Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a native and citizen of the Republic of Angola, sought review of an order by the BIA denying his petition to obtain relief from removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1182. The BIA denied petitioner asylum and withholding of removal under the INA because he was a member of, and provided material support to, a terrorist organization. The court held that the BIA did not err in deeming petitioner statutorily ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal under the INA's Material Support Bar. Therefore, the court denied the petition for review. View "de Almeida Viegas v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitioned for review of a decision of the BIA affirming an IJ's grant of a motion by the DHS to pretermit his applications for adjustment of immigration status and for a waiver pursuant to Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) section 212(h). The court held that the district court erred in finding petitioner barred under section 212(h) from obtaining a waiver of inadmissibility and granted the petition for review. View "Leiba v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of India, petitioned for review of the BIA's order affirming the IJ's decision that petitioner failed to establish a clear probability of persecution on return to India on the basis of his political opinion and thus was not entitled to withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1231, and withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court concluded that substantial evidence in the record supported the determination that petitioner was not entitled to withholding of removal under the INA. Further, because substantial evidence supported the conclusion that petitioner was not more likely than not to face torture if removed to India, the court concluded that the IJ and the Board did not err in finding petitioner ineligible for withholding of removal under the CAT. Finally, petitioner failed to establish that his due process rights were violated by having an incompetent interpreter that provided inadequate translation. View "Singh v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner Jose Barahona, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitioned the Fourth Circuit for review of the final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (the "BIA") which affirmed his ineligibility for a "special rule" cancellation of removal under section 203 of the Nicaraguan and Central American Relief Act of 1997 (the "NACARA"). Petitioner contended that the BIA erred by deeming him ineligible for NACARA relief because he had provided material support to a terrorist organization in the early 1980s by allowing anti-government Salvadoran guerrillas of the so-called "FMLN" (the Frente Farabundo Marti para la Libercion Nacional) the use of the kitchen of his Salvadoran home. Upon review, the Court rejected Petitioner's contentions and denied his petition for review. View "Barahona v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Mirna Del Carmen Gomez, a citizen of El Salvador, pled guilty to unlawful reentry of a deported alien after an aggravated felony conviction. Although she agreed with the statement of facts submitted by the government in support of her guilty plea, Defendant objected to the government's assertion that her prior conviction for child abuse under Maryland law amounted to a crime of violence for purposes of the U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) sentencing enhancement. According to Defendant, because the relevant portion of the statute did not contain a division between forceful and nonforceful conduct, the district court could not use the modified categorical approach to determine that her prior child abuse conviction was a crime of violence. The district court employed the modified categorical approach to determine that Defendant's child abuse conviction constituted a crime of violence and added sixteen levels to her base offense level. Thereafter, the district court calculated her Guidelines range to be forty-one to fifty-one months, but made a downward variance and sentenced her to twenty-four months' imprisonment. Because the Fourth Circuit found that the district court's application of the modified categorical approach to the indivisible provision at issue was in error, it vacated Defendant's sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Gomez" on Justia Law

Appellant Temitope Akinsade appealed a district court's denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, claiming that he was denied effective assistance of counsel when he plead guilty to embezzlement by a bank employee. Appellant is a Nigerian citizen who legally came to America in July 1988 at the age of seven and became a lawful permanent resident in May 2000. During his employment, Appellant cashed checks for several neighborhood acquaintances, who were not listed as payees on the checks, and deposited a portion of the proceeds from those checks into his own account. When interviewed by the FBI several months later, Appellant agreed to cooperate against the individuals for whom he cashed the checks. In early 2000, Appellant was charged with embezzlement by a bank employee. Relying on his attorney's advice that one count of embezzlement was not a deportable offense, Appellant pled guilty. The plea agreement made no mention that deportation was mandatory or even possible due to the offense. The district court sentenced Appellant to one month of imprisonment to be served in community confinement, a three-year term of supervised release, and a special assessment of $100. At sentencing, the district court recognized that Appellant's conduct was "out of character" based on his family background. The court thus gave Appellant the minimum sentence under the sentencing guidelines. Almost nine years after Appellant's conviction, immigration authorities arrested him at home and placed him in detention in Batavia, New York. After seventeen months in detention, the immigration authorities released Appellant and charged him with removability as an aggravated felon. The court held that while counsel's affirmative misrepresentations rendered his assistance constitutionally deficient under the first prong of "Strickland v. Washington," (466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)), Appellant was not prejudiced as required under Strickland's second prong. It reasoned that its admonishment of the potential for deportation during the plea colloquy cured counsel's affirmative misrepresentations. The issue before the Fourth Circuit was whether counsel's misadvice was an error of the "most fundamental character" such that coram nobis relief is required to "achieve justice." Upon review, the Court found that counsel's affirmative misrepresentations that the crime at issue was non-deportable prejudiced Akinsade. Accordingly, the Court granted the petition for writ of error coram nobis and vacated Appellant's conviction. View "United States v. Akinsade" on Justia Law

After pleading guilty to illegal reentry, Defendant Francisco Bonilla received an enhanced sentence based on a prior Texas conviction for burglary of a habitation. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred in applying the enhancement because his state conviction under Texas Penal Code section 30.02(a)(3) did not satisfy the definition of generic burglary under "Taylor v. United States," (495 U.S. 575 (1990)). Upon review, the Fourth Circuit disagreed and affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Bonilla" on Justia Law

Defendant, a citizen of Somalia, was convicted of unlawful wounding and grand larceny. 8 U.S.C. 1226(c) required the mandatory federal detention, without the possibility of bond, of certain deportable criminal aliens "when" those aliens were released from other custody. At issue was whether, as the district court held, defendant, a deportable criminal alien who was not immediately taken into federal custody upon his release from other custody, was exempt from section 1226(c)'s mandatory detention provision and therefore was entitled to a bond hearing. The court held that the BIA's interpretation of section 1226(c) in In re Rojas was reasonable, and must be afforded deference. Moreover, the Government's supposed failure to comply with a statutory immediacy requirement - when the statute did not specify a consequence for such noncompliance - did not bestow a windfall upon criminal aliens. Therefore, defendant remained subject to mandatory detention. View "Hosh v. Lucero" on Justia Law

Based on petitioner's conviction for an aggravated felony, the United States sought to remove him. The IJ denied petitioner's statutorily eligibility for a waiver of inadmissibility and the BIA affirmed, concluding that petitioner's post-entry adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident constituted an "admission" to the United States. Because the court found that the plain language of section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(h), did not bar an alien who adjusted post-entry to lawful permanent resident status from seeking a waiver of inadmissibility, the court granted the petition, vacated the order of removal, and remanded the case to the BIA for further proceedings. View "Bracamontes v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of falsely representing himself to be a U.S. citizen in violation of 18 U.S.C. 911 and of committing identity theft in relation to a false claim of U.S. citizenship in violation of 19 U.S.C. 1028A. At issue was what could constitute a claim of citizenship under section 911. The court held that the "cumulative context" provided a substantial foundation for the jury's conclusion of willful misrepresentation and the jury's verdict was consistent with decisions in other circuits that required a direct claim of U.S. citizenship to sustain a conviction under section 911. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Castillo-Pena" on Justia Law