Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner sought review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision finding her ineligible for cancellation of removal because of her 2014 New York conviction for attempted second-degree money laundering. Petitioner entered the United States without inspection in 1995. In 2014, she pleaded guilty under a plea agreement to attempted money laundering in the second degree. The agreement provided that she would receive a sentence of “time served.” Days later, the Department of Homeland Security served Petitioner with a Notice to Appear, charging her as removable for having entered the United States without inspection. Petitioner did not contest removability.   The Second Circuit granted Petitioner’s review of the Board of Immigration Appeals decision affirming the denial of Petitioner’s application for cancellation of removal. The court held that because the crime of conviction lacks the requisite scienter, it is not a crime involving moral turpitude. The court reasoned that the INA provides that aliens convicted of, or who admit having committed, or who admit committing acts that constitute the essential elements of a crime involving moral turpitude are ineligible for cancellation of removal. To determine whether a crime is a CIMT, the agency asks whether the act is accompanied by a vicious motive or a corrupt mind. Both the circuit court and the BIA have made clear that the indispensable component of a CIMT is evil intent. Here, the knowledge required for conviction under Petitioner’s crime falls well short of the depravity described by the BIA as requisite for a CIMT. View "Jang v. Garland" on Justia Law

The diversity-visa program makes as many as 55,000 visas available annually to citizens of countries with low rates of immigration to the United States, 8 U.S.C. 1151(e), 1153(c); the State Department holds a lottery to determine priority. Applicants who qualify, through random selection, for a diversity visa “shall remain eligible to receive such visa only through the end of the specific fiscal year for which they were selected.” The fiscal-year limit has caused many applications to fail; bureaucratic inertia or foul-ups have the same effect as affirmative decisions that applicants are ineligible. The Seventh Circuit held in 2002 held that the fiscal-year limit cannot be extended by judicial order.In March 2020, the State Department stopped processing routine visa applications, including diversity visas. High-priority applications, such as for diplomats, medical emergencies, and medical personnel, continued to be approved. Two presidential orders confirmed the Department’s approach. Fiscal Year 2020 expired.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a suit by applicants whose eligibility had expired. Section 1154(a)(1)(I)(ii)(II) applies regardless of the relief sought; it does not set a time limit for administrative action nor impose any duty on the State Department. It only specifies the consequence of delay: the applicant’s eligibility expires. A court is not authorized to substitute a different consequence. There is no statute authorizing monetary relief for the plaintiffs’ outlays that did not lead to visas. View "Shahi v. United States Department of State" on Justia Law

The First Circuit granted in part a petition for review from Petitioner in which Petitioner challenged the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the immigration judge's (IJ) denial of Petitioner's request for deferral of removal pursuant to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading treatment or Punishment (CAT), holding that the BIA's decision was not supported by substantial evidence.Petitioner, a noncitizen who was granted asylum in 2002, was served with a notice to appear from removal proceedings. The notice alleged that Petitioner was subject to removal from the United States pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) and 1182(a)(2)(C) based on his prior Massachusetts state law convictions. Ali submitted to the IJ an application for asylum, for withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT, asserting that he was be subject to torture in Somalia. The IJ sustained the charges and ordered Petitioner removed to Somalia. The BIA affirmed. The First Circuit vacated the BIA's order, holding that the BIA did not address Petitioner's contention that the IJ failed to consider relevant evidence concerning the torture that Petitioner would face from private militias and armed criminals, and the failure to consider that evidence was not harmless. View "Ali v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner challenged an order of removal based on his violation of a court protection order and moved for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, appointment of counsel, and a stay of removal. Respondent, in turn, moved to expedite the petition.The Second Circuit dismissed Petitioner’s petition for review of a removal order based on his violation of a court protection order. The court held that removability under 8 U.S.C. Section 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii) is determined by a circumstance-specific inquiry as to whether a court found a particular alien’s conduct to violate a protection order then applicable to him, and whether that violation pertained to a provision of the order involving protection against credible threats of violence, repeated harassment, or bodily injury to the person for whom the protection order was issued. Here, because Petitioner’s arguments to the contrary lack any arguable basis in law or fact, and because his other challenges to removability and to the denial of cancellation of removal are similarly frivolous, the court dismissed his petition and denied all motions, both by the Petitioner and the Respondent, as moot. View "Alvarez v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner asserted a fear of persecution or torture in Nigeria based on his status as a gay man and the harm he suffered after being discovered having sex with his boyfriend in a hotel. The immigration judge (“IJ”) found that Petitioner was not credible because he “misrepresented” the name of the hotel where he and his boyfriend were discovered. The IJ found that Petitioner failed to establish that he is gay or that he was ever harmed in Nigeria for being gay. The IJ also found that Petitioner’s asylum application was frivolous, concluding that the misrepresentation of the hotel was a material element of his application.   Petitioner appealed arguing that the agency (1) erred by failing to consider potentially dispositive evidence concerning his CAT claim; (2) violated due process in its CAT determination; and (3) erred in concluding that he had filed a frivolous asylum application.   The Ninth Circuit, granted in part, and denied in part, Petitioner’s petition for review. The court concluded that the Board erred by failing to consider potentially dispositive evidence concerning his CAT claim, thus the agency’s denial of CAT relief could not stand. The court did not reach, and therefore denied, Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment violation claims. Further, the court held that the Board erred in concluding that Petitioner had filed a frivolous asylum application, because any fabrication concerning the name of the hotel where Petitioner was discovered was not material to his claim. View "PETER UDO V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted for illegal reentry after removal in a case in which a Marine Corps surveillance unit spotted him immediately after he unlawfully entered the United States, and notified Customs and Border Patrol agents who soon detained him. Defendant argued that the Marine Corps surveillance violated the Posse Comitatus Act, which codified the longstanding prohibition against military enforcement of civilian law.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction for illegal reentry after removal. The court reasoned that the military may still assist civilian law enforcement agencies if Congress expressly authorized it, and here, the 2016 National Defense Authorization Act directed the U.S. Secretary of Defense to offer military assistance to Border Patrol in hopes of securing the southern land border. The court concluded that the district court therefore properly denied Defendant's suppression motion based on the alleged violation of the Posse Comitatus Act. Further, the court also denied Defendant’s Batson challenge to the prosecution’s striking two Asian jurors from the venire, concluding that Defendant failed to rebut the prosecution’s race-neutral reasons for doing so. View "USA V. CLEMENTE HERNANDEZ-GARCIA" on Justia Law

After Ramirez-Figueredo entered the U.S. from Cuba, he amassed convictions for the delivery and manufacture of controlled substances, domestic violence, assault with a dangerous weapon, retail fraud, stalking, assault and battery, disorderly conduct, possession of a switchblade, receiving stolen property, possession of a controlled substance, and indecent exposure. In 2020, a woman claimed that Ramirez-Figueredo had raped her and kept her for two days. About a month later, officers arrested Ramirez-Figueredo. A search of his backpack revealed heroin and methamphetamine. After receiving his Miranda rights, Ramirez-Figueredo confessed that the drugs were from the Sinaloa Cartel and that he intended to sell them. He admitted to distributing methamphetamine, heroin, and cocaine in Lansing. He pleaded guilty to drug crimes under Michigan law.In federal court, he pled guilty under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The district court performed a Rule 11 colloquy but, contrary to FRCP 11(b)(1)(O), did not tell Ramirez-Figueredo that his guilty plea might have immigration-related consequences. Ramirez-Figueredo’s counsel claimed that his client had cooperated and proffered, but that the government had not moved for a downward departure under U.S.S.G. 5K1.1. After calculating a Guidelines range of 168-210 months, the district court sentenced Ramirez-Figueredo to 192 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Ramirez-Figueredo was already deportable when he pleaded guilty. The district court considered the minimal evidence of his cooperation. View "United States v. Ramirez-Figueredo" on Justia Law

Petitioner a native and citizen of North Macedonia, appealed the dismissal or, alternatively, the denial of his 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2241 habeas petition seeking release from an alleged “unlawful and indefinite” detention by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). Petitioner claimed that his detention by ICE officials violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, because it exceeded the “presumptively reasonable” 180-day period established in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). The district court denied Petitioner relief, concluding, among other things, that the delay in his removal did not violate Zadvydas because Petitioner had sought and obtained an administrative stay of his removal proceedings.   The Eleventh Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of Petitioner’s habeas petition seeking release and dismissed the case as moot. The court reasoned that it need not decide whether the voluntary cessation doctrine applies in the habeas immigration context because even if it did, it has not been satisfied. Further, the government has described Petitioner’s detention as having “ceased,” and, as of now, more than fifteen months have passed since Petitioner was released. Thus, the court found that there is no reasonable basis for it to believe that Peitioner will be re-detained unlawfully upon the termination of his suit. View "Goga Djadju v. Juan A. Lopez Vega, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner a citizen of Somalia, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). The BIA’s order reversed the decision of the immigration judge (IJ) granting Petitioner’s application for deferral of removal to Somalia under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The Eighth Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review in part, granted the petition in part, and remanded it to the BIA for further proceedings.   Petitioner challenged the BIA’s reversal of the IJ’s grant of deferral of removal under CAT, asserting that the BIA failed to provide sufficient justification for its determination. The court held that it will not disturb the BIA’s findings as to the unlikelihood of Petitioner’s institutionalization because the BIA identified reasons grounded in the record sufficient to satisfy a reasonable mind.   Next, Petitioner challenged the BIA’s conclusion that the IJ clearly erred in finding that Petitioner would more likely than not be tortured as an IDP forcibly evicted from an IDP camp. The court found that the BIA gave sufficient justification for its determination that Petitioner failed to show that he would more likely than not be forcibly evicted from an IDP camp.   Finally, the court held that further proceedings are required for the BIA to address in the first instance the IJ’s findings regarding Petitioner’s likely treatment in an IDP camp and what part of the IDP camp experience would constitute torture. The court found that the BIA erred by resolving DHS’s appeal without addressing the IJ’s findings regarding treatment in IDP camps. View "Musla Salat v. Merrick B. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner petitioned for review of an immigration officer’s decision to reinstate a prior order of removal against him and for review of an immigration judge’s subsequent decision that he does not qualify to pursue claims for withholding of removal to India. Petitioner was removed from the United States in 2010 and again in 2017, the latter time pursuant to a removal order entered on March 25, 2016, he expressed a fear of persecution and torture in India based on his political views, triggering the protocol set out in 8 C.F.R. Sec. 208.31   The Second Circuit dismissed the immigration Petitioner’s petition for review of an immigration officer’s decision to reinstate a prior order of removal. The court held that it did not have jurisdiction because Petitioner sought review of withholding-only decisions but no final order of removal subject to judicial review. The court reasoned that Illegal reentrants are “not eligible and may not apply for any relief under” the INA and “shall be removed under the prior order at any time after the reentry.” View "Bhaktibhai-Patel v. Garland" on Justia Law