Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Jathursan, a citizen of Sri Lanka, entered the U.S. without inspection in 2018. He was apprehended and expressed a fear of returning to Sri Lanka. After a credible fear interview, DHS determined that Jathursan had a credible fear of persecution in Sri Lanka. Jathursan applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture (CAT) protection. Jathursan cited his Tamil race and/or ethnicity, his imputed political opinion as a supporter of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), his imputed membership in the LTTE through his brother, and his status as a Tamil failed asylum seeker.The BIA upheld the immigration judge’s findings that Jathursan failed to establish past persecution on account of a protected ground, a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of a protected ground, or that he would more likely than not be tortured if he returned to Sri Lanka. The Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded for further consideration of his asylum and withholding-of-removal claims based on his fear of future persecution as a Tamil failed asylum seeker and the denial of relief under CAT. The court rejected his claims for asylum and withholding of removal based on past persecution; substantial evidence supported the BIA’s denial of relief on that ground. View "Jathursan v. United States Attorney General" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint (SAC) based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The SAC sought review of the USCIS's revocation of Plaintiff Nouritajer's previously-approved Form I-140, Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker (I-140); the USCIS Administrative Appeals Office's (AAO) denial of Nouritajer's revocation appeal on August 1, 2018; and the May 29, 2019 denial of plaintiffs' motion to reopen and reconsider the revocation. The court agreed with the district court that the jurisdictional bar to a substantive challenge to a discretionary decision by the Secretary of Homeland Security applies here, because plaintiffs do not assert a procedural challenge to the revocation decision. Rather, plaintiffs assert several arguments which essentially challenge the underlying reasons for the revocation of the immigration petition. View "Nouritajer v. Jaddou" on Justia Law

Following several unlawful reentries into the U.S., Lopez sought review of the 2017 reinstatement of his 1996 order of removal, arguing that the drug conviction on which it was based was vacated in 2014.The Ninth Circuit dismissed Lopez’s petition. The 1996 order had a valid basis both when it was issued and when he was removed; he failed to establish a miscarriage of justice that would permit the court to entertain a collateral attack under 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(D). Lopez’s conviction was legally valid at the time his original removal order was issued and when it was executed. The vacatur of his conviction did not make his removal order “void ab initio” under governing precedent. The court noted that Lopez was independently removable at the time of his underlying proceedings for having entered the United States unlawfully. View "Vazquez v. Garland" on Justia Law

Arulnanthy, part of Sri Lanka’s Tamil ethnic minority, entered the U.S. through Mexic in 2018. He was immediately apprehended. An asylum officer conducted a credible-fear interview, 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(1)(B). Arulnanthy described two 2018 encounters with the Sri Lanka Police after officials discovered that Arulnanthy was planning to participate in a local election as a member of the Tamil Party. The first encounter involved detention and beating. The asylum officer determined that Arulnanthy had established a credible fear of persecution based on his political opinion. Arulnanthy indicated that he intended to apply for asylum and withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). His application's description of his police encounters differed from his previous account. Arulnanthy submitted documentary evidence, some pertaining to his police encounters, and the rest concerning country conditions in Sri Lanka, particularly the situation facing many Tamils.The IJ denied relief, finding that Arulnanthy was not a credible witness based on three omissions and discrepancies. The BIA dismissed Arulnanthy’s appeal. In 2020, Arulnanthy was removed from the United States. The Fifth Circuit remanded, first holding that the appeal was not mooted by Arulnanthy’s removal. The adverse credibility finding was fatal to Arulnanthy’s asylum claim but not to his CAT claim. The BIA violated the CAT regulations by ignoring Arulnanthy’s hundreds of pages of evidence about country conditions in Sri Lanka. View "Arulnanthy v. Garland" on Justia Law

Prasad owned and operated Maremarks, through which he filed petitions seeking H-1B status for nonimmigrant, foreign workers in specialty occupations to come to the U.S. as Maremarks’ employees performing work for Maremarks’ clients. Prasad falsely represented in the H-1B petitions that there were specific, bona fide positions available for the H-1B beneficiaries. Prasad was convicted of 21 counts of visa fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1546(a), and two counts of aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 1028A(a)(1). The district court ordered forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. 982(a)(6)(A)(ii): $1,193,440.87.The Ninth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Prasad’s argument that he did not “obtain” the entire $1,193,440.87 because he eventually paid portions of the money to the H1B beneficiaries. Prasad possessed the full $1,193,440.87 paid by the end-clients and had control over the money before he paid a percentage of it to employees. Considering the term “proceeds” in the context of the forfeiture statute, the statute’s punitive purpose, and its prior construction of virtually identical criminal forfeiture provisions, the court concluded that the term extends to receipts and is not limited to profit. Although the H-1B beneficiary employees performed legitimate work for end-clients, the portions of the money that Maremarks received for that work and subsequently paid to the beneficiary employees was, nonetheless, “obtained directly or indirectly from” Prasad’s unlawful conduct. View "United States v. Prasad" on Justia Law

Canales-Granados, born in El Salvador, was admitted to the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident in 2001. In 2018, he was convicted of criminal offenses, which he attributes to a multi-year struggle with substance abuse. He pleaded guilty to Virginia petit larceny, felony eluding, felony hit and run, and driving under the influence. For the latter three convictions, he was sentenced to 15 years and 60 days in prison. All but five days of the sentence were suspended; he was instead sentenced to a residential addiction treatment program.Charged with removability under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) because he was an alien convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs) not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct, Canales-Granados contended that neither Virginia felony hit and run nor Virginia felony eluding qualified as CIMTs. An IJ agreed that the hit and run conviction was not a CIMT but determined that felony eluding was. That conviction, when combined with Canales-Granados’ petit larceny conviction, gave him two CIMTs, rendering him removable. The BIA affirmed. The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The phrase “crime involving moral turpitude” is neither unconstitutionally vague nor violative of the nondelegation doctrine. Virginia’s felony eluding statute qualifies as such an offense. View "Granados v. Garland" on Justia Law

The First Circuit dismissed one of the claims in Petitioner's petition for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing Petitioner's challenges to the denial of his asylum and withholding of removal claims and denied the others, holding that Petitioner was not entitled to relief.An immigration judge denied Petitioner's applications for asylum, withholding of removal, cancellation of removal, protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture and voluntary departure. The BIA dismissed Petitioner's appeal. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) this Court lacked jurisdiction to consider Petitioner's first claim on appeal because Petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies; (2) the BIA's decision on Petitioner's political opinion claim was supported by substantial evidence; and (3) Petitioner's withholding of removal claim failed because his asylum claim failed. View "Gomes v. Garland" on Justia Law

Argueta, a 20-year-old citizen of Honduras, entered the U.S. in 1998. In 2007, Argueta had an altercation with a former employer over the late payment of wages. Convicted of aggravated assault, he was sentenced to 96 months’ imprisonment. In removal proceedings, he sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. Argueta has been in ICE custody since December 2014 and has been transferred at least 15 times. His removal proceedings remain pending, Argueta unsuccessfully requested bond.In 2019, Argueta sought habeas corpus relief, 28 U.S.C. 2241. The district court denied Argueta’s petition without prejudice, reasoning that the statutory scheme under which Argueta was detained rendered him ineligible for immediate release. In April 2020, Argueta, who by then had been transferred to a detention facility outside of New Jersey, moved to reopen. The district court denied Argueta’s motion, finding that the motion raised new claims and constituted a new habeas petition over which it lacked jurisdiction because of ICE’s transfer of Argueta.The Third Circuit reversed. In referring to Covid-19 and to a change in the governing statutory scheme, Argueta did not raise new claims; his motion is a Rule 60(b)(6) motion. After a district court acquires jurisdiction over an ICE detainee’s section 2241 petition for relief from continued detention, the transfer of the detainee outside of the court’s territorial jurisdiction does not strip that court of jurisdiction to entertain a Rule 60(b) motion. View "Anariba v. Director Hudson County Correctional Center" on Justia Law

Quebrado entered the U.S. in 2006. In 2011, he was served a notice to appear lacking the time or place of his removal hearing. He later was served notice with the date, time, and place of his hearing. His final order of removal issued in 2014. In 2018, the Supreme Court (Pereira) held that the stop-time rule, which sets out the circumstances under which a period of continuous physical presence is deemed to end for cancellation of removal, is triggered by a notice to appear only if it includes the “time and place” of removal proceedings. Quebrado then moved to reopen before the BIA, arguing he was statutorily eligible for cancellation. The BIA denied the motion.The Ninth Circuit remanded. A final order of removal does not trigger the stop-time rule. Under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(d)(1) a period of continuous physical presence ends upon the earlier of two events: Under subsection (A), upon the service of the notice to appear, and under subsection (B), upon the commission of certain offenses. Neither subsection applied here. Quebrado’s presence was not deemed to end, so his claim for cancellation facially satisfied the 10-year presence requirement. Quebrado’s improbable situation is entirely of the government’s own making: “If men must turn square corners when they deal with the government, it cannot be too much to expect the government to turn square corners when it deals with them.” View "Quebrado-Cantor v. Garland" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied the petition for judicial review sought by Petitioner in this case and upheld the order of removal against him, holding that the Agency's denial of asylum and other relief was supported by substantial evidence in the record.Petitioner conceded removability and cross-appleid for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. An immigration judge (IJ) denied Petitioner's application for relief and ordered him removed to Rwanda. The Board of Immigration Appeals upheld the IJ's decision, ruling that the IJ's adverse credibility determination was not clearly erroneous. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the denial of Petitioner's claim for asylum was supported by substantial evidence, ending this Court's inquiry. View "Mashilingi v. Garland" on Justia Law