Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

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This case involves a dispute between members of Black Gold Enterprises, LLC, a company formed in 2013, including plaintiff Adam Pummill, plaintiff Kurtis Robertson, and defendant Joshua T. Patterson. The source of the dispute was the payment of rent from Patterson's businesses to Black Gold for the use of a property. Patterson eventually stopped paying rent, leading to the involvement of a receiver, James Galipeau, to manage the property.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana considered the appeal by Patterson against the award of fees to the receiver and his attorney from interplead funds held by the Clerk of Court, arguing that the District Court abused its discretion. Patterson also contested the District Court's decision that the lien on the property, arising from a loan agreement between Patterson's business and Black Gold, was invalid.The Supreme Court, applying the Hickey factors to assess the reasonableness of the receiver's fees, found no abuse of discretion by the District Court. The court concluded that the receiver's work in the complex, time-consuming case was essential, and the sale of the property (Black Gold's only asset) was reasonably executed. The court also found that the District Court had the inherent power to distribute interplead funds for services related to the receivership, rejecting Patterson's claim that the dispersal should have waited until a final disposition.Thus, the Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's decisions regarding the award of the receiver and attorney fees and the method of their payment. The court did not address the issue of the validity of the lien on the property. View "Pummill v. Patterson" on Justia Law

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The case centers around the dispute over the requirement for a supermajority vote in the Town of Bar Harbor's amendment to its Land Use Ordinance (LUO) concerning vacation rentals. Erica Brooks and Victoria Smith, both property owners in the town, argued that due to a 2-2 tie vote by the Planning Board on the proposed amendment, a two-thirds majority vote was necessary for the amendment to pass. The amendment, however, was enacted with a 60% majority vote. The Superior Court sided with the Town, asserting that the LUO language did not necessitate a supermajority vote.On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower court's decision but did so on different grounds. The court agreed with the argument put forth by the Maine Municipal Association in an amicus brief, which asserted that irrespective of the LUO's language, under Maine statutes 21-A M.R.S. § 723(4) (2023) and 30-A M.R.S. § 2501 (2023), only a simple majority vote was required for the amendment to take effect, unless the Town's charter provided otherwise, which it did not. Therefore, the court concluded that the amendment was lawfully enacted with a simple majority vote, rendering the Town's supermajority requirement unenforceable. View "Brooks v. Town of Bar Harbor" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court of Maryland has ruled that the term "rent" under Real Property § 8-401, as applied to residential leases, refers to the fixed, periodic payments a tenant is required to make for use or occupancy of a rented premises. This definition excludes additional charges such as late fees, attorney’s fees, and court costs. The court also ruled that any provision in a residential lease that allows a landlord to allocate payments of "rent" to other obligations, thereby subjecting a tenant to eviction proceedings based on failure to pay "rent", violates Real Property § 8-208(d)(2). Further, penalties for late payment of rent, capped at 5% of the monthly amount of rent due, are inclusive of any costs of collection other than court-awarded costs. Finally, the court ruled that the Circuit Court erred in declining to review the merits of the tenants’ second renewed motion for class certification. The case has been remanded for further proceedings in line with these holdings. View "Westminster Management v. Smith" on Justia Law

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The case was a lawsuit filed by Janet and Joseph Harvey against the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Sierra Leone to the United Nations. The Harveys alleged that they were harmed by faulty renovations at the Mission's headquarters, which is located next door to their home in Manhattan. The Mission sought to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The district court, however, denied the Mission's motion to dismiss, holding that two exceptions to the Mission's immunity applied: the commercial activity exception and the tortious activity exception.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The Appeals Court held that the commercial activity exception applied because the Harveys' claims were based upon the Mission's allegedly faulty contractual renovations, which is an activity that a private party can, and often does, do. The court did not need to address the tortious activity exception as the commercial activity exception was sufficient to affirm the district court's decision. The Mission, therefore, was not immune from the lawsuit under the FSIA. View "Harvey v. Permanent Mission of the Republic of Sierra Leone" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court of Louisiana considered whether an architect and contract administrator had duty of care towards an employee of a subcontractor under the terms of a construction contract. The employee, Gustavo Bonilla, had been injured during a demolition job and filed a suit alleging negligence against Verges Rome Architects (VRA) and Morphy Makofsky, Inc. (MMI). VRA had been hired as a consultant for design and contract administration services. The trial court ruled in favor of VRA, but the court of appeal reversed this decision.Upon review, the Supreme Court of Louisiana found that the contract terms were clear and unambiguous, and did not impose a duty on VRA to oversee, supervise, or maintain the construction site or Mr. Bonilla’s safety. VRA was required to make weekly site visits to ensure work was progressing according to specifications. However, the contract specifically stated that these visits should not be construed as supervision of actual construction. Responsibility for site safety and construction methods was allocated to the contractor.The Court concluded that VRA could not be held liable for failing to perform duties it was not contractually obligated to undertake. As a result, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal's decision and reinstated the trial court's judgment, which granted summary judgment in favor of VRA. View "BONILLA VS. VERGES ROME ARCHITECTS" on Justia Law

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In Arizona, condominium unit owners Jie Cao and Haining Xia challenged the forced sale of their unit by their condominium association (the “Association”) following the dissolution of the condominium. The Association, which had been given power to sell under the Arizona Condominium Act, sold the unit to PFP Dorsey Investments, a company that had previously acquired the majority of units in the condominium.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona held that the Arizona Condominium Act, which authorized the sale, did not violate the eminent domain provision of the Arizona Constitution. The court stated that the Act was incorporated into the condominium declaration, to which the owners had agreed. However, the court also held that in these circumstances, the Act required the sale of all property, rather than individual units as occurred in this case.The court noted that the Association's power to sell derived from the condominium declaration that all unit owners had signed. Thus, the Act didn't effect a taking of the owners' property. As such, the forced sale of the owners’ unit alone rather than as part of a sale of all common elements and units of the condominium was impermissible under the Act.The court vacated the court of appeals’ decision and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The court also granted the owners reasonable attorney fees for amounts expended to enforce the Declaration, excluding those attributable to the unsuccessful eminent domain claims. View "CAO v PFP DORSEY" on Justia Law

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In this case, the Supreme Court of North Carolina was asked to consider whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing and remanding the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the defendant, a landlord, in a lawsuit brought by the plaintiff, a tenant. The plaintiff had suffered serious burns in an explosion caused by a gas leak in the rental property. He claimed that the landlord had been negligent, violated the Residential Rental Agreements Act (RRAA), and breached the implied warranty of habitability.The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court’s decision. The Court found that the plaintiff had failed to provide any evidence that he had notified the landlord of the issues with the flooring or the heating system, or that the landlord had any actual knowledge of these issues. Consequently, the landlord's duty under the RRAA had not yet arisen. Therefore, the landlord could not be held liable for negligence, violation of the RRAA, or breach of the implied warranty of habitability.The Court further clarified that the RRAA does not completely abrogate the common law principle of caveat emptor (let the buyer beware) in relation to repairs and dangerous conditions on leased residential premises. The RRAA only imposes a duty on the landlord to make repairs after receiving notice or acquiring actual knowledge of the need for them. Therefore, the Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals on all of the plaintiff's claims, reinstated the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant, and dismissed the matter. View "Terry v. Pub. Serv. Co. of N.C" on Justia Law

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In this case, Charles Crowder bought a property owned by Delores Blevins at a tax sale. After the purchase, Crowder took possession of the property and made improvements. Subsequently, Blevins sought to redeem the property following the statutory procedures. The Jefferson Probate Court granted Blevins's redemption petition and entered a judgment in her favor. Crowder then filed a postjudgment motion to set aside that judgment and a Rule 60(b)(4) motion to vacate the judgment, both of which the probate court denied.In his appeal, Crowder contested the process of service arguing that he had not been properly served with Blevins's redemption petition. He claimed that the signature on the return receipt was not his and that he had moved out of the address where the service was delivered before Blevins filed the redemption petition. However, Crowder both received and sent correspondences to and from the contested address after he claimed to have moved. Moreover, he did not deny that the signature on the return receipt was his at any point during the proceedings in the probate court.The Supreme Court of Alabama dismissed the appeal in part and affirmed the probate court's judgment. It found that Crowder failed to file a timely appeal concerning the probate court's judgment on the merits. Additionally, the court concluded that the probate court's judgment was valid and properly denied Crowder's Rule 60(b)(4) motion. View "Crowder v. Blevins" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court of Alabama ruled in a case concerning a dispute over the amount of ad valorem taxes owed by Indorama Ventures Xylenes & PTA, LLC for the personal property at a petrochemical plant that it owns in Morgan County.The Morgan County Revenue Commissioner assessed Indorama's personal-property value at nearly 1.5 times the amount that Indorama had paid for the plant, which Indorama challenged before the Morgan County Board of Equalization. After the Board affirmed the Commissioner's assessments, Indorama appealed the decisions to the Morgan Circuit Court. The circuit court ruled in favor of Indorama, determining that the fair market value of the property was roughly $150 million less than the Board's appraisal.The Board then appealed to the Supreme Court of Alabama, arguing that the circuit court's valuation was contrary to the evidence and violated Alabama law. However, the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, stating that under Alabama law, the circuit court was entitled to consider "all the evidence," and was not restricted to any particular method of valuation.Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Alabama also affirmed the circuit court's application of the corporate rate to the prejudgment interest on Indorama's overpayment, determining that this was correct under Alabama law. View "Morgan County Board of Equalization v. Indorama Ventures Xylenes & PTA, LLC" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and the District Court in favor of the City of Des Moines, in a case brought by Lime Lounge, LLC. Lime Lounge, a bar, challenged a city ordinance requiring it to obtain a conditional use permit (CUP) to operate. After receiving noise complaints, the City revoked Lime Lounge's CUP, which was upheld in a prior appeal. Lime Lounge then challenged the ordinance arguing it was preempted by Iowa Code, violated equal protection and spot zoning prohibitions. The trial court dismissed Lime Lounge's claims and this decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.The Supreme Court of Iowa found that the city's ordinance was not preempted by state law. Rather, it was a proper exercise of the city's zoning authority and did not create a separate local alcohol license. The Court also rejected Lime Lounge's equal protection claim, holding that the city had a legitimate purpose in imposing a CUP on specific businesses selling alcohol. Finally, the Court dismissed the claim of illegal spot zoning, as Lime Lounge failed to prove that the city had engaged in such activity. The Court thus affirmed the dismissal of Lime Lounge's challenge to the ordinance. View "Lime Lounge, Inc. v. City of Des Moines, Iowa" on Justia Law