Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit denied a petition for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) that affirmed the denial of Appellant's application for adjustment of status on statutory and federal constitutional grounds, holding that there was no error.Appellant conceded removability but sought to remain in the country by applying for adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. 1255(a). An immigration judge denied Appellant's application for adjustment of status, concluding that Appellant had not met his burden of showing that he merited a favorable exercise of discretion. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The First Circuit denied Appellant's petition for review, holding that Appellant's claims on appeal were without merit. View "Thomas v. Garland" on Justia Law

The First Circuit granted in part and denied in part Appellant's petition for review of the judgment of the board of immigration appeals (BIA) finding that Appellant was ineligible for asylum and denying her application for withholding of removal, holding that Appellant's application for withholding of removal should be remanded.Appellant, a native of Guatemala, applied for relief that included asylum and withholding of removal. The immigration judge (IJ) and the BIA denied relief. On appeal, the government conceded that Appellant's application for withholding of removal should be remanded due to the failure of the IJ and BIA to consider relevant aspects of Appellant's claims of past persecution. The First Circuit (1) vacated the denial of Appellant's application for withholding from removal, holding that the IJ and BIA erred by failing to consider certain evidence and by failing to provide her with an opportunity to explain why she could not provide certain corroborating evidence in connection with her request for withholding; and (2) held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the denial of Appellant's request for asylum. View "Ixcuna-Garcia v. Garland" on Justia Law

Singh, a citizen of India, entered the U.S. without inspection. DHS served him with a Notice to Appear that did not provide a date or time for Singh’s removal hearing, instead stating that the date and time were “TBD.” DHS released Singh after he posted a bond. Singh then traveled to Indiana to live with a friend but provided the immigration court with the address of the friend’s other residence because it was the more reliable mailing address. The immigration court sent multiple hearing notices to the address, but his friend did not promptly forward them to Singh. An IJ ordered him removed in absentia.The Ninth Circuit granted Singh’s petition for review. Noncitizens must receive a Notice to Appear in a single document specifying the time and date of the noncitizen’s removal proceedings, otherwise, any in absentia removal order directed at the noncitizen is subject to rescission. 8 U.S.C. 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii). The omission of the time or date of a removal hearing cannot be cured by a subsequent hearing notice; such an interpretation would contravene the unambiguous statutory text and the Supreme Court’s 2021 "Niz-Chavez" decision. The government must provide all statutorily required information in a single Notice to Appear, not only to trigger the stop-time rule but for all removal proceedings that require notice pursuant to section 1229(a). View "Singh v. Garland" on Justia Law

He, a 28-year-old native of China, entered the U.S. in 2012 without inspection. He applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture, claiming past persecution and well-founded fear of future persecution and torture in China because of his Christian faith. An Immigration Judge denied relief. The IJ found his testimony credible but noted that He did not know the denomination of the faith that was practiced during the two gatherings he attended and had never heard of anyone getting in trouble for attending a Christian government-authorized church. The IJ found that the evidence of the harm He described during two detentions, including an assault by police, does not rise to the level of persecution contemplated by the” Act. He failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution, presenting no evidence that "anyone associated with the Chinese government is looking for him, or that he would be harmed or persecuted . . . if he practices his Christian religion in China.”The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review. Substantial evidence supported the finding that HE failed to establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of his religious beliefs. He failed to establish eligibility for asylum and necessarily cannot meet the more rigorous standard for proof of withholding of removal. View "He v. Garland" on Justia Law

In 2019, the Fifth Circuit affirmed Fuentes-Rodriguez’s sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to illegal reentry into the U.S. following deportation and having been previously convicted of an aggravated felony. The court held that his prior Texas conviction qualified as a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16. While his petition was pending, the Supreme Court decided in "Borden" that a crime capable of commission with “a less culpable mental state than purpose or knowledge,” such as “recklessness,” cannot qualify as a “violent felony” under 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(I), the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA).On remand from the Supreme Court, the Fifth Circuit vacated. Fuentes-Rodriguez’s underlying Texas conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony only through 18 U.S.C. 16(a), which defines a “crime of violence” almost identically to the ACCA’s “violent felony” provision at issue in Borden. Fuentes-Rodriguez should not have been sentenced under 8 U.S.C. 1326(b)(2) because Texas’s family-violence assault can be committed recklessly. His conviction falls within 8 U.S.C. 1326(b)(1), which covers illegal reentry after conviction for a non-aggravated felony. The district court’s judgment should be reformed because section 1326(b)(2) is associated with worse collateral consequences than section 1326(b)(1). Remanding the case for entry of an amended judgment, reflecting that Fuentes-Rodriguez was convicted and sentenced under 8 U.S.C. 1326(b)(1) as an “Alien Unlawfully Found in the United States after Deportation, Having Previously Been Convicted of a Felony,” will reduce the risk of future confusion. View "United States v. Fuentes-Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Tomas-Ramos, a citizen of Guatemala, reentered the U.S. illegally in 2018. A removal order previously entered against him was reinstated. Tomas-Ramos expressed a fear of returning to Guatemala because gang members had threatened to kill him for resisting their recruitment of his son. An asylum officer conducted a screening interview and determined that Tomas-Ramos failed to establish a reasonable fear of harm and was not entitled to relief from his reinstated removal order. The asylum officer recognized that Tomas-Ramos might have been threatened because of his relationship to his son but held that immediate family is not a qualifying “particular social group” under 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3)(A) because it “lacks social distinction.” An IJ agreed.The Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded. The primary ground for the IJ’s decision was an erroneous conclusion that there was no “nexus” between the harm Tomas-Ramos faced and a protected ground. The record compels the conclusion that Tomas-Ramos was persecuted on account of a protected ground, in the form of his family ties. The IJ’s finding that “[Tomas-Ramos] can relocate” is not an independent ground for affirmance, because that finding is called into question by the determination that Tomas-Ramos has established past persecution. View "Tomas-Ramos v. Garland" on Justia Law

Chamu, born in Mexico, entered the U.S. without inspection in 1990. In 2003, he was pleaded guilty to cocaine possession under Florida law; 14 years later, in removal proceedings, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(I), Chamu applied for cancellation of removal, alleging that his mother and children would suffer exceptional hardship.Cancellation is unavailable for those who have been convicted of a state offense “relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of title 21)” of the U.S. Code, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1)(C), 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). Section 802 defines “controlled substance” as any substance included in federal controlled substance schedules. Chamu unsuccessfully sought to have his Florida cocaine possession conviction vacated, then argued that the Florida statute was too broad to bar his cancellation request. The IJ and BIA rejected his argument, reasoning that Chamu had not shown a realistic probability that the Florida statute would be enforced more broadly than the federal statutes. The Eleventh Circuit agreed. Florida’s definition of cocaine may not be completely consistent with the federal definition but Chamu failed to prove that it covers more substances. No illicit-nature mens rea is necessary to trigger removal consequences for offenses listed under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) and 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). View "Chamu v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

DHS placed Robles in removal proceedings following his arrest for injuring a pedestrian while driving under the influence. Urrutia applied for cancellation of removal, 8 U.S.C. 1229b. An IJ found that Urrutia satisfied the four eligibility requirements, concluded that Urrutia’s “significant negative factors” were outweighed by positive factors, and granted relief. Reviewing that discretionary determination de novo, the BIA denied cancellation of removal, ordered Urrutia removed to Mexico, then denied his timely motion to reopen proceedings. In 2019, the Eighth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to overturn the initial discretionary decision and that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Urrutia’s motion to reopen.Urrutia filed a second motion to reopen, citing newly-discovered evidence and his due diligence and extraordinary circumstances as “compelling statutory tolling of the time and number limits on motions to reopen. The BIA denied that motion, stating “[w]e balanced the respondent’s equities and negative factors" concluding that he did not warrant discretionary relief, given his repeated DUI offenses and that “supplemental evidence is not likely to change the outcome of the proceedings.” The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review. Motions to reopen removal proceedings are disfavored because there is a “strong public interest” in finality. View "Robles v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit concluded that the USCIS did not act arbitrarily when it determined that plaintiff was not eligible for an extraordinary ability visa and affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of the government. The court first determined that it had jurisdiction despite plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies. In regard to plaintiff's challenges to the framework the USCIS used to evaluate his application, the court concluded that the regulation does not say that meeting the regulatory criteria presumptively qualifies an applicant for a visa. Furthermore, the Policy Memo is valid without notice and comment where the Policy Memo does not create legal rights or obligations.In regard to plaintiff's substantive challenge, the court concluded that the USCIS did not act arbitrarily at both steps of its analysis because the agency considered plaintiff's evidence and explained why it does not meet the regulatory standard. In this case, the USCIS considered plaintiff's evidence and credited his accomplishments but determined that he did not meet his burden of proving that his designs were of "major significance" to his field. Finally, the agency properly considered plaintiff's accomplishments but found them insufficient. The court stated that its determination reflects the reasoned consideration the Administrative Procedure Act requires. View "Amin v. Mayorkas" on Justia Law

Dai, a Chinese citizen, was admitted to the U.S. on a student visa in 2010. She later applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) on the basis of religious persecution. Following a merits hearing, an immigration judge denied relief, finding that Dai was not credible and that her evidence failed to establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. The BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review, finding the decision supported by substantial evidence. Dai acknowledged discrepancies in her testimony concerning how long she had been practicing her faith and her encounters with the police; she did not provide corroborative evidence. View "Dai v. Garland" on Justia Law