Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

The American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan (the ACLU) filed a complaint against the Calhoun County Jail and Calhoun County Sheriff’s Office (the CCSO), alleging CCSO violated Michigan’s Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) when it denied the ACLU’s request for documents. The ACLU sought disclosure of all records related to the December 2018 detention of United States citizen Jilmar Benigno Ramos-Gomez. Ramos-Gomez’s three-day detention at the Calhoun County Correctional Facility occurred pursuant to an Intergovernmental Service Agreement executed between United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the jail. The CCSO denied the ACLU’s request, asserting that the requested records were exempt from disclosure under MCL 15.243(1)(d) because they related to an ICE detainee. The Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal, finding the records at issue were exempt public records from disclosure under the statute. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, finding error in that court holding a federal regulation had the legal force of a federal statute; "federal regulation is not a federal statute." The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan v. Calhoun County" on Justia Law

Petitioners, three brothers who are Bolivian citizens, came to the United States on temporary visas in 2015. Petitioners claim they fled Bolivia because investors in their business, many of whom were retired military and government officials, were unhappy with the lack of returns and threatened Petitioners. Petitioners also faced fraud charges in Bolivia. Based on these charges, Interpol issued Red Notices seeking Petitioners’ arrest.Upon the expiration of their temporary visas, Petitioners sought asylum in the United States. The immigration judge denied Petitioners’ claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and Protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Pertaining to Petitioner’s CAT claims, the immigration judge found that Petitioners had not shown it was more likely than not they would be tortured if returned to Bolivia. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed.The Eighth Circuit denied relief. The immigration judge’s adverse credibility determinations were supported by the record and thus, entitled to deference. Additionally, Petitioners’ evidence suggesting they would be tortured if returned to Bolivia was based on “abusive or squalid conditions in pretrial detention facilities or prisons that result from a lack of resources rather than a specific intent to cause severe pain or suffering.” These conditions, the court held, failed to rise to the level of torture. View "Victor Paredes Gonzales v. Merrick B. Garland" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision upholding the denial of his application for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court rejected petitioner's contention that the Board erred by declining to address the IJ's adverse credibility finding where the court agreed with the Board that the IJ's decision includes an alternative determination that petitioner's claim would fail even if his testimony were believed. The court also concluded that the Board adequately addressed petitioner's arguments on administrative appeal and that the IJ's decision is sufficient to allow for meaningful judicial review. Because petitioner's procedural objections are without merit, the petition for review is denied. View "Jama v. Garland" on Justia Law

Tescari and Salame, Venezuelan citizens, have two minor children. Tescari removed the children from their home in Venezuela and brought them with her to the U.S. Salame filed a petition seeking their return under the Hague Convention on Civil Aspects of International Abduction. Tescari and the children were granted asylum in the U.S.The parties stipulated that Salame had a prima facie of wrongful removal and retention. Tescari claimed an affirmative defense under Article 13(b) of the Convention, 22 U.S.C. 9003(e)(2). The court concluded Tescari failed to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, her affirmative defense that returning the children to Venezuela would subject them to a grave risk of physical or psychological harm or otherwise place them in an intolerable situation.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Because the alleged abuse was relatively minor, the court had no discretion to refuse the petition nor to consider potential future harm. The determination that Salame could provide the children with shelter, food, and medication in Venezuela is not clearly erroneous. Despite Venezuela’s political schisms and civil unrest, Tescari failed to introduce sufficient evidence that it is a zone of war, famine, or disease. Any defects in the Venezuelan court system fall short of "an intolerable situation." While the factors that go into a grant of asylum may be relevant to Hague Convention determinations, the district court has a separate and exclusive responsibility to assess the applicability of an Article 13(b) affirmative defense. View "Ajami v. Solano" on Justia Law

Petitioner Kelly Gonzalez Aguilar was a transgender woman from Honduras. She came to the United States and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and deferral of removal. In support, Kelly claimed she had been persecuted by family, feared further persecution from pervasive discrimination and violence against transgender women in Honduras, and would likely be tortured if she returned to Honduras. In denying asylum, an immigration judge found no pattern or practice of persecution. Kelly appealed the denial of each application, and the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed the appeal. The dismissal led Kelly to petition for judicial review to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, which granted the petition. "On the asylum claim, any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to find a pattern or practice of persecution against transgender women in Honduras." View "Gonzalez Aguilar v. Garland" on Justia Law

Plaintiff challenged the USCIS's denial of his application for lawful permanent residence (LPR) as arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The district court affirmed the denial under the weapons bar of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(V).The Second Circuit vacated the district court's judgment, concluding that it is unable to discern USCIS's full reasoning for denying plaintiff's application or to conclude that the agency considered all factors relevant to its decision. In this case, a finding that plaintiff had used a weapon on behalf of the Taliban is not enough, the court explained that the INA also requires that the agency find that plaintiff's offending act either was unlawful where it took place (Afghanistan) or would be unlawful in the United States before it can determine that he is inadmissible under the weapons bar. Therefore, the decision was arbitrary and capricious under the APA and the court remanded to the district court to remand to the USCIS to consider and more clearly explain whether, in light of plaintiff's duress defense, his conduct was unlawful under the laws of the United States and thus qualifies as a terrorist activity under section 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii). View "Kakar v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services" on Justia Law

In November 2017, Saul Cisneros was charged with two misdemeanor offenses and jailed. The court set Cisneros’s bond at $2,000, and Cisneros’s daughter posted that bond four days later, but the El Paso County Sheriff’s Office did not release Cisneros. Instead, the Sheriff’s Office notified U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) that the jail had been asked to release Cisneros on bond. ICE then sent the jail a detainer and administrative warrant, requesting that the jail continue to detain Cisneros because ICE suspected that he was removable from the United States. Cisneros was then placed on an indefinite “ICE hold,” and remained detained. The jail subsequently advised Cisneros’s daughter that the Sheriff’s Office would not release her father due to the ICE hold, and she ultimately recovered the bond money that she had posted. During his detention, Cisneros, along with another pretrial detainee, initiated a class action in state court against Sheriff Elder, in his official capacity, for declaratory, injunctive, and mandamus relief. Their complaint alleged that Sheriff Elder did not have the authority under state law to continue to hold pretrial detainees in custody when Colorado law required their release, nor did he have the authority to deprive persons of their liberty based on suspicion of civil violations of federal immigration law. Cisneros also asserted a tort claim against Sheriff Elder, seeking damages for false imprisonment, but he subsequently filed an amended complaint in which he did not reassert that claim, stating that he intended to file the requisite notice of such a claim under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (“CGIA”) and to reassert that claim at the proper time. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the district court erred in concluding that section 24-10-106(1.5)(b), C.R.S. (2021), of the CGIA did not waive sovereign immunity for intentional torts that result from the operation of a jail for claimants who were incarcerated but not convicted. The Supreme Court concluded section 24-10-106(1.5)(b) waived immunity for such intentional torts. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the division below and remanded for further proceedings. View "Cisneros v. Elder" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's order affirming the IJ's denial of petitioner's application for cancellation of removal. The court agreed with petitioner that he satisfied his burden of demonstrating his eligibility for cancellation of removal for certain lawful permanent residents because his violation of Fla. Stat. 893.13(6)(a) did not relate to a controlled substance, as defined in 21 U.S.C. 802, and thus did not prevent him from accruing the necessary seven-year period of continuous residence.The court explained that, because a violation of section 893.13(6)(a) did not relate to a controlled substance as defined under federal law, petitioner's conviction under this statute in 2017 did not affect his ability to accrue the required seven years of continuous eligibility necessary for cancellation of removal. Rather, petitioner's residence "clock" stopped in 2019 when he was arrested for fleeing and eluding while lights and sirens were activated. The court explained that, at this point in time, petitioner had lived in the United States continuously for eight years, thereby meeting the residency requirement under INA 240A. View "Fuad Fares Fuad Said v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit granted the petition for review of the BIA's decision concluding that petitioner is categorically ineligible under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(H)(i)(I), because his U.S. citizen father is no longer living. Pursuant to section 1227(a)(1)(H)(i)(I), the Attorney General has discretion to grant waiver of removal to a person who is the son or daughter of a citizen of the United States.The court concluded that the statutory text includes no living-parent requirement. In this case, the issue is not whether petitioner should be granted a waiver as a matter of executive discretion—it is whether Congress has forbidden one via legislative command. Because the answer is no, the court granted the petition for review, vacated the Board's decision, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Julmice v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of defendants' motion to dismiss his complaint, seeking judicial review of the USCIS's denial of a national interest waiver pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1153(b)(2)(B)(i), based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court held that section 1153(b)(2)(B)(i) specifies that a national interest waiver is within the discretion of the Attorney General, and therefore section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) precludes judicial review. Accordingly, the district court did not err by dismissing the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Brasil v. Secretary, Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law