Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his convictions for willfully and knowingly making a false statement on a passport application after he prepared, signed, and submitted passport applications for his three stepsons and listed himself as the children's father. The court held that the district court did not err in concluding that the Bronston literal truth defense did not entitle defendant to judgment as a matter of law; in the context of an application for a United States passport, the word "father" was not fundamentally ambiguous; the evidence was sufficient to find that defendant understood the inquiry made by the passport application as the Government itself did and answered the question posed falsely; and the district court did not err in refusing to give defendant's proposed instruction regarding the lack of statutory definition of the word "father." Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Defendant sought relief from a sentence of 240 months in prison, imposed as a result of his illegal reentry into the United States after being removed for a conviction of an aggravated felony. On appeal, defendant raised several procedural challenges to the sentence. The court held that the sentencing court committed no procedural error because the Guidelines did not expressly prohibit the triple counting of defendant's prior record; the court did not impermissibly count defendant's extensive criminal record when it imposed the upward variance justified under the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors; the district court's upward departures were not procedurally defective; and the 240 month sentence was substantively reasonable. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Plaintiff's application for naturalization was denied by USCIS when USCIS determined that plaintiff's 2002 conviction in the District of Columbia Superior Court for distribution of cocaine in a drug-free zone qualified as an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1101, which prevented plaintiff from establishing his good moral character and thus obtaining citizenship. Plaintiff contended that because his 2002 conviction was set aside under D.C. law, it had no operative effect and USCIS should not have considered it. The court held that plaintiff's conviction remained unchanged for immigration purposes despite the fact that the conviction was set aside on rehabilitative grounds. Because plaintiff's conviction was an absolute bar on obtaining citizenship, his naturalization application was properly denied.

Petitioner, a native of El Salvador who had been granted LPR status, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision to dismiss his appeal from an IJ's decision classifying him as an alien subject to removal under section 237(a)(2)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). The order of removal was based upon the IJ's determination that petitioner previously had been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Because the court concluded that the moral turpitude provision of the INA was not ambiguous and did not contain any gap requiring agency clarification, the court held that the procedural framework established in Matter of Silva-Trevino was not an authorized exercise of the Attorney General's authority. Accordingly, the court granted the petition and vacated the BIA's decision and the order providing for petitioner's removal.

Ghana-born Petitioner James Turkson asked an immigration judge (IJ) to defer his removal from the United States because he believed that he would be tortured if returned to his native Ghana. The IJ ruled that Petitioner would likely face torture in Ghana, and therefore deferred his removal. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appealed the IJ's ruling. On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals reviewed all aspects of the IJ's decision, but erred in its review of the IJ's factual findings: the BIA reviewed the case under the de novo standard of review instead of under the "clearly erroneous standard" prescribed by its governing regulations. The Fourth Circuit therefore granted Petitioner's petition for review, vacated the BIA's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Honduras, petitioned for review of the BIA's order affirming the denial of his claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT. The court held that the BIA's conclusion that petitioner's proposed social group of young Honduran males who refuse to join MS-13 (Mara Salvatrucha gang), have notified the police of MS-13's harassment tactics, and have an identifiable tormentor within the gang did not qualify as a particular social group was not manifestly contrary to the law or an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review with respect to the asylum and withholding of removal claims. However, the court granted the petition for review with respect to petitioner's CAT claim, vacating the BIA's final order, and remanding for further proceedings for additional investigation and explanation as the court had outlined.

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Cameroon, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision to affirm the IJ's denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Petitioner asserted that the BIA erred in making an adverse credibility determination and, even if it did not so err, independent evidence existed to establish past persecution. The court upheld the adverse credibility determination as supported by substantial evidence and agreed with the BIA that petitioner failed to provide sufficient independent evidence establishing past persecution. Accordingly, the petition was denied.

Petitioner, a native and citizen of the Republic of China, petitioned for review of an order of the BIA, which upheld the denial of petitioner's application for adjustment of status and dismissed her appeal from the IJ's decision, finding that the IJ failed to provide petitioner "with the required advisals." The BIA remanded petitioner's case to the IJ in order for the IJ to grant a new period of voluntary departure and to provide the required advisals. Petitioner timely appealed. The government urged the court to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The court concluded that it had jurisdiction, but nonetheless declined to exercise that jurisdiction for prudential reasons, following the approach employed by the First and Sixth Circuits in similar circumstances. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition without prejudice to petitioner's right to seek review at a later time.

Defendant appealed his conviction for illegal reentry after deportation. Defendant argued that during the time it took an officer to call the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), he was subjected to an unconstitutional seizure because calling ICE unlawfully prolonged the routine traffic stop. Thus, defendant appealed the district court's denial of his motion to suppress his fingerprints, which were obtained when he was later transported to an ICE office and questioned. Because the court concluded, under the totality of the circumstances, that the officer's call to ICE did not unreasonably prolong the seizure, the court affirmed the judgment.

Petitioner, a native and citizen of the Republic of Cameroon, petitioned for review of the BIA's order affirming the denial of her claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court concluded that the IJ committed multiple legal errors where the IJ erroneously (1) applied the rules of evidence; (2) suggested that corroborative evidence required further corroboration; and (3) discredited documents as unauthenticated under the immigration regulations without providing petitioner an opportunity to authenticate them by other means and without otherwise providing sound, cogent reasons for rejecting them. The IJ's factual findings were not supported by substantial evidence, but by inaccurate perceptions of the record or by speculation and assumption. The court held that the BIA erred in failing to recognize the IJ's multiple errors concerning important aspects of petitioner's claims, rendering the BIA Order manifestly contrary to law and an abuse of discretion. The court granted the petition for review, vacated the BIA Order, and remanded for further proceedings.