Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

The Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP) was created by the Secretary of DHS on December 20, 2018. On June 1, 2021, DHS permanently terminated MPP. The district court subsequently vacated the Termination Decision and ordered DHS to implement the Protocols in good faith or to take a new agency action that complied with the law. DHS chose not to take a new agency action, and instead chose to notice an appeal and defended its Termination Decision, seeking a stay of the district court's injunction while the appeal was pending. The Fifth Circuit denied the motion and the Supreme Court affirmed. On October 29, 2021, DHS issued two additional memoranda to explain the Termination Decision, purporting to "re-terminate" MPP. The Government then informed the Fifth Circuit that, in its view, the October 29 Memoranda had mooted this case.Under Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit precedent, the court concluded that this case is nowhere near moot. In any event, the vacatur DHS requests is an equitable remedy, which is unavailable to parties with unclean hands. The court stated that the Government's litigation tactics disqualify it from such equitable relief. The court addressed and rejected each of the Government's reviewability arguments and determined that DHS has come nowhere close to shouldering its heavy burden to show that it can make law in a vacuum.On the merits, the court concluded that the Termination Decision was arbitrary and capricious under the APA. The court also concluded that the Termination Decision is independently unlawful because it violates 8 U.S.C. 1225, which requires DHS to detain aliens, pending removal proceedings, who unlawfully enter the United States and seek permission to stay. Finally, in regard to the Government's contention that section 1182 allows DHS to parole aliens into the United States on a case-by-case basis, the court concluded that deciding to parole aliens en masse is the opposite of case-by-case decisionmaking. The court denied the Government's motion to vacate the judgment and affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Texas v. Biden" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied the petition filed by Petitioner, a native and citizen of Haiti, seeking review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) that affirmed the denial of Petitioner's application for protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), holding that Petitioner's claims failed.After Petitioner was served with a notice to appear alleging that he was subject to removal, Petitioner filed an application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT. An immigration judge (IJ) denied Petitioner's application. The BIA affirmed and adopted the IJ's determination. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the lower courts did not err in finding that Petitioner failed to show that it was more likely than not that he would be tortured in Haiti if he returned. View "Bonnet v. Garland" on Justia Law

Chavez-Chilel entered the U.S. without admission. DHS issued her a Notice to Appear (NTA), “on a date to be set at a time to be set,” charging her with removability, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). A subsequently-served notice specified the date and time. Chavez-Chilel sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, asserting that she would be subject to persecution because she is a member of a particular social group (PSG): “Guatemalan women.” The IJ denied Chavez-Chilel's motion to terminate her removal proceedings, reasoning that she suffered no prejudice from any deficiency in the NTA; "Pereira" concerned only cancellation of removal and its stop-time rule, not asylum or withholding of removal. A deficient NTA does not divest the IJ of jurisdiction. Chavez-Chilel testified that she was raped as a teenager in Guatemala, the police did not take any action when she reported this crime, and the same man later threatened to rape her again. The IJ denied Chavez-Chilel’s applications, finding that, while she was credible and that her rape qualified as past persecution, “Guatemalan women,” did not constitute a PSG for asylum or withholding of removal purposes. The BIA affirmed.The Third Circuit denied a petition for review. Failure to include the date and time of her hearing in the NTA did not require termination of the immigration proceedings. Substantial evidence supported the BIA’s conclusion that “Guatemalan women” is not a PSG for asylum or withholding purposes. View "Chavez-Chilel v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

Scarlett was born in Honduras in 2013. Her family moved to the United States in 2015. The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services received a referral claiming that her father, Franklin, had attacked her mother, Karen. The Department filed a Welfare and Institutions Code 300(a), (b)(1) petition. The court found true the allegations that, because of multiple instances of domestic violence, and because Franklin had hit Scarlett with a belt, Franklin placed Scarlett at risk of serious physical harm and Karen failed to protect her.Scarlett subsequently filed a request for Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) findings under Code of Civil Procedure 155.1. A child is eligible for SIJ status if: the child is a dependent of a juvenile court, in the custody of a state agency by court order, or in the custody of an individual or entity appointed by the court; the child cannot reunify with one or both parents due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis; and it is not in the child’s best interest to return to his or her home country or the home country of her parents. The juvenile court denied the request, ruling the findings were “discretionary.” The court of appeal reversed. The lower court was required to consider the evidence submitted and Scarlett submitted unimpeached and uncontradicted evidence that required the court to enter an order with the findings Scarlett requested under section 155. View "In re Scarlett V." on Justia Law

Ge, then a citizen of China, entered the U.S. on a student visa. After pursuing his education for four years, he enlisted in the Army through the Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest (MAVNI) program, which allows foreign nationals to enlist in the armed forces and thereafter apply for naturalization under 8 U.S.C. 1440(a). Ge filed his application in May 2016. After completing interviews and tests administered by USCIS, he received notice in July 2017, that his naturalization oath ceremony had been scheduled for later that month. Days later, he was informed that the ceremony had been canceled. USCIS had a new policy, requiring that enhanced Department of Defense background checks for all MAVNI applicants before their naturalization applications could be granted.Ge filed suit in December 2018, under 8 U.S.C. 1447(b). The district court directed USCIS to adjudicate Ge’s naturalization application within 45 days. Shortly after the court’s remand order, Ge reported that he had been sworn in as a citizen. The court dismissed Ge’s action. Ge then sought attorneys fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. 2412, alleging that he was the “prevailing party” and that USCIS’s position was not “justified in law and fact at all stages.” The district court denied his motion, ruling that Ge did not qualify as a prevailing party because its remand was not a judgment on the merits or consent decree that created a “material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties.” The Fourth Circuit affirmed. After the remand order, Ge was still the applicant; USCIS was still the agency that could grant or deny the application. The legal relationship had not changed. View "Ge v. United States Citizenship & Immigration Services" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision ordering petitioner removed to Egypt based on his prior guilty plea to violating Section 14:81 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes, which proscribes indecent behavior with juveniles. Addressing the merits of petitioner's exhausted claims, the court concluded that any errors in finding that petitioner violated Section 14:81 were harmless. The court explained that, even in the absence of his testimony and his attorney's statements, the BIA could have taken administrative notice of the relevant facts contained in the criminal-court minutes, which unequivocally show that petitioner pleaded guilty of indecent behavior with a juvenile under Section 14:81. The court also concluded that any errors the BIA made in concluding that petitioner was removable for committing a crime of child abuse were harmless. View "Ibrahim v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's denial of petitioner's motion for immigration relief. Almost eighteen years after plaintiff was ordered removed in absentia, he sought a motion to reopen the removal proceedings and to rescind the removal order on the basis that he never received notice of the proceedings.The court concluded that petitioner forfeited his right to notice by failing to provide a viable address and his claims to the contrary are unpersuasive. The court explained that substantial evidence supported the IJ's rejection of petitioner's affidavit testimony as untrustworthy and finding that petitioner provided immigration officials with a deficient address. Furthermore, the IJ and the BIA did not abuse their discretion by failing to adequately consider petitioner's affidavit testimony. Finally, petitioner failed to analyze the cancellation of removal theory in a meaningful way in his opening brief, and thus his argument is forfeited. View "Spagnol-Bastos v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner Gabriel Villegas-Castro was a Mexican citizen who entered the United States without being admitted or paroled. The government sought removal, and Villegas-Castro requested asylum, cancellation of removal, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. The Board of Immigration Appeals ordered removal, rejecting all of Villegas-Castro’s requests. In its opinion, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed three issues involving: (1) the scope of the immigration judge’s authority when the Board orders a remand; (2) the Board’s failure to apply the clear-error standard to the immigration judge’s factual findings; and (3) the immigration judge’s discretion to reconsider eligibility for withholding of removal and deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture. The Court found: the immigration judge properly considered petitioner's second application for asylum but the Board's reasoning did not support its denial of asylum; and the Board erred in failing to apply the clear-error standard. With regard to the Convention Against Torture, the Court found the immigration judge abated consideration of these applications, but the Board sua sponte rejected the applications, concluding that Villegas-Castro couldn’t obtain relief because the immigration judge had earlier deemed Villegas-Castro ineligible for withholding of removal under federal law and the Convention Against Torture. The Tenth Circuit found the immigration judge had discretion to revisit these conclusions. "Until the immigration judge entered a final decision on removal, the Board had no basis to sua sponte deny withholding of removal or deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture." The Court granted the petition for judicial review, and remanded the matter for the Board to reconsider Villegas-Castro’s application for asylum, to apply the clear-error standard to the immigration judge’s credibility findings, and to reconsider the applications for withholding of removal and deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture. View "Villegas-Castro v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner Edgar Tarango-Delgado appealed the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) denial of his two motions to reopen his removal proceedings. Tarango-Delgado, a Mexican citizen, came to the United States in 1977, when he was seven months old. He became a lawful permanent resident at age ten. And for almost four decades, he lived in the U.S. with his parents, siblings, wife, and children. In 2015, state police arrested Tarango-Delgado and charged him with aggravated animal cruelty, a felony. He pleaded guilty to that charge. But, before entering his plea, his counsel failed to advise him that pleading guilty would have deportation consequences because aggravated animal cruelty was a crime of moral turpitude. A few months after he pleaded guilty, the government commenced removal proceedings. Tarango-Delgado moved for post-conviction relief in state court, arguing he received ineffective assistance of counsel. This was ultimately denied, and Tarango-Delgado was removed in 2017. Almost a year after his removal, a Colorado state court ruled on Tarango-Delgado’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel motion, concluding that Tarango-Delgado had not “knowingly and voluntarily” pleaded guilty to the aggravated-animal-cruelty charge, and vacated his conviction and reinstated the original aggravated-animal-cruelty charge. In January 2019, Tarango-Delgado filed his first motion to reopen his immigration proceedings before an IJ. The IJ denied Tarango-Delgado’s motion to reopen. In late February or early March 2019, a few days after the IJ denied Tarango-Delgado’s first motion to reopen, he reentered this country without authorization. And a few weeks later, after the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) learned about the illegal reentry, it reinstated Tarango-Delgado’s prior removal order. Tarango-Delgado applied for withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). An asylum officer found that Tarango-Delgado credibly feared returning to Mexico and referred his petition to an IJ. But the IJ denied his petition for CAT relief. The BIA affirmed. Tarango-Delgado pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor animal-cruelty charge, which by definition would no longer qualify as a crime of moral turpitude. Tarango-Delgado then filed a second motion to reopen his immigration proceedings. The government raised a new argument: Tarango-Delgado's motion could not be considered because he had illegally reentered the U.S. after being removed. Tarango-Delgado appeals the BIA’s denial of his two motions to reopen. Because the Tenth Circuit concluded that 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(5) barred the reopening of his removal proceedings, the BIA’s denials were affirmed. View "Tarango-Delgado v. Garland" on Justia Law

Pugin, a citizen of Mauritius, was admitted to the U.S. in 1985 as a lawful permanent resident. In 2014, Pugin pleaded guilty in Virginia to being an accessory after the fact to a felony. He was sentenced to 12 months imprisonment with nine months suspended. Pugin was charged with removability because he was convicted of an aggravated felony: “an offense relating to obstruction of justice, perjury, or subornation of perjury,” 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(S), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).The IJ employed the categorical approach to determine whether the Virginia conviction qualified as obstruction of justice, noting that the BIA had previously decided that a federal conviction for accessory after the fact is a crime relating to obstruction of justice. The IJ then held that Virginia accessory after the fact is an offense relating to obstruction of justice because, like its federal counterpart, the offense requires the defendant “act with the ‘specific purpose of hindering the process of justice.’” The Fourth Circuit affirmed that Pugin may be deported. The BIA definition of “obstruction of justice” under the Act is entitled to "Chevron" deference and the Virginia offense of accessory after the fact categorically matches that definition. View "Pugin v. Garland" on Justia Law