Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Pineda-Teruel is a citizen of Honduras, where he owns a coffee farm. He entered the U.S. in 2007, was removed to Honduras in 2017, reentered the U.S. in 2019, and was apprehended at the border. Pineda-Teruel applied for withholding of removal, 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3)(A), and protection under the Convention Against Torture, claiming that the mafia had demanded money from him in Honduras and threatened to kill him but had killed his two cousins who were working at the farm. Pineda-Teruel said that he feared for his life.The IJ denied Pineda-Teruel’s application, finding that he failed to establish past persecution or the likelihood of future persecution if he were to relocate within Honduras and that there was no nexus between Pineda-Teruel’s fear of harm—which was due to the mafia’s belief that he had money from his time in the U.S.—and any claimed status as a member of a statutorily protected social group. The BIA dismissed Pineda-Teruel’s appeal, concluding that his past experiences in Honduras did not rise to the level of past persecution or torture and he had not established a clear probability of torture in the future given that he had successfully relocated within Honduras. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review, noting that Pineda-Teruel claimed that the men who threatened him and killed his cousins were now living in the U.S. View "Pineda-Teruel v. Garland" on Justia Law

Jaco left Honduras fleeing domestic violence. She and her child entered the U.S. in 2016. Although her former partner has not contacted her since she entered the U.S., her mother and a neighbor reported that he is trying to find her and that he wants revenge. In removal proceedings, Jaco applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Her child sought derivative asylum.The IJ denied Jaco’s claims, finding “insufficient evidence . . . indicating the government of Honduras would wish to torture or acquiesce in the torture of” Jaco and that Jaco’s proposed social group—women in Honduras unable to leave their domestic relationships—was not cognizable. The BIA reasoned that “[g]enerally, claims by aliens pertaining to domestic violence perpetrated by non-governmental actors will not qualify for asylum.” On remand, the BIA again dismissed the appeal, refusing to consider new groups proposed by Jaco and noting that Jaco was not married to her former partner, the relationship was not long-lasting, the abuse was not extensive, she moved out of her former partner’s home, and she took her former partner to court and received child support and a protective order. The Fifth Circuit denied a petition for review. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Jaco’s particular social group was not cognizable, and substantial evidence supported its conclusion. View "Jaco v. Garland" on Justia Law

Through a Form I-130, a U.S. citizen can seek to establish that an alien relative is eligible for an immigrant visa, 8 U.S.C. 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) & 1154(a)(1)(A)(i). Relatives residing outside the U.S. must apply for the visa at a U.S. Embassy or Consulate in their country of residence. Angela, a U.S. citizen married to Carlos, a Mexican citizen, filed a Form I-130. Carlos had resided in the U.S. without status for over a year; upon returning to Mexico to apply for a visa he would have been inadmissible for 10 years, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II). Carlos obtained a provisional unlawful presence waiver to return to Mexico. Following an interview, a consular official denied his visa application, alleging that Carlos had sought to obtain an immigration benefit by falsely misrepresenting a material fact, had falsely represented himself to be a U.S. citizen, and had unlawfully resided in the U.S. for over a year. The notice did not cite facts supporting those findings.Angela claimed mistaken identity. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of her suit for failure to state a claim. Consular officials are not required to identify facts underlying a visa denial when the statutory provision of inadmissibility sets out factual predicates. The doctrine of consular non-reviewability bars judicial review of a consular official’s decision regarding a visa application if the reason given is “facially legitimate and bona fide” but does not strip federal courts of their subject matter jurisdiction. View "Del Valle v. Secretary of State, United States Department of State" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the ruling of the district court that there was no per se constitutional entitlement to a bond hearing after six months of detention and otherwise vacated the district court's declaratory and injunctive relief, holding that it was advisory.Petitioners brought this class action on behalf of noncitizen detainees held without possibility of release pending the completion of their removal proceedings. On remand, Petitioners alleged that mandatory detention of the class members under 8 U.S.C. 1226(c) for more than six months violated the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause or the Eighth Amendment excessive Bail Clause. The district court ruled that there was no per se constitutional entitlement to a bond hearing after six months of detention but that the length of time that might constitutionally pass without a bond hearing turned on each noncitizen's individual circumstances. The court then issued declaratory and injunctive relief in favor of all class members. The First Circuit held (1) the district court properly rejected the claim that persons detained for six months under section 1226(c) are automatically entitled to a bond hearing; and (2) the district court improperly granted binding equitable relief. View "Reid v. Donelan" on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated the judgment of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing Appellant's appeal from a decision of an immigration judge (IJ) ordering him removed from the United States, holding that the BIA failed to address Appellant's request to apply equitable tolling in assessing whether her appeal was timely.Appellant, a native and citizen of Jamaica, applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture. The IJ denied Appellant's requests for relief and ordered her removed to Jamaica. In the midst of the newly-announced health emergency occasioned by the COVID-19 pandemic, Appellant missed the deadline to appeal the IJ's removal order. The BIA summarily dismissed Appellant's appeal as untimely. The First Circuit vacated the BIA's order of dismissal, holding that the BIA erred by failing to consider Appellant's request for equitable tolling in deciding whether her appeal was timely. View "James v. Garland" on Justia Law

Jenifer Miladis Alvarado-Diaz and Magdaly Suleydy Perez-Velasquez appealed the district court’s affirmance of their convictions for entering the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1325(a)(1). Alvarado and Perez crossed the U.S.-Mexico border into New Mexico by walking around a fence, miles away from the nearest designated port of entry. Alvarado was stopped by a border patrol agent after she made it about 180 yards past the border, and a border patrol agent saw Perez just as she walked into the country. Each was detained. Alvarado and Perez admitted to the agents that they were nationals of El Salvador and Guatemala, respectively, and had no authorization to enter the country. They contended “enter” was a term of art that required more than a physical intrusion; it also required “freedom from official restraint” and “inspection or intentional evasion of inspection.” The district court affirmed the convictions because, even assuming freedom from official restraint was required for an “entry,” the Defendants were not under official restraint. The defendants argued they were under official restraint because they had been continuously surveilled, but the court noted that continuous surveillance alone did not equate to restraint. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, defendants reiterated arguments made at the district court. The Tenth Circuit rejected these arguments and affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Perez-Velasquez" on Justia Law

In the mid-2000s, Carlos Argenis Figueroa Alatorre was working as a car salesperson when he lost his job. Although he knew his brother-in-law, Luis, was involved in something unsavory, Alatorre began working for him, acting as a lookout and a driver for about two months before the United States Department of Justice closed in on Luis’s drug importation ring, arresting Alatorre along with several others at a border patrol checkpoint. In the wake of the arrest, Alatorre was forthcoming about his involvement. He had already been in jail for a year and a half, awaiting his trial, when he was offered a plea deal that would allow him to be released from custody with credit for time served. So in 2008, at the age of 24, he pleaded guilty to his first and only criminal charge: conspiracy to possess cocaine for sale. Alatorre did not know this conviction would render him immediately deportable. He had come to the United States from Mexico when he was just four years old, and lived here as a permanent resident. In 2011, three years after his plea, he attempted to become a naturalized citizen, which had the unintended consequence of alerting immigration authorities to his criminal conviction. Within a few months, he was deported to Mexico. Alatorre lived in Mexicali after that, taking any available work he could find. Although his children, who are both U.S. citizens, were usually able visit him on the weekends, he was separated from his wife and children, parents, four siblings, and dozens of nieces, nephews, and cousins—all of whom lived in the U.S. In early 2020, Alatorre moved to vacate his conviction, only to have the trial court deny it as untimely based on a finding that he did not exercise “reasonable diligence” to become aware of the existence of the statutory remedy after the law became effective. The question posed by this case was how a petitioner’s “reasonable diligence” should be evaluated when the ripening of an unexpected immigration consequence predates the creation of an avenue of relief. After considering the text, history, and purpose of Penal Code section 1473.7, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s ruling, finding that it applied an incorrect legal standard when it assumed Alatorre was obligated to learn about section 1473.7 starting in January 2017, when the section became effective. As to the merits of his request, the Court found he established prejudicial error within the meaning of section 1473.7, and remanded to the trial court with instructions to issue an order granting the motion. View "California v. Alatorre" on Justia Law

In 2016, Gonzalez was granted deferred action on his removal from the U.S. under the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program (DACA). After his conviction for a misdemeanor in North Carolina, the DHS terminated Gonzalez’s grant of deferred action; he was immediately placed in removal proceedings. During the course of his proceedings before the IJ, DHS restored Gonzalez’s DACA grant of deferred action. Gonzalez asked the IJ to either administratively close his case, terminate the removal proceedings, or grant a continuance based on his mother’s pending application to be a legal permanent resident (LPR). The IJ denied all requests for relief. While the matter was pending in the BIA, Gonzalez’s mother obtained LPR status, and Gonzalez sought remand. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision and denied the motion to remand, reasoning that neither the IJs nor the BIA had the authority to terminate removal proceedings and that administrative closure and a continuance were inappropriate based on the speculative possibility of Gonzalez’s mother earning LPR status.The Fourth Circuit vacated. IJs and the BIA possess the inherent authority to terminate removal proceedings. The BIA improperly denied the request for administrative closure because it failed to address Gonzalez’s specific argument based on his DACA status. View "Gonzalez v. Garland" on Justia Law

In April 2020, the district court entered a preliminary injunction and provisionally certified nationwide subclasses of ICE detainees with risk factors or disabilities placing them at heightened risk of severe illness and death from COVID-19. The court found that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on claims of deliberate indifference to the medical needs of detainees, punitive conditions of confinement, and violation of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794. The preliminary injunction imposed a broad range of obligations on the federal government.The Ninth Circuit reversed, stating that neither the facts nor the law supported a judicial intervention of this magnitude. The plaintiffs did not make a clear showing that ICE acted with deliberate indifference to medical needs or in reckless disregard of health risks. If a particular condition or restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective, it does not, alone, amount to punishment; there was a legitimate governmental objective here, ICE was holding detainees because they were suspected of having violated the immigration laws or were otherwise removable. ICE’s national directives did not create excessive conditions of “punishment.” Rejecting the Rehabilitation Act claim, the court stated that the plaintiffs at most demonstrated that they were subjected to inadequate national policies; they did not show they were treated differently from other detainees “solely by reason” of their disabilities. View "Fraihat v. United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement" on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated the order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) that affirmed the denial of Appellant's application for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), holding that the BIA's affirmance of the immigration judge's (IJ) finding of adverse credibility did not hold up.After a hearing, the IJ issued an oral decision denying Appellant's claims, finding that Appellant was not a credible witness in terms of crucial aspects of his claim and his lack of credibility was ultimately fatal to his argument that he had suffered past persecution. The BIA affirmed. The First Circuit vacated the BIA's order, holding that the BIA's affirmance of the IJ's adverse credibility finding could not be sustained, and therefore, the BIA's rulings could also not be sustained. View "Lopez Troche v. Garland" on Justia Law