Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Ward, a 50-year-old man from the United Kingdom, obtained lawful-permanent-resident status in 1995. Ward left the U.S. in 2003 to take care of his mother, who suffered from dementia. When he returned in 2006, Ward presented an expired green card and was charged as subject to removal under 8 U.S.C.A. 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). The government asserted that Ward had abandoned permanent resident status.” At a hearing, the government called Ward to testify, but called no other witnesses. Ward testified in his behalf and his brother also testified. Both sides also introduced documentary evidence. The Immigration Judge held that removability had been sustained by the requisite clear and convincing evidence. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Sixth Circuit vacated, holding that the Immigration Judge erred in applying the wrong degree of proof and in assigning the burden of proof to the immigrant. View "Ward v. Holder" on Justia Law

In 2006, Shearson, the executive director of the Cleveland chapter of the Council on American-Islamic Relations, was stopped by U.S. Customs and Borders Protection as she and her daughter were returning from Canada, removed her from her car, handcuffed her, and detained her for about 2-1/2 hours. Shearson claims that an officer swiped her passport and an “armed and dangerous” warning came up. After being allowed to enter the U.S., Shearson filed a request under the Freedom of Information Act for documents related to her detention. Following a suit, she obtained documents indicating that her name returned “an Armed and Dangerous” designation in Customs’ terrorist database and was a positive match to the FBI’s Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File. The FBI declined to discuss the matter and recommended that Shearson use an administrative remedy, the Department of Homeland Security’s Traveler Redress Inquiry Program, 49 U.S.C. 44926. Shearson did not seek redress through that Program, but filed suit claiming due process, First Amendment, Privacy Act, Administrative Procedures Act, and equal protection violations. The district court dismissed, based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Shearson v. Holder" on Justia Law

Ramos, a citizen of El Salvador, entered the U.S. without inspection or authorization in 2009, at the age of 14. In removal proceedings, he sought asylum and withholding of removal, claiming that, in El Salvador, members of a gang had begun attempting to recruit him when he was 11 years old and had threatened to beat him if he refused to join. Neither Ramos nor acquaintances, having refused to join, were physically harmed by gang members. A member of the gang was arrested for the murder of a neighbor child who had stolen gang property. An Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals found that Ramos had not established membership in a particular social group protected under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The Sixth Circuit denied review, noting that the social visibility of a particular social group refers to whether those with the relevant shared characteristic are perceived as a group by society, rather than whether the group’s individual members are visually recognizable “on-sight.” View "Umana-Ramos v. Holder" on Justia Law

Shweika applied for naturalization in 2004. Three years passed without review. Shweika obtained a writ, compelling USCIS to complete review by May 30, 2008. On May 29, 2008, USCIS denied the application because Shweika failed to provide certified copies of expungement documents to meet his burden to establish good moral character. Shweika sought a hearing. Although regulations require that USCIS schedule a hearing within 180 days of a timely request, 10 months passed. Shweika returned to the district court, which found that mandamus was unnecessary, but did not dismiss. The immigration officer conducted a de novo review, contrary to Shweika’s expectations, asking about a conviction from 1992, and allegations by Shweika’s ex-wife suggesting domestic violence. Shweika’s attorney asked to stop the hearing because the inquiry exceeded the scope of appeal; the officer refused. On advice of counsel, Shwika left. USCIS denied Shweika’s application on the record before it. Although noting that USCIS equivocated over whether denial was on the merits or for failure to prosecute, the district court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit vacated, reasoning that that the 8 U.S.C. 1421(c) hearing requirement is nonjurisdictional, but that Shweika was not free to disregard the requirement, if he did so. View "Shweika v. Dep't of Homeland Sec." on Justia Law

Suazo is a Honduran immigrant. He entered the U.S. without inspection in 1998. He has been in the U.S. continuously since that time. In 1999, Suazo was granted Temporary Protected Status (TPS) due to his Honduran citizenship. His TPS designation has been continuously renewed due to his continued good moral character, but could potentially be discontinued anytime without notice. In 2010, Suazo married Stacey, who filed an Immediate Relative I-130 Petition on behalf of her husband. Suazo filed an accompanying I-485 Application for Adjustment of Status form, seeking to become a Lawful Permanent Resident (8 U.S.C. 1255). The Suazos had an interview with immigration officials. Stacey’s petition was approved, providing an independent basis to become an LPR. Suazo’s LPR Application, however, was denied because he entered without inspection. The district court dismissed their petition, deferring to the government’s interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101–1537. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, stating that it was “disturbed by the Government’s incessant and injudicious opposition in cases like this, where the only purpose seems to be a general policy of opposition for the sake of opposition.” View "Flores v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs." on Justia Law

German law requires all children to attend public or state-approved private schools. The Romeikes, parents of five young children, feared that the public school curriculum would influence their children against Christian values” and chose to home-school. The government imposed fines for each unexcused absence. Once, police went to the Romeikes’ house and escorted the children to school. The next time, four adults and seven children from the Romeikes’ home-schooling support group intervened, and the police, reluctant to use force, left the premises without the children. The family traveled to the U.S. to seek asylum under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(42)(A), which applies to those who have a “well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” The Board of Immigration Appeals found that German authorities have not singled out the Romeikes in particular or home-schoolers in general for persecution and denied their petition. The district court and Seventh Circuit upheld the decision. The German law does not on its face single out any protected group, and the Romeikes did not provide sufficient evidence to show that the law’s application turns on prohibited classifications or animus based on any prohibited ground. View "Romeike v. Holder" on Justia Law

Sejdini and his family are from the former Yugoslavia. In 1987, Sejdini, then less than a year old, entered the U.S., traveling with his mother by boat from Canada. In 1999, the government placed Sejdini in removal proceedings. In 2003, an immigration judge granted Sejdini a special-rule cancellation of removal under section 203 of the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act, which in 1997 had amended the Immigration and Nationality Act. In 2010, Sejdini was convicted in Michigan state court for possession of Vicodin and ecstasy, for which he received a prison sentence of 18 months to 10 years. The government began removal proceedings; Sejdini applied for cancellation of removal under section 240A(a) of the INA, but the immigration judge barred him, from applying for this relief because he had already received cancellation of removal under the Nicaraguan Act. The BIA affirmed. The Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review, concluding that cancellation of removal under the Nicaraguan Act is cancellation of removal under section 240A of the INA. View "Sejdini v. Holder" on Justia Law

In 2004, Yeremin, a Russian citizen who lawfully entered the U.S. in 1999, pleaded guilty (18 U.S.C. 1028(f)) to conspiracy to traffic in identification documents. Section 1028(a)(3) prohibits knowingly possessing with intent to use unlawfully or transfer unlawfully five or more identification documents or false identification documents. The Department of Homeland Security initiated proceedings and an immigration judge ordered removal, finding that Yeremin’s conviction was for an offense qualifying as a crime involving moral turpitude. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review. Under the categorical approach, Yeremin’s conviction qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude because the conduct prohibited by the statute he was convicted under inherently involves deceit. View "Yeremin v. Holder" on Justia Law

When her car was stopped, Villega, then pregnant, failed to produce a valid driver’s license. At the jail, an agent of the U.S. through Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s 287(g) program, 8 U.S.C. 1357(g), determined that Villega was not lawfully in the U.S. A detainer was imposed, so that federal immigration officials would delay action until resolution of pending state charges. Unable to post bond, she was classified as a medium-security inmate because of the detainer and held for two days, until she informed a guard that she was about to have her baby. For transportation, Villega was placed on a stretcher with her wrists handcuffed in front of her body and her legs restrained together. At the hospital, the handcuffs were removed, but one of Villega’s legs remained shackled to the stretcher before and after the birth. In her suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court granted summary judgment on her shackling and denial-of-breast-pump claims; a jury awarded $200,000. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, noting material factual disputes surrounding whether Villega was shown to be a flight risk, whether officers had any knowledge about a doctor’s no-restraint order, and the conflicting expert testimony about the ill effects of shackling. View "Villegas v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cty." on Justia Law

Yeremin, a Russian citizen, lawfully entered the U.S. in 1999; in 2004, he pled guilty to violation of 18 U.S.C. 1028(f), for conspiracy to traffic in fraudulent identification documents in violation based on “unauthorized transfer or use of any means of identification unlawfully to produce or obtain any other means of identification, and … possession of 5 or more means of identification that unlawfully were produced from, or obtained by the use of, another means of identification. Yeremin was sentenced to five months of imprisonment followed by two years of supervised release. n 2005, DHS initiated removal proceedings, under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), which allows removal of aliens convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years of admission to the U.S., if the crime is punishable by at least one year in prison, and second under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). An IJ rejected an argument that his conviction did not involve moral turpitude, because he did not plead guilty to an offense which necessarily involved fraudulent or deceptive conduct. The BIA affirmed. The Sixth Circuit denied review, applying the “categorical approach” because the conduct prohibited by the statute he was convicted under inherently involves deceit. View "Yeremin v. Holder" on Justia Law