Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

In 1996, Congress passed a statute known as the "stop-time rule," which provides that a noncitizen's years of physical presence are cut off when he is served with notice of the commencement of removal proceedings. Petitioner, a national of Columbia, entered the United States without inspection in 1986. In 1987, Petitioner was placed into deportation proceedings. In 2007, Petitioner applied for asylum and withholding of removal. Petitioner applied for suspension of deportation, which required him to show he had accrued seven years of continuous physical presence in the United States since his arrival. Because Petitioner arrived in the United States in 1986, and his proceedings began in 1987, the immigration judge concluded that, under the stop-time rule, Petitioner had not accrued the necessary years of physical presence. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied in part and dismissed in part for lack of jurisdiction Petitioner's petition for review, holding (1) the stop-time rule applied retroactively to Petitioner; and (2) Petitioner's remaining argument was not exhausted before the agency. View "Aguirre v. Holder" on Justia Law

The Immigration and Nationality Act establishes that an individual "who entered the United States as a crewman" after 1964 is ineligible for cancellation of removal. Petitioner, a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic, entered the United States in 1998 on a C-1/D visa. Petitioner remained in the United States and eventually married a United States citizen. Petitioner subsequently applied for an adjustment of status, which was denied. Petitioner was then placed in removal proceedings. Petitioner conceded removability but applied for cancellation of removal. The immigration judge (IJ) found Petitioner ineligible for cancellation of removal because he had last entered the United States as a crewman. The board of immigration appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision, concluding that, even though Petitioner's visa was annotated "C-1" and he had not been employed as a crewman since his arrival, he had entered the United States as a crewman. The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's petition for review, holding that the record supported the BIA's finding that Petitioner entered the United States intending to work as a crewman and pursuing employment as such. View "Guerrero v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Guatemala, entered the United States illegally in 2000. Petitioner later admitted removability but sought cancellation of removal under section 203 of the Nicaraguan and Central American Relief Act (NACARA), alleging that he was a child "battered or subjected to extreme cruelty" by a parent who acquired lawful permanent resident status under the NACARA. An immigration judge found Petitioner was not "battered or subjected to extreme cruelty" and therefore decided Petitioner was not eligible for special rule cancellation of removal under NACARA. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. Because Petitioner did not raise any legal or constitutional issue on appeal, the First Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed Petitioner's petition for review for lack of jurisdiction. View "Castro v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of the People's Republic of China, sought asylum and withholding of removal. The immigration judge (IJ) denied relief and ordered Petitioner removed to China. The board of immigration appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision. About eight years later, Petitioner filed a motion with the BIA to reopen her case, claiming that she had converted to Christianity and that because conditions related to treatment of Christians in China had significantly worsened, she fell within the "changed country conditions" exception to the rule that a motion to reopen must be filed within ninety days of the final administrative decision. The BIA denied the motion. The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's petition for review, holding that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Petitioner did not establish "changed conditions" in China for Christians practicing in unregistered churches. View "Liu v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Guatemala, conceded the charges of removability for entering the United States by fraud and for remaining in the United States beyond the period of his authorized stay. The immigration judge (IJ) denied Petitioner's applications for waivers of inadmissibility relating to fraud and unlawful presence and denied his application for permission to reapply for admission. The IJ then granted voluntary departure. The board of immigration appeals (BIA) dismissed Petitioner's appeal. The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's petition for review, holding (1) the BIA did not err in finding Petitioner was removable due to having gained admission to the United States by fraud; and (2) the Court did not have jurisdiction to consider Petitioner's arguments that the IJ did not properly analyze the facts in denying Petitioner's applications for waivers of inadmissibility and permission to reapply for admission. View "Urizar-Carrascoza v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Pakistan, filed an application for asylum and withholding of removal in which he also sought protection under the Convention Against Torture, alleging he was eligible for relief because he had and would suffer persecution because of his anti-Taliban political opinion and membership in a particular social group. An immigration judge denied Khan's application, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's petition for review, holding that the BIA did not err (1) in concluding that there was no government connection to support a finding of past or future persecution, and (2) in concluding that Petitioner failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution. View "Khan v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of the People's Republic of China, filed an asylum application in 1997. An immigration judge (IJ) denied Petitioner's application. The board of immigration appeals (BIA) dismissed Petitioner's appeal in 2000. In 2012, Petitioner, who allegedly converted to Christianity in 2011, filed a motion with the BIA to reopen proceedings, claiming that, since the time of his hearing in 1998, circumstances surrounding the practice of Christianity had changed insofar as persecution of unregistered Christian groups had increased. The BIA determined that Petitioner had failed to establish changed circumstances in China and so his untimely motion did not qualify for an exception to the statutory deadline for a motion to reopen. The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's petition for review, holding that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in determining that Petitioner failed to demonstrate changed country circumstances, and therefore, it was not an abuse of discretion for the BIA to deny his motion to reopen. View "Zhao-Cheng v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Kenya, married a U.S. citizen in 2002. The couple divorced in 2006. Later, Petitioner Petitioner filed a Form I-751 petition to remove the conditions on his residency. Petitioner did not file the petition with his ex-wife but argued that he was entitled to a removal of the conditions despite his marriage to a U.S. citizen ending in divorce. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services denied the petition. Petitioner was later charged with being removable. Petitioner conceded removability but requested relief in the form of a review of his petition for removal of conditions. The immigration judge (IJ) found that Petitioner had failed to meet his burden of showing that his marriage had been in good faith, therefore concluding that Petitioner's I-751 petition had to be denied. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's petition for review, holding that substantial evidence supported the IJ's decision to deny Petitioner's I-751 petition. View "Kinisu v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of Senegal and a citizen of Guinea, filed an application for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture. The immigration judge (IJ) denied Petitioner's application and ordered him removed to Guinea. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. Petitioner appealed, arguing, among other things, that the IJ and BIA erred in failing to consider whether the threat of forced genital mutilation to his daughters, should they return with him, constituted a threat of direct persecution to him in the form of psychological injury. The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's petition for review, holding (1) substantial evidence supported the determination that Petitioner faced neither past persecution nor a likelihood of future persecution; and (2) Petitioner did not establish that his removal would result in his daughters' accompanying him to Guinea, and Petitioner's theory of direct persecution of him based on the possible risk to his daughters was foreclosed by the BIA, in a reasonable interpretation of the relevant statute, and by circuit precedent. View "Camara v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of China, was placed in removal proceedings. Petitioner sought filed an application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, seeking relief. An immigration judge granted Petitioner's asylum application, finding that Petitioner had a reasonable fear in being subject to, at a minimum, having a forced intrauterine device (IUD) insertion and possibly sterilization in order to prevent her giving birth to future children. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) reversed. The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's petition for review, holding that the BIA did not err in concluding that Petitioner did not face an objectively reasonable risk of having implanted an IUD by Chinese authorities through persecutory means or of suffering persecutory harm if she were to refuse to have an IUD implanted. View "Lin v. Holder" on Justia Law