Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, lawful permanent residents taken into custody based on past convictions, (8 U.S.C. 1182) sought a declaratory judgment that continued detention of putative class members, without bond hearings, violated the Immigration and Nationality Act and the Due Process Clause. The District Court denied class certification and dismissed the class complaint, based on 8 U.S.C. 1252(f)(1), which precludes class actions that seek to "enjoin or restrain the operation of" several immigration statutes. The Third Circuit reversed. The word "restrain" does not encompass classwide declaratory relief.

The Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3)(B)(iv), precludes withholding of removal if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the alien is a danger to the security of the United States. In November 2003, the Government of Uzbekistan requested the extradition of the petitioners, asserting they participated in seeking the forced overthrow of the Republic and the establishment on its territory of a religious extremist Islamic fundamental state. Immigration judges concluded that the extradition request would be given no weight, coming from a government with a history of persecution and torture. On remand from the Third Circuit, the Board of Immigration Appeals found that petitioners are a danger to national security and ineligible for withholding of removal, but granted deferral of removal under the United Nations Convention Against Torture. The Third Circuit held that petitioners are entitled to withholding of removal as a matter of law; the determination that petitioners are a danger to national security was not supported by substantial evidence and there is no question that they will be persecuted and tortured on religious and political grounds if returned.

After pleading guilty to illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. 1326) the defendants challenged their sentences, claiming that their Fifth Amendment rights were violated as a result of the Department of Justice "fast-track" programs that allow a departure from sentencing guidelines in return for a guilty plea and waiver of right of appeal. Such programs have been implemented in several areas, but not in any district within the Third Circuit. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that the program is rationally related to, among others, the goals of allocating prosecutorial resources and enforcing the immigration laws. The sentences imposed on the defendants were reasonable.

The plaintiffs were subjected to raids as part of "Operation Return to Sender," implemented to apprehend fugitive aliens. The complaint included "Bivens" claims: unreasonable home entries, unreasonable searches; unreasonable seizures, all in violation of the Fourth Amendment; a Fourth Amendment claim for excessive force by four individuals; a Fifth Amendment substantive due process claim involving three individuals; and a Fifth Amendment equal protection claim by one individual. The district court denied a motion to dismiss. The Third Circuit reversed on qualified immunity grounds. The plaintiffs did not allege that the defendants, high-level federal Immigration enforcement supervisors, participated in the raids, adopted an unconstitutional policy, or had legally sufficient notice of the unconstitutional conduct of subordinates. They did not identify what defendants should have done differently with respect to training or other matters, that would have prevented the unconstitutional conduct. The plaintiffs may pursue official capacity claims for injunctive relief against any further intimidation or unlawful entry. The court did not address individual capacity claims for damages against the lower-ranking agents

Petitioner, a citizen of Israel, twice overstayed visitors' visas, then sought an adjustment of status based on an employer's approved petition for an alien worker. The application was denied because he refused to submit an affidavit detailing past attempts to enter and because he had been arrested attempting to smuggle another alien into this country. He was deemed inadmissible. His request to cancel removal was denied. The Board of Immigration Appeals and the Third Circuit rejected appeals. Removal may be cancelled if an inadmissible alien shows that he has been physically present in the United States for a continuous period of not less than 10 years immediately preceding the date of application (8 U.S.C. 1229b). The petitioner's presence ended when he was refused readmission in 1999, after a short trip to Canada; his visa was cancelled because of his prior arrest. He signed a withdrawal of application for admission at that time, then obtained a passport under a new name and evaded immigration authorities in returning, indicating his awareness that he would not be allowed to return.

In 1996 the petitioner, an Indian citizen charged as deportable, posted bond and traveled from Texas to Wisconsin. An attorney, hired by his family, had the matter transferred to New Jersey, but later moved to withdraw on the ground that he had not seen or heard from the client. The motion was denied, the petitioner was ordered deported in absentia, and notice was served on the attorney. In 2009 the petitioner's motion to reopen was denied. The Third Circuit denied an appeal, noting that the petitioner was not entitled to actual notice and had contributed to his failure to receive actual notice through his attorney of record.

Petitioner, a Chinese citizen, was charged with fraudulent attempt to enter the United States under a false identity in 2002 and sought asylum to avoid removal. The Bureau of Immigration Appeals (BIA) rejected the petition, but reopened after the petitioner gave birth to two daughters in the United States. On remand, the immigration judge heard contradictory testimony and denied the petition, concluding that the Chinese government does not sterilize or fine citizens who give birth to two or more children abroad. The BIA rejected an appeal, concluding that the petitioner was not entitled to asylum under the 2005 REAL ID Act, 8 U.S.C. 1158(b). The Third Circuit denied review, holding that the decision was supported by substantial evidence. The BIA's error in conducting de novo review was harmless.

Petitioner, a Palestinian citizen, overstayed his visitor's visa, and was denied asylum in September 2003. In May 2004 he married a U.S. citizen and moved his residence. In December 2004 the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) gave him 30 days to leave voluntarily. The petitioner learned of the decision in February 2005, and, in March attended an interview about his marriage, obtained a visa, and submitted a motion to reopen to the BIA. The BIA rejected the motion and held that he was barred from adjusting his status. In June the petitioner received an order to report for removal and hired a new attorney. In May 2007 Immigrations and Customs officials arrested the petitioner, who was released under supervision. The BIA rejected a second motion to reopen, filed in August 2009, as time-barred. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim of equitable tolling. The petitioner claimed ineffective assistance by his first attorney, but his second attorney, against whom he did not make such a claim, did not file a motion to reopen. There was no evidence to support an allegation that the attorney was relying on a promise by the Department of Homeland Security to file a joint motion.

In 2007 the Board of Immigration Appeals denied a petition for asylum and to withhold removal brought by an Albanian citizen who had entered the United States illegally. In 2009 the BIA declined to reopen the case to consider a claim for asylum based on health care concerns. The Third Circuit remanded for clarification. The BIA acted within its discretion in finding the motion untimely. There is no time limit on a motion to reopen if conditions in the home country have changed, but there was insufficient proof of such a change in this case. The BIA retained discretion to reopen the case sua sponte. While noting that the BIA's discretion on a sua sponte motion is "essentially complete," the court stated that it may point out a possible misperception of the law. Economic disadvantage is not a "serious harm" that would justify reopening the case, but unavailability of needed health care could qualify in some circumstances.