Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

In 2001, after being convicted of forgery, Estrada-Gonzalez was removed to Guatemala. Twenty years later, he was arrested for domestic violence. Estrada-Gonzalez pleaded guilty to illegally reentering the U.S, 8 U.S.C. 1326; the government agreed to recommend a within-Guidelines sentence. The agreement added: “Neither party will recommend or suggest in any way that a departure or variance is appropriate, either regarding the sentencing range or regarding the kind of sentence.” The agreed guidelines range was six-12 months. The prosecutor noted that the state had dismissed Estrada-Gonzalez’s domestic-violence charges, then played an officer’s body-camera footage from Estrada-Gonzalez’s arrest, and stated that a sentence at the top of the guidelines range “would be at the least appropriate”: I realize that the statutory maximum is 20 years based on his prior forgery conviction … I would echo [the court’s] sentiments in regards to the safety of not only the wife, the children … certainly a high end of the sentencing guideline range would be at the least appropriate." The court imposed an 18-month term, rejecting the defense argument that the government had violated the plea agreement.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court heard the prosecution’s ambiguous statement and rejected Estrada-Gonzalez’s reading of it, finding that the prosecutor had been advocating only “for a sentence at the high range of the guidelines.” What the prosecutor expressed is a type of fact question; the district court did not clearly err in its resolution of the question. View "United States v. Estrada-Gonzalez" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a motion to reopen his immigration proceedings over sixteen years after the statutory deadline for doing so had passed. He argued that the deadline should be equitably tolled because he allegedly received ineffective assistance of counsel when his prior lawyers did not file earlier motions to reopen on his behalf, even though those motions would also have been untimely.The Ninth Circuit denied the petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ denial. The court held that Petitioner has not shown that his prior counsel acted deficiently in not filing untimely motions to reopen, nor has he demonstrated prejudice. The court further held that the Board did not err in declining to allow Petitioner’s untimely motion to reopen based on allegedly changed country conditions in Mexico. Further, the court found that even if Petitioner could show deficient performance, he still cannot show prejudice. Finally, although Petitioner submitted articles reporting violence against law enforcement in Mexico, those reports do not suffice to establish changed country conditions because they do not show that “circumstances have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim” now does. View "JUAN HERNANDEZ-ORTIZ V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, seeks review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision denying his untimely motion to reopen his removal proceedings. Although the BIA denied relief on the merits, the BIA lacked jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s motion to reopen because he was subject to a reinstated prior removal order.   The Ninth Circuit held that it can deny Petitioner’s petition for review based on the BIA’s lack of jurisdiction. The court held that under the Chenery doctrine, the court’s review is typically limited to the grounds upon which the agency relied and that the court should generally remand to the agency. However, the court concluded that the considerations underlying the Chenery doctrine did not apply because the BIA was required to deny Petitioner’s motion for lack of jurisdiction. Thus, the court concluded that it need not remand for the agency to reach the same conclusion on the BIA’s jurisdiction. Finally, the court noted that denying the petition was consistent with the court’s precedents. View "JOSE GUTIERREZ-ZAVALA V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

During the height of the COVID-19 public health crisis, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York Judge issued a preliminary injunction principally requiring the United States Immigration & Customs Enforcement ("ICE") to release Petitioner and three others from immigration detention. The government appealed from an August 2020 order denying its motion to vacate or modify. The government sought permission to re-detain Petitioner on the ground that since his release he has been arrested and charged with crimes, thereby violating the court-imposed condition that he does not commit a crime while on release. The district court denied the motion.   The Second Circuit concluded that the court erred in ruling that a release condition prohibiting the commission of a crime is not violated unless there has been a criminal conviction. The court reasoned that the district court based its decision not on an assessment of the evidence as to Petitioner’s conduct but rather on its view as a matter of law that a release condition prohibiting the commission of a crime is not violated unless and until there is a conviction. The court also remanded for the district court to reconsider the government's motion, taking into account whether it was more likely than not that Petitioner committed a crime while on release. View "Villiers v. Decker" on Justia Law

Petitioner petitioned for review of the agency’s rejection of his Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) claim and rejection of his motion to reopen and remand his removal proceedings.The Ninth Circuit denied Petitioner’s review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). The court held that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner’s motion to reopen and substantial evidence supported the BIA’s denial of relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).The court reasoned that Petitioner’s current proceeding was initiated with a different charging document which made Pereira inapplicable. Even if the court were to assume the Notice to Appear (“NTA”) and Notice of Referral to Immigration Judge (“NOR”) was analogous, his argument is foreclosed by precedent holding that when hearing details are later provided there is no jurisdictional defect.Further, the court explained that while petitioners seeking CAT relief are not required to demonstrate that safe relocation would be impossible, they do carry the burden to establish that it is more likely than not that they will be tortured. Here, the court concluded that the evidence established that Petitioner’s relocation to his home state was eminently possible. Moreover, the court found that the record would not compel the finding that Petitioner established a more than 50% chance of future torture. Finally, the court explained that Petitioner failed to show that he faces a particularized, ongoing risk of future torture higher than that faced by all other citizens in his country. View "JOSE TZOMPANTZI-SALAZAR V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circuit court finding co-defendants Adrianna Reecy and Kevin Dickerson guilty of robbery and burglary and also finding Dickerson guilty of aggravated assault against Julio Rojas, holding that exclusion of certain evidence resulted in violation of both defendants' Sixth Amendment right of confrontation.On appeal, both defendants argued that the circuit court erred in precluding any reference to Rojas's immigration status and in admitting into evidence an exhibit listing transactions from Rojas's debit card. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed, holding (1) the circuit court's exclusion of the immigration evidence was error, and the error was not harmless; and (2) the circuit court erred in admitting the bank records at issue because the State did not lay an adequate foundation for the admission of the documents and the court erroneously determined that Rojas was a qualified witness, as contemplated by the exception to the hearsay rule. View "State v. Dickerson" on Justia Law

Defendant, a naturalized United States citizen, received advice from counsel in 2010 that because of his newly obtained citizenship, his guilty plea to a narcotics offense would not subject him to deportation. However, Defendant's citizenship was revoked in 2016. In 2018, Defendant received a Notice to Appear informing him that he would be removed from the country because his 2010 conviction was an aggravated felony. Upon receiving that notice, he filed a collateral attack upon his 2010 guilty plea under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2255. The district court found that Defendant’s 2018 petition was untimely under Sec. 2255(f)(4).The court reasoned that Sec. 2255 petitions must typically be filed within one year of the date “on which the judgment of conviction becomes final.” But petitions based on facts that arise after a conviction becomes final must instead be filed within one year of “the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.Defendant testified that his Alexandria-based attorney told him in 2016 that his conviction was an aggravated felony. The court found that notice alone triggered Sec. 2255(f)(4)’s limitations period. Second, even setting aside that admission, the nature of Defendant’s sentencing proceedings on July 8, 2016, put him on inquiry notice that his 2010 conviction was an aggravated felony. Therefore, the court held that the district court correctly dismissed the petition as untimely. View "US v. Jose Nunez-Garcia" on Justia Law

The First Circuit granted a petition for review sought by Petitioner from the denial of Petitioner's application for cancellation of removal and request for voluntary departure, holding that the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) failed to apply clear error review to the immigration judge's (IJ) finding that Petitioner's removal was extreme hardship to Petitioner's father.Petitioner conceded removability but applied for cancellation of removal and for voluntary departure. Petitioner met the statutory prerequisites for each. The IJ took evidence on the discretionary factors and found that Petitioner merited a favorable exercise of administrative discretion. The BIA reversed, concluding that Petitioner merited neither cancellation of removal or voluntary departure. The First Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the BIA impermissibly changed the IJ's factual finding that Petitioner's removal was hardship to his father. View "Barros v. Garland" on Justia Law

In November 2017, Saul Cisneros was charged with two misdemeanor offenses and jailed. The court set Cisneros’s bond at $2,000, and Cisneros’s daughter posted that bond four days later, but the County Sheriff’s Office did not release him. Instead, pursuant to Sheriff Bill Elder’s policies and practices, the Sheriff’s Office notified U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) that the jail had been asked to release Cisneros on bond. ICE then sent the jail a detainer and administrative warrant, requesting that the jail continue to detain Cisneros because ICE suspected that he was removable from the United States. Cisneros was placed on an indefinite “ICE hold,” and remained in detention. During his detention, Cisneros, along with another pretrial detainee, initiated a class action in state court against Sheriff Elder, in his official capacity, for declaratory, injunctive, and mandamus relief. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the appellate court erred in concluding that section 24-10-106(1.5)(b), C.R.S. (2021), of the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (“CGIA”) did not waive sovereign immunity for intentional torts that result from the operation of a jail for claimants who were incarcerated but not convicted. The Supreme Court concluded section 24-10-106(1.5)(b) waived immunity for such intentional torts. "In reaching this determination, we conclude that the statutory language waiving immunity for 'claimants who are incarcerated but not yet convicted' and who 'can show injury due to negligence' sets a floor, not a ceiling. To hold otherwise would mean that a pre-conviction claimant could recover for injuries resulting from the negligent operation of a jail but not for injuries resulting from the intentionally tortious operation of the same jail, an absurd result that we cannot countenance." Accordingly, the judgment of the division below was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Cisneros v. Elder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of El Salvador, entered the United States in 2013 without authorization. The next year, Petition was arrested and ultimately found removable. Petitioner sought relief under the Convention Against Torture, claiming he would be tortured by the MS-13 gang, the police, or anti-gang vigilante groups if he was deported to El Salvador.The Immigration Judge denied relief, finding Petitioner's testimony was not credible and that there was "less than a fifty percent chance of torture both separately and in the aggregate" that Petitioner would be tortured by any party. The Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") affirmed.On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed. The Immigration Judge properly considered the aggregate chance that Petitioner would be tortured by any party. Neither the Immigration Judge nor the BIA ignored relevant evidence that Petitioner would be tortured. Further, the BIA used the proper standard when assessing Petitioner's claims. View "Miguel Ibarra Chevez v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law