Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a Peruvian citizen, petitioned for review of the BIA's order affirming the IJ's decision that she was removable, and the IJ's denial of her applications for a waiver of removability and cancellation of removal. The court held that the plain language of 8 U.S.C. 1256(a) did not apply to removal proceedings; substantial evidence supported the IJ's and the BIA's finding that petitioner was removable under INA 212(a)(6)(C)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(C)(i); to the extent an interpreter was not present at the hearings addressing petitioner's applications for waiver of removability and cancellation of removal, petitioner had no cognizable due process interest because those forms of relief were discretionary; petitioner's claim that she was denied a full and fair hearing due to the IJ's purported bias was rejected; the court lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA's discretionary denial of petitioner's application of removability; and the court also lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA's denial of petitioner's application for cancellation of removal under INA 240A, 8 U.S.C. 1229b.

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Cuba and a lawful permanent resident of the United States, petitioned for review of the decision of the BIA affirming the IJ's order of removal rendered on the ground that he was inadmissible to the United States because he was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude due to his conviction for false imprisonment under section 787.02, Florida Statutes. The court held that the BIA and the IJ erred by considering evidence beyond the record of petitioner's false imprisonment conviction to determine that he had been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. The court held, however, that because the BIA and IJ assumed without deciding that the Florida offense of false imprisonment was not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude, the court must remand to the BIA to determine in the first instance whether petitioner's false imprisonment conviction qualified as a conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Therefore, the court granted the petition and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff appealed the district court's judgment dismissing his petition for a writ of mandamus and his complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq. Plaintiff's complaint requested the district court to mandamus the defendants (1) to determine as a matter of law that plaintiff had been "admitted" to the United States for purposes of his application for adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. 1255(a) and (2) to re-open and re-adjudicate plaintiff's application for adjustment of status, which was previously denied. The court held that plaintiff could not satisfy the requirements for mandamus relief and that he had not demonstrated that he lacked an adequate remedy for obtaining relief. In fact, plaintiff had sued under the APA, which provided an adequate remedy. Therefore, the court held that because plaintiff had an adequate remedy available to him, the district court properly dismissed his request for mandamus relief. The court also held that the plain language of section 1255(a) limited eligibility for status adjustment to an alien who had been inspected and admitted or paroled. That an alien with Temporary Protected Status had lawful status as a nonimmigrant for purposes of adjusting his status did not change section 1255(a)'s threshold requirement that he was eligible for adjustment of status only if he was initially inspected and admitted or paroled. Accordingly, the court held that the district court's ruling was consistent with the plain language of the statute. Furthermore, even if the statutory language was ambiguous, the court deferred to the Department of Homeland Security's consistent and well-reasoned interpretation of the interplay between section 1255(a) and section 1254a(f)(4). Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the petition and complaint.

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Venezuela, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision, affirming the IJ's finding that petitioner's testimony was not credible. At issue was whether substantial evidence supported the BIA's decision. The court held that substantial evidence supported the IJ's and the BIA's finding that petitioner's testimony was not credible where the IJ and BIA offered specific and cogent reasons for the finding and where they cited numerous material inconsistencies between petitioner's testimony and the documentary evidence introduced in support of his asylum application. Therefore, the court denied the petition for review.

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitioned for review of the final order of removal issued by the BIA affirming the IJ's finding that he was removable as charged and denying his applications for adjustment of status and post-order voluntary departure. This case involved petitioner's application for adjustment of status to permanent resident under 8 U.S.C. 1255, in which he asserted his entitlement to classification as a child under the Child Status Protection Act (CSPA), Pub. L. No. 107-208, section 1, 116 Stat. 927. The court held that the BIA correctly concluded that petitioner was not entitled to adjustment of status because he did not meet the requirements under the CSPA to maintain his child status. The court also held that the BIA correctly denied petitioner's request for post-order voluntary departure because he did not reside in the United States for one year immediately preceding the delivery date of the notice to appear. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review.

Appellant illegally reentered the United States in 2007 and pled guilty to being an alien found in the United States after having been convicted of aggravated felonies and deported. Appellant challenged the district court's decision to impose a 16-level enhancement to his base level offense score pursuant to U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A), where the district court based the enhancement on its finding that the North Carolina statute under which appellant previously was convicted, N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-202.1, constituted "sexual abuse of a minor" and thus, was a "crime of violence" pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court and held that the Padilla-Reyes v. United States definition of "sexual abuse of a minor" was at least as broad and inclusive as section 14-202.1 and where appellant failed to demonstrate any North Carolina precedent that did not fit within the broad contours of the definition in Padilla-Reyes. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Pakistan, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision upholding the IJ's denial of his request for discretionary relief and order of removal. At issue was whether an attorney rendered ineffective assistance when he conceded, at a second removal hearing, that petitioner had sought to procure an immigration benefit through willful misrepresentation of a material fact in violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(C)(i); 1227(a)(1)(A). The court denied the petition for review and held that substantial evidence supported the finding by the BIA that the attorney's decision to concede removability was a reasonable strategic decision.