Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Argueta, a 20-year-old citizen of Honduras, entered the U.S. in 1998. In 2007, Argueta had an altercation with a former employer over the late payment of wages. Convicted of aggravated assault, he was sentenced to 96 months’ imprisonment. In removal proceedings, he sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. Argueta has been in ICE custody since December 2014 and has been transferred at least 15 times. His removal proceedings remain pending, Argueta unsuccessfully requested bond.In 2019, Argueta sought habeas corpus relief, 28 U.S.C. 2241. The district court denied Argueta’s petition without prejudice, reasoning that the statutory scheme under which Argueta was detained rendered him ineligible for immediate release. In April 2020, Argueta, who by then had been transferred to a detention facility outside of New Jersey, moved to reopen. The district court denied Argueta’s motion, finding that the motion raised new claims and constituted a new habeas petition over which it lacked jurisdiction because of ICE’s transfer of Argueta.The Third Circuit reversed. In referring to Covid-19 and to a change in the governing statutory scheme, Argueta did not raise new claims; his motion is a Rule 60(b)(6) motion. After a district court acquires jurisdiction over an ICE detainee’s section 2241 petition for relief from continued detention, the transfer of the detainee outside of the court’s territorial jurisdiction does not strip that court of jurisdiction to entertain a Rule 60(b) motion. View "Anariba v. Director Hudson County Correctional Center" on Justia Law

Quebrado entered the U.S. in 2006. In 2011, he was served a notice to appear lacking the time or place of his removal hearing. He later was served notice with the date, time, and place of his hearing. His final order of removal issued in 2014. In 2018, the Supreme Court (Pereira) held that the stop-time rule, which sets out the circumstances under which a period of continuous physical presence is deemed to end for cancellation of removal, is triggered by a notice to appear only if it includes the “time and place” of removal proceedings. Quebrado then moved to reopen before the BIA, arguing he was statutorily eligible for cancellation. The BIA denied the motion.The Ninth Circuit remanded. A final order of removal does not trigger the stop-time rule. Under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(d)(1) a period of continuous physical presence ends upon the earlier of two events: Under subsection (A), upon the service of the notice to appear, and under subsection (B), upon the commission of certain offenses. Neither subsection applied here. Quebrado’s presence was not deemed to end, so his claim for cancellation facially satisfied the 10-year presence requirement. Quebrado’s improbable situation is entirely of the government’s own making: “If men must turn square corners when they deal with the government, it cannot be too much to expect the government to turn square corners when it deals with them.” View "Quebrado-Cantor v. Garland" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied the petition for judicial review sought by Petitioner in this case and upheld the order of removal against him, holding that the Agency's denial of asylum and other relief was supported by substantial evidence in the record.Petitioner conceded removability and cross-appleid for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. An immigration judge (IJ) denied Petitioner's application for relief and ordered him removed to Rwanda. The Board of Immigration Appeals upheld the IJ's decision, ruling that the IJ's adverse credibility determination was not clearly erroneous. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the denial of Petitioner's claim for asylum was supported by substantial evidence, ending this Court's inquiry. View "Mashilingi v. Garland" on Justia Law

A family-based immigrant is presumptively likely to become a public charge, ineligible for admission, but that presumption can be overcome if a sponsoring relative executes an “affidavit of support.” 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)(C)(ii), (a)(4)(D). Kuznitsnyna and her daughter, Thomas, co-sponsored the immigration of Kuznitsnyna’s husband, Belevich, and signed Form I-864 affidavits, which that their obligation to support Belevich would terminate if he became a citizen, worked 40 quarters, no longer had lawful permanent resident status and departed the U.S., attained a new support affidavit, or died; “divorce does not terminate your obligations.” DHS granted Belevich a visa.Years later, while Belevich was visiting his mother in Russia, Kuznitsnyna sought a divorce. When Belevich returned to the U.S., Kuznitsnyna would not allow him into their home. She obtained an order of protection against him. Neither Thomas nor Kuznitsnyna subsequently provided Belevich with any financial support. Later, Belevich was charged with abusing Thomas’s six-year-old daughter and possessing child pornography. Belevich sued for breach of the support affidavits. The women raised the affirmative defenses of unclean hands, anticipatory breach, and equitable estoppel. The district court rejected those arguments, held that Belevich’s conduct relating to the pending criminal charges had “no relevance to the statute,” and granted Belevich summary judgment. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The sponsors’ equitable defenses are foreclosed by the statute and regulation and by the text of the affidavit. View "Belevich v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Detained, separated from his family, speaking no English, and having diligently pursued representation, asylum applicant Usubakunov finally connected with a pro bono attorney at Catholic Charities who agreed to represent him. When that attorney was unavailable on the date of his merits hearing, Usubakunov requested his first continuance of that hearing. The IJ denied a continuance, leaving Usubakunov unassisted.The Ninth Circuit remanded. Under these circumstances, the IJ’s refusal to grant a continuance of Usubakunov’s merits hearing deprived him of his right to counsel and was an abuse of discretion because it was tantamount to a denial of counsel. The immigrant illustrated diligence, not bad faith, coupled with very difficult barriers. This was not a case of indefinite continuances, nor was it a case where Usubakunov was trying to game the system. View "Usubakunov v. Garland" on Justia Law

VHV, a wholesale jewelry importer and the domestic counterpart of Khushi in India, filed a new-office petition and obtained L-1 nonimmigrant status for Vaidya, a citizen of India, to work as VHV’s CEO. VHV later sought to extend Vaidya’s L-1 classification for two years. After allowing VHV to submit additional information, USCIS concluded that the record was insufficient to prove that Vaidya was employed in an executive capacity in his foreign position and insufficient regarding his domestic position. USCIS found that Vaidya’s subordinates did not hold positions in a managerial capacity, Vaidya’s duties did “not make sense given the overall nature and organizational complexity of the foreign organization,” Vaidya apparently performed many non-qualifying duties, and the descriptions of his duties were overly generic.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the government. USCIS’s decision was not arbitrary and capricious. For an employee to qualify for L-1 status as an executive, 8 U.S.C. 1361 requires that the employee bear a certain set of high-level responsibilities and that the employee primarily engages in those specified duties. New-office petitions additionally require evidence that the transferee was employed abroad “for one continuous year in the three-year period preceding the filing of the petition in an executive or managerial capacity.” Neither Vaidya’s employment abroad nor his domestic position met these requirements. View "VHV Jewelers, LLC v. Wolf" on Justia Law

Contreras-Rojas appealed the sentence imposed following his guilty plea conviction of illegal reentry, arguing that the enhancement of his sentence under 8 U.S.C. 1326(b)(1) is unconstitutional because the fact of a prior conviction was neither found by a jury nor alleged in the indictment.The Fifth Circuit granted summary affirmance. The Supreme Court’s 1998 “Almendarez-Torres” decision held that a prior conviction is not a fact that must be alleged in an indictment or found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury for purposes of a statutory sentencing enhancement. The Fifth Circuit reiterated that “[i]n the future, barring new developments in Supreme Court jurisprudence, arguments seeking reconsideration of Almendarez-Torres will be viewed with skepticism.” View "United States v. Contreras-Rojas" on Justia Law

A border patrol agent found and stopped Rizo-Rizo near the U.S./Mexico border. Rizo-Rizo admitted that he was a citizen of Mexico without appropriate immigration documents. The agent arrested him. Rizo-Rizo was then questioned again, waived his Miranda rights, and confirmed that he was a citizen of Mexico who had just “illegally entered.” Rizo-Rizo was charged with the misdemeanor of attempted illegal entry, 8 U.S.C. 1325(a)(1), and chose to plead guilty without a plea agreement. The magistrate listed these elements of attempted illegal entry. Defense counsel objected, claiming that “the Defendant ha[d] to know he was an alien” and that the magistrate had improperly omitted an element of the offense. The magistrate overruled the objection. Rizo-Rizo pled guilty and was sentenced to time served.The district court and Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that knowledge of alienage was not an element of 8 U.S.C. 1325(a)(1). The statute describes a regulatory offense and no presumption in favor of scienter applies. View "United States v. Rizo-Rizo" on Justia Law

Mabuneza, a citizen of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) entered the U.S. in 2000 as a refugee and became a lawful permanent resident in 2001. After a 2006 conviction for petit larceny and a 2016 conviction for aggravated sexual abuse, Mabuneza was placed in removal proceedings.Mabuneza applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), asserting that he received refugee status because he had faced persecution as a member of the Tutsi ethnic group and that he would be targeted again if he were deported; that he would be viewed as a political dissident for being featured in Chicago Tribune articles describing his family’s experiences as refugees; that he would be detained upon return to the DRC as a traitor; and that he would be seen as a threat due to his sexual abuse conviction. Mabuneza submitted country conditions evidence showing that persons returning to the DRC may face suspicion from the police and be arrested and detained and that the Congolese government sometimes tortures detainees and prisoners for political and human rights activism.The BIA dismissed an appeal from the IJ's denial of relief. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. The IJ did not make any factual or legal error in finding that Mabuneza did not face a substantial risk of torture as a recent deportee. View "Mabuneza v. Garland" on Justia Law

Arreaga-Bravo, a 31-year-old from Guatemala. arrived in the U.S. in 2016. In removal proceedings, she sought withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), claiming that she had fled Guatemala to escape harassment and sexual violence by the Mara 18 gang. She discussed the rape of her 15-year-old sister, which was not reported to the police because the nearest police station was four hours away; after the family moved, another sister was raped but the police never investigated. The family moved again. Arreaga-Bravo’s friend was raped by multiple men; in 2016, Arreaga-Bravo was targeted by gang members to enlist as a gang girlfriend. Arreaga-Bravo refused and began to receive threats. Eventually, two men grabbed her on the street, pulled out a knife, and threatened to kill her unless she surrendered to the gang.The IJ granted Arreaga-Bravo CAT relief, finding that Arreaga-Bravo was generally credible, candid, and forthcoming, that it is more likely than not that Arreaga-Bravo will be harmed if she returns to Guatemala, and that the Guatemalan government would acquiesce in Arreaga-Bravo’s tortureThe BIA reversed, finding that it was not “sufficiently persuade[d]” that Arreaga-Bravo faces a particularized risk of torture and that it was “unable to agree” with the IJ’s conclusions. The Third Circuit vacated. Rather than defer to the IJ’s factual findings and review for clear error, the BIA inserted itself into the fact-finder role and disagreed with the IJ’s weighing of the evidence. View "Bravo v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law