Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

The U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency (ICE) entered into a contract with the City of Holtville (City) to detain noncitizens at the Imperial Regional Detention Facility (Facility). The City did not own the Facility, so the City subcontracted its detention responsibilities to the Facility’s owner. The owner did not operate the facility, so the owner subcontracted its responsibilities (with ICE’s approval) to a private operator, real party in interest Management & Training Corporation (Operator). Petitioner Anna Von Herrmann served the Operator with a California Public Records Act (CPRA) request regarding the Facility. Operator refused to comply, reasoning it was not subject to the CPRA because it did not have a contract directly with the City, and, thus, the Facility was not one that “detains a noncitizen pursuant to a contract with a city.” Alternatively, Operator contended several CPRA exemptions applied. Petitioner sought a writ of mandate from the trial court compelling Operator to comply with the CPRA request, but the court agreed with Operator’s interpretation of California Civil Code section 1670.9(c) and denied the petition without reaching Operator’s CPRA exemption claims. The Court of Appeal agreed the trial court construed section 1670.9(c) too narrowly as applying the CPRA only to an entity that contracts directly with a city to detain noncitizens. "[T]he structure of section 1670.9 as a whole, indicate the Legislature intended for the CPRA to apply to immigration detention facilities on a facility-wide basis rather than an entity-specific basis." The Court issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order denying the petition and to enter a new order granting it, subject to resolution of Operator’s CPRA exemption claims. View "Von Herrmann v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The First Circuit granted in part one of Petitioner's petitions for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) ordering Petitioner removed, holding that remand was required.The same day the denial of Petitioner's I-751 petition to remove the conditions of his residency was issued, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiated removal proceedings against Petitioner. Petitioner subsequently divorced his former wife and married anew. Petitioner's new wife filed an application for adjustment of Petitioner's status on the basis of their marriage and an I-751 waiver petition. Petitioner was subsequently indicted for kidnapping and two counts of sexual assault. The IJ granted Petitioner's application for adjustment of status. The BIA sustained the DHS's appeal and ordered Petitioner removed without acknowledging that Petitioner had a pending I-751 waiver. The First Circuit held (1) the BIA abused its discretion in denying Petitioner's motion to reconsider based on two clear-error-standard violations; and (2) remand was required for consideration of the effect, if any, of the final denial of the I-751 waiver on Petitioner's motions. View "Adeyanju v. Garland" on Justia Law

In connection with his leading role in a Chinese construction company in 2010-2016, Zhong was convicted of forced-labor conspiracy 18 U.S.C. 1594(b); forced labor, section 1589(a) and (b); concealing passports and immigration documents in connection with forced labor, section 1592(a); alien smuggling conspiracy, 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(I); and visa fraud conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 371.The Second Circuit vacated in part. The district court committed evidentiary errors that may have affected the jury’s decision to convict Zhong on the three forced-labor counts. The court allowed testimony about 2001-2002 preindictment conduct, preventing Zhong’s attempts to impeach a witness by offering evidence of the witness’s reputation for truthfulness, and permitting expert witness testimony that exceeded its proper scope. .Those errors were unconnected to Zhong’s other two counts. The government presented sufficient evidence to allow a jury to convict him on the alien smuggling and visa fraud counts. The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to give an “adverse but legitimate consequences” jury instruction regarding threats made to the workers. View "United States v. Zhong" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the ruling of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying Petitioner's application for asylum, withholding of removal, protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), and voluntary departure, holding that the BIA's determination was supported by substantial evidence.Petitioner, a native and citizen of Guatemala, was charged with removability. Petitioner conceded removability and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, protection under the CAT, and post-conclusion voluntary departure. The immigration judge (IJ) found that Petitioner's asylum claim failed on the merits and that Petitioner was not entitled to relief on his remaining arguments for relief. The BIA affirmed. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that substantial evidence supported the decisions of the IJ and the BIA. View "Lopez-Perez v. Garland" on Justia Law

Gallegos, a citizen of Mexico, gained Lawful Permanent Resident status through her marriage to a U.S. citizen. After Gallegos petitioned to dissolve the marriage, DHS concluded that the marriage was fraudulent. DHS filed a Notice to Appear, charging Gallegos as removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(A) as an alien who was inadmissible at the time she adjusted her LPR status because she procured admission through fraud (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(C)(i)); under section 1227(a)(1)(A) because she did not possess valid immigration documents when she sought readmission as an LPR (1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I)); and under 1227(a)(1)(G)(ii) for failing or refusing to fulfill a marital agreement which was made for the purpose of procuring admission as an immigrant.The immigration court later mailed an amended Notice, informing Gallegos her hearing was rescheduled. Gallegos failed to appear at the rescheduled hearing. The IJ ordered Gallegos removed in absentia. Gallegos argued that exceptional circumstances prevented her from attending the hearing. Gallegos admitted to receiving the amended Notice but explained that she misplaced it and incorrectly remembered the hearing date because of mental health issues, claiming she was treated for depression and anxiety and was involuntarily hospitalized. The BIA affirmed the denial of relief, finding that Gallegos did “not show that her mental condition was causally related to her failure to appear.” The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review, finding no exceptional circumstances justifying Gallegos’s failure to appear. View "Gallegos v. Garland" on Justia Law

The First Circuit dismissed Petitioner's petition for review of a final administrative removal order (FARO) issued against her in 2018 by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), holding that this Court lacked jurisdiction over the petition.The DHS issued a FARO against Petitioner stating that she was removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) because she had been convicted of an aggravated felony as defined in 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(K). While Petitioner's petition for review of the FARO was still pending the DHS issued a notice to appear for separate removal proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1229a based on Petitioner's extended presence in the United States after her visa had expired. The DHS subsequently canceled the FARO. The First Circuit dismissed Petitioner's petition for review, holding that in the wake of the government's purported cancellation of Petitioner's FARO, the cancellation will result in there being no final removal order against Petitioner at the present time. View "Xu v. Garland" on Justia Law

Zarate, a citizen of Mexico, was convicted of violating 42 U.S.C. 408(a)(7)(B) for using a social security card that was not his. An IJ ruled that Zarate was statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal because his conviction under section 408(a)(7)(B) was for a “crime involving moral turpitude” (CIMT), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2); 1229b(b)(1)(c) but otherwise would have granted him that relief. The BIA dismissed his appeal, reasoning that section 408(a)(7)(B) requires intent to deceive.The Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded, noting that the circuits are divided on the issue. While a conviction for a violation of section 408(a)(7)(B) may be a CIMT, the BIA must apply its two-pronged moral turpitude standard and decide whether the statute, under the categorical approach, involves conduct that is “reprehensible,” i.e., conduct that is “inherently base, vile, or depraved, and contrary to the accepted rules of morality and the duties owed between persons or to society in general.” Previous BIA decisions indicate that making a false statement or engaging in general deception is not necessarily the same thing as fraud; non-fraud offenses involving deception are not automatically CIMTs. View "Zarate v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Ferreiras became a lawful permanent resident in 2011. On three separate occasions in 2017, he was convicted of New York petit larceny. Ferreiras was charged as removable as a noncitizen convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMT), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). The IJ found that Ferreiras’s petit larceny convictions were CIMT. The BIA affirmed.The Second Circuit certified to the New York State Court of Appeals the question: Does an intent to "appropriate" property under New York Penal Law 155.00(4)(b) require an intent to deprive the owner of his or her property either permanently or under circumstances where the owner's property rights are substantially eroded?The New York Court of Appeals declined to answer the question. The Second Circuit then denied the petition for review. The court held that, as a matter of New York law, New York petit larceny requires an intent to deprive the owner of his or her property either permanently or under circumstances where the owner’s property rights are substantially eroded and is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude. View "Ferreiras v. Garland" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied in part Petitioner's petition for judicial review and remanded this immigration case to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) for further consideration, holding that remand was required for consideration of an argument Petitioner raised before the BIA but the BIA did not address.The BIA in this case affirmed an immigration judge's (IJ) decision denying Petitioner asylum relief, withholding of removal under Immigration and Nationality Act, protection pursuant to the Convention Against Torture Act, and ordering her removed. Petitioner filed a petition for review. The First Circuit remanded the case, holding (1) because the BIA did not address Petitioner's argument that the record evidence supported Petitioner's membership in a particular social group, that of Salvadoran female small business owners, remand was required for such consideration; and (2) this Court lacked jurisdiction to hear Petitioner's second claim. View "Gomez-Abrego v. Garland" on Justia Law

Ortiz entered the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident but was later found removable for having committed two crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs) not arising out of a single scheme of conduct, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A). Ortiz contended that his conviction for voluntary manslaughter under California Penal Code section 192(a) was not a CIMT.The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review. California defines voluntary manslaughter as the “unlawful killing of a human being without malice . . . upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion.” The California Supreme Court has construed the statute as requiring some form of culpable mental state—an intent to kill or a conscious disregard for life. Applying the categorical approach, the court compared the federal definition of a CIMT, involving either fraud or base, vile, and depraved conduct that shocks the public conscience. The court considered the requisite state of mind as well as the resulting harm in tandem; as the level of conscious behavior decreases (from intentional to reckless conduct), more serious resulting harm is required to find a CIMT. A crime committed only recklessly requires more serious harm to qualify as a CIMT. The court agreed with the BIA that section 192(a) is a CIMT; the statute only requires recklessness, but the harm—the unlawful killing of a human—stands at the apex. View "Narez v. Garland" on Justia Law