Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Felix Sanchez Rodriguez-Heredia, a Mexican national, petitioned the Tenth Circuit to review two decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). One decision, a request for a change in Petitioner's custody status, was dismissed as moot, because Petitioner was deported while waiting for this appeal. The second decision involved the order to remove him from the United States. Petitioner argued that he was not eligible for removal based on his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude because he received nothing "of value" in perpetration of the crime. Specifically, Petitioner argued that a social security number was not like a good or service that constituted something of value that could be taken under Utah state law. Petitioner used another person's social security number in order to gain employment. The BIA found that Petitioner's fraud involved a crime of moral turpitude, and recommended his removal. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found that because the state law required fraudulent intent in all circumstances regardless of whether anything of "value" was obtained, the law categorically described a crime involving moral turpitude. The Court upheld the BIA's order for Petitioner's removal.

Petitioner Francis Efagene petitioned the court for review of a final order issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). Petitioner was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1991. In 2005, Petitioner plead guilty to a sexual misconduct misdemeanor in the State of Colorado, and was sentenced to 364 daysâ imprisonment. Part of his sentence required that he register as a sex offender for a ten year period. Petitioner served his time. In 2007, he failed, however, to meet the registration deadline and was rearrested. He plead guilty to the misdemeanor of failure-to-register as a sex offender and was sentenced to thirty daysâ imprisonment. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) charged Petitioner as âremovableâ for having been convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude. Petitioner challenged his removability status before an Immigration Judge (IJ), arguing that failing to register is not a crime of moral turpitude. The IJ disagreed and ordered Petitioner to be deported. In an unpublished order, the BIA affirmed the IJâs decision and dismissed Petitionerâs appeal. The Tenth Circuit stayed Petitionerâs case and found upon later review that the BIAâs lacked jurisdictional authority to interpret the State of Coloradoâs misdemeanor failure-to-register statute as one involving âmoral turpitude.â The Court reversed the BIAâs decision and vacated Petitionerâs deportation order.

Appellant Jose Santos Vaquera-Juanes was indicted for knowingly attempting to re-enter the United States after having been previously deported. Appellant plead guilty to the charge, and was sentenced to forty-nine months' imprisonment and two years' supervised release. Although he did not raise the issue during sentencing, in this appeal Appellant argues that the lower court erred by imposing supervised release without first making required findings. On appeal, the Circuit Court dismissed Appellant's argument on ripeness grounds, holding that "because [Appellant] has shown no practical possibility he will ever legally be in a position to violate the terms of the condition he challenges, he has failed to show any likelihood his term of supervised release will be revoked because of a violation of the challenged condition⦠even if the [â¦] condition remains part of the criminal judgment, there is no reasonable possibility it will result in [his] re-incarceration⦠he has failed to show he will suffer any hardship."

After the defendant pled guilty to illegal re-entry by a deported alien, 18 U.S.C. 1326(a), the district court sentenced him to 51 months--the top of the sentencing guidelines range. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, noting that the defendant has been apprehended while trying to enter illegally on eight occasions, has been convicted of drug trafficking, and was arrested for domestic violence. The defendant did not challenge the procedural reasonableness of the sentence and a sentence within the guidelines is presumed to be substantively reasonable. The court adequately expressed its reasoning and acted within the law in considering the defendant's criminal history both as criminal history and as a basis for sentence enhancement.