Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the declaratory judgment and permanent injunction issued by the district court in this class action challenging the bond procedures used to detain noncitizen during the pendency of removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. 1226(a), the discretionary immigration detention provision, holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to issue injunctive relief in favor of the class.Specifically, the First Circuit held (1) the district court did not err in declaring that noncitizens "detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1226(a) are entitled to receive a bond hearing at which the government must prove the alien is either dangerous by clear and convincing evidence or a risk of flight by a preponderance of the evidence"; (2) the classwide injunction in this case unlawfully enjoined or restrained the operation of section 1226(a); and (3) the remaining portion of the district court's declaration was advisory. View "Pereira Brito v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit granted the petition for review of the BIA's decision agreeing with the IJ that petitioner's convictions were crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs) and that she was not entitled to cancellation of removal. The panel concluded that petitioner's convictions are not CIMTs and therefore she was not removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).In 2010, petitioner was convicted of solicitation to possess for sale less than two pounds of marijuana, in violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-1002 (solicitation), 13-3405(A)(2) (possession for sale), and (B)(4) (less than two pounds). Shortly thereafter, petitioner was convicted of offering to transport less than two pounds of marijuana for sale, in violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-3405(A)(4) (offer to transport) and (B)(10) (less than two pounds). The panel concluded that Arizona Revised Statutes 13-3405(A)(4), which prohibits certain conduct relating to marijuana, is overbroad and divisible; petitioner's section 13-3505(A) convictions, which involved categories in the statute involving the smallest quantity of marijuana, were not CIMTs; and petitioner was therefore not removable. View "Walcott v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision dismissing petitioner's appeal of the IJ's order pretermitting his application for cancellation. The BIA held that petitioner failed to establish that he had not been convicted of offenses with an aggregate sentence of at least 5 years.The panel concluded that the phrase "an offense" in 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1)(C) includes the multiple criminal convictions described in 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(B) that render an alien inadmissible. The panel rejected petitioner's contention that because the statutory disqualification is phrased in the singular, his multiple offenses do not trigger ineligibility. The panel also rejected petitioner's contention that the BIA erred in finding that his multiple convictions resulted in aggregated sentences of at least five years because the agency relied on the 2013 judgment, a record not clearly related to petitioner. Rather, substantial evidence supports the agency's determination that petitioner did not satisfy his burden to show that he had not been convicted of the qualifying offenses. View "Ramirez-Medina v. Garland" on Justia Law

Nsimba was born in the Congo in 1992. His wife and his children still live there. In 2011, Nsimba joined the largest political party, UDPS, which opposed the policies of then-President Kabila. When it became apparent that the head of UDPS, Tshisekedi, and Kabila were conspiring to ensure that Tshisekedi would succeed Kabila in the 2018 elections, Nsimba left UDPS. He and Fabrice co-founded Liberté Congolaise to oppose Kabila. Nsimba also actively participated in political demonstrations opposing Kabila and Tshisekedi. Tshisekedi became president. In 2019, Nsimba was targeted for his protest activities. Fabrice disappeared after being arrested. Days later, police forcibly entered Nsimba’s home and informed Nsimba’s family that they intended to arrest him. Nsimba escaped and hid in his aunt’s home, 385 miles away. The National Criminal Police issued ordered him to appear on a certain date. Nsimba fled to the United States, by exploiting personal contacts and bribes.The Third Circuit vacated the BIA ruling upholding the denial of Nsimba’s petition for asylum, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(42)(A), 1158(b)(1)(B). The Congo has a history and practice, of persecuting political objectors; Nsimba faced an individualized risk of persecution. Nsimba credibly testified that when fleeing the country, a government official told him never to return. “There is simply no way that the fair and objective reading of this record that the law requires can support a conclusion that Nsimba has not established that his fear of returning ... was objectively reasonable.” View "Nsimba v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review, concluding that the BIA sufficiently considered the evidence relevant to petitioner's claim of future torture and announced its decision in terms sufficient to enable a reviewing court to perceive that it has heard and thought and not merely reacted to petitioner's claims. The panel explained that this is all that is required; the agency need not provide a detailed explanation of every argument or piece of evidence in its decision. The panel also concluded that petitioner's due process claim fails for lack of prejudice because substantial evidence supports the BIA's rejection of his Convention Against Torture claim, irrespective of any testimonial inconsistencies. View "Rodriguez-Jimenez v. Garland" on Justia Law

Yasin, a citizen of Pakistan, last entered the United States more than 20 years ago. In 2002, he became subject to a final BIA removal order but continued residing in the U.S. In 2017, he and his U.S.-citizen wife had a U.S.-citizen daughter. Yasin’s daughter requires regular medical treatment to address gross developmental delays. Seven months after his daughter’s birth, Yasin filed an I-360, Petition for Amerasian, Widow(er), or Special Immigrant, requesting classification “as the abused spouse of a United States citizen” under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). His I-360 self-petition was approved over two years later.Yasin then moved to reopen sua sponte his removal proceedings on the ground that reopening was warranted to address his classification as an abused spouse under VAWA. The BIA denied his motion, refusing to grant Yasin a waiver of the one-year limitations period, 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(III), applicable to VAWA-based motions to reopen. The Third Circuit denied a petition for review. Because the BIA’s decision whether to waive the limitations period is an exercise of discretion committed by statute to the Attorney General, the court applied 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)’s jurisdiction-stripping provision and held that it lacked jurisdiction to review Yasin’s motion. View "Yasin v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the conditions of petitioner's supervision program render her "in custody" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 2241, such that the district court had jurisdiction to consider her habeas petition. The court also concluded that petitioner did not validly self-execute the 1995 deportation order when, shortly before it was entered, she voluntarily left the United States. Whether the court resolved 8 U.S.C. 1101(g)'s ambiguity through the principle of lenity or through Chevron deference, the court reached the same conclusion: Section 1101(g)'s two conditions operate successively. In this case, petitioner left the Untied States before she was ordered removed and thus she was not "deported or removed" within the meaning of Section 1101(g). Accordingly, the government may lawfully deport her under the still-operative 1995 order. View "Argueta Romero v. Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit denied a petition for review challenging the BIA's decision affirming the denial of petitioner's applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). While the court has misgivings about the IJ's reliance on inter-proceeding evidence under Matter of R-K-K-, 26 I&N Dec. 658 (BIA 2015), the court concluded that the judge's credibility findings were otherwise supported by substantial evidence and that petitioner's due process claims based on the IJ's alleged bias lacked merit. The court further concluded that the BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying petitioner's motion to remand to consider new evidence. View "Singh v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit denied the petition for review of the BIA's decision upholding the IJ's denial of petitioner's application for cancellation of removal. Petitioner testified regarding his daughter's suicide attempt and cited it as evidence that his removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to her.The court concluded that the BIA did not misapply the standard for exceptional and extremely unusual hardship by focusing on the daughter's current conditions. The court explained that the BIA's future-oriented analysis shows that the BIA applied the correct legal standard. Furthermore, the court lacks jurisdiction to review the IJ's findings. In this case, the cause of the daughter's declining mental health is a factual matter involving credibility assessments—precisely the sort of discretionary, fact-finding exercise that Congress has shielded from judicial review in cancellation disputes. The court also concluded that the BIA's decision not to address the IJ's misstatement about petitioner's eligibility for reentry is also outside the court's jurisdiction. View "Garcia-Ortiz v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought review of the BIA's decisions affirming the IJ's decision to allow petitioner to withdraw his application for admission to the United States, denying his motion to reopen, and affirming the IJ's finding that he was inadmissible. Petitioner, a Polish citizen, was a lawful permanent resident (LPR) of the United States, but he effectively abandoned his LPR status and was inadmissible after he stayed overseas too long to take care of his ailing grandfather.The Second Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review both the agency's decision to allow petitioner to withdraw his application and to deny his motion to reopen. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petitions insofar as they challenge those decisions. However, the court concluded that its jurisdiction to review the IJ's inadmissibility finding depends on whether that finding survives the withdrawal of petitioner's application for admission and therefore qualifies as a final order of removal, and this appears to be a question of first impression in this circuit that also has not been resolved by the agency. Therefore, the court granted the petition for review in 19-3001 in part and remanded for the BIA to clarify what, if any preclusive effect the IJ's inadmissibility finding, affirmed by the Board, would be given in subsequent immigration proceedings. View "Juras v. Garland" on Justia Law