012., Tantchev ran a trucking business out of a Chicago warehouse. In 2008, Tantchev started a side business coordinating the export of shipping containers from Chicago to Mongolia for customers. Tantchev never looked inside the containers; he completed customs paperwork describing the contents of the containers using the information provided by the customers. Customs learned that several of these shipping containers held stolen cars. In 2016, Tantchev was convicted of exporting stolen vehicles, 18 U.S.C. 553. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction, rejecting a challenge to the use of an “ostrich” instruction, referencing situations where the defendant is willfully blind to material facts,After Tantchev was released from prison, he was placed in removal proceedings, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), on the grounds that his conviction was an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G). An immigration judge ordered Tantchev deported. The BIA affirmed. Tantchev was deported in 2022. The Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review. The BIA in Tantchev’s case did not err in concluding that the mens rea of willful blindness encompassed in section 553(a)(1) categorically matches the mens rea requirement of a receipt of stolen property crime under section 1101(a)(43)(G). View "Tantchev v. Garland" on Justia Law

The First Circuit dismissed Petitioner's petition for review of an immigration judge's (IJ) denial of his application for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture and denied Petitioner's petition to review the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) denial of his motion to reopen proceedings, holding that Petitioner was not entitled to relief.On January 16, 2020, the BIA dismissed Petitioner's appeal of the IJ's denial of his application for withholding of removal and protection under CAT. On June 10, 2020, the BIA denied Petitioner's motion to reopen. Petitioner petitioned for review of both decisions. The First Circuit held (1) Petitioner's petition for review was untimely as to the January 16 decision; and (2) the BIA did not err by denying Petitioner's motion to reopen his orders of removal. View "Sarmiento v. Garland" on Justia Law

In 2002, Petitioner Mayra Estrada-Cardona entered the United States on a tourist visa which she subsequently overstayed. She resided in the United States with her two United States citizen children: A.E. and L.E. A.E. suffers from mental and physical disabilities, some of which are likely to be lifelong. While in the United States, Petitioner played a key role in ensuring A.E. received physical therapy and special education support—both vital to A.E.’s wellbeing and continued progress. In 2009, Petitioner was arrested for driving without a license. She pled guilty and paid the associated fines, but because of the traffic violation, Immigration and Customs Enforcement detained Petitioner and began removal proceedings. At the hearing, Petitioner appeared unrepresented and conceded the charge contained in the notice to appear—rendering her removable. At the time, Petitioner was in the country for at most seven years, making her statutorily ineligible for any discretionary relief from removal. The immigration judge therefore ordered Petitioner to voluntarily depart the United States. Every year—from 2013 to 2017—Petitioner requested a stay of removal, and every year ICE approved her request. ICE denied her most recent request on December 28, 2017. ICE did not take any immediate action to remove Petitioner from the United States, only requiring her to attend regular check-ins at the local ICE office. ICE finally detained Petitioner and initiated removal on September 30, 2020. Petitioner asked the BIA to reopen removal proceedings pursuant to Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018). Petitioner's notice to appear failed to specify the “time and place at which the proceedings will be held.” Because the notice to appear did not stop the clock, Petitioner insisted that she had the requisite presence to be eligible for cancellation of removal because she had been in the country for 16 years. BIA held Petitioner was not eligible for cancellation of removal because the immigration judge issued the order to voluntarily depart, which qualified as a final order of removal, when Petitioner had accrued, at most, eight years of physical presence. The Tenth Circuit rejected the BIA's final-order argument, holding that a final order of removal did not stop the accrual of continuous physical presence. View "Estrada-Cardona v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner petitioned for review of the denial of his motion to reopen his removal proceedings. After receiving a notice to appear that initiated his removal proceedings and advised him of his obligation to keep his address up-to-date with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Petitioner moved and did not send the agency his new address. The immigration court later sent Petitioner a notice informing him of the time and place of his removal hearing. Since he had moved, Petitioner did not receive that notice. He then failed to show up at his removal hearing and was ordered removed in absentia. Petitioner asserts that he was improperly ordered removed in absentia because he did not receive the notice of his removal hearing the agency was required to provide under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).   The Eleventh Circuit denied the petition. The court explained that once he received a notice to appear warning him of his obligation to update the agency when he changed addresses, Petitioner was on the hook to follow through with that instruction. Because he failed to keep DHS apprised of his whereabouts, the INA allowed for Petitioner’s removal in absentia even though he never received the later notice informing him of his removal hearing’s time and place. Thus, the court wrote that Petitioner’s removal order complied with the statute’s requirements. View "Andrei Dragomirescu v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeal affirming the judgment of the probate court denying Petitioner's petition to issue the predicate findings he needed to support an application to the federal government for special immigrant juvenile (SIJ) status, holding that the probate court applied an incorrect legal framework in ruling on Petitioner's petition.Petitioner, who left his native El Salvador at the age of sixteen to escape gang violence, filed an SIJ petition the day after he turned eighteen. The probate court denied the petition, and the court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded with direction that the case be remanded to the probate court for issuance of SIJ predicate findings, holding that returning Petitioner to live in El Salvador would be detrimental to his best interest under California law. View "In re Guardianship of Saul H." on Justia Law

Petitioner pleaded guilty, without counsel, to six misdemeanor theft charges. The BIA later concluded that his petty theft convictions were crimes involving moral turpitude that rendered him ineligible for cancellation of removal. Petitioner moved the Superior Court, through counsel and pursuant to Cal. Penal Code Section 1018, to withdraw his guilty pleas and set aside his convictions.The Superior Court granted his motion, and Petitioner pleaded guilty to violating Cal. Penal Code Section 368(d), theft from an elder adult. Petitioner moved to reopen his immigration proceedings. The BIA granted the motion but ultimately decided that Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof as to the nature of the vacatur of his convictions.Granting Petitioner’s petition for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals, and remanding, the Ninth Circuit held that: 1.) an applicant for cancellation of removal bears the burden of proving that a conviction was vacated because of a substantive or procedural defect in the criminal proceedings, and not solely for immigration purposes or for rehabilitative or equitable reasons; and 2.) Petitioner carried this burden of proof.The court explained that vacated convictions remain valid for immigration purposes if they are vacated solely for reasons unrelated to the merits of the underlying criminal proceedings, that is, equitable, rehabilitative, or immigration reasons. However, a conviction vacated on the basis of a defect in the underlying criminal proceedings is no longer valid for immigration purposes. Next, the court concluded that Petitioner carried that burden, explaining that the record compelled the conclusion that his convictions were vacated due to legal defects in his pleas. View "LUIS BALLINAS-LUCERO V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

The BIA concluded that Petitioner’s CPC Section 136.1(b)(1) convictions were offenses relating to obstruction of justice under Section 1101(a)(43)(S). In light of Valenzuela Gallardo I, and after Petitioner filed a petition for review, this court granted an unopposed motion to remand. The BIA then decided Matter of Valenzuela Gallardo, 27 I. & N. Dec. 449 (BIA 2018), modifying its definition of “an offense relating to obstruction of justice” to include: “offenses covered by chapter 73 of the Federal criminal code or any other Federal or State offense” involving certain conduct motivated by a specific intent—as relevant here—“to interfere either in an investigation or proceeding that is ongoing, pending, or reasonably foreseeable by the defendant.”The Ninth Circuit granted Petitioner’s petition for review and remanding, the court held that dissuading or attempting to dissuade a witness from reporting a crime, in violation of Section 136.1(b)(1), is not a categorical match to “an offense relating to obstruction of justice” aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. Section 1101(a)(43)(S). The government argued that Valenzuela Gallardo II left untouched the first prong of the BIA’s definition from Matter of Valenzuela Gallardo—“offenses covered by chapter 73 of the Federal criminal code.”The court rejected the government’s new position as flatly inconsistent with Valenzuela Gallardo II’s requirement of a nexus to an ongoing or pending proceeding or investigation. The court concluded that CPC Section 136.1(b)(1) is not a categorical match with Section 1512 because the California statute lacks the requirement, in Section 1512(b)(3), that an individual “uses intimidation, threatens, or corruptly persuades another person,” or “engages in misleading conduct toward another person.” View "FERNANDO CORDERO-GARCIA V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

Petitioner petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals denying his application for relief from removal to Iraq. The Eighth Circuit concluded that there is no basis to set aside the decision of the Board, and denied the petition for review.Petitioner first challenges the Board’s conclusion that he is removable under 8 U.S.C. Section 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) as an alien convicted of a crime of child abuse. Congress did not define “crime of child abuse,” but the Board has defined the term in a series of precedential decisions, and Petitioner does not challenge the agency’s definition. The court explained that under the categorical approach the court considers whether the elements of the offense necessarily fit within the Board’s generic definition. The court wrote that it does not examine the specific facts of Petitioner’s case, but instead presumes that his conviction rested on the least of the acts criminalized by the Nebraska statute. Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013).Further, the court held that the Board reasonably concluded that the lesser charge did not diminish the gravity of the crime to the point where an offense involving serious bodily injury to a six-month-old was not particularly serious. The Board did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Petitioner was convicted of a particularly serious crime. Moreover, the court wrote that to the extent that Petitioner also challenges the Board’s weighing of the evidence in affirming the IJ’s decision, this court lacks jurisdiction to review the Board’s discretionary determination. View "Raad Al-Masaudi v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Defendant Andrew Gregor, a naturalized citizen from Australia, pleaded guilty to a felony sex offense that was later reduced to a misdemeanor and dismissed after early termination of probation. After he was informed he was not able to sponsor his father for a family visa due to this conviction, defendant filed a motion pursuant to Penal Code section 1473.7 and sought to withdraw his plea claiming he was unable to meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the adverse immigration consequences of his conviction. The trial court denied the motion; defendant appealed. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Gregor" on Justia Law

Bonds posted a $200,000 bail bond for Quinones-Arias. North was the surety and guaranteed the defendant’s appearance. Quinones-Arias did not appear at a plea hearing on December 17, 2018. The court declared the bond forfeited and issued a $200,000 bench warrant. A notice of forfeiture was mailed to the companies, advising that the forfeiture would become final on July 14, 2019 (180 days plus five days for mailing) unless the defendant is surrendered. On July 8, 2019, Bonds moved to toll the 180-day period based on temporary disability (Pen. Code 1305(e)), or alternatively to extend the time to return Quinones-Arias to court. (1305.4), arguing that Quinones-Arias’s detention and deportation constituted a temporary disability. A bail agent is entitled to tolling during a period of disability and for a reasonable time thereafter. The prosecutor stated that the Department of Homeland Security indicated that Quinones-Arias was not deported but voluntarily departed. The court denied the motion, finding that Quinones-Arias had voluntarily left the country and the bail agent had made no effort to return or surrender Quinones-Arias, or request his extradition.The court of appeal reversed, noting the state’s concession that Quinones-Arias was under a temporary disability when he failed to appear and the disability continued throughout the 180-day appearance period. View "People v. North River Insurance Co." on Justia Law