Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Elias Jimenez-Galicia, a native and citizen of El Salvador, sought judicial review of a final order of removal issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"). The BIA's order affirmed an immigration judge's ("IJ") order of removal and denial of Petitioner's request for cancellation of removal. The denial was based on a determination that Petitioner lacked good moral character. Because the Fourth Circuit was not presented with a genuine question of law, the Court lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA's discretionary determination that Petitioner lacked good moral character. Therefore the Court dismissed the petition. View "Jimenez-Galicia v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of China, petitioned for review of the BIA's determination that his motion to reopen should be considered withdrawn because of his departure, relying upon Matter of Armendarez-Mendez. At issue was whether the "departure bar" regulation - stating that the BIA could not entertain a motion to reopen filed by or on behalf of a person who has departed the United States - impermissibly conflicted with the Immigration and Nationality Act's provision permitting an alien to file one motion to reopen, 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(7)(A). The court concluded that the plain language of the statute, the statutory structure, and the amendment scheme all pointed to one conclusion: the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Publ. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-549, guaranteed an alien the right to file one motion to reopen and the departure bar impermissibly undercutted that right. Therefore, the court granted the petition and remanded for further proceedings. View "Lin v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Sudan, petitioned for review of the BIA's final order affirming the IJ's order of removal and denial of petitioner's application for waiver of inadmissibility under section 209(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1159(c). The court held that the IJ and the BIA committed no error in determining that petitioner was a violent or dangerous individual subject to In re Jean's heightened, "extraordinary circumstances" standard for determining whether to grant a discretionary section 209(c) waiver of inadmissibility. The court held, however, that the IJ and the BIA erred by failing to consider evidence of the country conditions in Sudan and the hardship petitioner individually would suffer upon removal to Sudan. Accordingly, the petition was granted in part, denied in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Makir-Marwil v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Peruvian citizen, sought review of the decision of the BIA that he was not eligible for special rule cancellation of removal under Section 240A of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(2). The BIA denied the petition because petitioner failed to show that he was "battered or subjected to extreme cruelty" by his American citizen spouse. The court concluded that the BIA had discretion to make this determination, and therefore lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA's decision that petitioner was not a battered spouse. View "Bedoya-Melendez v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, has lived in the United States since 1972 and in April 2004, he pleaded guilty to, and was sentenced to 96 months imprisonment for, conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine. At issue was whether the district court properly denied his 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion as successive and whether Padilla v. Kentucky announced a retroactively applicable new rule of law. The court held that the district court failed to issue Castro v. United States warnings when it recharacterized petitioner's July 2008 motion as a section 2255 petition. However, the court affirmed the district court on the ground that petitioner's July 2010 petition for post-conviction relief was untimely under section 2255. Accordingly, the court affirmed. View "Figuereo-Sanchez v. United States" on Justia Law

Petitioner and his wife, natives and citizens of China, petitioned for review of the denial of their third motion to reopen removal proceedings. After the Board denied their motion, petitioners had 30 days to file their petition for review in the court but they filed their petition one day late. Petitioners urged the court to rule that their petition was timely because they paid a commercial parcel service to provide overnight delivery 29 days after the Board issued its decision and, but for a delay caused by inclement weather, the petition would have reached the court on the day it was due. The government argued that the Board did not abuse its discretion by denying petitioners' third motion to reopen. Because the court lacked jurisdiction to consider an untimely petition for review and the court was accessible on the day the petition was due, the court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. View "Lin v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of the Ukraine, sought review of a final order of removal issued by the BIA dismissing her appeal of an IJ's ruling denying her application for asylum and withholding of removal, as well as protection under the CAT, based on a finding of adverse credibility. The court concluded that, based on the totality of the circumstances, both the IJ and the BIA weighed the evidence of authenticity and determined that the State Department's Report was more credible than petitioner's testimony and the claims of her family. Their determinations were not based on any single source or inconsistency, but on substantial record evidence. Therefore, the court found no reason to disturb these rulings. The court also concluded that petitioner did not overcome the presumption of regularity afforded to government investigations. Therefore, the court affirmed the BIA's finding that petitioner's right to confidentiality in the asylum application process was not breached. View "Lyashchynska v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitioned for review of the decision of the BIA affirming an order that denied his motion to terminate removal proceedings based on his prior convictions. In 1994, the government first charged petitioner with removeability based on multiple convictions for child molestation and the IJ terminated those proceedings after finding that his convictions did not fall within the INA's definition of "aggravated felony." The government again charged petitioner with removability based on his 1993 convictions after Congress changed the law, codifying an expanded definition of aggravated felony to include "sexual abuse of a minor." The court agreed with the district court and held that res judicata did not bar the current removal proceedings against petitioner because they were based on a ground for removal that did not exist when the prior proceedings were terminated. Accordingly, the petition for review was denied.

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Senegal, petitioned for review of the BIA's final order, which affirmed an IJ's decision to deny her application for withholding of removal. Petitioner claimed that if she returned to Senegal, it was more likely than not that she would be beaten or killed for attempting to protect her U.S. citizen daughter from being subjected to female genital mutilation (FGM). The court granted the petition for review because the BIA failed to give reasoned consideration to petitioner's application when it found that she could relocate within Senegal to avoid persecution. Accordingly, the court vacated the BIA's decision and remanded for further proceedings.

Migrant workers who worked for defendant appealed a summary judgment in favor of defendant and against their complaint that defendant violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (Act), 29 U.S.C. 203(m). At issue was whether an employer that hired migrant farm workers through the H-2A visa program was entitled to wage credits under the Act for housing and meals that federal law required the employer to provide the workers. The court deferred to the Secretary of Labor's interpretation that defendant could not credit the cost of housing in the wages paid to the workers and agreed with defendant that it was entitled to wage credits for the costs of meals for the workers. The court also concluded that defendant was not liable under principles of agency law for the fees that third parties charged the workers related to their efforts to obtain employment with defendant. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.