Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant arrived in the U.S. in 1985, at age three. He became a lawful permanent resident and submitted an Application for Naturalization (N-400). He orally went through the form at a Citizenship and Immigration Service office. He answered "No" to: "Have you ever committed a crime or offense for which you were not arrested?" and "Have you ever sold or smuggled controlled substances, illegal drugs or narcotics?" His application was recommended and he was notified by N-445 of a mandatory oath ceremony. The N-445 contained questions to confirm that the applicant had maintained good moral character. Defendant again answered "No." He was naturalized in 2006. In fact, he had distributed cocaine 2004-2005, and, between the N-400 interview and the oath ceremony, was arrested for distributing cocaine and amphetamines. After pleading guilty to drug charges, defendant was convicted of making a material false statement to DHS (18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(2)) and unlawfully applying for and obtaining naturalization (18 U.S.C. 1425(b)). The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that admission of form N-445 violated his right to confrontation; that admission of form N-445 under the public records exception to hearsay was error; and that repeated reference to his prior conviction was unfairly prejudicial. View "United States v. Lang" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Guatemalan national, entered the U.S. illegally in 1997. DHS initiated removal about 10 years later, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). She applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture,asserting that if returned to Guatemala, she would face persecution on account of her status as either a single woman with perceived wealth or a former "child of war." The IJ determined that her claim for asylum was time-barred; denied withholding of removal on the ground that she had failed to demonstrate a likelihood of persecution in Guatemala on account of a statutorily protected status; and dismissed her entreaty for CAT relief because she had not shown any governmental involvement in the feared harm. The BIA affirmed. The First Circuit denied review, finding no connection between her claimed fears and the government of Guatemala.

Petitioner entered the U.S. in 1992 without being admitted or paroled and filed an affirmative asylum application, asserting that he had been persecuted and had a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of his political beliefs. He asserted that he was at risk because of his opposition to guerillas who occupied his village during the Salvadoran civil war and that he had been conscripted at gunpoint. Following an unexplained delay, federal authorities initiated removal in 2007. An immigration judge found the petitioner credible but concluded that he failed to substantiate a cognizable claim of past or future persecution, noting peace accords signed between the guerillas and the Salvadoran government in 1991 and the absence of evidence that any remaining guerillas would continue to harbor an interest in the petitioner. The BIA affirmed. The First Circuit denied appeal.

Petitioner, a Brazilian national, entered the U.S. illegally in 2006 and was apprehended by DHS, which initiated removal proceedings, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). Sh conceded removability and sought asylum and other relief, alleging that she had seen two men fleeing from the scene of a neighbor's murder and was subsequently threatened. She indicated that the police in Brazil are corrupt and often allow criminals to kill witnesses. The IJ deemed the evidence insufficient, finding that her fear was unconnected to any statutorily protected ground and that she did not establish that the Brazilian government was either unable or unwilling to protect her. The BIA agreed. The First Circuit denied review. Petitioner chose to premise both her claim of past persecution and her claim of fear of future persecution on her membership in a group that lacks the requisite social visibility.

Petitioner, born in El Salvador, entered the U.S. illegally in 2006. The Department of Homeland Security brought removal proceedings, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). He conceded removability and filed an application for withholding of removal and Convention Against Torture protection, claiming that he would be harmed by criminal gangs, prevalent in El Salvador, whose attempts to recruit him he had resisted and that the gangs would perceive him as wealthy because of his time in the U.S. and therefore subject him to further threats and violence. The IJ held that his fear was genuine, but that there was neither a sufficient likelihood of harm nor was the feared harm directed at a statutorily protected social group. The Board affirmed. The First Circuit denied review.

Petitioner, a citizen of Ukraine, now married to a U.S. citizen, entered the U.S. on a visitor's visa in 1999 and overstayed. An IJ granted voluntary departure by March 8, 2006. A motion to reopen was denied. Petitioner, who claims to have been unaware of the denial, remained in the U.S. and was arrested in 2010. Another motion to reopen was denied and, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1229c(d)(1)(B)3 the IJ imposed an absolute 10-year bar on any adjustment of status. A new attorney filed a third motion to reopen, based on petitioner's reliance on his previous attorney, who was incompetent. The IJ rejected the motion and the BIA affirmed. The First Circuit remanded for consideration of whether the time-bar on motions to reopen may have tolled, based on equitable considerations, and whether petitioner "voluntarily" remained in the U.S. so as to be subject to the 10-year bar.

In 1999 petitioner, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, entered the U.S. without inspection. He married a U.S. citizen in 2001 and obtained conditional resident status 8 U.S.C. 1186a(a)(1). The marriage ended in 2004. He applied for a hardship waiver of the requirement of submitting a joint petition to remove the condition. The IJ determined that the marriage had not been in good faith and ordered removal. The BIA affirmed. The First Circuit denied review. The IJ based the decision on contradictory accounts, by petitioner and his ex-spouse, about the details of the marriage; petitioner placed the marriage at issue and cannot complain that he did not have notice of the issue.

Petitioner, a citizen of Albania, entered the U.S. illegally, on a fraudulent Italian passport, in 2004. Arrested at the airport, he sought asylum. The IJ, BIA, and First Circuit rejected his petitions. While appeal was pending, he sought to reopen removal proceedings and argued that removal had been improperly initiated. On appeal from rejection of the petition, he argued that, because of his limited command of English, he did not understand the Visa Waiver Program form he signed, under which he waived the right to contest removal on any grounds other than asylum. The First Circuit denied review, noting petitioner's delay in asserting his claim and that he never attempted to assert any grounds other than asylum.

In 1991, petitioner, a citizen of Guatemala, was taken into custody by immigration officials while crossing the Rio Grande. He applied for asylum, but did not appear at a hearing. A deportation order issued. In 2001 petitioner sought to reopen and an immigration judge held hearings and found that the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act, 111 Stat. 2193, 2644 did not apply because petitioner was apprehended "at the time of entry." With respect to asylum, the IJ found that petitioner had a well founded fear of future persecution if he returned to Guatemala as "a member of a particular social group composed of family returning to Guatemala after lengthy residence in the United States perceived as wealthy and, therefore, particularly susceptible to extortionate and/or kidnapping demands." The BIA reversed with respect to asylum. The First Circuit denied review.

Petitioner, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, entered the U.S. in 1982 and became a lawful permanent resident. About 10 years later he pled guilty to armed robbery. Later he pled guilty to auto-stripping. Upon his return from a 2003 trip he was denied readmission, then paroled. During removal proceedings petitioner conceded that second-degree robbery was a crime of moral turpitude, but contended that his conviction should be waived under former 8 U.S.C. 1182(c)). The immigration judge rejected the argument, finding that auto-stripping is also a crime of moral turpitude. The BIA affirmed and petitioner was removed. In 2010 petitioner requested that the BIA reopen in light of the 2010 Supreme Court decision, Padilla v. Kentucky. Petitioner claimed ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney did not inform him of the immigration consequences of a guilty plea. The BIA denied the motion. The First Circuit denied appeal. Aliens have a right to move to reopen removal proceedings, 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(7)(A), within 90 days of a final order. The BIA was within its discretion in refusing to waive the limit, given that petitioner made no attempt to have his state law convictions overturned.