Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Ford, a Haitian national, became involved in Haitian national politics by joining PPD in 2012; he believed the ruling political party, PHTK, was corrupt and involved in human rights abuses. Ford received anonymous threatening telephone calls; in 2014, armed men encircled Ford’s home, shot into it, and burned it down. Ford reported the attack to Haitian authorities and fled Haiti. The United States began removal proceedings.Ford hired an attorney, who submitted a Form I-589 application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. Ford and the attorney subsequently had little contact. Ford stated the attorney “never prepared me for my final hearing.” The attorney provided scant documentary evidence to support Ford’s application and did not submit any documents about the PPD. The IJ denied relief, finding that Ford was credible but had “submitted no objective evidence” to help meet his burden in proving that he was harassed or persecuted on account of his political opinion or that Ford’s fear of persecution upon his return to Haiti was reasonable. Ford retained new counsel. The BIA affirmed and denied a motion to reopen Ford’s case based on ineffective assistance.The Third Circuit vacated. Ford presents a meritorious ineffective-assistance claim; his lawyer failed to present important and easily available evidence going to the heart of Ford’s claims. View "Saint Ford v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

A mother and daughter from El Salvador were ordered removed. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. Mother and daughter retained counsel and filed a petition for review in the Fifth Circuit. As a result of personal issues and the challenges presented by the COVID-19 pandemic, counsel requested three extensions to file an opening brief. Upon the final due date, instead of filing an opening brief, counsel filed a motion asking the court to dismiss the petition for the mother, but remand it for the daughter. Evidently, the mother had died and the daughter was now proceeding as a minor orphan.The Fifth Circuit denied the petition. First, counsel provided no legal arguments for the relief he sought on behalf of his clients. Second, the court was not provided with the relevant standard to apply to the voluntary withdrawal of a petition for review. Finally, the court noted that counsel provided no explanation as to why giving up on daughter's petition for review was in her best interest and that, in the court's assessment, doing so would be manifestly unjust. View "Vasquez-De Martinez v. Garland" on Justia Law

Patel, who entered the United States illegally in the 1990s, applied for adjustment of status, 8 U.S.C. 1255. Because Patel had previously checked a box on a Georgia driver’s license application falsely stating that he was a U.S. citizen, USCIS denied the application. Section 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) renders inadmissible a noncitizen who falsely represents himself to be a citizen for any legal benefit. In removal proceedings based on his illegal entry, Patel renewed his adjustment of status request, arguing that he had mistakenly checked the “citizen” box and lacked the subjective intent necessary to violate the federal statute.The BIA dismissed Patel’s appeal from a subsequent removal order. The Eleventh Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Patel’s claim. Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) prohibits judicial review of “any judgment regarding the granting of relief” under 1255, except “constitutional claims” or “questions of law.” The court concluded that the determinations of whether Patel had testified credibly and of subjective intent each qualified as an unreviewable judgment.The Supreme Court affirmed. Federal courts lack jurisdiction to review facts found as part of discretionary-relief proceedings under section 1255 and the other provisions enumerated in section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). This case largely turns on the scope of the word “judgment." A “judgment” does not necessarily involve discretion, nor does context indicate that only discretionary judgments are covered by section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). Using the word "judgment" to describe the fact determinations at issue here "is perfectly natural.” The Court rejected arguments that the statute is ambiguous enough to trigger the presumption that Congress did not intend to foreclose judicial review. View "Patel v. Garland" on Justia Law

In 2004, Petitioner was ordered removed in absentia; however, he continued to reside in the United States. In 2019, Petitioner filed a motion to reopen under 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(III), which extends the amount of time a Petitioner who is a "battered spouse" can file a motion to reopen. The Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") denied Petitioner's motion to reopen, refusing to waive the one-year filing deadline that applied to battered spouses. The BIA determined that the abuse Petitioner suffered did not qualify as an "extraordinary circumstance" and that the hardship Petitioner or his children would not suffer "extreme hardship" if removed.The Fifth Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review, finding that the BIA did not abuse its discretion. Extraordinary circumstances or extreme hardship requires proof of something beyond ordinary circumstances or mere hardship, and something more than the typical challenges associated with relocation. View "Pena-Lopez v. Garland" on Justia Law

8 U.S.C. Section 1226(a) permits the Attorney General to detain aliens pending their removal hearings. The Attorney General has adopted procedures for making that discretionary decision. Under those procedures, an alien is given notice and three opportunities to seek release by showing they are neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community. A district court determined that a class of aliens had a likelihood of establishing that those procedures violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. That court then issued a preliminary injunction ordering that to continue detaining an alien under 1226(a), the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that an alien is either a flight risk or a danger to the community. The district court also required immigration judges to consider an alien’s ability to pay any bond imposed and consider alternatives to detention.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s preliminary injunction order and held that under 8 U.S.C. Section 1252(f)(1), the district court lacked jurisdiction to issue class-wide injunctive relief that enjoined or restrained the process used to conduct Section 1226(a) bond hearings. Further, the court held that as for the individual relief issued by the district court, the detention procedures adopted for 1226(a) bond hearings provide sufficient process to satisfy constitutional requirements. Thus, the aliens are unable to establish a likelihood of success on their due process claims. Nor have they shown that they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief. View "Marvin Miranda v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

The Transgender Law Center (collectively “TLC”), acting on behalf of the family and estate of an asylum-seeker, submitted two FOIA requests. The first FOIA request was directed to the U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), and the second was directed to the Department of Homeland Security Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties. TLC filed suit in district court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court granted TLC’s request for declaratory judgment holding that the agencies had failed to timely respond to their FOIA requests, but ruled for the agencies in all other respects.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s partial summary judgment; vacated the district court’s mootness determination; and remanded. The court held that the government’s belated disclosure was not “adequate” under FOIA. The court reasoned that the Government failed to carry its burden because the agencies did not appropriately respond to positive indications of overlooked materials provided by TLC and did not hew to their duty to follow obvious leads.The court further held that the agencies’ Vaughn indices were filled with boilerplate or conclusory statements; and this high-level, summary approach resulted in an unacceptable lack of specificity and tailoring that undermined TLC’s ability to contest the agencies’ withholdings. The court also held that the Government failed to come forward with clear, precise, and easily reviewable explanations for why the information was not segregable. View "TRANSGENDER LAW CENTER V. ICE" on Justia Law

Petitioner was ordered removed and sought relief under the Convention Against Torture. Petitioner claimed he had a well-founded fear of persecution based on his membership in two social groups, his father’s immediate family and “young Guatemalan men who refuse to cooperate with gang members.” The Immigration Judge denied Petitioner relief and the Board of Immigration Appeals.The Eighth Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for relief. Petitioner's main claim was that the group his father belonged to which subjected him to likely persecution was not a "cognizable social group" at the time the Immigration Judge and Board of Immigration Appeals issued their opinions. However, subsequently, the group gained recognition.The Eighth Circuit determined that, notwithstanding any issues related to the group's recognition, Petitioner's application failed because he failed to establish a nexus between the persecution he allegedly suffered and either of his proposed social groups. Additionally, substantial evidence supports the determination that TojinPetitioner did not suffer past persecution. View "Diego Tojin-Tiu v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner petitioned the Eleventh Circuit for review of his Final Administrative Removal Order and adverse reasonable fear determination, which were issued during his expedited removal proceedings as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act.   Petitioner contended that he was substantially prejudiced by his lack of counsel at the hearing before the immigration judge in his reasonable fear proceedings. He also argued that he was denied a “full and fair hearing” before the immigration judge because the judge failed to provide an adequate explanation of the procedures.   The Eleventh Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review and held that Petitioner’s due process rights were not violated during his expedited removal proceedings. The court concluded that the immigration judge reasonably found that Petitioner’s assertions failed to establish his torture claim and the record does not compel a contrary finding. The court further concluded that substantial evidence supports the asylum officer’s and immigration judge’s negative reasonable fear determination on Petitioner’s claim for CAT relief.   The court reasoned that under the substantial prejudice standard, the petitioner “must demonstrate that, in the absence of the alleged violations, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.”  Petitioner failed to identify how he would have presented his case differently before the immigration judge.  Further, while Petitioner testified that some individuals threatening him were Haitian public officials, he did not offer any examples to show that those officials were threatening him in their official capacities or under the color of law. View "Emmanuel Priva v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought review of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) final order affirming the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of his application for asylum on account of racial persecution. Petitioner had applied for asylum under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) Section 208(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. Section 1158(b)(1), withholding of removal under INA Section 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. Section 1231(b)(3), and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), 8 C.F.R. Section 208.16(c). On appeal, Petitioner argued that (1) the BIA failed to provide reasoned consideration on his request for asylum relief based on racial persecution, having adopted in large part the IJ’s determination making the same mistake, and (2) the IJ should have permitted him advance notice of the need for specific corroborating evidence to meet his burden of proof and an automatic continuance to provide that evidence after determining that his testimony was credible because 8 U.S.C. Section 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) requires it.   The Eleventh Circuit denied Petitioner’s request to review the BIA's final order. The court held that the BIA’s decision makes clear that it provided reasoned consideration to Petitioner’s racial claim. The court reasoned that a review of the decision shows that the BIA did not misstate the contents of the record, fail to adequately explain its rejection of logical conclusions, or provide an unreasonable justification for its decision, which, when present, would tend to suggest a failure to provide reasoned consideration. The court dismissed the rest of the petition finding that Petitioner failed to exhaust his second claim. View "Sergio Elias Lopez Morales v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a group of blood plasma companies, challenged a U.S. Customs and Border Protection ("CBP") rule precluding aliens from entering the U.S. using B-1 business visitor visas to sell plasma. Plaintiffs claimed that they invested substantial resources to develop plasma collection facilities near the border and that the CPB rule failed to take Plaintiffs' interests into account when creating the new rule.The district court denied Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that the Plaintiffs' interests were not within the Administrative Procedure Act's "zone of interests." The district court, determining the zone-of-interest determination was jurisdictional, dismissed the complaint.The D.C. Circuit reversed. For the Plaintiffs to sue under the APA, they must have been “adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute." However, the zone-of-interests determination is a merits issue, not a jurisdictional one. From there, the D.C. Circuit considered the merits, finding that the Plainitffs' case interests should have been considered under the B-1 analysis. Thus, the court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "CSL Plasma Inc. v. United States Customs and Border Protection" on Justia Law