Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Chol, a citizen of South Sudan, was born in a refugee camp in Uganda. At age five, he was admitted to the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident. Twelve years later, he was convicted of two counts of robbery and sentenced to seven-15 years. Charged with removability, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony, Chol applied for asylum and withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Chol appeared pro se. The IJ explained that he was ineligible for asylum due to his criminal record, but alerted him that he would be eligible for CAT relief if he could prove that it is more likely than not that he would be tortured by the government (or with its acquiescence) in South Sudan and Uganda.After testimony from Chol, his mother, and a prison official, the IJ determined he was not entitled to CAT relief and ordered removal, finding that it is not more likely than not that Chol would be tortured in South Sudan because he is a member of the governing Dinka tribe, and not a politician, journalist, or humanitarian worker. The BIA dismissed his appeal. The Eighth Circuit denied Choi’s petition for review, rejecting arguments that the IJ erred by failing to fully develop the record about Choi’s tribal faction, provide the State Department’s country reports for South Sudan and Uganda, and tell Choi the definition of “torture” under the CAT. View "Chol v. Garland" on Justia Law

After Mejia-Velasquez entered the United States without inspection, she sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under CAT, claiming that she and other members of her family had been the victims of physical harm due to their membership in a particular Honduran political party, and their affiliation with a family member who was elected mayor of the family’s hometown as a member of that same party. Because Mejia-Velasquez failed to produce biometrics (such as her photograph, fingerprints, and signature) in support of her application, after having been warned of the consequences of failing to do so, the immigration judge deemed her application abandoned pursuant to 8 C.F.R.1003.47(c) and 1208.10 and ordered her removed.The BIA and Fourth Circuit affirmed. Section 1003.47(d) is unambiguous as to the three requirements specified — oral notification, a biometrics notice, and instructions. Mejia-Velasquez actually received a biometrics notice from the IJ at her master calendar hearing. That document, entitled “Fingerprint Warning,” contained all the information that could reasonably be contemplated by the regulation’s requirement of “a biometrics notice.” It warned of the consequences for failing to submit the required information (abandonment) and set a deadline. View "Mejia-Velasquez v. Garland" on Justia Law

This action involved a request for documents under Michigan’s Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Plaintiff, the American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan (the ACLU), submitted a FOIA request to defendant, the Calhoun County Sheriff’s Office (the CCSO), seeking disclosure of all records related to the December 2018 detention of United States citizen Jilmar Benigno Ramos-Gomez. Ramos-Gomez’s three-day detention at the Calhoun County Correctional Facility occurred pursuant to an Intergovernmental Service Agreement (IGSA) executed between United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the jail. The CCSO denied the ACLU’s request, asserting that the requested records were exempt from disclosure under MCL 15.243(1)(d) because they related to an ICE detainee. The issue this case presented for the Michigan Supreme Court's review centered on whether a federal regulation with a nondisclosure component, 8 CFR 236.6 (2021), could be the basis for exempting public records from disclosure under MCL 15.243(1)(d). The Supreme Court held that it could not, "for the simple reason that a regulation is not a statute." The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ holding to the contrary, and the Court overruled Soave v. Dep’t of Ed, and Mich Council of Trout Unlimited v. Dep’t of Military Affairs, as to their erroneous interpretations of MCL 15.243(1)(d). The case was remanded back to the Calhoun Circuit Court for further proceedings. View "American Civil Liberties Union Of Michigan v. Calhoun County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

Tomczyk, a citizen of Canada, was deported in 1990. He reentered in 1991 after he was waved in by an immigration official. More than 25 years later, DHS reinstated his removal order under 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(5), which requires proof that the petitioner is an alien, who was subject to a prior removal order, and who “reentered the United States illegally.”A Ninth Circuit panel previously granted Tomczyk’s petition for review. The en banc court subsequently dismissed that petition. DHS did not err in reinstating Tomczyk’s removal order. The statute does not define “reentered the United States illegally” but under the ordinary meaning of “illegal,” a noncitizen reenters “illegally” when the noncitizen is forbidden by law from gaining admission into the country. Tomczyk had been deported under a drug-related ground of inadmissibility and had not obtained a waiver of inadmissibility. Nor did Tomczyk's manner of reentry result in waiver; his reentry while inadmissible was illegal as a matter of law. Rejecting an estoppel argument, the court noted there was no indication of government misconduct. The court rejected Tomczyk's argument that section 1231(a)(5) could not be applied retroactively against him. Tomczyk had no pending application when the law came into effect; merely being eligible to apply for relief in the future was insufficient. Tomczyk failed to allege a gross miscarriage of justice that might permit review of his underlying order and failed to previously exhaust such arguments. View "Tomczyk v. Garland" on Justia Law

Iredia was admitted to the U.S. in 1997 on a tourist visa, which he overstayed. Later, he was granted advance parole, left the U.S., returned in 2006, and was paroled into the country. The parole was valid until 2007. Iredia overstayed the parole and, in 2011, was charged as inadmissible, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I)). An IJ held ordered him removed. Iredia argued that he should have been charged as removable, not inadmissible. He claimed that when he was served with the Notice to Appear, he already had been admitted on a tourist visa, and the visa’s expiration did not affect the fact of his admission. Iredia argued that advance parole did not change his immigration status.The BIA dismissed his appeal. The Third Circuit denied a petition for review. Because Iredia was paroled into the U.S. in 2006, he is considered an arriving alien regardless of his previous admission. The statute permits parole for “any alien applying for admission” and no other category of alien; when parole ends, the alien’s case is “dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission.” The term “arriving alien: encompasses not only aliens who are actually at the border, but also aliens who are paroled after their arrival. View "Iredia v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

The noncitizens, victims of grave crimes, cooperated with law enforcement. They applied for U-visas, 8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(1), 1101(a)(15)(U), and authorization to work; two sought derivative U-visas and work authorization for family members. They have waited years for USCIS to adjudicate their applications and remain unable to obtain lawful employment, to visit family members who live abroad, or to attain deferred-action status to protect them from removal. They filed suit. While an appeal was pending, USCIS announced a new program for persons with pending U-visa applications: the “Bona Fide Determination Process,” (BFDP).The Sixth Circuit held that the BFDP did not moot any part of the case. Federal courts are not precluded from reviewing claims that USCIS unreasonably delayed placing principal petitioners on the U-visa waitlist. USCIS is required by 8 U.S.C. 1184(p)(6) and the BFDP to decide whether a U-visa application is “bona fide” before the agency can decide whether principal petitioners and qualifying family members may receive Bona Fide Determination Employment Authorization Documents, so 5 U.S.C. 706(1) permits the federal courts to hasten an unduly delayed determination.The court subsequently held that the plaintiffs pleaded sufficient facts that the delayed waitlist determinations have harmed their health and welfare. Plaintiffs should be permitted to amend their complaints should they wish to challenge any delayed “bona fide” determinations. View "Garcia v. United States Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

Tzompantzi-Salazar unsuccessfully sought to reopen his removal proceedings arguing that his Notice to Appear (NTA) did not include the time and date of his hearing. The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review.Tzompantzi-Salazar’s current proceeding was initiated with a different charging document, a Notice of Referral to Immigration Judge, so the Supreme Court’s “Pereira” holding is inapplicable. When hearing details are later provided, as they were here, there is no jurisdictional defect.Substantial evidence supported the Board’s denial of Convention Against Torture (CAT) relief. Tzompantzi-Salazar could avoid any risk of future torture by relocating to his home state in central Mexico, Tlaxcala—thousands of miles from the border where his two kidnappings allegedly occurred. For CAT applications, the agency must consider the possibility of relocation without regard for the reasonableness of relocation that is considered in other types of applications. The remaining CAT factors did not change the result. Although past torture can be relevant in assessing an applicant’s risk of future torture, CAT relief is “forward-looking.” Tzompantzi-Salazar’s previous kidnappings, even assuming they occurred as described, do not establish that he continues to face a risk of torture more than 10 years later. Nor did the record compel the conclusion that the kidnappings rose to the level of torture. Country conditions evidence and context also undercut Tzompantzi-Salazar’s belief that he faces the extremely high threshold of future torture. View "Tzompantzi-Salazar v. Garland" on Justia Law

Ruiz-Colmenares, a Mexican citizen, has illegally entered the U.S. multiple times, wherein he was convicted for multiple felonies. He has been deported three times. During his fourth deportation, Ruiz-Colmenares expressed for the first time a fear of returning to Mexico and that he had been robbed and assaulted by police officers in Mexico. After finding Ruiz-Colmenares not credible, an IJ rejected his claim for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The BIA affirmed.The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review, rejecting an argument that the agency lacked jurisdiction because his charging document omitted the time and date of his hearing, That argument was not presented before the IJ or BIA. The adverse credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence, based on inconsistencies and omissions in Ruiz-Colmenares’s written, verbal, and documentary evidence regarding what happened in Mexico. Even minor inconsistencies that have a bearing on a petitioner’s veracity may constitute the basis for an adverse credibility determination; “this type of evolving story is precisely what one would expect if a petitioner is fabricating or embellishing past harms.” The agency properly considered Ruiz-Colmenares’ failure to mention fear of returning to Mexico, or the robberies, during previous deportation proceedings. Even if the record compelled reversal of the adverse credibility determination, substantial evidence supports the finding that Ruiz-Colmenares did not suffer past torture and does not face a particularized risk of future torture if returned to Mexico. View "Ruiz-Colmenares v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit denied the petition for review of an order of the BIA upholding the denial of his motion to reopen proceedings and to rescind an order of removal entered in absentia. The court concluded that the agency reasonably concluded that petitioner's explanations left "too many questions" unanswered, and that he failed to overcome the presumption that mail sent to his address in Lincoln was delivered and received. Therefore, the agency did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion to reopen proceedings and to rescind the removal order entered in petitioner's absence. View "Hesso v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit granted the petition for review and vacated the agency's denial of petitioner's claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) because those determinations were permeated with several legal and procedural errors.Insofar as petitioner's request for asylum was rejected as untimely, the court concluded that the agency applied the wrong legal standard to his claim of changed circumstances and the agency's alternative discretionary determination failed to indicate the requisite examination of the totality of the circumstances. In regard to petitioner's application for withholding of removal, the court concluded that the agency erred when it incorrectly categorized his federal conviction for wire fraud and identity theft as "crimes against persons," and concluded that they fell within the ambit of "particularly serious crimes" without evaluating the elements of the offenses as required under the agency's own precedent. Finally, in regard to petitioner's CAT claim, the court concluded that the agency erred in determining that petitioner lacked a reasonable fear of future persecution or torture in Nigeria due to his status as a criminal deportee without even addressing the declaration of his expert supporting his claim. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Ojo v. Garland" on Justia Law