Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

This case involves a dispute over jurisdiction in a divorce proceeding between Maria Del Carmen Rendon Quijada and Julian Javier Pimienta Dominguez. The couple, originally from Mexico, moved to the U.S. in 2007. Pimienta held a TN visa, allowing him to work temporarily in the U.S., while Rendon held a TD visa, reserved for spouses and minor children of TN visa holders. Rendon's TD visa expired in March 2020, and she began seeking lawful permanent resident status in December 2020. In May 2022, Rendon filed for divorce in Arizona. Pimienta argued that Rendon could not establish domicile in Arizona due to her expired TD visa, which precludes her from intending to remain in the state indefinitely. The trial court agreed and dismissed the case.The court of appeals reversed the decision, holding that Rendon's TD visa did not prevent her from establishing a U.S. domicile, as she had begun seeking lawful permanent resident status. The court concluded that federal immigration law did not preempt Arizona jurisdiction over the dissolution proceeding.The Supreme Court of Arizona disagreed with the lower courts' focus on federal immigration law. It held that the question was not whether federal immigration law divested Arizona courts of jurisdiction over a divorce sought by an expired TD visa holder, but whether the visa holder could meet the domicile requirements under Arizona law. The court concluded that federal immigration law did not prevent Rendon from establishing domicile in Arizona, and thus, the state courts had jurisdiction over the divorce proceeding. The court vacated the court of appeals' opinion, reversed the trial court's decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF QUIJADA/DOMINGUEZ" on Justia Law

The petitioner, Virginia Garcia Cortes, a Mexican citizen, sought review of a Board of Immigration Appeals decision affirming an Immigration Judge's denial of her application for cancellation of removal. The Immigration Judge and Board of Immigration Appeals denied Garcia Cortes’s application on the basis that she failed to make the requisite showing under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) that her removal would impose “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” on her daughter.The Immigration Judge found that Garcia Cortes satisfied the first three statutory eligibility requirements for cancellation of removal. However, he rejected Garcia Cortes’s request after concluding that she could not satisfy the fourth statutory requirement—whether her removal would impose “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” on a family member who was an American citizen or lawful permanent resident. The Immigration Judge ordered that Garcia Cortes either voluntarily leave the country or be removed. Garcia Cortes appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“the Board”). A divided three-member panel of the Board adopted and affirmed the Immigration Judge’s decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded that the facts as found by the Immigration Judge do not support a determination that Garcia Cortes’s daughter would suffer exceptional and extremely unusual hardship if Garcia Cortes was removed. However, because the Immigration Judge failed to consider key portions of a therapist’s letter that was central to Garcia Cortes’s argument, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Garcia Cortes v. Garland" on Justia Law

The case involves Leopoldo Rivera-Valdes, a Mexican citizen who unlawfully entered the United States in 1992. In 1994, Rivera-Valdes failed to appear at his deportation hearing and was ordered deported in absentia. He was finally deported in 2006 after being apprehended. After being deported, Rivera-Valdes again unlawfully entered the United States. In 2019, he was charged with illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. He challenged the indictment, alleging that his 1994 in absentia deportation order violated due process. The district court denied the motion, and Rivera-Valdes entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving the right to appeal the constitutional challenge to his deportation.The district court denied Rivera-Valdes's motion to dismiss the indictment, ruling that his 1994 in absentia deportation order did not violate due process. Rivera-Valdes had argued that immigration authorities violated his due process rights by ordering him deported in absentia despite the notice of the deportation hearing being returned as undeliverable or unclaimed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the deportation in absentia did not violate due process. The court found that whether Rivera-Valdes actually received the notice, the government followed its statutory obligations and reasonably attempted to inform him of the hearing by mailing notice to his last (and only) provided address. The court rejected Rivera-Valdes's argument that additional steps to notify him of his deportation hearing were required under Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2006). The court concluded that even if Jones's "additional reasonable steps" standard did supersede the constitutional adequacy of notice as recognized in this court’s cases, the government still satisfied due process because no additional reasonable steps existed that were practicable for it to take. View "USA V. RIVERA-VALDES" on Justia Law

The petitioner, Tania Lizeth Gonzalez-Lara, sought review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) decision denying her motion to remand to apply for voluntary departure and dismissing her appeal of an Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of her applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Gonzalez-Lara, a native of El Salvador, entered the United States in December 2017. She claimed persecution on account of her membership in particular social groups, including family members of Salvadoran police officers and Salvadoran women. The IJ found Gonzalez-Lara credible but denied her applications, finding that she had not suffered harm that rose to the level of past persecution and that her fear of future persecution was not objectively reasonable.The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision and denied Gonzalez-Lara's motion to remand to apply for voluntary departure. The BIA reasoned that Gonzalez-Lara did not show a well-founded fear of future persecution because she did not present evidence that the gangs have shown interest in her, her former partner, or family since she left El Salvador in 2017. The BIA also found that Gonzalez-Lara had waived the IJ’s denial of her CAT claim because she did not raise any specific argument on appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied the petition for review. The court found that the BIA erred in denying the motion to remand on the basis that Gonzalez-Lara had not previously applied for voluntary departure. However, the court concluded that the BIA’s error was harmless because Gonzalez-Lara did not allege facts to satisfy all elements of voluntary departure, and the record did not independently establish her prima facie eligibility. The court also found that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s finding that Gonzalez-Lara’s fear of harm was too speculative to support her claim for relief. View "GONZALEZ-LARA V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

The case involves three aliens, Moris Esmelis Campos-Chaves, Varinder Singh, and Raul Daniel Mendez-Colín, who were ordered removed in absentia after failing to appear at their respective removal hearings. The Government had initiated removal proceedings against each of them, serving them with Notices to Appear (NTAs) that did not specify the time and date of the hearings. However, each alien was later provided with a notice specifying the time and place of the removal hearing. After being ordered removed in absentia, each alien sought to rescind the order, arguing that they did not receive a proper NTA.In the lower courts, the Fifth Circuit denied Campos-Chaves's petition for review, while the Ninth Circuit granted the petitions for Singh and Mendez-Colín. The Fifth Circuit based its decision on the fact that Campos-Chaves did not dispute receiving the subsequent notice specifying the time and place of the hearing. The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, held that the lack of a single-document NTA alone rendered the in absentia removal orders rescindable.The Supreme Court of the United States held that to rescind an in absentia removal order on the ground that the alien did not receive notice in accordance with paragraph (1) or (2), the alien must show that he did not receive notice under either paragraph for the hearing at which the alien was absent and ordered removed. Because each of the aliens in these cases received a proper paragraph (2) notice for the hearings they missed and at which they were ordered removed, they cannot seek rescission of their in absentia removal orders on the basis of defective notice. The Court affirmed the judgment of the Fifth Circuit, reversed the Ninth Circuit’s judgment in Garland v. Mendez-Colín, and vacated and remanded the Ninth Circuit’s judgment in Garland v. Singh for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Campos-Chaves v. Garland" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant, Nelson Barros, who was charged with assault and battery on a household member. Barros, a noncitizen, chose to represent himself during his arraignment and plea hearing. He signed a form acknowledging he had waived his right to counsel. The judge did not conduct any further inquiry to determine whether Barros' waiver of counsel was made knowingly and intelligently. Barros later admitted to sufficient facts to warrant a guilty verdict and was placed on probation for one year. After completing his probation, the charge was dismissed. However, upon returning to the U.S. from a trip to Portugal, Barros was detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement officers due to his admission of guilt in the assault case.The lower courts denied Barros' motions to withdraw his plea. The motion judge found that Barros' waiver of the right to counsel was knowing and voluntary. Barros appealed, and the Supreme Judicial Court granted his application for direct appellate review.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that a defendant's waiver of the right to counsel must be made knowingly and intelligently, regardless of whether the defendant is at arraignment or a plea hearing. The court confirmed that a trial court judge has the responsibility of ascertaining whether the waiver is made knowingly and intelligently. The court also recognized that for a noncitizen defendant, the disadvantages of self-representation include forgoing counsel's advice about the immigration consequences of a disposition. However, the court affirmed the lower court's decision on alternate grounds, concluding that Barros' waiver of counsel was invalid, but he failed to establish a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice to prevail on appeal. View "Commonwealth v. Barros" on Justia Law

The case involves a 52-year-old native of the Dominican Republic, G.P., who unlawfully entered the United States twice and was convicted for drug trafficking both times. After serving his sentence for the second conviction, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) intended to remove him again. However, G.P. expressed fear of retaliation in the Dominican Republic due to his cooperation with the government in prosecuting the leader of the drug trafficking organization. An asylum officer found his fear credible and placed him into withholding-only proceedings. G.P. applied for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), but his application was denied by an immigration judge (IJ) and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). G.P. appealed the decision, and the case was remanded for further consideration of his CAT claim.While his CAT claim was pending, G.P. was held in immigration detention. He brought an application for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that there was "no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future," and that he should therefore be released subject to supervision. The district court disagreed, and G.P. appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that G.P.'s situation was distinguishable from the case of Zadvydas v. Davis, which G.P. cited as precedent. The court noted that G.P.'s detention was not indefinite or potentially permanent, as his CAT proceedings were still pending and there was no indication of bad faith or undue delay by the agency. Furthermore, G.P. did not dispute that if he was ultimately denied relief, the government would be able to remove him to the Dominican Republic. Therefore, the court concluded that G.P. had failed to show that there was "no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future." View "G.P. v. Garland" on Justia Law

The case involves Elsy and Isai Diaz-Hernandez, siblings from El Salvador who illegally entered the United States and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. They claimed that they had suffered harm or fear of harm in El Salvador from their maternal uncle, who abused them to avenge his earlier deportation from the United States, for which he blamed their mother. The Immigration Judge (IJ) found that revenge was not a central reason for the uncle’s abuse of Elsy and Isai but at most a “tangential reason.” The IJ concluded that Elsy and Isai failed to establish the required nexus between their harm and a protected ground and therefore the requirements for either asylum or withholding of removal.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision and dismissed the appeal. The BIA rejected the petitioners’ argument that the evidence showed that their relationship to their mother was “at least one central reason” for the uncle’s abusive behavior against them. The BIA noted that the IJ’s finding that the petitioners failed to demonstrate the necessary nexus between the harm and a protected ground was “a classic factual question,” and after reviewing the facts, concluded that the IJ did not clearly err.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied the petitions for review, concluding that substantial evidence supported the agency’s finding that the petitioners failed to establish the requisite nexus between the harm they feared and their family tie. The court also rejected their argument that the BIA applied the wrong standard for assessing whether they met their burden to prove the required nexus with respect to their withholding of removal claims. View "Diaz-Hernandez v. Garland" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant, Antonio E. Gonzalez, was charged with assaulting his then-wife and their son. During the trial, the defense sought to cross-examine the wife about her application for a U visa, which is a visa for noncitizens who are victims of certain crimes and are helpful to law enforcement in the investigation or prosecution of criminal activity. The trial court ruled that the defense had not established a sufficient factual foundation for this line of questioning and thus it was not allowed. The defendant was convicted and appealed the decision, arguing that the trial court erred in precluding the cross-examination.The Supreme Court of Maryland held that the trial court did err in this regard. The Court found that the defense had established a sufficient factual foundation for the cross-examination, as the wife had submitted a U visa application based on being a victim of the crime for which the defendant was on trial, and a member of the State’s Attorney’s Office had signed the necessary certification for the U visa. The Court reasoned that these circumstances could have led a jury to infer that the wife had a personal interest in the outcome of the trial or a motive to testify falsely.However, the Court ultimately concluded that this error was harmless and did not influence the verdict. The Court noted that the defendant had acknowledged committing acts that constituted the assaults for which he was convicted, and that the wife's testimony was consistent with other evidence presented at trial. Therefore, the Court affirmed the lower court's decision. View "Gonzalez v. State" on Justia Law

The case involves a group of Afghan and Iraqi nationals who served the United States during recent armed conflicts and are now facing serious threats due to their service. They applied for special-immigrant visas, but their applications were delayed. Congress had authorized the Secretary of State to issue these visas and later mandated that the government should improve its efficiency to process the applications within nine months, except in cases involving unusual national-security risks. However, the plaintiffs' applications had been pending for more than nine months.The district court held that the government had unreasonably delayed processing these applications. In 2020, the court approved a plan requiring the prompt adjudication of applications filed by class members and pending for more than nine months as of May 21, 2020. In 2022, the Secretary moved to terminate or modify the plan based on changed circumstances in the two years since 2020. The district court recognized that changed circumstances warrant modifying the plan, but it refused to terminate the plan. The government appealed the refusal to terminate.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the district court reasonably responded to the changes and that some continued judicial involvement remains appropriate. The court also noted that the government's increased difficulties in processing visa applications cannot retroactively make past unreasonable delays reasonable. The court concluded that the district court permissibly balanced the various competing interests in declining to terminate the 2020 adjudication plan. View "Afghan and Iraqi Allies v. Blinken" on Justia Law